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Abstract
The following thesis is an attempt to explore the historian William Robertson's
contribution to the history of political discourse on the international order. It presents
Robertson's two great works of international history, The History of the Reign of the
Emperor Charles V and The History ofAmerica as interventions in the debate over
Great Britain's global policy in the aftermath of British victory in the Seven Years War.
Robertson's oeuvre is further explored as a pioneering synthesis of contemporary Scottish
theory on the progress of society and the narrative conventions of civil history. It offers
a series of contexts in relation to which Robertson's ambitious historiographical project
may be situated: the 'reason of state' historiography of the late seventeenth-
century and its critics, as well as the international dimension of the historiography of
David Hume. The text of Charles V employed a narrative of the progress of society in
Europe to contextualise the rise of a European states system that structurally precluded the
possibility of universal monarchy. The History ofAmerica situated a narrative of conquest
and settlement alongside philosophical digressions on the savage state and the psychology
of the conquerors, and in so doing, provided a study of imperial governance as well as a
critique of the colonial policy practiced in common by European powers. It is argued that
Robertson's work, taken as a whole, constitutes not only a profound meditation on statecraft,
but also an innovative attempt to construct a new universal history. The thesis argues that
enlightened philosophical history as practiced by Robertson, for all its formal innovation and
conceptual sophistication, did not break with the humanistic understanding of history as
instruction, as well as entertainment, for the statesmen of the day.
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On June 10. 1777, the world's most famous living historian received a short,
congratulatory note from a friend in Parliament. William Robertson had recently
published his third work. The History ofAmerica, and had sent a complimentary copy to
the House of Commons' most celebrated rhetorician, Edmund Burke. Burke had been
rather tardy in acknowledgment, but tried to make amends with a variation on the theme
of fulsome praise to which the author had long since become accustomed, and no doubt
expected. Robertson had yet again rendered an old, tired tale fresh and exciting, but for
Burke, Robertson's tale of exploration, conquest, and savage manners was no mere
entertainment. 'You have, besides,' Burke extolled, 'thrown quite a new light on the
present state of the Spanish provinces, and furnished both materials and hints for a
rational theory of what may be expected from them in future.' With the sardonic aside
that if more politicians had read such history, the 'present civil war' might have been
averted, Burke paused to wonder that France and Spain had yet to throw themselves into
the conflict. Following further praise of another aspect of the work, its perceptiveness in
relating manners to the progress of society, Burke closed his letter with a valedictory if
rather world-weary send off. 'Adieu, Sir, continue to instruct the world; and whilst we
carry on a poor unequal conflict with the passions and prejudices of our day, perhaps with
no better weapons than other passions and prejudices of our own, convey wisdom at our
expense to future generations.'1
Obvious celebrity value aside, the letter is worth our attention for the light it sheds
on how Robertson was read by one of his most enthusiastic and perceptive readers.
1
quoted in D. Stewart, 'Account of the Life and Writings of Dr. William Robertson,' Miscellaneous
Works and Commentaries, in Works, p. 155.
1
Above all. Burke was keenly aware just how topical, how precisely situated these works
were within the political debates and political realities of their day. Robertson, with one
eye to theory and another to the coffee house, knew how to select his topics. However
brilliantly Robertson may have combined, to the appreciation of commentators from
Dugald Stewart onwards, the role of the narrative historian with that of the philosopher,
his synthetic approach underscored, rather than diminished, the prescriptive aspect of his
works. The point is worth underscoring, as much of the most eye catching of recent work
on the history of historiography has sought to underplay the prescriptive or the 'merely
political' in favour of emphasising the 'constructed' literary nature of historical texts.
Much of this has been entirely salutary in its effect. Contemporaries highlighted
Robertson's 'artful arrangement,' not only of different strands of neo-classical narrative,
-l
but also of radically different genres of narrative, as among his greatest achievements.
This was a formidable literary achievement, but it was above all a humanist achievement
with a traditionally humanist prescriptive purpose. Robertson, alone amongst the
historians of the Scottish Enlightenment, successfully integrated the new 'science of man'
in all its complexity with neo-classical narrative history. In its nuts and bolts, this new
Scottish science of man was a re-tooling and development of the conceptual categories of
seventeenth century natural jurisprudence for a newly polite and commercial world
preoccupied with questions about the nature of improvement.4 Robertson deployed the
2 The point of departure for all such attempts is H. White, Metahistory, (Baltimore, 1973). The
most recent, most nuanced, and arguably most persuasive attempt to understand eighteenth-century
historiography in such terms is M. S. Phillips, Society and Sentiment: Genres ofhistorical
writing in Britain 1740-1800 (Princeton, 2000). The phrase'merely political'is Phillip's.
3 N. K. Hargraves, The Language of Character and the Nature ofevents in the Historical Writings of
William Robertson, (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1999), particularly chapters 1 and 5;
Phillips, Society and Sentiment, pp. 89-91.
4 The literature detailing this transformation is voluminous, and this listing is by no means exhaustive.
But see D. Forbes, 'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John Millar, Cambridge Journal, 7
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apparatus of natural jurisprudence in his historical writings to elucidate problems that
arose from his central theme: the relationship between improvement and war. This was
not incidental, as the new questions thrown up by early modern warfare had served as the
impetus for the development of modern jurisprudence and had arguably always been that
genre's overriding preoccupation.3 Robertson was to employ the idiom to answer two
parallel questions, how the military capacity among the states of Europe had attained near
parity by the sixteenth century, and how at that same period the military capacity of
Europeans and American Indians had proved to be tragically unequal.
The trajectory of Robertson's oeuvre tellingly flagged his intellectual interests.
His History ofScotland (1759), a highly accomplished but in many ways apprentice
work, situated the arrested development of the rule of law and domestic balance of power
between crown and nobility in Scotland within the normative framework of the progress
of the rule of law in Europe. His first mature work, The History of the Reign of the
Emperor Charles V (1769), told the story of how the modern international state system, -
i.e. the adoption of a balance of power between states - came into being through jealous
emulation of a would-be hegemon. This work was itself prefaced by a celebrated View of
the Progress ofSociety in Europe, a discourse upon how the resolution of an internal
balance of power rendered concerted state action possible. The History ofAmerica
(1953-4), pp. 643-670; idem, Hume's Philosophical Politics, (Cambridge, 1975); idem, 'Sceptical
Whiggism, Commerce, and Liberty'in Essays on Adam Smith, (Oxford, 1976) pp. 179-201; K.
Haakonssen, The Science ofa Legislator (Cambridge, 1981); Natural Law andMoral Philosophy:
from Grotius to the Scottish Englightenment (Cambridge, 1996); I. Hont and M. Ignatieff (eds)
Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping ofPolitical Economy In the Scottish Englightenment (Cambridge,
1981); I. Hont, 'The language of sociability and commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the theoretical
foundations of the 'Four- Stages Theory' in Anthony Pagden, (ed) The Languages ofPolitical
Theory in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 1987) pp. 253-276; H. Medick, Naturzustand und
naturgeschichte der biirgerlichen Gesellschaft: die Urspriinge der biirgerlichen Sozialtheorie als
Geschichtsphilosophie und Sozialwissenschaft bei Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, und Adam Smith
(Gottingen, 1973) and P. Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story ofan Idea (Cambridge, 1980).
5 R. Tuck, The Rights ofWar and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order (Oxford,
1999).
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(1777), his flawed masterpiece, thrillingly combined a narrative of brutal conquest with
an analysis of savage manners, and told the story of how an empire for expansion slowly
and painfully transformed itself into an empire for preservation at peace with its
neighbours. Robertson's final work. An Historical Disquisition Concerning Ancient India
(1791), an appendix to a map and more a pendant to than a summation of a literary
career, nevertheless revealed how concerned he was to the end to exert some influence
over the manner in which Britain treated the indigenous people over whom she claimed
imperium. Robertson, for all his considerable innovation, retained a very traditional
notion of 'the dignity of history', both in terms of the subject's proper subject matter, and
of its importance in public life. Central to the interpretation offered below is that
Robertson's choice of subject matter was powerfully informed by the novel nature of the
challenges Britain faced in conducting her foreign policy in a period of intense
international competition. Robertson worried, no less than his compatriots Hume and
Smith, that an antiquated understanding of the operations of the international order had
led Britain into a series of costly and unnecessary wars with her rival France. In his two
principal works on the international order, The History of the Reign of the Emperor
Charles V and The History ofAmerica, Robertson would provide a philosophical history
of the development of the balance of power in Europe and of the flawed commercial
empires in the Americas to subvert the assumptions underpinning eighteenth-century
conflict. A correct understanding of the balance of power and of commercial empire
properly pursued would render conflicts such as the Seven Years War redundant. These
were works, to employ the contemporary cliche, as much for instruction as for
amusement, aimed as much at instructing statesmen and moving opinion among the
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chattering classes as diverting a wider reading public. Robertson yielded to no man in his
predilection for the didactic.6
While a comprehensive survey of Robertsonian historiography is beyond the
scope of the present short introduction, a brief discussion as to why these central aspects
of Robertson's oeuvre have been relatively neglected requires comment. The most
salient factor is that interest in Robertson as an historian has always lagged behind that of
his contemporaries Voltaire, Hume and Gibbon. For the better part of the twentieth
century, interest in Robertson's works was confined to historians of sociology, who
emphasised his contribution to the social theory of the Enlightenment at the expense of
the totality of his historical writing.7 As historical interest in the Scottish Enlightenment
developed later in the century, emphasis was placed on Robertson's role within the
o
history of Moderatism, somewhat to the detriment of his role as an historian.
Furthermore, studies of the political thought of the Scottish Enlightenment have tended to
focus on the nature of Scottish endorsement of the Revolution of 1688 and the Union of
1707 as manifestations of 'North-Britishness', and have tended to neglect Scottish
thought on the international order.9 Colin Kidd's work in particular has greatly enhanced
our understanding of Robertson's attitude towards his Scottish past, but this was not a
6 Which is to say that, pace David Womersley, Robertson's histories were as exemplary as any. They
were, perhaps, more exemplary as regard to processes and policy than to individuals, however. For
an opposing view, see D. Womersely, The Historical Writings of William Robertson' Journal of the
History of Ideas, 47 (1986) pp. 497-506; Hargraves, The Language of Character.
1 R. Pascal, 'Property and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth-Century' Modern
Quarterly, 2 (1938), pp. 167-179; G. Bryson, Man and Society: The Scottish Enquiry of the
Eighteenth- Century (Princeton, 1945); E. A. Hoebel, 'William Robertson: An Eighteenth-Century
Anthropologist- Historian,' American Anthropologist, 62 (1960) pp. 648-655; R. L. Meek, Social
Science and the Ignoble Savage, (Cambridge, 1976).
81. D. L. Clark, 'Moderatism and the Moderate Party in the Church of Scotland 1752-1805,' (PhD
thesis, University of Cambridge, 1963); and classically, R. Sher, Church and University in the
Scottish Enlightenment, the Moderate Literati ofEdinburgh, (Edinburgh, 1985).
9
The state of the art of this approach is C. Kidd, Subverting Scotland's Past: Scottish Whig Historians
and the Creation ofan Anglo-British Identity 1689-C.I830 (Cambridge, 1993).
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theme pertinent to Robertson's later works. This is not to say, of course, that the
international dimension of Robertson's thought has been entirely ignored; Karen O'Brien
has provided a suggestive reading of his works in the context of eighteenth-century
cosmopolitanism, and J. G. A. Pocock has recently offered an equally suggestive reading
of his narration of 'the Christian millennium' so illuminating to Edward Gibbon.10 Nor
can it be said that war has been a neglected theme in the historiography of political
thought, but such studies have tended to focus on the challenge of standing armies and
public credit to republican values." The relationship between the themes of war, balance
of power and empire has yet to be systematically pursued in Robertson's thought.
Particular explanation should be provided as to why the recent emergence of two
highly accomplished doctoral dissertations on Robertson nonetheless leave room for
further exploration of his writings. Drawing on the work of Mark Salber Phillips, Neil
Hargraves is particularly sensitive to the literary and constructed nature of the historian's
work, emphasising their status as narratives and persuasively arguing for the centrality of
a language of character in Robertson's writings. Hargraves is thus particularly successful
in directing attention to Robertson's exploration of the psychology of his protagonists,
especially when dealing with the text of Charles V. It may be argued, however, that
focusing so squarely on the literary aspect of Robertson's humanist conception of history
10 Karen O'Brien Narratives ofEnlightenment: Cosmopolitan historyfrom Voltaire to Hume
(Cambridge, 1997); J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Enlightenment: Narratives ofCivil Government
(Cambridge, 1999).
" On this see particularly, J. Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh,
1985), and I. Hont, 'The Rhapsody of Public Debt: David Hume and Voluntary State Bankrupcy,' in
N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner, (eds.) Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, (Cambridge,
1993), pp. 321-348.
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has resulted in a largely internalist reading that leaves undiscussed the historian's equally
12
important prescriptive concerns and the contexts from which they emerged.
Recent work by Alexander Du Toit on Robertson's Presbyterian inheritance and
treatment of empire promise to nicely supplement Hargraves' close reading of the texts.
Extrapolating from David Allen's insight that enlightened historiography owed much to
the heroic example of the sixteenth century-humanists, Du Toit has advanced the thesis
that this inheritance informed Robertson's defensive Scottish patriotism and hostility to
empire. Unfortunately, while Du Toit brings an impressive erudition to bear on his
subject, his approach is not as historically sensitive as one would hope. In maintaining
that Scots viewed the world exclusively through the lens of a proud tradition of resisting
the English and thus to a man rejected empire and all its works, Du Toit seems to suggest
that the Scottish political mind froze in amber around the year 1348. He is on firmer
ground when stressing Robertson's Presbyeterian antipathy to the Roman church, but, in
neglecting the fact that this criticism was strictly political and not theological, Du Toit
misrepresents the preoccupations and objectives of the Moderate party. Room remains
for a more historically minded contextualist reading of Robertson's history of the
international order.
Chapter one will outline the development of the notion of the balance of power in
European discourse, with particular attention both to the historical nature of that
discourse and to its relationship to humanist historiography. While discussion of the
balance of power first came to prominence with Guicciardini's History of Italy, it evolved
most fruitfully in parallel with the doctrine of state interest as applied to questions of war
and peace. A brief treatise by the Duke of Rohan on the interest of the various states of
12
see note 3 above.
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Europe developed into a new genre of historical composition in the hands of the
seventeenth-century German jurist Samuel Pufendorf. Particular attention will be paid to
the confessional nature of Pufendorf's understanding of state interest and his advocacy of
balance of power politics in the defence of the Protestant religion. The efficacy of the
balance of power as a means of preserving peace came under renewed scrutiny in the
aftermath of the devastation wrecked upon France in the aftermath of the wars of Louis
XIV. The chapter will thus move on to consider contributions to the discussion of state
interest and the balance of power of two of Louis' most penetrating critics, the
Archbishop Fenelon and the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. Both of these authors advanced the
argument to discuss the effects of the balance on commercial prosperity. The chapter
concludes with the assimilation of 'interest of states historiography' within the Whig
discourse of eighteenth-century Britain in the writings of John Campbell.
Chapters two and three will present two types of Scottish context with which
Robertson's texts engaged. The first was the unique challenge posed to Whig
Presbyterianism by David Hume's The History ofEngland. Chapter two will address an
important but comparatively neglected aspect of Hume's text, his narration and
assessment of English foreign policy measured against its success in maintaining the
European balance. Hume's treatment of European conflict was informed firstly by his
sceptical understanding of the interplay of religious passions with notions of interest and
secondly by his view of the arrested development of the understanding of commerce on
the part of statesmen. His treatment of the pathology of priestcraft and the key role it
played in the near dissolution of political society at the end of the sixteenth century was a
gauntlet thrown down to any who would defend the benign role of the first estate in
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public life. It will be argued, however, that Hume's assimilation of his own insights
remained incomplete, and that the great sceptic was never so vulgarly Whiggish as in his
narration of the Manichean nature of Anglo-French rivalry.
Chapter three will introduce Robertson's first efforts as a man of letters within
their local contexts. It will suggest how in general his understanding of human
sociability and the international order were informed by his youthful encounters with
stoic philosophy, and how his specific views on church government were formed in the
wake of a new wave of evangelisation within the Kirk he viewed as a dangerous
enthusiasm. Robertson's only published sermon. The Situation of the World at the Time
ofChrist will be presented as a response not only to the aftermath of the '45 rebellion but
also to the difficulties faced by the Scottish Society for the Propagation of Christian
Knowledge in the New World. It will further be suggested that the sermon served as a
blueprint for the historical theodicy Robertson developed in all his later writings.
Chapters four and five will take on the two works that together form Robertson's
grand narrative of the rise of the modern international order, The History of the Reign of
the Emperor Charles V, and The History ofAmerica. Both works will be presented
through the lens that they were written in time of war by an historian who understood the
dignity of history fulfilled by its humanist function to provide instruction to statesmen.
Robertson's decision to follow his History ofScotland with an account of the reign of
Charles V will be presented as in part a desire to intervene in the controversy surrounding
Lord Bute's controversial peace of 1763 that ended Britain's involvement in the Seven
Years War. The traditional legitimating discourse for British participation in that conflict
was yet again the urgent necessity to maintain the balance of power in the face of French
9
military and commercial aggression that amounted to a renewed bid for universal
monarchy. In addressing himself to the reign of the first modern aspirant to universal
monarchy, Charles V, Robertson thus went to the heart of the Whig version of European
history and the Whig understanding of Britain's providential role within the European
state system. This chapter will take the unusual step of presenting the text of Charles V
as it was written, two lengthy volumes of intricate narration of war and diplomacy,
followed by a weighty historical narrative of how the progress of civilisation by the early
sixteenth century had resulted in a balance of military forces. The narrative section of
Charles V will be presented as preoccupied with contrasting models of statecraft: Charles
himself representing the new diplomacy of reason of state, his rival Francis I representing
a traditional diplomacy based upon honour. Key to thwarting Charles' ambitions was the
capacity of rival statesmen, such as Maurice of Saxony, to jealously emulate his methods
to achieve their own ends. Normally seen as an introduction, the View of the Progress of
Society in Europe will instead be presented as Robertson's ad hoc attempt to integrate his
narrative of personal jealousy and emulation with a more philosophical account of how
that effective emulation was practicable. An important lesson Charles V offered to its
various audiences was that lasting conquest or the establishment of universal monarchy
was no longer structurally possible in a Europe of balanced capacities.
Chapter five will focus on Robertson's most ambitious narrative, The History of
America. It will be argued that as the American history was originally conceived as
forming a part of his Charles V, its themes were similarly shaped by Britain's
involvement in the Seven Years War and its aftermath. Most pertinent to Robertson's
discussion was how commercial empire had become entangled with what Elume
10
described as jealousy of trade. The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of the
history of Scottish imperial aspirations, centring on the thought of William Paterson. The
chapter will go on to present Raynal's History of the Two Indies as a provocative but
highly suggestive account of how empire could be conceived and narrated in its totality.
Robertson's own history will be presented in turn as meditation on the possibilities of
prudent statecraft in a novel and bewildering context, and of the failure of the Spanish to
deal prudently with a people they did not understand. Robertson was to make clear that
the result of this tragic incomprehension was war, genocide and exploitation. The
celebrated Book IV will be presented not as a generic exercise in the natural history of
man, but as a focused response to the problem that the nature of the savage posed both for
Spanish history and for his own narrative. Robertson's narration of the conquests of
Mexico and Peru will be presented as variations on this disturbing theme, with particular
emphasis on how a superstitious lust for gold had led to utter corruption of morals. The
chapter will conclude with Robertson's discussion of the principles of Spanish
colonisation, and with the historian's recommendations for how European empire might
still fulfil its providential purpose.
The conclusion will present a speculative sketch of Robertson's macronarrative of
the progress of civilisation extending throughout the world. It will further suggest that
this macronarrative contained the seeds of a new model for universal history as the
history of contact between peoples. Such a universal history was both providential and
discreetly post-millennial in its implications.
11
Chapter One: The History of the balance ofEurope
Part one: The interest of states
The balance of power was a central term of political discourse in the early modern period,
yet its history has still to be fully incorporated into the history of political thought. As
suggested in the introduction, this lacuna has had the effect of obscuring a major theme of
Robertson's historical writings. Standard histories of international relations have
identified an Italian versus a German conception of the international order, one 'realist'
and deriving from the idiom of reason of state and the other 'Grotian' and deriving from
the idiom of ius gentium.' Modern intellectual history, distinguishing between a
language of classical republicanism and a language of natural jurisprudence, has
reinforced the metaphor of a set of parallel tunnels. While the balance of power has been
seen to emerge from within the Italian model and to resist incorporation into a rule based
approach, the following chapter will seek to complicate this story somewhat. Discourse
on the balance of power was occasioned by war, and accordingly this discourse was in
practice impossible to disentangle from the evolving web of political, religious, and
eventually economic concerns over which those wars were fought.
The concept of the balance of power entered English political discourse with the
1578 translation of Francesco Guicciardini's History ofItaly. In the interpretation of
Felix Gilbert, Guicciardini's historical sense was powerfully informed by the slow
realisation of the disastrous consequences of Charles VIII of France's invasion in 1494.
The invasion had signified the moment in which Italian history could no longer be written
' This literature is too voluminous to cite in full, but perhaps the most influential example has been
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study ofOrder in World Politics (London, 1977).
2 The most explicit statement of this is in J. G. A. Pocock, 'Virtue, Rights and Manners: A model for
historians of political thought', in idem, Virtue, Commerce, and History, Essays on Political Thought
and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1985), pp 37-50.
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in terms of the liberty of cities and the purposeful actions necessary to maintain it.
Instead. Italy had become a pawn in the contest between the great northern powers,
brought about by the shortsightedness of statesman who could only see through the lens
of personal ambition. This underscored that the liberty of the great cities would always
depend on the system of alliances between them, and that Italian history could only be
written as the history of that alliance system. Written in his twilight years,
Guicciardini's History of Italy was a tragic tale of a pre-lapsarian state of peace and
security repeatedly ruptured and increasingly difficult to recreate." What Gilbert did not
emphasise was that this peace and security had rested for Guicciardini upon a stable
balance of forces between the great cities of Italy, a balance that had been the settled
political reality prior to the French invasion. Guicciardini's prudent prince had
recognised this state of affairs and had directed his foreign policy towards maintaining
the equilibrium. He presented the Neopolitan king Ferdinando as a model prince,
attentive to preserving the balance. Ferdinando had recognised that the greatest threat to
Italian equilibrium was the commercial strength and military aggression of the Venetian
republic, 'which at that Time alarmed all of Italy.' Ferdinando had joined with Milan and
Florence into a defensive league designed to check Venetian ambitions.4 Paradoxically,
Guicciardini held that a state of perpetual fear and anxiety led directly to the maintenance
of international peace:
3 Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence
(London, 1965), pp. 253-255, 285-287.
4 'The chief Design of the contracting Parties was to keep down the Power of the Venetians; who were
without question superior to any of the Confederates separately, but not able to cope with them when
united. Their Senate seemed to consider themselves, and acted as a Body, that had little or no
connection with the other people of Italy, widening every breach, and cherishing and fomenting
Discord amongst them, in hopes of attaining, by these Means, the Sovereignty of Italy.' F.
Guicciardini, The History of Italy, from the year 1490, to 1532, translated by the Chevalier A. P.
Goddard (London, 1755), pp. 8-9.
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Their Envy and Emulation of each other made them watchful of every Motion,
and jealous of every Measure, that they conceived might in any way increase the
Power or Credit of their Neighbours. This Precaution, however, did not make the
Peace less secure: On the contrary, it created a most ardent Impatience in them all
to quench immediately those Sparks which, if neglected, might break out into a
general conflagration. Such then was the State of Affairs; these were the Foundations
for the Tranquillity of Italy; so connected, and counterpoised, that where was any
Appearance of a present Change, but the most discerning Person could not devise,
by what Counsels, Accidents, or Powers, such a peace could be disturbed.'5
If for Guicciardini, the power politics of the sixteenth-century northern powers had
unleashed a series of tragically missed opportunities for Italy to secure peace and
prosperity, within English 'imperial' discourse, these developments had heralded a new
dawn. In the eyes of her contemporaries, Queen Elizabeth, having resolved a generation
of bitter religious faction with the Religious Settlement of 1558, had removed the barriers
to a more active foreign policy. Geffray Fenton, in the dedication of his translation
sought to portray Elizabeth as the guardian of the international order.
I may with good comelinesse resemble the gratious reigne of your Maiestie touching
these regions of Christendome, to the happy time and dayes of Ceasar Augustus
Emperor of Rome: who, after a long and generall combination and harranging of the
whole worlde with blood and warres, did so reforme and reduce the Regions confining
his Empire, that with the Sceptre and seale of peace he much more prevayled than ever
he could have with the sword: By his clemencie he brought to submission his
neighbours that strode out agaynst him, and by his constancie helde them assured being
once reconciled: His wisdom seemed an Oracle to Nations about him to dispose of their
counsels and swaigh their enterprises: And touching quarrels or controversies of state,
eyther for his gratitude and injustice, the only arbitration and resolution was referred to him,
or at least for the awe that was had of him, the factions dunst not burst out to further limits
then he liked of. Lately, it was an approved Monarchic of God, for that Christ the sonne
of God amid such an universal malice of man and mankinde, was contended to shew
himself in fleshe in the days of his reign.6
Fenton's parallel of Elizabeth and Augustus had millennial significance. According to
Orosius, the first Christian writer of universal history who Fenton was invoking, Christ
had appeared during the reign of Augustus only after the Emperor had put an end to the
5 Ibid., p. 10.
6 G. Fenton, 'Epistle Didicatorie' in F. Guicciardini, The History ofGuicciardin, Contending the
Warres of Italie and Other Parties, Continuedfor many years under sundry Kings and Princes,
together with the variations and accidents of the same devided into twenty books, (London, 1579).
dedication unpaginated.
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Civil Wars and established a newly pacific international order under his protection.7 This
vision of Millenial monarchy owed a debt to the parallel rhetoric of the imperial
o
apologists of Charles V, yet with a crucial difference. The apologists of Charles V had
presented his reign as fulfilling the prophesies of Daniel through establishing a universal
monarchy, while Fenton hinted that Elizabeth would do so through her pacific control of
the scales of Europe, as she had placed in her hands 'the balance of power and iustice, to
poiyze and counterpoyze' the other states of Europe.
The theme of Guicciardini's History received far greater prominence through its
mention in an essay by Francis Bacon. Bacon was a friend and admirer of the Italian
Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, Alberico Gentilli, whose juridical works had codified
the practices of Italian ragione di stato at their most brutal.9 In his 'On Empire' Bacon
provided his own brief overview of the duties of the sovereign.
First, for their neighbours, there can be no general rule be given (the occasions
are so variable), save one which ever holdeth -which is, that princes do keep due
sentinel, that none of their neighbours do overgrow so (by increase of territory,
by embracing of trade, by approaches, or the like), as they become more able to
annoy them than they were; and this is generally the work of standing councils
to foresee and to hinder it. During that triumvirate of kings, King Henry VIII.
of England, Francis I., king of France, and Charles V., emperor, there was such
a watch kept that none of the three could win a palm of ground, but the other
two would straightways balance it, either by confederation, or, if need were, by
a war, and would not in any wise take up peace at interest; and the like was done
by that league (which Guicciardine saith was the security of Italy), made between
Ferdinando, king of Naples, Lorenzius Medices, and Ludovicus Sforsa, potentates
the one of Florence, the other of Milan. Neither is the opinion of some of the
schoolmen to be received, that a war cannot justly be made, but upon a precedent
injury or provocation; for there is no question but a just fear of an imminent danger,
though there be no blow given, is a lawful cause of war.10
7 J. G. A. Pocock Barbarism and Religion: The First Decline and Fall (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 85-86.
8 F. Yates, Astrea. The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1975); J. Robertson 'Empire
and Union: two concepts of the early modern international order' in Robertson (ed) A Union for
Empire, Political Thought and the Union of 1707, p. 11.
9 R. Tuck, The Rights ofWar and Peace: Political Thought and the International Orderform Grotius
to Kant (Oxford, 1999), pp. 16-17.
10 F. Bacon, 'Of Empire' in Essays (London, 1857), pp. 185-186.
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For Bacon, the duty to maintain the balance of power was a directive to war. The
passage betrays something of the humanist's contempt for traditional scholastic
condemnations of the legitimacy of a pre-emptive strike." The practical implication, in
Bacon's mind, of the sovereign's duty to maintain the European balance was for
12
Elizabeth to wage war on an over-mighty Spain. His discussion was to have a
resonance beyond informing his own official counsel; its effect was to link the
achievement of early sixteenth-century statecraft with the beginning of the modern age as
13
marked by the appearance of the compass, the needle, and gunpowder. This
juxtaposition was to exert a powerful influence over Robertson's own historical thought.
The moderated form in which the balance of power came into its own within
historiography was through the doctrine of state interest. As Albert Hirschman has
shown, the concept of 'interest' had emerged in the study of government as a middle way
between reasoned conduct in accordance with the common good and erratic action
dictated by the selfish passions.14 As it implied calculation and prudence, advocacy of
governance in accordance with state interest served to moderate the more brutal forms of
reason of state.15 The founding work in what developed into the genre of 'interest of
states history' was A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States ofChristendome
(1638) by the Huguenot statesman and general, the Duke of Rohan, and dedicated to
Cardinal Richelieu. (Ironically, Rohan had previously fought in the Huguenot uprising
11 Tuck presents the 'humanists are from Mars, Scholastics are from Venus' argument quite forcefully.
The Rights ofWar and Peace, chapters 1 and 2.
12 Ibid., p. 19.
13 F. Bacon, The New Organum, book I. aphorism no. 129 (Oxford, 1855)
14 A. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Arguments for Capitalism (London, 1975) pp. 31-54.
15 N. O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment
(Princeton, 1980), pp. 153-154.
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Richelieu had effectively suppressed.)'6 In his preface. Rohan began with the arresting
phrase, 'The PRINCES command the People. & the Interest commands the Princes.'17
Hence, the ability of a prince to correctly determine state interest was coterminous with
that state's preservation. Rohan held that the interests of certain states were dictated by
the logic of expansion, others by the logic of preservation. The changing fortunes of
states in pursuance of these goals meant that state interest itself altered with the passage
of time. Exploring state interest was thus primarily a task for modern history. Rohan did
not offer his assessment of state interest for the benefit of the statesmen or sovereign of
the individual state in question, but rather for those with which they engaged. The utility
of Rohan's endeavour assumed a sort of rational choice theory; as interest ruled princes,
their movements were therefore predictable: to know their interests would be to know
their actions.
The salient aspect of the international order as Rohan perceived it was its division
into two rival blocs, that of France and that of Habsburg Spain. The desire of Spain was
to realise a universal monarchy, the aim of France was to prevent this. The remainder of
the states of Europe lined up with the one, or the other, as it suited their interest. Rohan
did not employ the term balance of power, yet he did hold that in nearly every case it
would interest states to side with France against Spain to prevent universal monarchy.
Rohan noted that Elizabeth had best understood England's interest, and had
provided an exemplary model of state interest correctly pursued. First, she had
effectively suppressed faction, having realised that 'England is a mighty Animal, which
16 Friedrich Meinecke, Machiavellism: The Doctrine ofRaison d'Etat and Its Place in Modern
History, translated by Douglas Scott with an introduction by Werner Stark, New Brunswick, NJ,
1998.
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can never dye except it kill itself.' She had then embraced the reformed faith as a
method of lessening Spanish influence, having fully understood the benefits of
maintaining hostilities with that kingdom. These advantages included having thwarted
Spanish ambitions in the Indies, increasing England's wealth thereby, and in having
perpetuated the martial vigour of her subjects. Rohan held that the Elizabethan legacy
had set a model to her successor, that 'he ought thoroughly to acquire the advancement of
the Protestant Religion, even with as much zeale as the King of Spaine appears
Protectour of the Catholick.'19 Rohan's analysis would have been well received by those
Englishmen who understood their realm as having a providential role in defending the
Protestant religion, and who understood Elizabeth's Stuart successors to have signally
failed in this capacity. They would have been comforted by the fact that their zeal had
the backing of cold reason of state. Supporters of both king and Parliament seized upon
Henry Hunt's 1640 translation of Rohan, and as the seventeenth century progressed, the
20
notion of 'interest' had come to dominate English political discourse.
The example of 'interest of state historiography' that enjoyed the greatest success
both in England, and in Europe generally was Samuel Pufendorf's Introduction to the
History of the Principal Kingdoms ofEurope (1682). As with Rohan, the study of
interest was for Pufendorf reducible to the study of a state's relationship to the European
balance. The timing of the English translation of Pufendorf's Introduction, and the
success of its reception, was due in no small part to the timeliness of its theme. The
German emigre physician, Jodocus Crull, published his translation in 1698, following the
18 Ibid., p. 55.
19 Ibid., p. 59.
20 J. A. W. Gunn, '"Interest Will Not Lie": A Seventeenth-Century Political Maxim', Journal of the
History of Ideas, 29 (1968), pp. 551-564.
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cessation of William Ill's war against Louis XIV's France waged to preserve the balance
and liberties of Europe. A large part of the work's success was due to the international
renown its author had earned as a natural law theorist. Installed in university curricula
throughout Protestant Europe, Pufendorf's writings, and particularly his doctrine of
sociability, were viewed as offering a sound theoretical defence against the perceived
atheistic and absolutist theories of Thomas Hobbes. Yet if Pufendorf's translation found
itself as a foot soldier in William's wars against Louis, the original work emerged from
quite another context. Recent scholarship has portrayed Pufendorf's oeuvre as an attempt
to develop an ethical and political philosophy required by the newly 'desacralised states'
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of the new Germany created by the Treaty ofWestphalia. In his juridical works,
Pufendorf thus abetted this deconfessionalisation of the state by sharply severing the type
22of natural jurisprudence he offered from natural theology. Yet those very aspects of
Pufendorf's work that recommended it to an English audience in time of war, namely its
robustly sectarian defence of a European balance to thwart popish universal monarchy,
would seem to fit uncomfortably within such an overall project. Furthermore, the
imperative to maintain the balance of power was a doctrine of reason of state, as it often
recommended pre-emptive war of a type difficult to reconcile with scholastic just war
theory.
Yet while the idioms of natural jurisprudence and reason of state might seem
antithetical, the one concerned with the codification of ethical norms and the other with
the breach of such norms in the name of necessity, the conflict was more apparent than
real. Reason of state did not enjoy a greater coherence in German discourse than it had
21 I. Hunter, Rival Enlightenments (Cambridge, 2001), p. 148; J. Tully, 'Introduction, S. Pufendorf, On
the Duty ofMan and Citizen According to Natural Law (Cambridge, 1991) pp. xiv -xxi.
221. Hunter, Rival Englightenments, pp. 149-151; J. Tully, 'Introduction,' xxi -xxiv.
anywhere else."1 The idiom had been introduced into Germany early in the seventeenth
century, but reached the peak of its influence in the years surrounding the Thirty Years
War. In the pioneering writings of Arnold Clapmar, reason of state emerged within the
dominant Aristotelian discourse of its day as an attempt to subordinate jurisprudence to
politics, and it developed as a method of practical adjudication between the rival schools
of the monarchomachs and of the divine right theorists. In its German dialect, reason of
state addressed such local issues as the doctrine's applicability to the constitution of the
Empire and as an arbiter between contrasting confessional understandings of the common
good.24 It is noteworthy that the apparently mutually hostile idioms of natural
jurisprudence and reason of state both shared a common feature: the reorientation of
political discourse away from the citizen towards the rights and duties of the sovereign.
Richard Tuck has gone further, arguing that the Protestant and neo-stoic natural
jurisprudence that took its bearings from Hugo Grotius could itself be seen as a
movement within reason of state discourse by rendering self preservation a first
25
principle. Through collapsing the moral distinction between individuals in the state of
nature and states within the international realm, Grotius had provided a doctrine that
permitted sovereigns remarkable latitude in their relations with other states. The effect of
this, Tuck has argued, was to provide theoretical justification for Dutch imperialism at its
most nakedly aggressive26 Even for those theorists who would distance themselves from
some of Grotius' more controversial positions, such as a natural right to punish in the
23 H. Hopfl has argued that 'reason of state,' had no coherence as a body of thought and only ever
served as a useful phantom menace for more orthodox opponents. See his 'Orthodoxy and reason of
state', The History ofPolitical Thought, 23 (2002), pp. 211-237.
24 H. Dreitzel 'Reason of state and the crisis of political aristotelianism: an essay on the development of
17th century political philosophy', History ofEuropean Ideas, 28 (2002), pp. 3-4
25 R. Tuck, The Rights ofWar and Peace, p. 6.
26 Ibid., pp. 78-108.
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international arena, reason of state was sufficiently unencumbered theoretically, or at
least encumbered in a sufficiently diverse manner, to allow itself to be absorbed within a
juridical idiom in the assessment of the actions of sovereigns. In Pufendorf's case, the
rapprochement hung upon the definition of interest.
Ironically. Pufendorf. unlike Grotius, freely employed the idiom of state interest
in assessing the proper conduct of princes while entertaining a more generally pacific
understanding of the international order than had the Dutch jurist. Pufendorf, with his
avant garde metaphysics of 'moral entities,' extended Grotius' parallel between the state
of nature and the international order by describing the individual as a 'simple' and the
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state as a 'compound' moral entity. Yet in his juridical works, Pufendorf argued that if
one understood the state of nature as less red in tooth and claw than Grotius or Hobbes
had done, one emerged with a different model of the potential for relations between
states. Alfred Dalfour has argued that it was no contradiction for Pufendorf to argue that
sovereigns had a duty to pursue reason of state, so long as that sovereign understood the
public good to be his first duty and that the dictates of reason of state he pursued were
conformable to right reason. From such a perspective, the ius naturcile and the ius
gentium informed by reason of state were one and the same, as no promise made to a
28
foreigner could possibly trump the duty of a sovereign to his people.
Pufendorf's reputation as an historian in the latter half of the eighteenth century
suffered somewhat on account of the damning criticism of Voltaire. In the preface of the
second volume of his Esscii sur les meurs, Voltaire contrasted his own brand of polite,
27 Pufendorf described the state as 'a compound moral person, whose will, intertwined and united by
the pacts of a number of men, is considered the will of all.' Op. cit. in A. Dufour, 'Pufendorf,' in The
Cambridge History of Political Thought (Cambridge, 1993), p. 567.
28 Ibid., p. 585-586. '
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discriminating and philosophical history with the plodding, interminable and 'tedious and
incorrect descriptions of battles' that served no purpose other than to 'overload the mind.'
Voltaire employed Pufendorf as a straw man of pointless erudition with which his own
29
philosophy would shine in comparison. While Voltaire was referring to the jurist's
massive volumes written for the Swedish court, he held, as we shall see, the present work
in similar contempt. This was somewhat unfair, as Pufendorf ironically understood his
own work as a practical counterblast to antiquarian pedantry. Pufendorf's Introduction
can in fact be seen as a parallel work to his On the Duty ofMan and Citizen (1673), both
in terms of pervasiveness of influence and intended purpose. The former work was an
abridgment of his colossal On the Law ofNature and Nations (1672), the latter intended
as a primer in modern European history for apprentice statesmen. As Pufendorf wrote in
30
a letter to a friend, the former was written for the university, the latter for the court.
Pufendorf began with the claim that such a history would be 'the most pleasant and
useful Study for Persons of Quality, and more particularly for those who design for
31
Employments in the State.' He felt such a history would address a pressing need, as he
was dissatisfied with the teaching of history in the universities of his day, which
remained mired in an unjustifiable preoccupation with the literary aspects of ancient
29 'I remember, that upon looking into Puffendorff, who wrote in Stockholm, and had access to the
archives of the state, we thought ourselves sure of finding what forces that kingdom maintained;
what number of inhabitants; how far the people of the privince of Gothland had joined those who
ravaged the Roman empire; in what manner the arts, in process of time, were intorduced into
Sweden; what were its principal laws, is riches, or rather its poverty: but we did not find a single
word'. Voltaire, The General History and State ofEurope, from the time ofCharlemain to Lewis
XIV. With a Preliminary View of the Oriental Empires (Edinburgh, 1758), p. iv.
'° Pufendorf to Christoph Schomer in a letter from 1690: 'Under the pressure of war I was compelled
to change my home and manner of life, being unexpectedly driven from the school to the court,
where I had to give up those studies and apply myself to a new kind of activity. But the outline of
that doctrine as I then conceived it, has stuck in my mind...' quoted in James Moore and Michael
Silverthorn, 'Protestant Theologies, Limited Sovereignties', in J. Robertson (ed) A Union for
Empire, p. 173.
31 S. Pufendorf, An Introduction to the History of the Principal Kingdoms And States ofEurope,
translated by Jodocos Crull (London, 1752), p. a4.
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history. 'Now I cannot for my life,' Pufendorfmaintained, ' apprehend what great Benefit
we can expect to receive from Cornelius Nepos, Curtius, and the first Decad of Livy, as
to our Modern Affairs, tho' we had learn'd them by heart, and had, besides this, made a
perfect Index of all the Phrases and Sentences that are to be found in them: Or if we were
so well vers'd in them, as to be able to give a most exact account, how many Cows and
Sheep the Romans led in Triumph when they had conquer'd the Aequi, the Volci, and the
32 rHernici.' Future Statesmen did not require from history such antiquarian curiosities or
flights of humanist rhetoric; they needed practical vocational training. The structure of
the Introduction reflected its purpose; it did not attempt to tell the history of Europe in a
continuous narrative, but rather accorded each national history its own, self-contained
chapter. This fragmentation further reflected the method of the work's composition, each
national history cobbled together from its own native historians. Pufendorf stated his
intention to assess, without flattery or malice, the relative strength of each state and the
nature of its constitution, so as to train young statesmen to be sensitive to such matters.
As a tool for purely political instruction, Pufendorf's history was almost entirely
geared towards inculcating a correct understanding of State Interest, 'the Principle, from
whence must be concluded, whether State Affairs are either well or ill managed.'33 The
essence of statecraft, then, could be collapsed into prudent discernment of real versus
imaginary State Interest. 'Real' interest, for Pufendorf, could itself be divided into
Perpetual and Temporary. 'Perpetual' interest is informed by 'the Situation and
Constitution of the Country, and the natural Inclinations of the People' whereas
temporary interest depends on 'the condition, strength, and weakness of the neighbouring
32 Ibid., p. a5.
33 Ibid.
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Nations; for as those vary, the Interest must also vary.' Statecraft could then for
Pufendorf be reduced to a science of Interest, the principal skills being a sort of national
self-awareness and constant observation and study of one's neighbours. It revealed, at
one level, a hyper-rationalist understanding of international relations, or rather what
international relations should be, one that puts great faith in the 'right-reason' of
statesmen in the possession of full knowledge of their own Interest.
But Pufendorf was not so sanguine as to imagine that European history was a
consistent narrative of the science of statecraft objectively pursued. Sovereigns were
often ill informed, acted out of private interest, or under the influence of favourites or
their own blind passions. As a result sovereigns often acted in pursuit not of 'Real,' but
of 'Imaginary' interest. Imaginary interest was the delusion ofmyopic statesmen,
insufficiently aware of the sentiments and capabilities of neighbouring states, and was
found 'when a Prince judges the Welfare of his State to consist in such things as cannot
be performed without disquieting and being injurious to a great many other States, and
which these are oblig'd to oppose with all their Power: As for Example, The Monarchy
of Europe, or universal Monopoly, this being the Fuel with which the whole World may
be put into a flame.'34 Pufendorf's binding together of the spectres of universal
monarchy and universal monopoly was ambiguous; the two might be read as the same
concept under different descriptions, or he could be read as linking the freedom of the
seas with the liberties of Europe.
34 Ibid., pa?.
33 F. Meinecke had argued that Pufendorf s historical writing lacked any general principles. It is
curious that Meineche was unable to recognise the balance of power as such. Cf. L. Krieger 'History
and Law in the Seventeenth Century: Pufendorf, Journal of the History of Ideas, 21 (1960) p. 208.
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Pufendorf s first chapter, 'Of the Ancient Monarchies' was something of an
anomaly within his arrangement, as a deceased sovereignty had no present interest. Yet it
was in this section, arguably, that Pufendorf the jurist most transparently informed
Pufendorf the historian, both in regard to the origins of government, and in the critique of
government offered in terms of its effectiveness in providing security and civil peace.
Waxing lyrical about ancient republican liberty was not part of his plan. Pufendorf began
with a lengthy section on why individuals join to form civil unions. He maintained that
Government, properly speaking, had not existed before the Deluge. All authority had
rested with the fathers of families, who had only felt the need to relinquish a part of their
authority to wise men in the wake of conflict with neighbouring families. Pufendorf
noted how an increase of population had led to increased insecurity, and the need for a
common defence, and how such societies had entrusted a severely limited sovereignty to
a single chieftain: a process that for Aristotle had initiated a Heroic stage in government.
Pufendorf understood this primitive constitution as the origin of the republic, where
family heads recognised the need for government, yet felt unable to relinquish a sufficient
portion of their liberty to render that government effective.'36
While Pufendorf saw ancient democracy as a lesser evil than outright anarchy, he
nonetheless understood it as having a role to play in the slow evolution of human society
toward ordered government. 'And here is to observ'd', he stated, 'that as all humane
Affairs do not come immediately to Perfection, so were the first Institutions of civil-
Society very simple and imperfect till by degrees the supreme civil-Power, togather with
such Laws and Constitutions as were requisite for the maintaining of a civil Society, were
35 Ibid., p. 2.
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instituted."7 Pufendorf understood the constitution of ancient Rome in this light; Roman
history was for him rather distasteful and in no sense exemplary. 'And truly Rome was
nothing else but a Den of Wolves,' he wrote, 'and its Inhabitants, like Wolves, always
thirsting after their Neighbour's goods and Blood, living by continual Robberies.'
Pufendorf discerned no meaningful distinction between martial valour and bloodlust, and
the latter was a rather poor foundation for stable government. 'It is not always
advisable,' he wrote,
to lay the Foundation of a State upon Military Constitutions, since the
Changes of War are uncertain, and then it is not for the Quiet of any state
that martial Tempers should prevail too much in it. Wherefore Peaceable
times did never agree with the Romans; and as soon as they were freed from
the Danger of Foreign enemies, they sheath'd their Swords in each other's
Bowels.'38
It would be difficult to conceive of a sentiment less in keeping with republican
orthodoxies. Some of Pufendorf's scorn, however, was that of an evangelical Lutheran
for a fundamentally Heathen society. Pufendorf had no more love for ancient than he had
for modern Roman religion; he was at some pains to collapse the distinction between the
fundamentally political nature of both ancient and modern Roman priestcraft. 'What the
Romans did call Religion', he sneered, 'was chiefly instituted for the benefit of the State,
that thereby they might the better be able to rule the Minds of the People, according to the
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Conveniences and Exigencies of the State.' Roman priests, who had been selected from
those families that had had an active interest in state affairs, cared little for the actual
articles of faith of the vulgar multitudes, who were suitably impressed with the bells and
smells offered for their distraction and amusement.
37 Ibid., p. 3.
38 Ibid., p. 14.
39 Ibid., p. 16.
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Pufendorf grudgingly conceded the social utility of Roman priestcraft, for a
republic was always in particular need of instruments of social control: 'Mankind in
general, politically consider'd', Pufendorfmaintained, 'is like wild unruly Creatures,
ready upon all occasions to shake off the Bridle of civil Obedience, as often as matters do
not suit with its humours. Besides, this man cannot be kept in Obedience without the
assistance of Men.'40 Nonetheless, Pufendorf did acknowledge that Roman liberty had
materially contributed to Roman greatness, if only because any future sovereign,
solicitous of his own personal security, would have needed to curtail Roman martial spirit
and would have grown stronger in the process.
For Machiavelli the strength of the Roman republic lay in the creative tension
between patrician and plebeian; Pufendorf turned this notion on its head. He saw the
Roman Republic condemned to perpetual instability because it had foolishly
institutionalised faction in the form of the Tribunes of the People. 'In this the Nobles did
commit a grand Error,' Pufendorf wrote, 'that they allowed to the Common People,
which made the major part of the City, a protection independent of the Senate; making
thereby the Body of the Commonwealth as it were double-headed.' For Pufendorf a
sovereignty divided could never be regular or stable. This unstable division of
sovereignty had exacerbated as the Roman Empire expanded; citizens sent abroad to
govern newly acquired colonies had become dangerously powerful, and this had been the
cause of what Pufendorf described as the return ofmonarchy, where the Army had
exercised sovereign authority. The irregularity of the Roman constitution resultant from
imperial overstretch had thus precipitated her decline and fall. Pufendorf's discussion of
the ancient world had few lessons for the modern statesman in terms of the balance of
40 Ibid., p. 19.
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power; rather it contained a portrait of a universal monarchy as dangerously unstable as it
had been tenable.
Yet this was not to say that the legacy of the Roman Imperium had no role in
contemporary European affairs, for Pufendorf followed Hobbes in understanding the
bishop of Rome as seated upon the throne of the emperors of old. Pufendorf s chapter on
the constitution of 'The Spiritual Monarchy of Rome' was most sharply polemical in his
Introduction, designed to demonstrate point by point that not only had all arguments in
favour of the Roman sovereignty been chimerical, but also and more fundamentally had
been entirely political in origin. Pufendorf could find no reasonable parallel between the
need for a supreme civil sovereignty and the need for a correspondingly supreme
ecclesiastical authority:
The Rights of Sovereignty are founded upon evident and undeniable
Principles and Divine Institution, since without it, it is impossible that
Mankind should live honestly, securely, commodiously and decently.
But to find out the same necessity and foundation of the Pope's Sovereign
Authority, and to demonstrate that as the Peace and Welfare of Mankind,
cannot subsist without a Supreme Civil Power; so the Christian World
cannot be without a Supreme Ecclesiastical Power, is in my mind impossible
to be done. He that is unwilling to believe this, let him find out a
demonstrative proof and he will be the miracle of the World.41
Pufendorf insisted that it would not be possible to more artfully design a method of
producing such a fraudulent sovereignty than that of secret election by that aristocratic
cabal, the College of Cardinals. 'By means of this Election,' Pufendorf maintained, 'it is
much easier to pick out one that is fitly qualified to represent the great and artificial
Hypocrite, and afterwards to make the people believe, that they are ignorant of the
Ibid., p. 412.
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Intrigues of the Conclave, that it was by the particular providence of God Almighty, that
such a Person was chosen as the most worthy to be the Vicar of God on Earth'.42
Not only had the papal form of elective monarchy been devised for purely
political purposes, but each individual theological tenet of the Roman church, from the
typology of sin to the institution of the sacrament of reconciliation, had been artfully
devised to maximise the encroachment of the 'papal prerogative' in particular and the
interest of the clergy in general.
The distinction betwixt Venial and Mortal Sins, as also what is alleged
de casilus reservatis is invented for the benefit of the Clergy. That infinite
number of Books of confession, enough to fraight whole Fleets withal, is not
published with an intention to correct Vices, but that by laying Tax upon the
same, the Clergy may be better be able to maintain their Grandeur, and falsifie
their Avarice. The most comfortable doctrine of remission of Sins, has wholly
been accommodated to the Interest of the Clergy. For, because it would not
have turned to the profit of the Clergy, if everyone who truly repented should
obtain remission of Sins, only by Faith in the Merits of Christ; it has been the
doctrine of the Church of Rome, that it was an essential piece of penitence,
and the means to obtain forgiveness of Sins, if a most exact and precise
account of every individual Sin was given to the Priest.43
The doctrines of justification through good works44 and purgatory45 had been similarly
inspired by clerical avarice and ambition.
Pufendorf found the most scandalous aspect of the papal tyranny to be its
monopoly of learning, prosecuted from the insight that opinions formed early in life were
the most powerful and lasting. The unfortunate consequence of this was that, for
centuries, the greatest scholars of Europe had been no more than 'Popish slaves.'
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 422.
44
'Why good Works have been made meritorious, and the means of obtaining Salvation from God
Almighty, is easily to be guessed. For when they were to give a definition of good works, they were
sure to put in the first place, that the People ought to be liberal towards the Clergy, Churches, and
Monasteries, and to perform every thing which is commanded them by the Pope and his Adherents,
tho' never so full of Superstition and Hypocrisy.' Ibid., p. 423.
45
'Purgatory was invented for no other purpose, but that the dying Man, who at that time is not so
greedy of worldly goods, which he is to leave to others, might be liberal towards the Clergymen.'
Ibid., p. 425.
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Pufendorf dubbed Peter Lombard, Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus 'Patriarchs of
Pedantry.' He furthered that 'what they call Philosophy is nothing else but a Collection of
foolish Chimeras, empty Terms, and very bad Latin, the knowledge of which is rather
hurtful than profitable, if you have not been better instructed otherwise.'46
Pufendorf adopted quite another tone as he turned to the subject of Roman efforts
to spread the Christian religion beyond Europe, where the higher level of Roman
organisation had accomplished a modicum of good. The 'Jesuitical sect,' who had
merited scorn in Europe for their attempt to 'insinuate themselves into the very Secrets of
the State' to advance the papal interest, outside Europe appeared in a different light
altogether.47 Pufendorf could not deny that the Roman church and the Jesuits in
particular had been vastly more successful than had Protestants in making conversions in
the New World, in large part because they had applied themselves to the task with greater
vigour. He suspected that their feats of conversion had been in all likelihood
48
exaggerated, but nonetheless viewed them with an uncomfortable admiration. While
Robertson was later to take this gesture of conciliation much further, even in the eyes of a
zealous Protestant such as Pufendorf, Popish superstition was clearly preferable to
heathen idolatry.
Pufendorf began his survey of contemporary Europe with that state most closely
associated with Counter-reformation Catholicism at its most persecuting and inquisitorial,
Spain. Pufendorf began with the traditional point that Spain as a modern entity had
46 Ibid., p. 426.
47
'They have found means, under pretence of being Confessours, to creep into most Courts, and to
insinuate themselves into the very Secrets of the State; so that in a great many Courts they have the
greatest sway in the Councils; And there you may be sure they will never be forgetful of the Pope's
or their own Interest.' Ibid., p. 428.
48 Ibid., p. 436.
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commenced with the fifteenth century Union of Crowns, when it had achieved 'that pitch
of Greatness, which ever since has made it both the Terrour and the Envy of Europe.'4'1
That terror had been first inspired during the reign of Charles V, a reign that refused to be
pigeonholed within Pufendorf s rigid structure; he discussed the whole of Charles'
sundry campaigns throughout Europe within his Spanish section, which entailed lengthy
digressions into the history of Italy of Germany. In Pufendorf s analysis, Charles' novel
ambition had been thwarted by the jealousy of his rivals in three stages; in the first
instance by the French king, Francis I, until his defeat at the battle of Pavia. Charles'
success at Pavia had, in turn, roused the jealousy of the princes of Italy, whose general
confederacy against Charles was pre-empted by the sack of Rome.50 Finally, his attempt
'to make himself the absolute master of Germany' had been thwarted by a league of
German Protestants. Voltaire later found Pufendorf s handling of the rivalry between
Charles and Francis so full of error and fundamentally misguided that, in a fit of pique,
the French historian introduced a bit of erudition into his Essai to condescend to refute
him.51 Voltaire had little time for the notion that universal monarchy was possible in the
modern period and, in order to discount its possibility for Fouis XIV, he felt the need to
49
Ibid., p. 39.
50 'The prodigious Success which attended the Emperor, did raise no small Jealousie among the other
princes; and by instigation of Pope Clement VII these Armies were raised to maintain the liberty of
Italy. To prevent this storm, and especially to withdraw the Pope from the Confederacy, the
Emperor's Generals marched directly against Rome...and committed great outrages. Ibid., p. 45.
51
'I am far from losing sight of the general view of Europe, to refute the details of a few historians; yet
I cannot forbear observing how greatly Puffendorff is mistaken on some occasions. He says, that
this expedition against Navarre was undertaken in 1516, immediately after the death of Ferdinand
the Catholic, by the dethroned king. To which he adds, that Charles had always his plus ultra
present and was daily forming vast designs. Here are several mistakes. In 1516 Charles was only
fifteen years old; a time of life from which vast designs are hardly expected; and he had not yet
taken Plus ultra for his motto. In short, it was not John d'Albret that marched into Navarre in
1516, upon the death of Ferdinand; John d'Albert died this very year: but it was Francis I. that made
a transient conquest of this Kingdom in the name of Henry d'Albret, not in 1516, but in 1521.'
Voltaire, The General History and State ofEurope, pp. 187-188.
31
52chastise Pufendorf for maintaining it had ever been a goal for Charles. Ironically, far
from asserting that Charles had successfully achieved a universal monarchy, Pufendorf
held that Charles had prepared the ground for the decline of the Spanish monarchy itself.
By Pufendorf s time Spanish history had become a study in decline, and he found that
Spanish declension had commenced shortly after the peak of her power under Charles V.
As a result of the Emperor's decision to divide his inheritance, the Netherlands had fallen
under Spanish control, and Spain's ill judged actions to maintain her sovereignty there
had proved her undoing. Pufendorf nonetheless took a balanced view of Philip II; he
admired his 'evenness of temper' but felt he had made a fatal mistake in judging that the
vast riches acquired in the Americas enabled him to prosecute 'his ambitious designs'
c -3
with impunity. He linked the Spanish failure to hold the Netherlands with the increase
of Dutch commerce and military strength that had resulted from her overseas empire
building.
Pufendorf found empire to have had the opposite effect on Spanish strength.
Pufendorf noted the decisive importance of the conquest of the Americas in shaping
Spanish policy, but insisted that 'How easily the Spaniards did conquer these vast
Countries, and with what Barbarity they us'd the Inhabitants, is too long to be related
here.'54 He did pause to scoff at what he found to be the ridiculous papal justification,
noting that the 'barbarians' of America had found it as ridiculous as had Protestant
Europe. Pufendorf allowed himself the relativist sentiment that the empires of Mexico
52 'The sacking of Rome, and the captivity of the Pope, no more contributed to render Charles V
absolute master of Italy, than the taking of Francis I prisoner opened a passage for him into France.
Therefore the notion of universal monarchy attributed to CharlesV is as false and chimerical as that
which was afterwards imputed to Lewis XIV.' Voltaire, The General History and State ofEurope,
p. 195.
53 Pufendorf, Introduction, p. 55.
™ Ibid., p. 41.
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and Peru 'were not so Barbarous as some may imagine, thus having been found among
them such excellent Laws and Constitutions as would make some Europeans blush.'55
Pufendorf qualified his criticism somewhat by pointing out that claims to sovereignty
from conquest typically involve the artful manipulation of history, and that the nature of
the conquest was controversial in Spain itself.56 Elsewhere in Europe, the verdict had
been uniformly hostile, as Pufendorf illustrated with a possibly apocryphal vignette of an
exchange between two ambassadors:
Wherefore, when the French and Spanish Ambassadors at Rome, quarrelled
about Precedency, and the latter, to represent his Master's greatness, spoke
very largely of the vast Riches of America, the Frenchman answered, That all
Europe, but especially Spain, had been a considerable loser by them: The
Spaniards having employed themselves in searching after the Treasures of
America, were thereby become idle, and had dispeopled their own Country.
The King of Spain trusting to his great Riches, had begun unnecessary Wars.
Spain being the fountain from whence vast Riches were derived to other Nations,
did receive the least benefit of all of them, since those Countries that furnished
Spain with Soldiers and other Commodities did draw those Riches to themselves.57
As a result of Spanish mismanagement, America had not only lacked industry but had
also proven a drain on the Spanish economy. For Pufendorf the most salient index of
Spanish decline had been her falling population, which had required the use of
mercenaries to supplement a dangerously depleted supply of soldiers. The country
moreover had been poorly policed, and partly as a cause and partly as a result of this the
CO
clergy and nobility had enjoyed excessive influence within the Spanish constitution.
Yet despite the manifest injury Spain had inflicted upon the rest of Europe, her decline
remained a cause more for foreboding than for celebration. Spain had long been at the
centre of the European state system, and the effects of her forfeit of this position seemed
ominous for the European balance. Pufendorf was grimly fatalistic concerning the
55 Ibid., p. 66.
56 Ibid., p. 65.
57 Ibid., p. 67.
58 Ibid., pp. 69-71.
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possibility of war following the death of the last Habsburg king of Spain, and felt
therefore that it was in the interests of all Europe to prevent her collapse/9
Pufendorf thought France likely to become the beneficiary of Spanish decline.
France was well situated geographically, 'almost in the very midst of the Christian world;
where this King may conveniently keep Correspondence with them all, and prevent
Europe from falling into the Hands of any one Prince.' A further irony in Voltaire's
contempt for Pufendorf's historical analysis was that the German jurist advanced a
version of the these royale that Voltaire was later to extrapolate. Pufendorf located the
strength of France not in its relatively anaemic overseas holdings, but in her regular form
of government. The French nobility had previously been dangerously formidable, but
thanks to the policies of Richelieu and Mazarin, 'they were reduced to such a Condition,
that they dare not utter a Word against the King.'60 Rival centres of power, such as the
Assembly of the Estates and the Parliament of Paris, had formerly been powerful enough
to foment discord, but they too had been reduced. 'Heretofore the Parliament of Paris
us'd to oppose the King's designs, under pretence', Pufendorf noted with scorn, 'that it
had a Right, that the King could not do any thing of great Moment without its Consent;
but this King hath taught it only to intermeddle with Judicial Business, and some other
Concerns, which the King now and then is pleas'd to leave to its Decision.'61
59 'But if the old Maxims of Policy are not grown quite out of date, it is to be hoped, that all who have
any Interest in the preservation of Spain, will with all their Power endeavour to prevent the ruin of
Spain, that the Liberty and Possessions of all the States of Europe may not depend on the Pleasure
and Will of one single Person. But what Revolution may happen in Spain if the present Royal
Family, which has no Heirs get, should fail, is beyond Human Understanding to determine or
forsee; because it is to be feared, that upon such an occasion, not only France would do its utmost
to obtain it, but also, because several States which were annexed to Spain, by the Royal Family,
might take an opportunity to withdraw themselves from the same.' Ibid., p. 75.
60 Ibid., p. 232.
61 Ibid., p. 233.
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Pufendorf rounded off his discussion of France with a lengthy comparison of her
military capabilities vis a vis her neighbours. She was in a trivial sense neatly balanced
against England, the former having the superior infantry, the latter the more formidable
navy. However, the English navy was scant threat to French interests, and from Spain
and Italy she had equally little cause for apprehension. While the French navy was no
match for that of the Dutch, Pufendorf noted that French privateers might well be able to
accomplish no small amount of mischief to Dutch sea forces. Only Germany, Pufendorf
supposed, posed a potential threat. Even this was highly unlikely, for he found it
inconceivable that the various states of the Empire could devise a common interest in any
such War. Nor did France truly have much to worry about from a general Confederacy
against her, as it would never be in the Interest of Portugal to join with Spain, Sweden
with Denmark, or Poland with the House of Austria, in any war against her. For
commercial reasons, it was highly unlikely that England and the United Provinces would
join together, or that the protestant states of Germany would allow France to fall. France,
thus, enjoyed a highly secure position and no doubt promised future aggression, but was
certainly in no position to aim at universal monarchy. 'For France' Pufendorf wrote,
'may be the most Potent Kingdom in Christendom, but not the only one; and by
extending its Conquests too far, it would be weaken'd within: In the mean time, those
lesser States bordering upon France are in great danger to be devour'd by so flourishing a
Kingdom.'62
Pufendorf thought that England enjoyed a position nearly as advantageous as
France, secure from invasion and powerful enough to maintain the balance of power
throughout in Europe. However, England had not made the progress towards regular
62 Ibid., p. 236.
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government that France enjoyed. He worried that England would always be particularly
prone to instability, due to the notoriously factious nature of her citizenry:
But England ought to take special Care, that it fall not into civil Dissensions,
since it has often felt the Effects of the same, and the Seeds of them are
remaining yet in that Nation; which chiefly arises from the Difference in
Religion, and the headstrong Temper of this Nation, which makes it very fond
of Novelties. Nevertheless a wise and courageous King may easily prevent this
Evil, if he does not act against the general Inclination of the People, maintains
a good Correspondence with the Parliament; and as soon as any Commotions
happen, takes off immediately the Ring-Leaders.
While noting that England and Scotland (he made no distinction between their interests)
would only fear competition from maritime powers, he postulated that they did have a
crucial role to play on the international stage, being the only kingdom powerful enough to
hold the scales of Europe, while remaining sufficiently weak to see her security bolstered
by a general equilibrium. 'It is the chief interest of England, to keep up the Balance
betwixt France and Spain, and to make a special care, that the King of France do not
become Master of the Netherlands; for it is visible, that thereby his power at Sea would
be encreased to that degree, that he might enter on a Design of being even with England,
for what they have formerly done to France.' 63 Pufendorf was concerned that, through
the latter half of the seventeenth century, England's foreign policy had gone somewhat
astray; engaging in frequent commercial wars with the Dutch was not in her interest.
Nevertheless, how desirous so ever the English are to be sole Masters at
Sea, it does not seem to be the Interest of England frequently to engage in
wars with Holland it having been observed, that the Dutch since the Wars
with England are rather increased in Valour, Experience, and Power at Sea.
And because other Nations are not likely to suffer that Holland should be
swallowed up by the English, or that one Nation should have the Monopoly
of Europe; it seems therefore the best Method for the English to set
some others upon their Backs, who may give them so much work, as thereby
to give a Check to their growing Greatness; and in the mean while, take care
to establish their own Power at Sea, and their Commerce abroad.64
63 Ibid., p. 160.
64 Ibid., pp. 146-147.
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Pufendorf thus held it was in England's interest to allow competition within her waters so
as to ailay the jealousy of others. The acceptance of this was of cardinal importance to
English security, as it was no more in Europe's interest to accept an English universal
dominion of the seas than it was to accept the territorial universal monarchy of Spain or
France.
Pufendorf was of course most famous for his assessment of the irregularity of the
German constitution. The chapter in the Introduction containing the history and interest
of the German Empire recycled much of the content of his anonymously published De
Statu Imperii, where he notoriously described that constitution as an 'irregular monster.'
In Crulls' translation, the phrase emerged as 'a Body with a great many Heads, without
vigour, or any constant Resolution.'65 Pufendorf employed a Tacitean understanding of
the uniqueness of German liberty against itself; the Saxons had retained a greater sense of
their liberty than other tribes, and as a result their Kings lacked true sovereignty, and thus
Germany was to remain divided into a multitude of insignificant states. While he
predictably sided with secular authority against the papacy in discussing the investiture
crisis, he nonetheless found little to recommend in a German statecraft that had dispensed
justice with the sword until the reign ofMaximillian, who 're-established the Peace of the
Empire,' and had prepared the ground for his grandson, Charles V.66 The reign of Charles
V had been a turning point in the history of the German constitution, but primarily as a
series of missed opportunities to gain her true station within the European system.
Charles had been, in Pufendorf's mind, a fundamentally bad ruler of Germany who had at
no point in his reign given serious thought to her interests. It would have been well
65 Ibid., p. 298.
66 Ibid., p. 293.
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within Germany's capacity to have held the scales of the European balance herself, but
instead her interests at all points came second to those of the Spanish. It surely had not
been in Germany's interests to have her coffers ransacked for wars against France. It was
always a mistake to elect as Emperor a prince who already possessed a considerable
territory.67 Pufendorf was baffled at how a prince such as Charles could have failed to
take advantage of the opportunity to free himself from the papal tyranny; if he had acted
effectively, Germany would have become as safely Protestant as Sweden or England.68
For Pufendorf the result of German history had been the dysfunctional nature of the
German constitution. 'Its irregular Constitution of Government is one of the chief causes
of its Distemper;' Pufendorf wrote, 'it being neither one entire Kingdom, neither properly
a Confederacy, but participating in both kinds.69 The sundry princes of the empire could
not with reason be considered full subjects of the Emperor, rather as free citizens with the
right to dictate matters civil and ecclesiastical. A function of this was that German states
often successfully acted according to their independent interest, with 'little account how
70
they Ruin the most powerful.' Pufendorf believed that as a result of the lack of
coordination of German policy, she was likely to fall prey to French designs.
While in the main, the balance of power was either maintained or not according to
the prudence of statesmen, Pufendorf provided the beginnings of an explanation of the
European balance in terms ofmore structural forces at work within states. The capacity
for state action was first of all dictated by regularity of constitution; France was thus
potentially able to dictate the fate of Europe in a way Germany was not. While the reader
57 Ibid., p. 305.
68 Ibid., p. 306.
69 Ibid., p. 304.
70 Ibid., p. 307.
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with a will to do so could tease out from Pufendorf's text a teleology within the history of
individual states from irregularity to order, the jurist largely shied away from such
attempts at macronarrative. The vision of Europe Pufendorf outlined remained one
primarily determined by the interaction occasioned by conflict resultant from either
dynastic or from religious motivation. But Pufendorf did not hold that military alliance
was the only possible tie between peoples. In the last sentence of his Introduction
Pufendorf threw out a hint of another potential connection to explain how distant nations
not entangled with military alliances might remain peaceable and on good terms. 'The
good understanding betwixt Sweden and Portugal,' Pufendorf wrote, 'depends only from
the mutual Commerce of these two Nations, who else by reason of this great distance can
scarce be serviceable to one another.'71 That the general interaction between European
states might come to be dictated by commercial concerns did not engage Pufendorf, but
he had demonstrated the potency of some of the non-commercial barriers such an
international order would face.
Pufendorf's Introduction was not a work that aspired to be self-consciously
literary; the work contained more great set pieces on fisheries than it did on the orations
of statesman. The fact that it was so defiantly not a literary production, combined with
the rather ephemeral nature of the political prescription involved, went some way towards
explaining why Pufendorf's general history never found a foothold in the historical canon
to the same extent, as did his works on natural jurisprudence. In the early decades of the
eighteenth century, one could well have predicted otherwise, however, as Pufendorf's
historical work was a runaway best seller and a remarkable chapter in the history of the
book. Written in German, the work was soon translated into Latin, French, and English.
71 Ibid., p. 515.
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The chapter on the papacy was published on its own in 1690 as The History ofPopedom,
Its Rise and Demise. The same chapter was published independently in the German
original, in a critical edition by Christian Thomasius. The whole work, translated into
English by Crull, by 1702 had already gone through five editions. Crull, in a companion
volume, continued the work up to 1705. An anonymous English author extended the
work to include chapters on Africa and Asia. The transformation of Pufendorf's
Introduction in French translation was perhaps even more remarkable, where a short one-
volume introduction to European history morphed into a colossal eight-volume history of
the world. Later English editions appeared after 1748 with a newer, more polite
translation by Joseph Salter incorporated some of the additions of the work's French
editor, Breton de la Martiniere. Pufendorf's Introduction was widely reviewed in Dutch
periodicals, receiving testimonials from Bayle and Le Clerc, and found itself quickly
72embedded in university curricula throughout Europe. It was extolled in lectures by
Charles Mackie, first professor of Civil and Universal History at Edinburgh University,
where Robertson would have first encountered it. Yet despite its ubiquity during the first
half of the eighteenth century, Pufendorf's Introduction would eventually be eclipsed by
the historical productions of the Enlightenment, a development Voltaire would certainly
have understood in terms of the progress of civilisation.
72 J. J. V. M. de Vet, 'Some Periodicals of the United Provinces on Pufendorf: reconnecting the
reception of his ideas in the 17 and 18th centuries', in F. Palladini (ed) Samuel Pufendorf und die
Europaische Fruhaufkldrung (Berlin, 1994), pp. 208-222.
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II. Perpetual Peace?
Pufendorf has often been represented as a theorist with a distinctly bleak. Augustinian
view of view of human nature, who provided a politics for an irredeemably fallen man.71
The devastation brought to central Europe during his childhood had offered little to
counter such a thesis. As such his vision of Europe as a wary, nervously watchful set of
armed camps was perhaps all that could be expected. Pufendorf lived long enough to
witness the next occasion when Europe was similarly brought to its knees by the wars of
the great powers, this time occasioned by the novel success of the French state in
overpowering her neighbours. Contemporary observers understood Louis' aspiration
through the lens of the collective memory of the reign of the Emperor Charles V, the
monarchy of Europe.74 Ironically, the military capacity of the French state was the result
of policies informed by the very same conception of the balance of power as a reason of
state that was traditionally understood to ward off universal monarchy. Louis' chief
finance minister, Colbert, had transferred jealousy and emulation from balance of power
discourse to the economic sphere, and forged the most progressive and formidable 'fiscal
military state' of its day. It was when Hume surveyed the politics of this period that he
moved to remark that 'commerce had become a reason of state.'7
73 J. Moore and M. Silverthome place heavy emphasis on this aspect ofPufendorf s theological
orientation. Cf. 'Protestant theologies, limited sovereignties', pp. 173-177.
74 J. Robertson 'Empire and Union: Two Concepts of the Early Modern Political Order', in Robertson
(ed) A Union for Empire, p. 21.
75 I. Hont, The Jealousy of Trade, International Competition and the Nation State in Historical
Perspective (Cambridge, MA, forthcoming).
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The fiscal problems of the French state in the aftermath of the wars of Louis XIV
produced a state of general disffection with the conduct of the monarchy, and led to a
brief flourishing of projects for reform. 6 The locus of this reforming effort was the circle
of advisers to the son of the dauphin, the Duke of Burgundy, led by the Archbishop of
Cambrai, Fenelon (Franpois de Salignac de la Mothe). Politically, this circle sought to
revive the suppressed constitutionalist tradition within French political thought,
collectively producing a these nobiliaire that emphasised the consultative role that the
landed aristocracy had historically played within the French constitution.77 The group
was thus rather conservative in its political objectives, advocating a root and branch
reversal of all the innovations in statecraft and commercial policy implemented by
78Richelieu and Colbert. What Fenelon found most damaging in Colbert's policy was the
application of a ruthlessly competitive reason of state thinking to commerce, which had
opened the Pandora's box of luxury and corruption. In a militarily and commercially
overextended France, Fenelon feared he detected the first traces of decline and fall.79
Fenelon, in his brief essay Sentiments on the Balance ofEurope, outlined the
foreign policy of the pacific kingship he sought to promote. He began by observing that
while states are not tied together by a common rule of law, necessity required they
understand each other as forming 'a kind of society and general Commonwealth.' The
concerted purpose of this general commonwealth should be to maintain the balance of
power for its own safety, as the natural ambitions of princes would, left to their own
devices, lead any with the ability to pursue universal monarchy to do so. The need for
76 Pierre Goubert, Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen, (London, 1967); Colin Jones, The Great
Nation, (London, 2003).
77 N. O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State, p. 19.
78 Ibid., p. 345.1.
79 I. Hont, The Jealousy of Trade.
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such collective responsibility on the part of European monarchs had arisen from the
successful dynastic manoeuvres of the house of Habsburg in the early sixteenth century.
Fenelon argued that Charles V, after his defeat of Francis I at the battle of Pavia, had
80
come to be rightly dreaded as an aspirant to universal monarchy. 'What Wars did that
produce!' Fenelon exclaimed, 'what Desolation in all Europe, until the Peace of
81Vermins!' He argued that even those countries without a direct interest in the behaviour
of Spain, per se, would have had 'a very good right' to intervene militarily against him.
Fenelon was aware that he was advocating a course of action for states that could not be
sanctioned among individuals. Yet states in the international arena had no secure rule of
law from which to seek protection, and thus were required, for their safety, to assume a
82
more jealous posture. Fenelon took the parallel between the state and the individual
further, arguing that just as individuals have a duty to seek the common good of their
own polity, so sovereigns have a duty to seek the common good of the international
order. But having made the case for pre-emptive strike as a point of right, Fenelon
immediately sought to qualify it, adding that for such actions to be 'lawful, the Danger
from it must be real and pressing; the League defensive, or no farther offensive than a
just and necessary Defence requires; and such Bounds must be set to it, as it may not
83
entirely destroy that Power which it was form'd only to limit and moderate.'
In stressing the legitimacy of actions taken to preserve the European balance,
Fenelon was issuing a sharp warning to Fouis XIV that Europe would be justified in







83 Ibid., p. 12.
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the legality of the case might have been. Fenelon sought instead to recommend to him a
foreign policy directing towards the common good, relating to neighbours as friends and
understanding their commerce as reciprocal. France should then emerge all the stronger
at home after it had given up the chimerical superiority resulting from conquest. The
recent case of Spain had aptly demonstrated that all empire based upon conquest was
04
ephemeral and the aftermath of its necessary collapse was in all cases catastrophic. For
Fenelon a far better form of superiority drew from the inward strengths of a nation:
it consists in a more numerous People, better disciplin'd, and more skilful in Agriculture
and other necessary Arts. This kind of Superiority is generally the easiest attain'd, the surest,
the least expos'd to the Envy and Combinations of its inferior Neighbours, and more proper
than numerous Conquests, and fortify'd Places, to render a People invincible. A State cannot
too diligently aspire to this kind of Superiority, nor too carefully avoid the former, which has
no other than a false Lustre.85
Fenelon's view of pacific foreign policy was rooted in his own Quietist theology. Both
the state and the individual should strive after a pure and disinterested cultivation of its
inner qualities and love of order. As the individual through an act ofpur cimour would
grow to transcend himself, so the state, following a parallel spiritual path could grow to
forsake the misguided notions of interest that lead to the desire for conquest and war.86
If the writings of Fenelon and his circle were ultimately as reactionary in their
aims and proposals as they were progressive in their analysis, that dichotomy did not hold
for the work of a reformer of the next generation, the Abbe de Saint-Pierre. Having been
expelled from the Acaclemie francaise, Saint-Pierre became the doyen of a rival and more
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politicised semi-official institution, the Club de FEntresol. No less than the circle of
84 Ibid., pp. 20, 25.
85 Ibid., p. 27.
86 N. O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State, pp. 342-243; P. Riley, 'Fenelon Philosophe' The
Philosophical Review, 90 (1981), pp. 285-289.
87 N. O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State, pp. 362-363.
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Fenelon, that of Saint-Pierre sought to anatomise the dysfunction of the French monarchy
and offer a series of reforms that would put it on a more stable footing. While the
writings of Saint-Pierre were too eclectic to fit neatly into any specific tradition, the
purposes of his political writings were entirely in keeping with those of the natural jurists,
namely the study of the principles upon which the sovereign could achieve steady
government.88 While he seems to have read and admired the works of the jurists, he
89found them lacking in method. For all the startling modernity of his thought, revealed
through his emphasis on the importance of public opinion and his thoroughgoing
utilitarianism, the Abbe remained a committed advocate of the these royale\ he feared
dissolution of government more than he feared tyranny.90 The most notorious of Saint-
Pierre's many works, the Projet de traite pour render la paix perpetuelle entre les
souverains Chretiens, first published in 1712, formed a part of his broader attempt to
reconstitute the French monarchy on a more rational model. The Projet sought to
address the root cause of the problems of the monarchy, the state of perpetual war in
which she found herself, by advocating a revolution in her international relations through
entering into confederated union with the European states with which she had fought so
88 'I thought it necessary to begin, by making some Reflections upon the Happiness it would be, as well
to the Sovereigns of Europe, as to private Men, to live in Peace, united by some permanent society;
and upon the Necessity they are at present in to have continual Wars with each other, about the
Possession or Division of some Advantages; and finally upon the Means which they have hitherto
used, either to avoid entering upon those Wars, or not to sink under them.' Abbe de Saint-Pierre, A
Project for Settling Peace in Europe: First Proposed by Henry IV ofFrance, and approved of by
Queen Elizabeth, and most of the then Princes ofEurope, and now discussed at large, and made
practicable. (London, 1714) p. ii;
Cf. Merle Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre (London, 1957).
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'Hugo Grotius, Hollandais, et Samuel Pufendorf, Suedois, Doria, Italien, one discouru, ils ont traite
de la politique, ils ont apporte quelquefoid de bonnes raisons pur prouver quelques-unes de leurs
propositions: mais, a proprement parler, ils n'ont rien, ou Presque rien demontre.' He held the
method of Hobbes in greater esteem: 'Thomas Hobbes, anglais, a plus approche de la bonne
methode de demonstrer.' Op. cit. in Ibid., p. 52.
90 T. E. Kaiser, 'The Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French
Monarchy, The Journal ofModern History, 55 (1983), pp. 623-626.
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many expensive and damaging wars. It was a work that at once sought to abolish the ius
gentium that had served Europe so poorly, as well as a work that took the idiom of ius
naturale to its logical conclusion. Pufendorfian natural jurisprudence narrated and
legitimated the development and formation of civil societies as a response to the disorder
of an, admittedly fictitious, state of nature. Natural jurisprudence provided no
compelling logical reason why the advantages of political union should cease beyond the
level of the state. Intra-state union represented, in a sense, the final frontier of natural
jurisprudence
The root of the problem, for Saint-Pierre, lay with existing measures for ensuring
peace, treaties, alliances, and above all, the doctrine of the balance of power between the
major houses. The history of Europe, which had amounted to little more than perpetual
warfare, demonstrated quite plainly that none of these arrangements had worked. Saint-
Pierre discerned two underlying reasons why this had been, and without drastic revision
of the 'Constitution of Europe,' would likely remain so. The Abbe's first proposition was
that as the 'present Constitution' of Europe had been woefully inadequate in providing
for European collective security, it was doomed to produce nothing save perpetual War.
His understanding of the international order was informed by his strongly Hobbesian
conception of the fear of war in the state of nature and that this fear had been preserved
intact in the relationship between modern states.91 The wretched irony of politics was that
individuals had contracted together to provide for their security, but the resulting network
of rampaging Leviathans had put Europe right back where she had started: in perpetual
fear of a war of all against all. The international state system was a fig leaf disguising a
state of nature as red in tooth and claw as any state of savagery anywhere:
91 M. Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, p. 55.
46
Such is the Condition of the Heads of Families among Savages, who live
without Law: Such the State of the petty Kings of Africa, or the miserable
Caciques, or petty Sovereigns of America: Nay, such is the present
Condition of our European Sovereigns; as they have as yet no permanent
Society among them, they have no Law whereby to decide their Differences
without War: For even tho' by the Conventions of their Treaties, they were able
to foresee and decide all the Accidents that might possibly give birth to their
Differences; yet, can those Conventions ever by looked upon as inviolable Laws,
so long as it remains in the Power of one or other of the Pretenders to violate them,
under Pretences which those who are unwilling to submit to them never are
without; and will not each of them have the Power to violate them, according to
his Caprice, so long as neither the one nor the other is under a necessity of
observing them? And what can reduce them to that happy Necessity, but the
superior Force of a society permanent and sufficiently powerful, if they made a part
of it? But as yet they have not form'd a Society permanent and sufficiently powerful
Some indeed have form'd Societies by Treaties of Leagues and Alliances; but as
those Treaties have nothing in them that's binding, any longer than during the
Pleasure of the Allies, they are not permanent Societies. Some others have even
begun to form permanent Societies, such as the thirteen Switz Cantons, the seven
Sovereignties of the Netherlands; but they have not taken Associations enough into
their Society, it is not sufficiently powerful.92
As such, political society had not served its original mission.
The Abbe's second thesis was that the 'Equilibrium of Power' between the
housesof France and Austria had in no way contributed towards European collective
security. The precarious equilibrium prevented neither civil nor intra-state conflicts, and
had preserved neither territory nor commerce. The Abbe thought this point was self-
evident. European statesmen had sought to reduce Europe to a set of scales, and scales
were more easily upset than they were balanced:
If Evidence of Argument be not sufficient, let us consult Experience; let us
see what has happen'd for these two hundred Years last past in the System
of the Equilibrium; let us read the History of Europe: What has this wretched
System produc'd, but almost continual Wars? How short a time did the
Truce of Vervins last? I cannot call by any other Name a Peace that cannot
endure long. On the contrary, how long has the War lasted since that Truce?
Such is the Effect of this so desired Equilibrium. Now, does not Time past
instruct us, that from such Causes, we are, for the future, to expect only such
Effects? And who is there that does not perceive, that in the System of the
Equilibrium there is no Security but Arms in Hand? And thus no body can
never enjoy his Liberty, but at the Expence of his Repose93
92 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
93 Ibid., p 15.
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Perhaps the most fundamental reason why European policy based on equilibrium was
unsustainable was its extreme cost; Saint-Pierre argued that without the innumerable
military conflicts of the last four hundred years, Europe would now be four times richer
than at present.94 The interests that had led the major combatants in the war of the
Spanish Succession, namely fear of French universal monarchy, and the security of
maritime commerce, could only be resolved in a satisfactory way through European
Union. Saint-Pierre's inspiration for European Union was the constitution of the German
Empire, where fear of the Ban of the Empire had prevented individual German states
from engaging in hostilities with each other. The example of the German Empire further
demonstrated that Union was not idle Utopia, but practicable policy.
Saint-Pierre's solution was a European Parliament on a republican model with a
rotating presidency. The fundamental articles of the European Union were: to make
treaties with neighbouring Muslim states, guarantee the existing constitutions of each
state, offer special protection of monarchies in time of regency, and affirm their
contentment with existing territories. The sovereigns of Europe would additionally
resolve to enjoy only one sovereignty at a time, and to refuse forever the Kingdom of
Spain to the house of Bourbon. Sovereigns would further enact a free trade zone within
Europe, and establish a series of 'Towns Chambers' to adjudicate trade disputes.95
Individual EU sovereigns would be disallowed from declaring war on each other, or
against a neighbouring state without the express consent of the majority; failure to adhere
to this would result in penalties inflicted by the EU as a whole. Such disputes would be
heard in the European Senate, comprised of one delegate of the twenty-four member
94 Ibid., p. 20.
95 Ibid., p. 121.
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states of 'France. Spain, England, Holland. Savoy, Portugal. Bavaria and associates,
Venice, Genoa and associates, Florence and associates, Sweden, Denmark. Poland, the
Pope. Moscovy, Austria, Courland and associates, Prussia, Saxony, Palatine and
associates, Hanover and associates, Ecclesiastical-Electors and associates.'96 All that
remained was to convince European monarchs that European Union was in their true
interest. While he acknowledged, rather defensively, the starkly Utopian nature of his
proposal, he was thoroughly convinced that all European heads of state, if they read his
pamphlet with sufficient attention, would warm to the plan. It was not that Saint-Pierre
lacked a sophisticated understanding of interest; he well understood that ambition was the
primary passion of monarchs and that ambition would have to met with a more powerful
passion if it's effects were to be neutered. He offered both fear and avarice; universal
monarchs would need live in perpetual dread of conspirators, and the wars their universal
monarchy would require to maintain itself would sap their states of all their wealth.
Without war, commerce could proceed far more productively, thus greatly enhancing the
sovereign's revenues.97 Without the interruption of commerce necessitated by war,
98
competition for prestige in the arts and sciences would engross the attentions of Europe.
Furthermore, an end to war would encourage the growth of population. 'The more
96 Ibid., p. 128.
97 Ibid., p. 81.
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'Every body knows how much Arts and Sciences may help to make a State rich and flourishing; with
the Assistance of Art a Man may do as much as twenty others that shall be without Art.. .Any body
may convince themselves of this Truth, by casting their Eyes upon Printing, Graving, and upon Arts
more Ancient, upon Mills, Carriages by Water, and on a hundred other Arts; on another side, the
Sciences help to improve the Arts, and event he Speculative Arts themselves, by their Lights and
Methods, may very much serve to improve Physick, Law, Morality, and especially Polity, upon
which depends the Happiness of Sovereigns and their Subjects, [without war...] How much would
Pensions and Prizes have excited Emulation among good Genius's. And is it not plain, that the
more there are of good wits that apply to a Science, the more their Efforts are stirred up by
Emulation, the more the imperceptible Progress they daily make becomes perceptible, even every
Year? How many things might be borrowed from Foreign nations, and perfected, were it not for the
Interruption of Commerce? These are the true Means of aggrandizing and enriching a State, of
giving it Splendor.' Ibid., pp. 83-84.
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Subjects there are, the more Manufacturers they do produce; the better the Lands are
cultivated, the more Manufactures they do produce; the better the Lands are cultivated,
the more do they bring forth;' Saint-Pierre explained, 'besides, the more People there are
employed about Commerce, the more rich does the Country grow, there is no
Comparison, therefore, to be made on that side, between the System ofWar wherein we
do live, and the System of Peace wherein we may live.'99 Saint-Pierre recognised that
this argument would be most persuasive to those states with an unfavourable balance of
trade; it would be more difficult, but not impossible, to persuade the monopolists,
England and the Netherlands, that European Union was to their favour as well. His
argument was that commercial competition was not a zero sum contest, and that the more
profitable the commerce of English and Dutch competitors, the more profitable English
and Dutch commerce would continue to be; they would not lose their built-in
advantages.100 The ability to undersell was not in itself a legitimate ground for jealousy.
The Abbe de Saint-Pierre, in a crowning flush of optimism, had sent his manuscript to
Cardinal Fleury, who, upon perusing the manuscript, was reputed to have raised an
99 Ibid., p. 89.
100 'If by the Treaty of Union (I have been told) Commerce encreases in France, in Spain, in Denmark,
in Portugal, and elsewhere, that Increase cannot be made but to the Prejudice of England, and
especially of Holland, who now carry on the greatest part of the Commerce of the World: But it is
easie to answer this Objection, and to shew that this Argmentation of the Commerce of one, will
not at all hinder the Augmentation of the Commerce of the others; the truth is, Commerce will
augment among all the Nations; but then it will augment among all proportionably; the Nation
which carried on the twelth part of the Commerce of Europe, shall carry on a greater Commerce;
but as all the others shall encrease theirs in proportion, it shall still carry on but the same twelth part
of the Commerce.. .Thus those Nations which have the most Conveniences to carry on Trade, shall
continue to have the greatest Share in Trade. Now as the English, and especially the Dutch,w ill
always have, so long as they please, more of those Conveniences than any other Nation, they will
be able, so long as they please, to preserve the same Superiority over all other nations in
Commerce, as they have always hitherto had; and when they shall cease to please, the other
Nations will then do them no wrong to pick up what they do not any longer think worth their while
togather.' Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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eyebrow and retorted. 'You have forgotten, sir. to begin by sending a troop of
missionaries, to dispose the hearts and intellects of Princes to such a work.'101
Both Fenelon and Saint-Pierre were to have their essays on the international order
transformed by later eighteenth-century editors. Fenelon's Essay was published in
English translation in 1720, by the nineteen-year-old Scot. William Grant, later Lord
Prestongrange, with notes and a commentary substantially longer than the original essay.
Saint-Pierre's essay was to undergo a better known, if no less thorough, reworking at the
hands of Jean Jacques Rousseau. What both of these reworkings shared was their
increased historical sensitivity to how the balance of power developed as a by-product of
the progress of civilisation.
Grant began by commending Fenelon's defence of the balance of Europe,
describing it as the article of the ius gentium of greatest importance, one that had emerged
102
necessarily as a correction to an unimproved international order. He extolled it as a
principle beyond party, as both the patriarchal and the contractual model for the origin of
government rested upon a narrative of the dialectic of ambition and balance. From a
patriarchal perspective, Grant argued, ambition, the passion upon which the desire for
universal monarchy drew its strength, had not been merely coeval with the emergence of
civil society, but its foundation. A plurality of societies had sprung up out of jealousy of
103the first innovator. Fortunately, an underdeveloped people, 'rude in the Art of
preserving the balance' failed to do so, and a true civil sovereignty had been able to form,
one that closely resembled universal monarchy. On the contractual analysis that Grant
101 Tad Nugent, 'Introduction' to Jean Jaques Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace (London, 1762),
p.vii.
102 Two Essays on the Balance ofEurope, pp. 31-32.
103 Ibid., p. 33.
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favoured, the fear of an ambitious neighbour had caused families to gather under a single
banner, and this defensive league had effectively been the first civil society.104 He argued
that this dynamic was preserved in the subject matter of ancient poetry, for 'tis from a
certain universal Sense of this ambitious Depravity in Man. and of the Value of whatever
conduces to preserve a Balance, that the fabulous Heroes of antient times have been
represented as employing their Vertue to delliver the Oppress'd, and to subdue Beasts,
Monsters, and Tyrants, those Enemys of the common Repose and Safety.'105 Yet even
taking the contractual model, society had been too unimproved to guard effectively
against tyranny and conquest. The balance of power in its modern sense required
communication between peoples, and early societies were too isolated to form effective
confederacies; such a situation had only arisen within modern Europe.106 Now, Grant
argued, countries faced each other as had the fathers of great families in the state of
nature, and the balance was the necessary security of the weak against the strong. Further
to this, the balance of power both rested upon and served to augment commercial ties
between states, a development that led to reciprocal improvement.107
The lack of codified union between the states of Europe did not lesson the reality
of a single society bound by a common ius gentium and mutual dependency. All of
Europe thus had a single interest to the preservation of their common society, and this
106 Ibid., p. 38.
107'As the first Societys of single Men afforded them not Safety only, but many Advantages and
Conveniencys of Life, of which they were destitute in their separate State; so, in this general Society
of Mankind, by a continual Intercourse of Nations, and an universal Commerce, every one reaps the
Benefit of the Inventions and Products of all, and the Art of human Life is brought to Perfection.
Which since, without such Commerce, it had never been, we might from hence alone argue for our
Union of distinct Societys: No Country beign absolute and compleat in itself, but abounding with a
superfluity of certain Commoditys, and wanting others equally conducive to its Welfare; which
plainly discovers the Relation it bears to other Countrys, or to the States by whom they are
inhabited'. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
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amounted to a duty to prevent universal monarchy. Grant followed Fenelon in hesitating
over whether this duty amounted to a sanction for a pre-emptive strike against a
108
suspected aggressor. He rehearsed and seconded the Archbishop's qualifications,
coming down in favour of the legitimacy of such strikes on the grounds that a sovereign
had an overriding duty to the protection of European society as a whole. Intriguingly, but
perhaps not surprisingly from a future Lord of Session, Grant likened the maintenance of
the balance to an act of distributive justice: 'Such a one cannot more justly complain of
the retrenching his Exorbitancy, than cou'd that Man who abounded in Plenty, on his
being robb'd of a Morsel of Bread by a Person ready to starve for Hunger, and who was
compell'd to use that Violence for his own Preservation.'109 Grant held that in extremis,
private right must always be sacrificed to the public good, 'the part shou'd be subjected
to the Whole,' provided it was done with moderation. State conduct, in the same manner
as that of persons, could be either virtuous or vicious, and Grant felt it was his happy
office to report that Great Britain had acted just such a virtuous role throughout her recent
history.110 He ended by suggesting that the vision of the foreign policy of pacific
108 'One reason for his hesitation was that he understood the ius gentium to be rather more restrictive of
pre-emptive strikes than modern scholarship now wishes to emphasise. 'But whether the bare
suspicion of 111 from a Power capable by a rightfully acquired Strength to inflict it, be a just cause of
using Force to prevent its farther growth, or future injury, may be justly called into question. For
the most celebrated Writers on the Law of Nations agree in this, that (as in the Case of private
Persons in the State of Nature) the Fear of a State, gives the rest no right to take Arms for reducing
it, unless there be such evident Signs of a real Intention of injuring them as amount to a moral
Certainty of their Danger; that they are to suppose the superior Power will contain itself within due
Bounds, till the contrary appear; and that they are to provide against uncertain Dangers, not by
Force, but by allowable and harmless Cautions, as by fortifying themselves, and uniting together.
And this is most certainly true in all ordinary Cases, when there is no very exorbitant Superiority of
one above the rest: yet it may not be utterly repugnant to our Author's Opinion in this latter Case.'
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
109 Ibid., p. 47.
ll0'And if at all times the observation would not hold good, tis true at least as the Affairs of Europe are
now constituted. For we are now in an Age when our Society at large is fram'd, a Connexion of the
whole preserv'd, and the Ballance and Liberty of Europe universally regarded with greatest
Caution. And we are our selves the happy Nation, who ever since the firm Security of our own
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kingship outlined at the close of Fenelon's essay was actually present in the happy
government and pacific policies of George I, and that Great Britain, as the guardian of the
European balance, had most fully realised that conquest was contrary to interest, and that
in the balance lay the best protection of liberty and commerce.
While one can only imagine what the saintly Archbishop of Cambrai would have
made of his essay being employed by a nineteen-year-old Scottish Presbyterian as a
panegyric to British war policy, the Abbe was a friend and confidant of Rousseau's, and
sympathised with his younger contemporary. Admirers of the Abbe's vision of a united
Europe, such as the republican Mably seized the opportunity to pressure Jean Jacques
Rousseau into editing and repackaging his works, including the Perpetual Peace, in a
more forthright and engaging style. Rousseau agreed with alacrity, and in the summer of
1756, produced the Extrait de la Paix perpetuelle. Rousseau attempted to have the work
published in a new journal, Le Monde comme il est, in 1760, but Rousseau's contribution
failed to meet with the approval of the censor, and was dropped. It was therefore
published later that year in Amsterdam.
An English translation, by Tad Nugent, the translator of Montesquieu's The
Spirit of the Laws, appeared in 1762, at the time when Britain and France were engaged
in negotiation of what was to emerge the next year as the Peace of Paris ending the Seven
Years War. If Nugent had any intimations he was unleashing a turkey onto an
Libertys by settling a Ballance of Power between our Prince and People, have not only enjoy'd
those Blessings at home, but by our Greatness and Power given Life and Vigour to their Cause
abroad. We were the Head and Chief of the European League, founded on this common Cause, to
reduce the Exorbitancy of a neighbouring Prince, who threatened the World with a universal
Monarchy. Nor can we lose this noble Ardour, or quit the glorious Toil, whilst we are under the
wise Government of a King, whose chiefest Care is to make his People happy; and yet with an
extensive Goodness seeks the Benefit of all, and affects the Interest and Prosperity of the World.'
Ibid., pp. 54-55.
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unsuspecting public, he certainly did not let on. 'The world may be more essentially
benefited by the observation of his scheme', he rhapsodised, 'than by all the efforts
hitherto published for encreasing human felicity, as it is the most extensive of all hitherto
proposed.'
The problem for Nugent, as it had been for Pufendorf, lay in our classical
education:
I have been frequently induced to think, that the military actions of the Greeks
and Romans being rendered more illustrious by the writers of those nations than
their legislative institutions, hath, in a great measure, contributed to stamp on the
deeds of arms, a superior worth to those of legislation, and particularly in the
minds of princes; but it seems probable, that were it sufficiently reflected upon,
how much the genius of a legislator is superior to that of the most consummate
general, how much more arduous the task, of planning and perfecting government,
is than that of defeating armies, that intellect and virtue can alone be equal to
the former, and casualty may, and frequently does, give victory to inferior
understandings and vicious hearts, Sovereigns might be induced to relinquish the
clamorous joy of triumph for the silent and self-approving enjoyment of spreading
happiness on millions, and by that means the ambition of writing their renown in
blood of half the plains of Europe, may yield to the perpetuation of it by legislative
establishments of peace."'
Rousseau's extract was in reality nothing of the sort. The work had been almost entirely
rewritten, and with greater historical sophistication. However, it did glow with the same
optimism: 'I step forth to behold', Rousseau declared, 'at least in idea, mankind uniting
in love and friendship; I dispose myself to contemplate, of a sweet and peaceful society
of brothers, living in eternal concord, all guided by the same maxims, all happy in one
common felicity.' His strategy was to underscore at length the extent to which Europe
was already a single system in most key respects. The post Utrecht system already
provided for extensive commerce between European heads of state, and thus had gone




Besides these public confederacies, others less apparent, though not less real,
may silently form themselves, by the union of interests, by the analogy of maxims,
by the conformity of manners, and by other circumstances which permit the
common relations, between divided nations, to submit. It is in this manner, that
all the Potentates of Europe, form amongst themselves a kind of system, which
unites them by the same religion, by the same law of nations, hy manners, by letters,
by commerce, and by every kind of equipoze, which is necessary to preserve, is not
so easy to he broken, as many men are inclined to think.
Likewise religion served as a powerful connecting tissue between the disparate European
states. Rome, in both its ancient imperial and its modern ecclesiastical incarnation, had
bequeathed to Europe a single civilisation:
In this manner religion and the empire have formed the social link
of various nations; which, without possessing any real community of
interests, rights or dependance, enjoyed one of maxims and opinion;
the influence of which still remained when the principle was destroyed.
The antient image of the Roman Empire has continued to form a kind
of combination amongst the members which composed it, and Rome
possessing dominion in another manner, after the destruction of the Empire,
there remained of that double chain a more close society amongst the nations
of Europe, where the centre of their powers subsisted, than in the other parts
of the world, of which the people, too distant for correspondence, have
besides no particular subject of re-union."2
For this reason, European Union was a project less chimerical than would be the case for
other continents such as Asia, America, or Africa, which were entirely too physically
large and culturally varied for any such attempt. In Europe, however, such objections
lacked force:
To this then must be added the particular situation of Europe, its more
equal population and fertility, the closer union of its parts, and continual
mixture of interests, that consanguinity, commerce, arts and colonies have
distributed amongst the Sovereigns. Besides these, the number of rivers,
and the variety of their courses, which render the communication of all parts
easy. The inconstant disposition of the inhabitants, which invites them
continually to travel, and to visit each others countries; the invention of printing,
and the general taste in letters, which hath created amongst them a community
of studies and of knowledge; in fine, the multitude and smallness of the states,
which, united to the calls of luxury, and to the diversity of climates, render
them mutually necessary to each other. All these causes combined form of
Europe, not like Asia and Africa, an ideal collection of people, who have




manners, customs, and even its laws, from which no nation that composes a
part of it, can separate itself without speedily exciting troubles and commotions.113
This was not to imply that Europe possessed a single public law. The crucial point for
Rousseau was that while Europe may indeed, loosely speaking, be said to have a body of
common laws, this common body was rife with contradiction, and so lacking in binding
general principles, as to be of no great use in dubious cases. Self-interest would
invariably dictate action, and 'war would be inevitable, even when parties would
willingly be just'.114
There was no conceivable outcome of any of these wars likely to fundamentally
bring about any lasting cessation of hostility. There was no reason to fear, and also no
realistic reason to hope for, any sort of universal European monarchy. The national
strengths of the individual European military monarchies were too neatly matched for
that. To a greater degree than Saint-Pierre had suggested, Rousseau believed that the
present system of Europe did indeed have certain stability, but it was not stability worth
having. The predictable stability of perpetual war was not a system to celebrate:
But if the present system is immoveable, it is for that reason the more
tempestuous; for there is between the powers of Europe, a continual
action and re-action, which, without absolutely displacing, keeps them
in perpetual agitation, and their efforts are always ineffectual and always
generating, like the waves of the sea, which incessantly agitate the surface
without ever changing the level; so that the subjects are continually
harrassed without any perceptible advantage to their sovereigns.115
In short, while there existed a genuine European society, one could not truly speak of a
correspondingly genuine European order, if one took the word seriously. For Rousseau,
all the weighty tomes of the Law of Nations, lovingly compiled by German professors,
amounted to so much escapist fiction, and badly written fiction at that. There could be no
113 Ibid., p 8.
w Ibid., p. 10.
115 Ibid., p. 14.
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true Law of Nations, and indeed no prospect for a lasting peace in Europe, outwith a
genuinely federal structure, such as the Abbe had proposed. Rousseau did not hold such
a European Union to be a possible alternative, however. The failure was not in Saint-
Pierre's reasoning, however, rather the capacity of sovereigns for right reason. While
Rousseau's summary of the Abbe's project was to have no more effect on the hearts and
minds of the sovereigns of Europe than the original, it did present a highly suggestive
historical narrative of the progress of civilisation in Europe that made such a union
tenable, a narrative that was to share much with Robertson's own.
58
III. John Campbell and the Interest ofGreat Britain
While the eighteenth century has been seen as something of a high water mark for
Utopian conceptions of international order, such as that presented by Saint-Pierre or
Rousseau."6 it would be very wrong to suppose that the power of Saint-Pierre's argument
put an end to the Pufendorfian project of writing the history of state interest. This
certainly had not transpired in Britain, where as has been noted, Pufendorf's own history
enjoyed such considerable success and imitation. Probably the most prominent of
Pufendorf's British disciples was John Campbell, best known for his later involvement in
117the hugely ambitious publishing project of the multi-volume Universal History. While
the Universal History, an encyclopaedia of all existing historical knowledge, was an
endeavour as much commercial as intellectual, his earlier work, The Present State of
Europe, could not have had a more contemporary polemical thrust. Campbell saw his
work as following in a tradition of inquiry began by Rohan and continued by Pufendorf,
that sought to provide the sort of general historical framework necessary for statesmen to
comprehend the interests of the various states of Europe, so as better to understand that of
their own. Campbell could be seen as providing an answer to Hume's query as to
whether politics could be reduced to a science, arguing that the methodology of such a
science lay in applying the doctrine of state interest to concrete situations.118 Britain's
116 On this tradition see Felix Gilbert 'The "New Diplomacy" of the Eighteenth Century' World
Politics, 4 (1951) pp. 1-38.
117 John Campbell remains a somewhat neglected figure. But see, in addition to the writings of Guido
Abbatista, Peter N. Miller, Defining the Common Good: Empire, religion, and philosophy in
eighteenth- century Britain (Cambridge, 1994) chapters 2-3.
118' The SCIENCE I mean is POLITICKS; by which I understand a comprehensive Knowledge of the
fundamental Maxims of Policy, grounded upon the actual and real Interests of the several
Governments of EUROPE; and this is not only a polite as well as a useful kind of Learning, the
Study of which may be therefore recommended without Pedantry, but is in Reality a Point of great
Consequence; because without this Knowledge it will be a Thing very difficult, if not
impracticable, for a young Gentleman to qualify himself for the Service of his Country; in the
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present situation as a great commercial power had aroused the attention and interest of all
Europe, and therefore it would be neither possible nor desirable to remain aloof from
continental affairs. In Campbell's view this called for an increased attention to statecraft
and provided works, such as his own, with a new relevance."9
Campbell followed convention in arguing that the correct knowledge of interest
was the necessary prerequisite for prudent political action, yet his view of the content of
that knowledge differed from that of Pufendorf. For Pufendorf, the science of interest lay
in prudently discerning real from imaginary interest; sovereigns either acted according to
prudent calculation of advantage or they were deluded by blind passion. Campbell was
more concerned to emphasise that the study of interest was above all the study of opinion.
Understanding interest thus entailed learning to see through the eye of the interested
party. Campbell was able to quote Rohan with approval, while subtly altering the Duke's
meaning: 'It is the Notion that the governing Part of any Community has of this kind of
Science,' Campbell wrote, 'that in one Sense is properly stiled INTEREST, and in this
Sense it is that an illustrious and able French Politician says truly, and with great Spirit,
that Kings govern Nations, and Interest governs Kings: Les Princes commandent aux
Peuples, & I 'Interest commande aux Princes.'
Campbell was as concerned as Pufendorf had been with the way in which state
interest was determined by constitutional form. 'The first Thing therefore that is requisite
to be understood in practical Politicks,' he argued, 'is the true State of the Government
present Times more especially, when to be able to have a thorough Notion of the Interests of Great
Britain is not barely expedient, but absolutely necessary to have a clear Insight into the Concerns of
all the European Powers.' J. Campbell, The Present State of Europe (London, 1757) p. 1.
119 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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subsisting in any Country." Nonetheless, a few general principles tended to inform the
interest of states, regardless of the present state of its constitution. The first, though no
longer as decisive as in ages past, was religion. Also important were alliances, existing
and potential, as well as the geographical situation of a state. Just as key was a state's
relative situation, i.e. whether it was in a state of rise or decline, and lastly, what claims
or pretensions one state had over another. True statesmanship was the ability to apply
121these tests to concrete situations.
As confessional allegiance remained the primary determinant of national interest
for Campbell, no single state was more central to the political interest of Europe as a
whole than the See of Rome. Campbell followed Pufendorf in viewing the 'Spiritual
199
Monarchy of Rome' almost entirely in political terms. The politician in Campbell was
clearly fascinated by the figure of the Pope. In contrast to much contemporary Protestant
analysis of the papal power, which all too frequently degenerated into denunciations of
priestcraft and bovine superstition, Campbell, as a scientist of opinion, was concerned
with the vexing question as how an assertion of authority so patently absurd could hold
so many in thrall so effectively. Campbell likened the papacy to the leaning tower of
Pisa, which 'tho' it seems to carry evident Marks of Weakness, is in fact a Structure very
strong in itself, contrived with great skill, as well as erected with much Art.' In the minds
121 'It requires great Force of Mind, much Application, and a large Compass of Knowledge, to apply
these general Principles to each particular State. A superior Genius, capable of this in its utmost
Extent, and with the highest Degree of Perfection, becomes a consummate Statesman; one fit not to
assist only, but even to direct the greatest Monarch. And therefore the Emperor CHARLES V. who
was at once the wisest and most fortunate Prince of the Age in which he lived, had Reason to say to
his son PHILIP II. when he introduced to him his Secretary Eraso, the Day after he had resigned to
him so many kingdoms, and recommended him to his Service; "The Present I make you now, is
greater than that which I made you yesterday; Quanto os he dado este dia, no es tanto que daros
estecriado'. Ibid., p. 12.
122 He also follows Pufendorf in his use of the term.
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of the followers of the Roman rite, the person of the pope assumed a literal aura of
divinity, the efficacy of which, Campbell claimed, Protestants tended to lose sight.123
This made it all the more fascinating for him that the office of pope was so often filled by
commoners. Ironically, the Spiritual Monarchy of Rome offended Campbell's own
hierarchical conception of the natural distinction of ranks in society:
If we consider that the Popes rise to that Dignity from very inferior Stations,
were heretofore frequently, and still sometimes of mean Families, without
any Support from Kindred or Relations, deriving a great Part of their
Revenues from the Subjects of other Princes, and this in Virtue of their
claiming a Share in their Allegiance, exercising an Authority grounded only
in Opinion, and frequently assuming a Superiority over those to whom they
have not only been themselves in Obedience, but have also rendered them
domestick Offices in the Nature of Servants: When, I say, we consider all this,
with a Multitude of other Particulars, that every intelligent Reader's Memory
will furnish, we cannot help wondering that this Ecclesiastical Empire has
stood for so long, grown up to so great a Height, and continues yet to enjoy a
green old Age, that does not seem to betray any Symptoms of a speedy
Dissolution.124
Campbell thought Protestantism suffered a competitive disadvantage vis a vis Rome; it
was overwhelmingly a spiritual movement, and was not calculated for political gain. The
papacy, on the other hand, was free to act as mediator and interlocutor between Catholic
states, thereby earning their gratitude and their realisation that the propagation of
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Catholic doctrine was to their own political advantage. Campbell lamented that, with
123 Ibid., p. 423.
124 Ibid., p 424.
125 'The close Connection between the Clergy in all Popish Countries and the Court of Rome, joined to
the occasional Benefits that Monarchs themselves may receive by Bulls fromt the Holy See, makes
them unwilling to interpose, or break off that Commerce which their Subjects have wit Rome, that
upon certain Occasions they may derive Favours from thence, which may easily procure what
otherwise might with Difficulty be forced by their own Authority. The Subjection of the Clergy to
a foreign Head makes them sometimes more tractable to their natural Sovereigns than they
otherwise would be, since the Good-will and Friendship fo a single Person is more easilly attained,
than the Direction of many, and besides in those Cases there can be no Appeal to the People,
because in all such Disputes they think an implicity Submission to the Duty of the Clergy. We may
add to this another rReason, which is, that the Popish Princes cherish the Spiritual Power of the
Pope, as the Means of preserving Unity of Religion, and thereby preventing religious Disputes,
which very seldom disturb the Church, wihtout disturbing the State also. Thus it appears, that
independent of Enthusiasm and Superstition, political Principles have no small Share in promoting
that Adherence to the See of Rome, which at first Sight seems so irreconcilable to the absolute
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the passing of its original zeal. Protestantism, both in its theology and in its sectarianism,
seemed designed for political impotence.125
The relative strength of the Catholic position in Europe was the primary
justification for a policy of engagement with continental Europe. Those who clamoured
for the renewal of splendid isolation had not sufficiently come to terms with the fact that
interests change over time, and what might have been a prudent course of action in
agespast was by no means necessarily so today. The 'blue water' policy that Campbell
dated back to the early seventeenth century had become the delusion of sentimental
patriots. 127Campbell preferred, in any case, to indulge his nostalgia in other periods.
Campbell, in a move seemingly no less typical of interest of state discourse as patriotic
Whig discourse, harkened back to the gilded age of Gloriana as the time when Britain's
foreign policy was conducted in perfect accordance with her true interest.
The wise Queen Elizabeth, who laid the Foundation of the Wealth and Power
which we now possess, acted upon quite different Principles, and was so far
from paying no Attention to foreign Affairs, that it plainly appears they were
never so well understood or managed as in her Time. She it was that prevented
Philip II. from accomplishing his Scheme of universal Empire, not barely by
providing for the Security of her Dominions at home, but by employing both
Money and Men to occupy him with perpetual Diversions abroad. She prevented
France from becoming a Province to Spain, which must have been fatal to the
Liberties of Europe; and she afforded that Assistance to the States of the United
Provinces, that enabled them to become an independent Republick, which has in
succeeding Times contributed so much to preserve the Independence of the
European Powers against the ambitious Views of the House of Bourbon.128
Elizabeth was the first English monarch to pay proper heed to commerce and imperial
Authority of Sovereign Princes, and which notwithstanding by their dextrous Management is often
made to co-operate with'. Ibid., pp. 424-425.
126 Ibid., p. 16.
127 Ibid., p. 505.
128 Ibid., p. 507.
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expansion.129 Campbell argued that the greatness of any state lay in the size of her
population, and that the chief cause of the increase of British population lay in her
overseas colonies. Demand in any economy had a finite limit, yet the creation of new
markets overseas with an increased need for supply from the mother country had the
effect of augmenting domestic employment and prosperity.1'0 As such, Campbell argued
that the interest and the commerce of the British Empire were really the same entity
under different description. 'For Commerce is that Tie, by which the several, and even
the most distant Parts of this Empire, are connected and kept together, so as to be
rendered Parts of the same Whole."31 Commercial interests further dictated that the
liberty of Europe be preserved, for if the states of Europe were to fall under the spell of a
universal hegemon, the effect would be to 'naturally and even necessarily . . . lessen the
Number of Inhabitants, to extinguish Industry amongst them, and consequently to
enfeeble and impoverish them, which must be detrimental to us, if we correspond to trade
with them.'132
It was in Britain's commercial interest to maintain the balance of power in
Europe. In concrete terms this entailed maintaining the alliance with the Habsburgs
against the French.133 Campbell was at some pains to moderate the more rabid Whig
129 'It is true, that she likewise promoted the Navigation and Commerce other Subjects, opened a
Passage for them into both the Indies, and excited that Spirit which afterwards induced us to make
Settlements in the most distant Parts of the Globe; and by a wise and happy conjunction of our
Labours both there and in Britain, at once extended our Wealth and Power, without the least
Diminution of our People, contrary to the Effects of Plantations made from other Countries, which
have suffered at home, by aggrandizing themselves abroad; whereas our domestick Power is
constantly augmented in Proportion to the Advantages derived from our Settlements abroad; and to
this circulation of our Commerce it is in reality oweing , that our Strength is so much greater, our
Lands so much more valuable, and our intrinsic Wealth so much increased, as it since that Time;
and this, in spite of long Wars, and other intervening Accidents, not at all favourable to our
Interests.' Ibid., p. 508.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid., p. 510.
132 Ibid., p. 511.
133 'In supporting that august Family in three several Wars, we justified our Fidelity to our Treaties,
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polemic that the French were Catholic therefore tyrannical therefore always and
everywhere a clear and present danger to Britain's mixed constitution. At times France
had played out this role and at times it had not. It was thus the role of the prudent British
statesmen to keep a level head concerning French intentions. It was policy, not religious
zeal or endemic xenophobia, that had historically informed British hostility to French
foreign policy.
It is that Cause that we support, and not an innate, hereditary, and groundless
Aversion to the French Nation; for whenever their Statesmen shall abandon
that Plan which is dangerous and destructive in its Nature to themselves as
well as others, they will infallibly disarm us, and extinguish that Animosity
which their boundless Ambition, and not our Obstinacy or Perverseness, has
excited. There have been, within memory of the present Generation, certain
Seasons, in which the French ministers either really or seemingly laid by those
Schemes, and affected to act upon other Principles, and that very soon produced
an Alteration in the conduct of other Powers towards them, which fully justifies
this Observation; and therefore their Politicians have no just Grounds for
imputing to the Fierceness of our Manners, that Alacrity we have shewn in
entering into all Alliances against them, but ought rather to describe it to that
Rectitude of Judgment which is natural to a free People, and which will always
appear amongst us as long as we continue free.134
Campbell held that an irrationally jealous stance against French ambition would
ultimately prove contrary to British interest, which was to pursue her own commerce at
peace with her neighbours. It was an implicit critique of the imprudence of the past
conduct of British policy to underscore the point that the rage of party had no place in the
conduct of debate. Immoderate passion in the maintenance of hostilities led statesmen to
overplay their hand, and to lose sight of the fact that the British Empire was designed for
preservation, and not for increase. Campbell remarked therefore that,
at this Day our Princes can have no Temptation to enterprising Wars
of Conquest as in former Times; so that a true Spirit of Patriotism can never
which in itself is a Point ever of the highest Consequence, as it is a Kind of national Honour, which
once lost can hardly ever be regained.. .there be no other way than this of supporting the genera!
Balance of Power, and maintaining that Independence which is the primary Point in our foreign
System, we acted well and wisely in sustaining.' Ibid., p. 513.
134 Ibid., p. 514.
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he shewn, in opposing Projects that will never be set on foot; and in this lies our
great happiness, that having no Views or Pretensions upon our Neighbours, there
is no solid, indeed not so much as a plausible Ground for us to hate them, or they us.
This is the true fundamental Principle of our Policy; that in respect to the Affairs of
the Continent, we are not to be governed by any of those temporary or accidental
Conveniences, which very often, and that justly too, pass for Reasons of State in
other kingdoms; but by this single Rule, of their acting in Conformity to our natural
Interests, so far as is consistent with their own.135
Campbell was here rehearsing a familiar Whig trope in reversing Machiavelli's typology
of empires, commercial preservation in preference to territorial expansion. The practical
import of such an analysis was to underscore the wisdom of a blue water policy, which
was a shift of emphasis from continental power politics to the pursuit of overseas
commerce. To drive this point home was the central theme of his Pufendorfian
discussion of the present state and true interests of Europe. One may be sceptical
whether Pufendorf would have approved.
135 Ibid., p. 509.
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Conclusion
The preceding chapter has thus sought to demonstrate how an historical
discourse stemming from a language of reason of state and overwhelmingly preoccupied
with the interest of states and the balance of power between them became pervasive in
early modern Europe. This discourse developed from one preoccupied with the
relationship between interest and confession to one preoccupied with commercial
interest. This discourse was not only historically sensitive but produced an 'interest of
states' historiographical sub-genre that threatened into inflate into universal history. Yet
it could be argued that discussion of a European state 'system' remained at this point
relatively under-developed, far more concerned with promoting the interests of individual
states in a state of nature than in analysing how this state of nature developed and
functioned in the modern world. Narrative and macronarrative had yet to converge; the
European state system, in short, awaited its first systematiser. The first to attempt such a
project was the philosopher and historian David Elume, whose work the next chapter will
address.
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Chapter Two: David Hume's History ofEurope
The previous chapter suggested that the balance of power had emerged as an historically
sensitive critique of state action and had evolved in accordance with developments in the
understanding of the historically specific nature of 'interest' itself. The Scottish
philosopher and historian David Hume was to push the argument much further in his
attempt to tell the history of British statecraft in terms of the preservation of the European
balance. Of all historians of the English Parnassus beneath Tobias Smollett, no two were
1 2seated more uncomfortably close than William Robertson and David Hume. Friends"
and sometime rivals, the two are rightly, if rather casually, grouped together as exponents
of a similar style of 'philosophical history', in which narrations of war and diplomacy
were contextualised through parallel histories of manners and of the progress of society.
One should be cautious, however, in aligning the Presbyterian minister and the infidel too
closely. A trenchantly sceptical history can only have so much to do with an historical
theodicy such as Robertson's, particularly when both, at least in part, chronicled the
history of Europe in an age of religious war.
The relationship between the historiography of Hume and Robertson has not been
entirely neglected by modern scholarship. Much of this has centred on such local issues
as their contrasting assessment of the guilt ofMary Queen of Scots, their naturally
contrasting assessments of the Reformation, and Hume's scepticism concerning
Robertson's choice of Charles V as subject matter. The dominant themes of Robertson's
1 The phrase relates to a joke of Hume's, who did not particularly value Smollett's contribution to the art
of history.
2 It is difficult to be entirely sure precisely how warm their personal relationship was. Their
correspondence clearly reveals mutual admiration as well as no small amount of self-admiration for their
ability to transcend professional rivalry.
historiography, the development of the European balance of power and the expansion of
European empire, have been relatively neglected themes in Hume's own historiography.
This is not without cause, as the two have seldom been seen to pursue the same subject.
Hume's History has been persuasively described as fundamentally a history of English
liberty, with a focus squarely kept on the development of the constitutional balance
between liberty and authority. The History asserted that English liberty was a modern
phenomenon, only recently settled as a result of the events of 1688-89, and had as its
centre a revisionist account of the civil wars of the mid-seventeenth century, where Hume
'dared shed a tear for King Charles'. From such a perspective, Duncan Forbes was
undoubtedly correct in describing the narratives of the reigns of James I and Charles I as
constituting 'by far the most important period in the whole History. '3 Yet lengthy
sections of The History ofEngland were devoted to assessing the prudence of English
monarchs as they played out their roles on the international stage. In fact, the narratives
of the reigns of the late Stuarts, and particularly those of the late Tudors, were almost
entirely given over to foreign affairs. Hume was quite explicit about this. In his volume
on Elizabethan history, he stated that 'England furnishes few materials for history, except
the small part she took in foreign transactions.'4 The subject matter of Hume's chapters
on foreign developments was the balance of power, a term that had three distinct
meanings as applied to Hume's historiography. First, it related to the fluctuating balance
between the republican and the monarchical, or the liberal and authoritarian, aspects of
1
Duncan Forbes, Hume's Philosophical Politics (Cambridge, 1975). Karen O'Brien has been largely
alone in arguing that, on the contrary, the more internationally orientated Tudor volumes instead
formed the 'argumentative heart' of the history, cf. Narratives ofEnglightenment (Cambridge, 1997) p.
92. As O'Brien has sought to portray Hume's History as a 'cosmopolitan narrative', this is only
natural. The present chapter, however, is as concerned with the limits as with the extent of any such
'cosmopolitanism'.
4
Hume, The History ofEngland, (Indianapolis, 1983) IV, p. 178.
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the English constitution. In this sense, 'the balance of power' was indeed the central
theme of the entire History. Hume primarily understood the term, however, in its more
normal sense as the 'maxim of prudence' regarding foreign affairs, where prudence
consisted in siding with the weaker rather than the stronger player in an existing conflict,
and thus preserving the balance. This understanding in turn implied a third and more
'philosophical' sense, also central to Hume's historical thinking, of the equilibrium of
arms and revenue of the modern European states system. If the balance between and
within states was peripheral if important to Hume, it was of course the explicit subject of
Robertson's historical enquiries. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to explore
these Robertsonian themes in Hume's History, to explore the extent to which Hume's
writings set up, solved, or left ambiguous problems Robertson was later to pursue. Such
a task requires caution. Trawling Hume's historical narratives on the hunt for universal
truths is often self-defeating, for prudence, the virtue according to which his monarchs
were weighed in the balance, had few fixed points of reference. The foundation of
modern English liberty was the Revolution settlement of 1689, primarily an event in the
history of the English constitution, but one made possible by the state of play of the
religious and power politics of continental Europe. As Hume was to present it, William
III had never sought the English crown for its own sake, but as an opportunity to harness
the economic and military capacity of England in the service of defensive wars against
French hegemony in which she had remained aloof for generations.
The future interests of Hume the historian were clearly discernible in the work of
the philosopher. Hume invoked the revolution strategically and quite strikingly in his
70
first published work, the Treatise on Hitman NatureMuch of Hume's Treatise on
Human Nature can be understood as providing the psychological underpinnings of
political action, of both the ruler and the ruled. It is certainly beyond the scope of the
present chapter to attempt an exegesis of the Treatise. The intention here is only to
demonstrate the role played by the historical event of the revolution within it, and to point
how such a role would condition any later attempt to narrate it more fully.
The Treatise contained three distinct books, on the Imagination, on the Passions,
and on Morals. The centrepiece of Book III was a lengthy section on justice. Justice was
an 'artificial,' as opposed to a 'natural' virtue, which is to say it was based on convention
rather than human nature. Such a view of justice naturally had potentially troubling
implications for the grounding of political obligation. Indeed, in a sense, Hume offered
no such grounding at all. His interest lay rather in the psychology of allegiance. This
was perhaps the greatest arcana of any politics, ancient or modern, not how the one ruled
the many, but rather what patterns of thought drove the many to adhere so passionately to
the one. Hume began with a psychological, rather than a historical, account of the origin
of government. Human beings were fundamentally governed by a sense of preserving
their own interest.6 The natural operations of the passions, directed by the imagination,
5 Nicholas Phillipson, 'Propriety, property and prudence: David Hume and the defence of the Revolution'
in Phillipson and Skinner (eds), Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge, 1993), p. 303.
6
'Nothing is more certain, than that men are, in a great measure, govern'd by interest, and that even when
they extend their concern beyond themselves, 'tis not to any great distance; nor is it usual for them, in
common life, to look farther than their nearest friends and acquaintance. 'Tis no less certain, that 'tis
impossible for men to consult their interest in so effectual a manner, as by an universal and inflexible
observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve society, and keep themselves from
falling into that wretched and savage condition, which is commonly represented as the state ofnature.
And as this interest, which all men have in the upholding of society, and the observation of the rules of
justice, is so great, so is it palpable and evident, event o the most rude and uncultivated of the human
race; and 'tis almost impossible for any one, who has had experience of society, to be mistaken in this
particular. Since, therefore, men are so sincerely attach'd to their interest, and their interest is o much
concern's I nthe observance of justice, and this interest is so certain and avow'd; it may be ask'd, how
any disorder can ever arise in society, and what principle there is in human nature so powerful as to
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necessarily focus one on the present, rather than distant concerns. 'This is the reason,'
explained Hume, ' why men so often act in contradiction to their known interest; and in
particular why they prefer any trivial advantage, that is present, to the maintenance of
order in society, which so much depends on the observance of justice.'7
But to understand human psychology only in such terms would be unduly
pessimistic. The very fact that our imagination projects weakly into the future prevents
our passions from clouding our sense of interest regarding those very future events.
Though the desire to misbehave might be for the present moment unstoppable, we can all
readily enough decide to behave well tomorrow. Almost all squabble and rancour over
the rights and wrongs of particular allegiances were based not upon 'reason,' but upon
'bigotry and superstition.' All of this had troubling implications for the more casual
rights language upon which Whiggery relied, and Hume was well aware of this. 'But
here,' Hume announced, 'an English reader will be apt to enquire concerning that famous
o
revolution, which has been attended with such mighty consequences.' Hume's decision
to break with his normal preference of drawing historical examples from antiquity and to
incorporate a concrete historical event was startling. He noted that while he had already
admitted of the need for a doctrine of limited resistance, as a generalised principle, such a
doctrine was impossible for a sovereign power to allow codified. In a mixed constitution,
the silence of laws should not be mistaken for legislative deference to the executive, but
assigned rather to legislative prudence. Yet it was manifestly in the public interest for
this species of liberty to exist. A form of government, or indeed a branch of government,
overcome so strong a passion, or so violent as to obscure so clear a knowledge? D. Hume, A Treatise
on Human Nature, eds. A. L. Shelby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1978) p. 534.
7 Ibid., p. 535.
^Ibid., p. 563.
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unable to protect its interests by force if necessary was hardly in a position to fulfil its
original remit. 'So 'tis a gross absurdity to suppose, in any government", Hume
maintained, 'a right without a remedy, or allow, that the supreme power is shared with
the people, without allowing, that 'tis lawful for them to defend their share against every
invader. Those, therefore, who would seem to respect our free government, and yet deny
the right of resistance, have renounced all pretensions to common sense, and do not merit
a serious answer'.9 Hume insisted that it was not his purpose to deliver a particular
defence of the revolution, but only to reflect on general questions to which it gave rise.
The modern reader cannot help but find this assertion somewhat disingenuous, as his
discussion of general issues was entirely geared to demonstrate the psychological
plausibility of the perspective of the revolutionaries. It was entirely natural for the mind
to associate the tyranny of James II with apprehension of his heirs, and thus to wish their
exclusion from any future line of succession.
In the Treatise Hume also briefly touched on the Robertsonian theme of the
relationship between regularity of government and military capacity. As we shall see, for
Robertson, only regular governments are capable of concerted action on the international
stage. Hume was interested in this connection as it pertained to civil war and the
dissolution of government:
Now foreign war to a society without government necessarily produces civil war.
Throw any considerable goods among men, they instantly fall a quarelling, while
each strives to get possession of what pleases him, without regard to the consequences.
In a foreign war the most considerable of all goods, life, and limbs, are at stake; and as
every one shuns dangerous posts, seizes the best arms, seeks excuse for the slightest
wounds, the rules of society, which may be well enough observ'd, when men were calm,
can now no longer take place, when they are in such commotion.10
Experience reveals that only a regular government may engage in external aggression and
9




expect to maintain its integrity. To say as much implied a narrative the Treatise did not
seek to provide. The progress of society was, at one level, a story of the development of
constitutional irregularity towards regularity throughout the various polities of Europe.
The treatment of such themes in the Treatise remained perhaps more incidental and
suggestive than systematically pursued. Hume's Essays, however, more explicitly set as
problems a number of the themes Robertson would pursue in relation to the balance of
power and the European state system.
At first it seemed Hume was disinclined to view foreign history structurally or
philosophically, more a sea of distant contingency. In 1742 he argued,
The domestic and gradual revolutions of a state must be a more proper study
of reasoning and observation, than the foreign and the violent, which are
commonly produced by single persons, and are more influenced by whim, folly,
or caprice, by general passions and interests. The depression of the lords, and
rise of the commons in ENGLAND, after the statutes of alienation and the
encrease of trade and industry, are more easily accounted for by general principles,
than the depression of the SPANISH, and rise of the FRENCH monarchy, after the
death of CHARLES QUINT. Had Harry IV. Cardinal RICHELIEU, and LOUIS XIV.
been SPANIARDS; and PHILIP II. III. and IV. and CHARLES II. been FRENCHMEN,
the history of these two nations had been entirely reversed."
If foreign transactions were a mere sequence of accidents, one could not, with any sense,
seek for them any causal explanation. International history would not seem an
appropriate subject for philosophical history. Hume thought the point worth repeating in
his 1752 essay 'Of Commerce'. In defence of the sort of 'general reasoning' often
necessary in philosophy from any charge of abstruseness, Hume insisted this was
precisely the sort of reasoning necessary for the statesman. 'It is also the chief business
of politicians;' Hume maintained, 'especially in the domestic part of the state, where the
public good, which is, or ought to be their object, depends on the concurrence of a
11 David Hume 'Of the rise and progress of the arts and sciences' in Political Works, ed. Knud
Haakonssen (Cambridge, 1995), p. 59.
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multitude of causes; not, as in foreign politics, on accidents and chances, and the caprices
of a few persons."12 If foreign politics, and hence foreign history, was of no particular
use to the statesman, then, in neo-classical terms, the study was flatly denied its principal
justification. For Hume, however, history was also a polite genre, and he harboured
ambitions of a far more diverse readership for history than statesmen and magistrates.
Yet while pressing the point that if women wished to provide genuine intellectual
stimulation to men in conversation, Hume recommended they would need to possess a
sound grasp of the histories of ancient Greek and Roman history, as well as that of their
own country. The seventeenth century development, associated with Samuel Pufendorf,
away from classical subjects and classical values, and towards careful study of the
circumstances and interests of one's neighbours, did not figure in Hume's
recommendations either for entertainment or for instruction. To some extent Hume
remained a classicist and retained the interests of a classicist, and here the extent of
Hume's internationalism can reasonably be brought into question. Robertson, as we shall
see, was at great pains to demonstrate precisely the opposite. That historian sought to
discern those deep causes that underlie such phenomena as the depression of the Spanish
and the rise of the French, and recommended such subjects as the most useful to those in
public life. In doing so he rejected his friend's recommendation that he discard such
plans and choose a classical subject instead.
Hume's historiographical conservatism was highly paradoxical, for Hume sought
through philosophical history to augment classical values scarcely less than Pufendorf.
Nor could he be said to have ever taken an antiquarian or parochial view of his subject
matter. Hume, almost uniquely among the historians of the Scottish Enlightenment,
12 Hume 'Of Commerce' in Political Essays, p. 94.
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extended his narrative into the stormy waters of the civil and ecclesiastical tumults of the
seventeenth century, waters Robertson himself conspicuously avoided entering. And
within his own civil narratives, Hume consistently demonstrated the complex inter¬
relation between the domestic and the European balance of power. Clearly 'foreign
contingency' did not imply any lack of domestic relevance. Hume was instead
thoroughly a modern in his outlook who found a comparative approach comparing
different nations that are contemporaries, where we both judge more impartially, and can
13better set in opposition those manners, with which we are sufficiently acquainted.'
Hume described a certain type of interaction among states as a pre-requisite of
Enlightenment itself:
That nothing is more favourable to the rise ofpoliteness and learning, than a number
ofneighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy.
The emulation, which naturally arises among those neighbouring states, is an obvious
source of improvement: But what I would chiefly insist on is the stop, which such
limited territories give both to power and authority14
Hume was concerned here with the connection between power and knowledge. In a
sense, he was merely rehearsing the old trope that literature could flourish only where
liberty was enjoyed. A balanced system of states allowed for intellectual competition and
mitigated cultural imperialism. But there was a problem. Such an explanation could well
account for the revival of European letters, but could in no way account for the fact that
modern politeness as a European phenomenon was essentially courtly and French in
origin.13 Le bon David felt a sense of cultural cringe on two levels, as a Scot towards
13 'Of Refinement in the Arts' p. 112.
14 Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences Political Essays, p. 64.
15 'The FRENCH are the only people, except the Greeks, who have been at once philosophers, poets,
orators, historians, painteres, architects, sculptors, and musicians. With regard to the stage, they have
excelled even the GREEKS, who far excelled the ENGLISH. And, in common life, they have, in a
great measure, perfected that art, the most useful and agreeable of any, I'Art de Vivre, the art of society
and conversation.' 'Of Civil Liberty', p. 53.
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England and as a north-Briton towards France. As a Scot he was drawn to English liberty
and as a Briton towards the clear superiority of French cultural achievement. Flume
could partly square this circle by insisting that the narrative civil liberty in French history
was ill understood. 'It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies', Hume famously
postulated, 'what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a
government ofLaws, not ofMen16
Hume saw a strong parallel between the conditions necessary for learning and
those necessary for commerce. But again, there was a problem, as France stubbornly
refused to conform to this model.
The three greatest trading towns now in the world, are LONDON, AMSTERDAM,
and HAMBURGH; all free cities, and protestant cities; that is, enjoying a double
liberty. It must, however, be observed, that the great jealousy entertained of late,
with regard to the commerce of FRANCE, seems to prove, that this maxim is no more
certain and infallible than the foregoing, and that the subjects of an absolute prince
may become our rivals in commerce, as well as in learning.17
Hume admired French commerce distinctly less than he did culture, and was rather less
inclined to present a French economy bien police, or contemporary understanding of
18
French economic practice as well founded.
Our jealousy and our hatred of FRANCE are without bounds; and the former
sentiment, at least, must be acknowledged reasonable and well-grounded.
These passions have occasioned innumerable barriers and obstructions upon
commerce, where we are accused of being commonly the aggressors. But what
have we gained by the bargain? We lost the FRENCH market for our woolen
manufactures, and transferred the commerce of wine to SPAIN and PORTUGAL,
where we buy worse liquor at a higher price. There are so few ENGLISHMEN
who would not think their country absolutely ruined, were FRENCH wines sold
in ENGLAND so cheap and in such abundance as to supplant, in some measure,
16 'Of Civil Liberty,' p. 56.
17 Ibid, p. 54.
18
The greatest abuses, which arise in FRANCE, the most perfect model of pure monarchy, proceed not
form the number or wieght of the taxes, beyond what are to be met with in free countries; but from the
expensive, unequal, arbitrary, and intricate method of levying them, by which the industry of the poor,
especially of the peasants and fanner is, in a great measure, discouraged, and agriculture rendered a
beggarly and slavish employment.' Ibid., p. 56.
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all ale, and home-brewed liquors: But would we lay aside prejudice, it would not
be difficult to prove, that nothing could be more innocent, perhaps advantageous.
Each new acre of vineyard planted in FRANCE, in order to supply ENGLAND
with wine, would make it requisite for the FRENCH to take the produce of an
ENGLISH acre, sown in wheat or barley, in order to subsist themselves; and it is
evident, that we should thereby get command of the better commodity.19
Yet Hume insisted that the greatest threat to English liberty and commerce remained
French commercial and military aggression. In the Essays, through all their editions,
remained this fundamental tension regarding the nature of France, or rather, the sort of
polite, moderate view of France that a modern Briton should hold. One well established
theme of Hume's political advocacy was that vulgar Whig sharp dichotomies between
English liberty and French slavery were potentially catastrophic in their commercial and
military consequences, and revealed no clear understanding of the history or politics of
either state.
This perception underlies almost all of Hume's various Essays, but in none so
directly as in 'Of the balance of power.' Hume raised in this essay the problem of the
relative antiquity of the idea of balance. Surely the modern politics of a Europe of rival
but interconnected states resembled nothing so much as the ancient politics of Greek
cities. Our interest lies less in Hume's answer to his own question that in how he
supposed the actual process came to exist in modern Europe. Hume outlined a truncated
Harringtonian narrative of a transition from ancient to modern prudence, enjoyment of
the latter mitigated by fear of a return to the former in new forms:
After the fall of the ROMAN empire, the form of government, established
by the northern conquerors, incapacitated them, in a great measure, for farther
conquests, and long maintained each state in its proper boundaries. But when
vassalage and the feudal militia were abolished, mankind were anew alarmed
by the danger of universal monarchy, from the union of so many kingdoms and
principalities in the person of the emperor CHARLES. But the power of the
house of AUSTRIA, founded on extensive but divided dominions, and their
19'Of the Balance of Trade', p. 141.
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riches, derived chiefly from mines of gold and silver, were more likely to decay,
of themselves, from internal defects, than to overthrow all the bulwarks raised
against them. In less than a century, the force of that violent and haughty race was
shattered, their opulence dissipated, their splendour eclipsed. A new power
succeeded, more formidable to the liberties of Europe, possessing all the advantages
of the former and labouring under none of its defects; except a share of that bigotry
and persecution, with which the house of AUSTRIA was so long, and still is so
much infatuated.
That new power, of course, was France, and that 'share of bigotry and persecution', her
Roman Catholicism. It would have better facilitated the moderation of public discourse
to sever the link between the inquisitorial Spain of Phillip II and the ascendant France of
Colbert, but this was a strategy Hume did not pursue; he underscored, rather than
severed, the confessional nature of the French threat. What was striking here is the extent
to which the great sceptic presented unreconstructed the vulgar-Whiggish narrative of
modern European history as a succession of translatio tyranii, with each Catholic
aspirant a would be Babylonian tyrant with Britain as the last line of defence:
In the general wars, maintained against this ambitious power, GREAT BRITAIN
has stood foremost; and she still maintains her station. Beside her advantages of
riches and situation, her people are animated with such a national spirit and are so
fully sensible of the blessings of their government, that we may hope their vigor
never will languish in so necessary and so just a cause.
What connection, if any, existed between the confession of the Catholic monarchs and
their aggressive stance will be pursued at a later point. Hume here added his crucial
qualification. 'On the contrary,' he remarked, 'if we may judge by the past, their
passionate ardour seems rather to require some moderation; and they have oftener erred
from a laudable excess than from a blameable deficiency.' John Robertson has argued
that deletions of a few of the more incendiary passages of this and related essays after the
British victory of the Seven Years War represented a substantial shift in Hume's
assessment of the threat of universal monarchy after the Peace of Paris. There could be
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'no serious basis for rivalry' as 'no serious aspirant could be identified'.20 This seems an
overstatement. There is no questioning that further moderation was the general trajectory
of the development of Hume's analysis, but moderation is not the same as elimination.
To be only moderately alarmed was to be alarmed all the same.
There were, for Hume, three fundamental problems in pursuing this rivalry at all
costs. 'We seem to have been more possessed with the ancient GREEK spirit of jealous
emulation, than actuated by the prudent views of modern politics.' This psychological
posture coupled with a zero sum understanding of the balance of trade had resulted in
commerce becoming 'a reason of state.' Hume remarked that Anglo-French conflict
began 'with justice, and even, perhaps, from necessity', but had been pursued with an
undue zealousness, prolonging such wars far longer than necessary. A second problem
lay in the fact that Britain's implacable hostility to France was all too well known to her
continental allies, who were under no incentive to moderate their own behaviour if they
knew full well they would always have the British treasury to fall back on. The third
problem was that Britain's method of funding these extensive continental wars was
reliance on paper currency and national debt, a course of action that filled Hume with the
most intense foreboding. 'To mortgage our revenues at so deep a rate, in wars, where we
are only accessories, was surely the most fatal delusion, that a nation, which had any
21
pretension to politics and prudence, has ever yet been guilty of.'
Enormous monarchies are, probably, destructive to human nature; in their progress,
in their continuance, and even in their downfall, which can never be very distant from
their establishment. The military genius, which aggrandized the monarchy, soon leaves
the court, the capital, and the center of such a government; while the wars are carried on
at a great distance, and interest so small a part of the state. The ancient nobility, whose
affections attach them to their sovereign, live all at court; and never will accept of military
20 J. Robertson, 'Universal monarchy and the liberties of Europe: David Hume's critique of a Whig
doctrine', Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, p. 355.
21 Hume, Political Essays, p. 159.
employments, which would carry them to remote and barbarous frontiers, where they are
distant both from heir pleasures and their fortune. The arms of the state, must, therefore,
be entrusted to mercenary strangers, without zeal, without attachment, without honour;
ready on every occasion to turn against the prince, and join each desperate malcontent,
who offers pay and plunder. This is the necessary progress of human affairs: Thus human
nature checks itself in its airy elevations: thus ambition blindly labours for the destruction
of the conqueror, of his family, and of every thing near and dear to him. The BOURBONS,
trusting to the support of their brave, faithful, and affectionate nobility, would push their
advantage, without reserve or limitation. These, while fired with glory and emulation,
can bear the fatigues and dangers of war; but never would submit to languish in the
garrisons of HUNGARY or LITHUANIA, forgot at court, and sacrificed to the intrigues
of every minion or mistress, who approaches the prince. The troops are filled with
CRAVATES and TARTARS, HUSSARS and COSSACS; intermingled, perhaps,
with a few soldiers of fortune from the better provinces: And the melancholy fate of the
ROMAN emperors, from the same cause, is renewed over and over again, till the final
dissolution of the monarchy.22
John Pocock has described this passage as 'an oddly oblique attempt to prophesy the fate
of Rome for the states of modern Europe,' yet it is far from clear that Hume intended
such a reading. For no enormous modern monarchy could rise, decline and fall of its
own accord; the whole point was that the jealous ambition and emulation of the British
would counter France long before it ever could. France, as a 'pure monarchy' further
enjoyed the strategic advantage of the option of voluntary state bankruptcy, an option the
moneyed interest in London would never allow.24 It is worth noting that for Hume the
term 'enormous monarchy' recognises no distinction between 'state' and 'empire', and is
as applicable to the Roman empire as to modern Bourbon kingdoms of France or Spain.
The somewhat imprecise formulation of 'Bourbon' suggested a unified Catholic front.
Whether they were in league or potentially so due to family or to religion was left
unstated.
Hume noted the paradox that while enthusiasm at first arrives with a thunderbolt
and produces untold civil disorder, 'after time it pacifies to a degree impossible where
"" Political Essays, p. 160.
23 J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion III: The First Decline and Fall (Cambridge, 2003). p. 380.
24 Of Civil Liberty, p. 57.
81
25
superstition reigns.' An absence of clerical institutions meant that Protestant nations
lacked a class interested in maintaining and consolidating power over ceremonial.
Without the agitation of such self-interested groups, the population became less heated
and less factious in such matters:
Supersition, on the contrary, steals in gradually and insensibly; renders men
tame and submissive; is acceptable to the magistrate, and seems inoffensive
to the people: Till at last the priest, having firmly established his authority,
becomes the tyrant and disturber of human society; by his endless contentions,
persecutions, and religious wars. How smoothly did the ROMISH church
advance in her acquisition of power? But into what dismal convulsions did
she throw all EUROPE, in order to maintain it? On the other hand, our sectaries,
who were formerly such dangerous bigots, are now become very free reasoners;
and the quakers seem to approach nearly the only regular body of deists in the
universe, the literati, or the disciples of CONFUCIUS in CHINA.26
The pathology of superstition thus necessarily yielded a tyrannical political result. Yet
Hume was not merely asserting the Whig commonplace that civil and religious liberty
lived and died in symbiosis. For according to Hume's narrative the priest, not the
centralising absolute monarch, became the tyrant. Hume seemed to be imagining a
general coup d'etat by the Jesuits over all Catholic Europe. Yet curiously it was at this
point that Hume conjoined the general tyranny of ascendant priestcraft with the
27
expansion of ancient Rome. The empire of priestcraft seemed unavoidably an empire
of expansion, a second Roman universal monarchy. It was the nature of this empire to
snuff out liberty wherever she encountered it. Yet, as ever, Hume directed his discussion
towards its relevance to the French 'tyranny', as his juxtaposition of the Jesuit and the
Jansenist demonstrated:
The molinists, conducted by the jesuits, are great friends to superstition,
rigid observers of external forms and ceremonies, and devoted to the
25 'Of Supersition and Enthusiasm', p. 48.
26 'Of Superstition and Enthusiasm', p. 49.
27 'What cruel tyrants were the ROMANS over the world during the time of their commonwealth!' -'That
Politcs May be Reduced to a Science.'
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authority of the priests, and to tradition. The jansenist are enthusiasts,
and zealous promoters of the passionate devotion, and of the inward life;
little influenced by authority; and, in a word, but half catholics. The
consequences are exactly conformable to the foregoing reasoning. The
jesuits are the tyrants of the people, and the slaves of the court: And the
jansenists preserve alive the small sparks of love of liberty, which are to
be found in the FRENCH nation.'28
Jesuits were not to be despised on narrow confessional grounds, as 'priests of all religions
are the same.' The political danger of the Jesuitical strangle-hold on the French state lie
in the menacing logic of priestcraft.
Clergymen, being drawn from the common mass of mankind, as people are
to other employments, by the views of profit, the greatest part, though no atheists
free-thinkers, will find it necessary, on particular occasion, to feign more
devotion than they are, at that time, possessed of, and to maintain the appearance
of fervor and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises of their religion,
or when they have their minds engaged in the common occupations of life.
They must not, like the rest of the world, give scope to their natural movements
and sentiments: They must set a guard over their looks and words and actions:
And in order to support the veneration paid them by the ignorant vulgar, they
must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but must promote the spirit of superstition,
by a continued grimace and hypocrisy. This dissimulation often destroys the candor
and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character.29
All priestcraft was founded in the basic lie of superior spiritual attributes, and the
30
maintenance of this lie resulted in a severe truncation of moral life. Ambitious,
conceited, factious, intolerant and vengeful, the priest was the greatest danger any
state could face:
28 Ibid., p. 50
29 'Of National Characters' p. 80.
'° 'Most men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may commonly be satisfied, by excelling in
their particular profession, and thereby promoting the interests of society. The ambition of the clergy
can often be satisfied only by promoting ignorance and superstition and implicit faith and pious frauds.'
Ibid.
31 'Most men have an overweaning conceit of themselves; but these have a particular temptation to that
vice, who are regarded with such veneration, and are even deemed sacred, by that multitude.' Ibid.
32 'Most men are apt to bear a particular regard for members of their own profession; but as a lawyer, or a
physician, or merchant, does, each of them, follow out his business apart, the interests of these
professions are not so closely united as the interests of clergymen of the same religion; where the whole
body gains by the veneration, paid to their common tenets, and by the suppression of antagonists'. Ibid.
33 'Few men can bear contradiction with patience; but the clergy too often proceed even to a degree of fury
on this head: Because all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief, which their opinions meet
with; and they alone pretend to a divine and supernatural authority, or have any colour for representing
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Thus many vices of human nature, are, by fixed moral causes, inflamed
in that profession; and though several individuals escape the contagion,
yet all wise governments will be on their guard against the attempts of
a society, who will for ever combine into one faction, and while it acts
as a society, will for ever be actuated by ambition, pride, revenge, and
a persecuting spirit.'1"1
The history of the menace of priestcraft was perhaps better explained by narrative than by
analysis. The subject was a key theme of that part of The History ofEngland devoted to
foreign transactions, and not separable from that of the balance of power. The European
dimension of Hume's History was no less present minded than its domestic constitutional
aspect. No British discussion of the balance of power conducted in the middle of the
eighteenth century could ignore the specific question of how Britain's diplomacy vis a vis
France was best conducted, and no discussion of war in a new and disorienting age of
credit could be about anything but the survival of the constitution itself.
Hume was traditional in viewing Queen Elizabeth as a model of prudent
statecraft. By the time of her reign, the nature of England's confessional identity and her
consequent role in Europe had largely been established. The two had been intimately
linked, as 'religion was the capital point, on which depended all the political transactions
of that age.' Prudence in an age of religious warfare had entailed discerning the correct
relationship between protection of religion and true reason of state. It was rarely, if ever,
prudent for a monarch to attempt to influence the course of religious controversies.
Destruction of ecclesiastical unity and civil accord had been the result of the ill-
conceived interventions of Henry VIII and his immediate successors Edward and Mary.
their antagonists as impious and prophane. The Odium Theologicum, or Theological Hatred, is noted
even to a proverb, and means that degree of rancour, which is the most furious and implacable'. Ibid.,
pp. 80-81.
j4
Revenge is a natural passion to mankind; but seems to reign with the greatest force in priests and
women: Because, being deprived of the immediate exertion of anger, in violence and combat, they are
apt to fancy themselves despised on that account; and their pride supports their vindictive disposition.'
Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 81.
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The triumph of Elizabethan prudence against such an obstacle had been twofold; in an
age where religious warfare nearly destroyed all bonds of European society, she had
avoided civil foment through a moderate religious settlement, and just as crucially, she
protected the viability of that settlement - and perhaps of English society itself - by
avoiding entanglement in the religious wars of the continent. On the continent, in
contrast, prudence had been in short supply. The European wars of religion, both within
and between states, had destroyed the normal operations of the European balance.
Religion had become the primary reason of state:
The two great monarchies of the continent, France and Spain, being possessed
of nearly equal force, were naturally antagonists; and England, from its power
and situation, was intitled to support its own dignity, as well as tranquility, by
holding the balance between them. Whatever incident, therefore, tended too much
to depress one of these rival powers, as it left the other without controul, might be
deemed contrary to the interests of England; Yet so much were these great maxims
of policy over-ruled, during that age, by the disputes of theology, that Philip found
an advantage in supporting the established government and religion of France;
and Elizabeth in protecting faction and innovation.36
The alignment of Europe was no longer constituted by great dynastic rivalries such as
between Habsburg and Valois, and it had been a cardinal point of Elizabeth's political
sagacity that she had understood the perilous implications of this:
Elizabeth was fully sensible of the dangerous situation, in which she now stood.
In the massacre of Paris, she saw the result of that general conspiracy, formed for
the extermination of the protestants; and she knew, that she herself, as the head
and protectress of the new religion, was exposed to the utmost fury and resentment
of the catholics. The violence and cruelty of the Spaniards in the Low Countries was
another branch of the same conspiracy; and as Charles and Philip, two princes nearly
allied in perfidy and bigotry, had now laid aside their pretended quarrel, and had
avowed the most entire friendship, she had reason, as soon as they had appeased their
domestic commotions, to dread the efffects of their united counsels.37
Hume's repeated invocations of conspiracy were not intended as irony. Later sniffing for
Popish plots under every bed may well have been paranoid, but, for the moment, the
36 David Hume, The History ofEngland, vol. IV, p. 55.
37 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 165.
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38combined forces of Counter-reformation Europe were indeed out to get her.
Hume obviously did not understand religious conflict entirely through the prism
of international affairs. The centrepiece of his History was an interpretation of how in
seventeenth-century Britain, religious conflict had in large part precipitated a civil war.
Many of Hume's Whiggish readers had celebrated the struggle of the Huguenots as a
noble lost cause, the failure of which paved the way for the ultimate success of French
absolute monarchy. 'But the equal counterpoise of power, which, among foreign nations,
is the source of tranquillity,' Hume insisted, 'proves always the ground of quarrel
between domestic factions; and if the animosity of religion concur with the frequent
occasions, which present themselves, of mutual injury, it is impossible, during any time,
39
to preserve a firm concord in so delicate a situation.' Balance may well have been
important to liberty, but it could only ever complicate the regularity of government, and
Hume was adamant that the rise of Protestant protest had been disastrous for the French
polity. The conflict between Huguenot and Catholic in France had effectively dissolved
the bonds of French society itself:
The people were divided into two theological factions, furious from their zeal,
and mutually enraged from the injuries which they had committed or suffered;
and as all faith had been violated and moderation banished, it seemed impracticable
to find any terms of composition between them. Each party had devoted itself to
its leaders, whose commands had more authority than the will of the sovereign;
and even the catholics, to whom the king was attached, were entirely conducted by
the counsels of Guise and his family. The religious connections had, on both sides,
superseded the civil; or rather (for men will always be guided by present interest)
two empires being secretly formed in the kingdom, every individual was engaged
by new views of interest to follow those leaders, to whom, during the course of past
convulsions, he had been indebted for his honours and preferment.40
38 J. G. A. Pocock's assertion that Hume was 'not much impressed by the threat of the Counter-
Reformation' does not seem to be born out by Hume's text. Barbarism and Religon II: Narratives of
Civil Government, (Cambridge, 1999) p. 235.
'9
Hume, History ofEngland, vol. IV, pp. 55-56.
40 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 167-68.
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There was an unresolved tension in Hume's analysis of France's 'intestine commotions'.
On the one side, both factions had been motivated by a furious zeal which clouded the
normal operations of the understanding and dissolved sympathetic fellow feeling, leaving
nothing but blind rage at the opposing faction. The sociable preconditions of trust and
good faith necessary for regular government had entirely collapsed under the weight of
that rage. Hume's prose never leapt off the page more strikingly than when portraying
such a pathological breakdown of society itself, yet here the painter and the analyst of the
effect of religion on politics came at loggerheads. There had been something more than
zeal at work, namely a new and frightening form of priestcraft. The members of the
Society of Jesus, those modern foot soldiers of the Roman church militant, had hovered
semi-concealed within European corridors of power and learning, corrupting reason and
reason of state in equal measure:
These seminaries were all of them under the direction of the jesuits, a new order
of regular priests erected in Europe, when the court of Rome perceived, that the
lazy monks and beggarly friars, who sufficed in times of ignorance, were no longer
able to defend the ramparts of the church, assailed on every side, and that the
inquisitive spirit of the age required a society more active and more learned, to
oppose its dangerous progress. These men, as they stood foremost in the contest
against the protestants, drew on them animosity of that whole sect; and by assuming
a superiority over the other more numerous and more ancient orders of their own
communion, were even exposed to the envy of their brethren: So that it is no wonder,
if the blame, to which their principles and conduct might be exposed, has, in many
instances, been much exaggerated. This reproach, however, they must bear from
posterity, that, by the very nature of their institution, they were engaged to pervert
learning, the only effectual remedy against superstition, into a nourishment of that
infirmity; and as their erudition was chiefly of the ecclesiastical and scholastic kind
(though a few members have cultivated polite literature), they were only the more
enabled, by that acquisition, to refine away the plainest dictates of morality, and to
erect a regular system of casuistry, by which prevarication, perjury, and every crime,
when it served their ghostly purposes, might be justified and defended.41
Whatever the precise nature of the dialectic of zeal and cynicism underlying the
resurgence of political Catholicism, it had been the defining dynamic with which
41 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 188.
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Elizabeth need contend. She had seized the opportunity provided by temporary French
impotence to play a much more active and intrusive role in the affairs of Scotland than
would otherwise have been possible. But she had well understood the effective limits of
her reach, and nowhere had this been better observed than in her handling of the set of
opportunities provided by Europe's other great war of religion, the independence struggle
of iconoclastic Dutch Calvinists against the inquisitorial armies of Phillip IPs Spain.
Heavily drawing on Hugo Grotius' Tacitiean narrative, Annales et Historie des Rebus
Belgis, Hume made no attempt to downplay Alva's war crimes and sundry atrocities
through philosophically minded distancing. English opinion would have supported holy
war of any duration in defence of the Dutch faithful. The Dutch themselves were well
aware of this, and saw Elizabeth as their natural protector, going so far as to offer her the
Crown of a newly united Netherlands in return for military support. It would have been
an immense balm to her sense of vanity to accept such an offer. But Elizabeth was not to
be tied down militarily any more than she was romantically. To have accepted would
have drawn England into potentially endless protracted war against the combined forces
of Spain and France. She had dispatched Leicester, but had refused the Dutch crown and
had remained personally aloof from the progress of Dutch affairs.
Hume emphasised Elizabethan prudence in foreign affairs had been largely
emulated by James, whose generally pacific view of England's role in Europe Hume was
at pains to applaud. The historian presented the argument for English intervention in the
Thirty Years War as motivated purely by religious enthusiasm. In an analysis of the
contemporary European balance no committed Protestant could have accepted, Hume
maintained that the fate of the unfortunate but distant 'Winter Queen' had no particular
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relevance to the security of the Elizabethan Settlement. The clear lesson was that
protection of the religious liberties of Europe had not been a sufficient ground for
military action. Clamours for "liberal intervention' voiced by zealous enthusiasts had
been antithetical with national interest correctly understood:
High were now the murmurs and complaints against the King's neutrality and
unactive-disposition. The happiness and tranquility of their own country became
distasteful to the English, when they reflected on the oppressions and distresses of
their protestant brethren in Germany. They considered not, that their interposal in
the wars of the continent, tho' agreeable to religious zeal, could not, at that time,
be justified by any sound maxims of politics; that, however exorbitant the
Austrian greatness, the danger was still too distant to give any just alarms to
England; that mighty resistance would yet be made by so many potent and warlike
nations in Germany, 'ere they would yield their neck to the yoke; that France, now
engaged by bigotry to contract a double alliance with the Austrian family, must
necessarily be soon roused from her lethargy, and oppose the progress of so hated a
rival; that in the farther advance of conquests, even the interest of the two branches
of that ambitious family must interfere, and engender mutual jealousy and opposition;
that a land-war, carried on at such a distance, would waste the blood and treasure of the
English nation, without any hopes of success; that a sea-war, indeed, might be both safe
and successful against Spain, but would not affect the enemy in such vital parts as to
make them stop their career of success in Germany, and abandon all their acquisitions;
and that the prospect of recovering the Palatinate being at present desperate, the affair
was reduced to this simple question, whether peace and commerce with Spain,
or the uncertain hopes of plunder and of conquests in the Indies were preferable;
a question, which, at the beginning of the King's reign, had already been decided,
and perhaps with reason, in favor of the former advantages.42
James had in essence acted prudently, despite the opposition of loud Protestant voices
within Parliament. Opinion was capable of erring in the opposite direction, and allowing
religious considerations to minimise the perception of a threat to more genuine interests,
such as trade and commerce. Such was the case during the first two decades of the
seventeenth century, the high water mark of Dutch aggressive imperialism. Hume
emphasised that it was remarkable that the English body politic had been so little alarmed
by the increasingly belligerent attitude of the Dutch toward maintaining a favourable
balance of trade.43
42 D. Hume, The History of Great Britain, ed. Duncan Forbes, pp 167-8.
43
History ofGreat Britain, pp. 241-2
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The question of the prudence of intervention versus non-intervention grew far
more serious at the end of the seventeenth century as England engaged in a second Dutch
war, prompting from Hume a change of tack. This period had witnessed the rise of
Colbert's France, a ferociously aggressive state, whose traditional aim of territorial
aggrandisement had been rendered far more practicable through a potent symbiosis of
Catholic bigotry and far reaching economic reforms. A regular and efficient monarchy
had successfully emulated the commercial practices of the Dutch and the English and had
become truly formidable. The collapse of Spain brought about by a collapsed imperial
economy and a failed aggressive policy towards the Dutch, had left Louis XIV with only
one potential counterweight, England herself:
The animosity, which had anciently subsisted between the English and
French nations, and which had been suspended for above a century by the jealousy
of Spanish greatness, began to revive and exert itself. The glory of preserving the
balance of Europe, a glory so much founded on justice and humanity, flattered the
ambition of England; and the people were eager to provide for their own future
security, by opposing the progress of so hated a rival. The prospect of embracing
such measures had contributed, among other reasons, to render the peace of Breda
so universally acceptable to the nation. By the death of Philip IV. King of Spain,
an inviting opportunity, and some very slender pretences, had been afforded to call
forth the ambition of Lewis.44
Yet due to a long history of prudential wariness on the part of English monarchs of
engagement on the continent, the only resistance to France, despite the sentiments of the
English people, had remained the House of Orange. In a telling comparison between the
military capabilities of the two nations, Hume underscored how the Dutch, in and of
themselves, were in no condition to maintain such a lofty, if futile role. Seventeenth
century France was a curiously yet dangerously potent hybrid phenomena, where ancient
ambitions, modern finance, and manners in a state of transition all combined to pose
perhaps the most formidable threat to the independency of Europe.
44 D. Hume, The History ofEngland, vol. VI, pp. 216-17.
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The order, economy, and industry of Colbert, equally subservient to the ambition
of the prince and happiness of the people, furnished unexhausted treasures:
These, employed by the unrelenting vigilance of Louvois, supplied every military
preparation, and facilitated all the enterprizes of the army: Conde, Turenne,
seconded by Luxembourg, Crequi, and the most renowned generals of the age,
conducted this army, and by their conduct and reputation inspired courage into
every one. The monarch himself, surrounded with a brave nobility, animated his
troops by the prospect of reward, or, what was more valued, by the hopes of his
approbation. The fatigues of war gave no interruption to gaiety: Its dangers
furnished matter for glory: And in no enterprize did the genius of that gallant
and polite people ever break out with more distinguished lustre.'43
The frugal, sober, and industrious Dutch had never been likely to prove a match against
such an unprecedented Leviathan. Aristocratic government and commercial manners had
combined to soften the Dutch martial spirit, rendering them radically less able to provide
for their own defence than they had been a mere generation before.46
At this point Hume adopted the Whig critique of the negligence of Charles II in
guarding against French aggrandisement and contempt for the European balance without
qualification. He may have had tactical reasons for doing so, as he would later need to
present the statecraft of William III as instrumental in securing the liberties of Europe.
CharleS, however, had thrown the weight of England behind the French. A measure of
the imprudence of Charles' plan of war against the Dutch was the fact that popular
sentiment among the English troops was simply never aroused against their fellow
Protestants, the Dutch. The English nation would have fought against their allies the
French with considerably more enthusiasm.47
45 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 257.
46 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 258.
47 'It is indeed remarkable, that, during this war, though the English with their allies much over-matched
the Hollanders, they were not able to gain any advantage over them; while in the former war, though
often overborne by numbers, they still exerted themselves with the greatest courage, and always
acquired great renown, sometimes even signal victories. But they were disgusted at the present
measures, which they deemed pernicious to their country; they were not satisfied in the justice of the
quarrel; and they entertained a perpetual jealousy of their confederates, whom, had they been
permitted, they would, with more pleasure, have destroyed than even the enemy themselves.' Ibid.,
vol. VI, p. 278.
91
The most testing trial of the prudence of intervention had occurred in the context
of the War of the Grand Alliance against the resurgent France of Louis XIV. Charles, a
poor student of the European scene, had vacillated imprudently, never entirely able to
determine whether his personal interests lie with Louis or against him:
It is wothy of observation, that, during this period, the king was, by every one,
abroad and at home, by France and by the allies, allowed to be the undisputed
arbiter of Europe, and no terms of peace, which he would have prescribed,
could have been refused by either party. Though France afterwards found
means to resist the same alliance, joined with England; yet was she then obliged
to make such violent efforts as quite exhausted her; and it was the utmost necessity,
which pushed her to find resources, far surpassing her own expectations. Charles
was sensible, that, so long as the war continued abroad, he should never enjoy ease
at home, from the impatience and importunity of his subjects; yet could he not
resolve to impose a peace by openly joining himself with either party. Terms
advantageous to the allies must lose him the friendship of France: The contrary
would enrage his parliament. Between these views, he perpetually fluctuated;
and from his conduct, it is observable, that a careless, remiss disposition, agitated
by opposite motives, is capable of as great inconsistencies as are incident even to
the greatest imbecillity and folly.48
At one level the above passage can be read as a moralist presenting an object lesson in
the dangers of inconstancy. Yet Charles had failed politically as decisively as he had
morally; he had crucially failed to spot and seize his opportunity. Imprudence in foreign
transactions, in the context of an unstable constitutional arrangement had been bound to
have effects on England's internal balance of power between crown and parliament. A
key effect of his vacillation was the distrust of the commons. Hume firmly emphasised
that Charles fateful moment of decision had constituted a moment of truth in the history
of English foreign policy, and just as firmly emphasised that it was the key failure of the
monarch's reign not to have appreciated this:
It is certain, that this was the critical moment, when the king both might
with ease have preserved the balance of power in Europe, which it has since
cost this island a great expense of blood and treasure to restore, and might
by perseverance have at last regained, in some tolerable measure, after all
48 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 303.
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past errors, the confidence of his people. This opportunity being neglected,
the wound became incurable; and notwithstanding his momentary inclinations
to rely on his faith: he was still believed to be at bottom engaged in the same
interests, and they soon relapsed into distrust and jealousy.49
At this point the history of domestic and foreign policy fatally collided. Charles had by
now become so distrusted by Parliament, he could not act as he wished to do. But the
window of opportunity was gone in any case. Hume was keen to emphasise that Louis
had now reached his apotheosis; at which the entirety of the European stage was his to
command. Perhaps at no point since Charlemagne had the prospect of universal
monarchy been so credible:
Lewis had now reached the height of that glory, which ambition can afford.
His ministers and negotiators appeared as much superior to those of all Europe
in the cabinet, as his generals and armies had been experienced in the field.
A successful war had been carried on against an alliance, composed of the greatest
potentates in Europe. Considerable conquests had been made, and his territories
enlarged on every side. An advantageous peace was at last concluded, where he had
given the law. The allies were so enraged against each other that they were not
likely to cement soon any new confederacy. And thus he had, during some years,
a real prospect of attaining the monarchy of Europe, and of exceeding the empire
of Charlemagne, perhaps of equalling the that of ancient Rome. Had England
continued much longer in the same condition, and under the same government,
it is not easy to conceive, that he could have failed of his purpose.50
Waxing French power naturally aroused the resentment of her neighbours. English
opinion was doubly enraged, first out of jealousy, and second at the realisation that
English policy was that of a slavish subservience to a potential universal tyrant.
Domestic opinion was apoplectic, and for once, Hume sided firmly with the population
against the crown.51
Charles IPs reign had essentially been a failure, a series of fatefully missed
opportunities. A new monarch, as ever, brought the hope of a renewal of prudent policy
towards France. The populace had hoped that James II would correct the errors of his
49 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 308.
50 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 320.
51 Ibid., vol. VI, pp. 301-2.
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brother, and judiciously act to maintain the balance of Europe. This had not been the
way things had worked out; James found that he required the active assistance of the
French in pursuit of his religious policies. James' religious policy had been little short of
a violent assault on the delicately and precariously balanced Elizabethan compromise.
He had promoted the most imprudent levels of toleration for Roman Catholics,51 and then
had allowed their placement in Ireland, effectively wrecking the salutary policies of his
father and grandfather.54 The timing of such imprudence could not have been worse.
Louis XIV had recently revoked the edict of Nantes, ending the era of prudently
politique toleration in France. The Revocation and subsequent mass expulsion of the
Huguenots had been an act of immediate and universal significance, a shocking and
52 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 451.
53 'James, more imprudent and arbitrary than his predecessor, issued his proclamation, suspending all the
penal laws in ecclesiastical affairs, and granting a general liberty of conscience to all his subjects. He
was not deterred by the reflection, both that this scheme of indulgence was already blasted by two
fruitless attempts; and that in such a government as that of England, it was not sufficient that a
prerogative be approved by some lawyers and antiquaries: If it was condemned by the general voice of
the nation, and yet was still exerted, the victory over national liberty was no less signal than if obtained
by the most flagrant injustice and usurption. These two considerations indeed would rather serve to
recommend this project to James; who deemed himself superior in vigour and activity to his brother,
and who probably thought, that his people enjoyed no liberties, but by his royal concession and
indulgence.' Ibid., vol. VI, p. 482.
54'But what afforded the most alarming prospect, was the continuance and even encrease of the violent and
precipitate conduct of affairs in Ireland. Tyrconnel was now vested with full authority; and carried over
with him as chancellor one Fitton, a man who was taken from a jail, and who had been convicted of
forgery and other crimes, but who compensated for all his enormities by a headlong zeal for the catholic
religion. . . . The catholics were put in possession of the council of table, of the courts of judicature, and
of the benches of justices. In order to make them masters of Parliament, the same violence was
exercised that had been practised in England. The charters of Dublin and of all the corporations were
annulled; and the new charters were granted, subjecting the corporations to the will of the sovereign.
The protestant freemen were expelled, catholics introduced; and the latter sect, as they always were the
majority in number, were now invested with the whole power of the kingdom. The act of settlement
was the only obstacle to their enjoying the whole property; and Tyrconnel had formed a scheme for
calling a parliament, in order to reverse that act, and empower the king to bestow all the lands of Ireland
on his catholic subjects. But in this scheme he met with opposition from the moderate catholics in the
king's council. Lord Bellasis went even so far as to affirm with an oath, "that that fellow in Ireland was
fool and madman enough to ruin ten kingdoms." The decay of trade, from the desertion of the
protestants, was represented; the sinking of the revenue; the alarm communicated to England: And by
these considerations the king's resolutions were for some time suspended; though it was easy to foresee,
from the ususal tenor of his conduct, which side would at last preponderate.' Ibid,, vol. VI, pp. 484-5.
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tragic event in sacred history for Protestants of all stripes. The theological temperature of
political opinion in England, already dangerously high, had now risen to a fever pitch:
Lewis XIV. Having long harrassed and molested the protestants, at last revoked
entirely the edict of Nantz; which had been enacted by Harry IV. for securing them
the free exercise of their religion; which had been declared irrevocable; and which
during the experience of near a century, had been attended with no sensible
inconvenience. All the iniquities, inseparable from persecution, were exercised
against those unhappy religionists; who became obstinate in proportion to the
oppressions which they suffered, and either covered under a feigned conversion
a more violent abhorrence of the catholic communion, or sought among foreign
nations for that liberty, of which they were bereaved in their native country.
Above half a million of the most useful and industrious subjects deserted France;
and exported, together with immense sums of money, those arts and manufactures,
which had chiefly tended to enrich that kingdom. They propagated every where the
most tragical accounts of the tyranny, exercised against them, and revived among
the protestants all that resentment against the bloody and persecuting spirit of popery,
to which so many incidents in all ages had given too much foundation. Nearly fifty
thousand refugees passed over into England; and all men were disposed, from their
representations, to entertain the utmost horror against the projects, which they
apprehended to be formed by the king for the abolition of the protestant religion.
When a prince of so much humanity and of such signal prudence as Lewis could be
engaged, by the bigotry of his religion alone, without any provocation, to embrace
such sanguinary and impolitic measures; what might be dreaded, they asked, from
James, who was so much inferior in these virtues, and who had already been irritated
by such obstinate and violent opposition? In vain did the king affect to throw the
highest blame on the persecutions in France: In vain did he afford the most real
protection and assistance to the distressed Huguenots. All these symptoms of toleration
were regarded as insidious; opposite to the avowed principles of his sect, and belied
by the severe administration, which he himself had exercised against the nonconformists
in Scotland.55
Hume was keen to ratchet up the tension in driving home the importance of English
policy towards France at this juncture for all of Europe. The general agitation in Europe
had been greater than that occasioned by the rise of Charles V himself, while in the
meantime English policy had still vacillated. Louis' act had been imprudent in the
extreme; in a fit of bigoted rage he sowed the seeds of his own demise. In much the same
way as Robertson was to argue that the overreach of Charles V had made the opposition
of Maurice of Saxony possible, Louis' ambition and bigotry created his own nemesis in
the form of William of Orange:
55 Ibid., vol. VI, pp. 470-471.
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No characters are more incompatible than those of a conqueror and a persecutor;
and Lewis soon found, that besides his weakening France by the banishment of
so many useful subjects, the refugees had enflamed all the protestant nations against
him, and had raised him enemies, who, in defence of their religion as well as liberty,
were obstinately resolved to oppose his progress. The city of Amsterdam and other
towns in Holland, which had before fallen into a dependence on France, being terrified
with the accounts, which they every moment received, of the furious persecutions
against the Huguenots, had now dropped all domestic faction, and had entered into an
entire confidence with the prince of Orange. The protestant princes of the empire
formed a separate league at Magdebourg for the defence of their religion. The English
were anew enraged at the blind bigotry of their sovereign and were disposed to embrace
the most desperate resolutions against him. From a view of the state of Europe during
this period, it appears, that Lewis, besides sullying an illustrious reign, had wantonly
by his persecution raised invincible barriers to his arms, which otherwise it had been
difficult, if not impossible, to resist.
William had at that time 'formed a project of uniting Europe in one general league
against the encroachments of France, which seemed so nearly to threaten the
independence of all its neighbours.'56 At that point English Whigs offered William the
most effective means of accomplishing his task, the English crown, and consequent arms
and revenue. Hume's narrative of the events of the Revolution has been dealt with
extensively elsewhere, and there is no need to rehearse that discussion here.57 It is
enough to note the panegyrical tone of Hume's description of William's exalted place in
the history of modern European liberty:
The prince of Orange, throughout his whole life, was peculiarly happy in the
situations, in which he was placed. He saved his own country from ruin, he
restored the liberties of these kingdoms, he supported the general independency
of Europe. And thus, though his virtue, it is confessed, be not the purest, which
we meet with in history, it will be difficult to find any person, whose actions
and conduct have contributed more eminently to the general interests of society
and of mankind.58
We are, ironically, not far here from Robertsonian language at its most providential. No
figure in European history was more driven by prudent regard for the European balance.
56 Ibid., vol. VI, p. 498.
57 N. Phillipson, Hume (London, 1989) pp. 105-107.
58
History ofEngland, vol. VI, p. 504.
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William, a cunning pragmatist in his dealing with the English Whigs, nonetheless had a
certain visionary quality, as one who comprehended and was thus able to navigate the
dynamics of a state system that yearned for corrective balancing. Hume's narrative
terminated with the Revolution Settlement. It did not, therefore take him as far as the
subsequent wars William's invasion had been designed to facilitate. Such a narrative
would have entailed accounting for the revolution in war finance occasioned by Britain's
complete absorption into a 'continental' policy, and would no doubt have raised
profoundly troubling questions concerning the true nature of the Williamite legacy. The
History, however, did not end with such dark matters. The parallel failure of James and
triumph of William instead illustrated the true lesson of late seventeenth-century power
politics: deal prudently with the balance of power or the balance of power will deal
prudently with you.
This was a maxim of prudence to which Robertson might well have warmed, if
with qualification. The implication of Hume's narration of the history of the balance of
power was that it alone was the best defence against the triumph of priestcraft over
prudent politics. In defence of modern prudence in foreign affairs, Hume was perfectly
prepared to stoke up, or, as Robertson would have viewed it, imprudently exaggerate,
both the degree of dangerous, unbridled zeal and of its cynical manipulation by a corrupt,
self interested order as a factor in international politics.
The balance of power was not the only Robertsonian theme pursued by Hume in
his History. He was also, if rather more tangentially, concerned with the offensive
behaviour of Britain as an enormous monarchy. A key point in question was the vexed
issue of the status of Ireland as an English dominium and within the English imperium.
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Modern scholarship has emphasised the extent to which Hume's text reflected the sharply
confessional orientation of his sources, such as Sir John Davies, Sir John Temple, and to
a lesser extent, Lord Clarendon.59 This is not to say that Hume's understanding of
England's civilising mission in Ireland lacked an idealistic component:
The great plan of James, in the administration of Ireland, continued by Charles,
was, by justice and peace, to reconcile that turbulent people to the authority of laws,
and introducing art and industry among them, to cure that sloth and barbarism to
which they had ever been subject. In order to serve both these purposes, and at the
same time, secure the dominion of Ireland to the English crown, great colonies of
British had been carried over, and, being intermixed with the Irish, had every where
introduced a new face of things into that country. During a peace of near forty years,
the inveterate quarrels betwixt the nations seemed, in a great measure, obliterated;
and tho' much of the landed property, forfeited by rebellion, had been conferred on
the new planters, a more that equal return had been made, by their instructing the
natives in tillage, building, manufactures, and all the civilized arts of life. This had
been the course of things during the successive administrations of Chichester,
Grandison, Falkland, and, above all, of Strafford. Under the government of this last
Nobleman, the pacific plans, now come to greater maturity, and forwarded by his
vigour and industry, seemed to have operated with full success, and to have bestowed,
at last, on that savage country, the face of an European settlement.60
This was Whig gloss on the neo-Roman apologetic for empire as a civilising force at its
most naked. Imperium had justified itself through the improvement it provided,
uprooting discord and planting civility, and Hume displayed no inclination to place the
'plantation metaphor' under the microscope.61 He was the painter of the English
dominium over Ireland as much as its analyst. In Hume's view, Irish insurrection had
more than justified subsequent rounds of land seizures. Of course, there might have been
a tactical dimension to Hume's portrait. If the English imperium over Ireland had been
tyrannical rather than largely beneficent, the later rebellion might have proven less
contrary to all reason and morality. The Irish natives had had cause for gratitude, but
their pretended acquiescence to British lordship proved in fact a sort of national
59 J. Hill, 'Popery and Protestantism, Civil and Religious Liberty: the Disputed lessons of Irish History
1690-1812' in Past and Present 118 (Feb 1988), p. Ill; Paul B. Smith, 'Conjecture, Acquiescence, and
John Millar's History of Ireland' The European Legacy, 1 (1996), p. 2231.
60 D. Hume, History ofGreat Britain, p. 452.
61 D. Armitage, The Ideological Origins of the British Empire (Cambrige, 2000) pp. 24-60.
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dissimulation. Hume did not find this surprising, remarking that the better part of the
island remained in thrall to priestcraft. The Irish Catholics had been accorded a de facto
toleration, but their priests had been determined to foment unrest. 'So long as the
churches and the ecclesiastical revenues were kept from the priests, and they were
obliged to endure the neighborhood of profane heretics, being themselves discontented,'
Hume explained, 'they endeavored continually to retard any cordial reconcilement
betwixt the English and the Irish nations'.62
After rapacity had fully exerted itself, cruelty, and the most barbarous,
that ever, in any nation, was known or heard of, began its operations.
An universal massacre commenced of the English, now defenceless
and passively resigned to their inhuman foes. No age, no sex, no condition,
was spared. The wife, weeping for her butchered husband, and embracing
her helpless children, was pierced along with them, and perished by the same
stroke. The old, the young, the vigorous, the infirm, underwent a like fate,
and were confounded in one common ruin. In vain did flight save from the
first assault: Destruction was, every where, let loose, and met the hunted
victims at every turn. In vain was recourse had to relations, to companions,
to friends: All connexions were dissolved, and death was dealt by that
inhuman hand, from which protection was implored and expected.
Without provocation, without opposition, the astonished English, living in
profound peace and full security, were massacred by their nearest neighbours,
with whom they had long upheld a continued intercourse of kindness and
good offices.
The improving British had originally fought here to conquer, the wild Irishman now, to
destroy. But it was a destructive wildness underscored with the deepest cynicism.
Amidst all these enormities, the sacred name of RELIGION resounded
on every side; not to stop the hand of these inhuman savages, but to
enforce their blows, and to steel their heart against every movement of
human or social sympathy. The English, as heretics, abhorred of God,
and detestable to all holy men, were marked out by the priests for slaughter;
and, of all actions, to rid the world of these declared enemies to catholic
faith and piety, was represented as the most meritorious. Nature, which,
in that rude people, was sufficiently inclined to atrocious deeds, was farther
stimulated by precept; and national prejudices empoisoned by those aversions,
more deadly and incurable, which arose from an enraged superstition.
While death finished the sufferings of each victim, the bigotted assassins,
with joy and exultation, still echoed in his expiring ears, that these agonies
were but the commencement of torments, infinite and eternal.
... An event, memorable in the annals of human kind, and worthy to be held in
52
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perpetual detestation and abhorrence.63
The massacre, along with its ensuing repercussions, had proven a disaster above all for
the native Irish. Irish savagery had entirely prevented the subordination necessary for
military discipline. The manner of savage warfare discounted for Hume any possibility
that any jealous defence of their liberties had motivated the Irish:
So great is the ascendant, which, from a long course of successes, the English
has acquired over the Irish nation, that tho' the latter, when they receive military
discipline among foreigners, are not surpassed by any European people, they
have never, in their own country, been able to make any vigorous effort for the
defence or recovery of their liberties. In many encounters, the English, under
Lord More, Sir William St Leger, Sir Frederic Hamilton, and others, with great
disadvantage of situation and numbers, had put the Irish to rout, and returned in
triumph to Dublin. The siege of Tredah, the rebels raised, after an obstinate
defence made by the garrison. Ormond had obtained two compleat victories,
at Kilrush and Ross; and had brought relief to all the forts, which were besieged
or blockaded in different parts of the kingdom. But not withstanding all these
successes, even the most common necessaries of life were wanting to the victorious
armies. The Irish, in their wild rage against the British planters, had laid waste
the whole kingdom, and were themselves totally unfit, from their barbarous sloth
and ignorance, to raise any convenience of human life. During the course of six
months, no supplies had come in from England; except the fourth part of one small
vessel's lading. Dublin, to save itself from starving, had been obliged to send the
greatest part of its inhabitants to England. The army had little ammunition, scarce
exceeding 40 barrels of powder; not even shoes or cloaths; and for want of food,
the cavalry had been obliged to eat their own horses. And tho' the distresses of the
Irish were not much inferior; beside that they were more hardened against such
extremities, it was but a melancholy prospect, that the two nations, while they
continued their furious animosities, should make desolate that fertile island,
which might serve to the subsistence and happiness of both.64
We have seen Hume, in his discussion of English transactions in Ireland, defend a
Protestant argument for English imperium wholly traditional in character. The question
remains whether the Irish case was exceptional in Hume's thought, or accorded with a
more general understanding of the potential benefits of empire. Could one crudely
transpose the sceptical North Briton's arguments vis a vis Ireland to the remainder of
63 Ibid., p. 561.
M Ibid., p. 553.
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British maritime holdings? At first it would seem otherwise. In marked contradistinction
to his Jacobean plantation rhetoric vis a vis Ireland, Hume gave short shrift to the jaded
jurisprudence of bloody conquest and naked piracy that constituted European legal
pretensions to the New World:
When the courage and avarice of the Spaniards and Portuguese had discovered
so many new worlds, they were resolved to shew themselves superior to the
barbarous heathens, whom they invaded, not only in arts and arms, but also in the
justice of the quarrel: They applied to Alexander VI who then filled the papal chair;
and he generously bestowed on the Spaniards the whole western, and on the
Portuguese the whole eastern part of the globe. The more scrupulous protestants,
who acknowledged not the authority of the Roman pontiff, established the first
discovery as the foundation of their title; and if a pyrate or sea-adventurer of their
nation had but erected a stick or stone on the shore, as a memorial of his taking
possession, they concluded the whole continent to belong to them, and thought
themselves intited to expel or exterminate, as usurpers, the antient possessors and
inhabitants. It was in this manner, that Sir Walter Raleigh, about twenty-three years
before, had acquired to the crown of England a just claim to the continent of Guiana,
a region as large as the half of Europe; and tho' that the English title remained
certain and indefeazable. But it had happened in the mean time, that the Spaniards,
not knowing or not acknowledging the claim, had taken possession of a small part of
Guiana, had formed a settlement on the river Oronooko, had built a little town called
St Thomas, and were there working some mines of small value.65
By linking what his readers would no doubt have viewed as the ludicrous translatio of
the New World from the papacy to Spain and Portugal with the more respectable claim of
first possession, Hume completely undercut any notion of noble origins of the empire
'protestant, maritime, commercial, and free.' The passage would have further rankled
patriotic readers by underlining confessional difference while denying such difference
any salutary effect. Extermination would seem for Hume a thoroughly ecumenical
pursuit. This was not as devastating an indictment as might first appear, however. Most
imperium began with violence, and it was no doubt anachronistic to expect any different
from an age so lacking in politeness and correct notions of commerce. What that passage
did not prefigure was the rather jarringly sentimental view to which Hume could
occasionally give voice. As has been noted, Hume was at pains to demonstrate the
65lbid., pp. 165-66.
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prudence of James I's largely pacific foreign policy. He prudently moderated the
religious passions of the people away from involvement in the Thirty Years War. and
through his Irish plantations, adopted the best-calculated strategy for inculcating industry
and civility among that 'savage' people. The chief glory of the Jacobean age, however,
was the establishing of colonies along the Atlantic seaboard on correct, even 'noble'
principles. The three developments were linked. Only by denying them a great
continental war could James direct the creative energies of the population toward more
distant prospects of grandezza. 'When peace put an end to the war-like enterprizes
against Spain', explained Hume, 'and left ambitious spirits no hopes ofmaking any
longer such rapid advances towards honor and fortune, the nation began to second the
pacific intentions of its monarch, and to seek a surer, tho' slower expedient, for acquiring
riches and glory.'66 Here Hume lapsed back into the traditional contrast between the
sloth of the Spanish and the industry of the English, allowing Hume to rehearse his
qualified understanding of English exceptionalism:
What chiefly renders the reign of James memorable, is the commencement of
the English colonies in America; colonies established on the noblest footing,
that has been known in any age or nation. The Spaniards, being the first
discoverers of the new world, immediately took possession of the precious mines,
which they found there; and, by the allurement of great riches, they were tempted
to depopulate their own country as well as that which they conquered; and added
the vice of sloth to those of avidity and barbarity, which had attended their adventures
in those renown enterprises. That fine coast was intirely neglected, which reaches
from St Augustine to Cape Breton, and which lies in all the temperate climates, is
watered by noble rivers, and offers a fertile soil, but nothing more, to the industrious
planter. People gradually from England by the necessitous and indigent, who, at home,
increased neither wealth nor populousness, the colonies, which were planted along that
tract, have promoted the navigation, encouraged the industry, and even multiplied the
inhabitants of their mother-country. The spirit of independency, which was reviving in
England, here shone forth in its full lustre, and received new accession of force from the
aspiring character of those, who, being discontented with the established church and
monarchy, had fought for freedom amid those savage desarts. The seeds of many a
noble state have been sown in climates, kept desolate by the wild manners of the antient
inhabitants; and an asylum secured, in that solitary world, for liberty and science, if ever
66Ibid., p. 244.
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the spreading of unlimited empire, or the inroad of barbarous nations, should again
extinguish them in this turbulent and restless hemisphere.
Here surely was Humean historical irony at its most acute. The Spanish, at the height of
their bigoted, persecuting imperium, had brought about their own decline through a
fundamental misunderstanding of how correctly to procure national wealth. They
pumped the mother country full of useless specie, and fatally neglected agriculture and
those regions most conducive to it. To whom then does the philosopher direct the
attention of the reading public for a more exemplary performance and more laudable
results? To fanatical enthusiasts and other such rabble, who had been thoroughly useless,
if not downright destructive at home, but had produced the most marvellous
improvements in far-flung lands. These virtuous improvers had already created
something not far from an isolated Utopia, a haven from any universal monarchy or
violent conquest. In America, Hume had found a balm for his pessimism.
Hume provided little in the end by way of a critique of the English imperium; his
text dismissed the fear that the metropole might prove incapable of maintaining order
over the colonies. In short, the Jacobean legacy was both preservable and well worth
preserving:
Speculative reasoners during that age, raised many objections to the planting
those remote colonies; and foretold, that, after draining their mother-country
of inhabitants, they would soon shake off her yoke, and erect an independent
government in America: But time has shown, that the views, entertained by
those who encouraged such generous undertakings, were more just and solid.
A mild government and great naval force have preserved, and may long preserve
the dominion of England over her colonies. And such advantage have commerce
and navigation reaped from these establishments, that more than half of the English
shipping is at present computed to be employed in carrying on the traffic with the
American settlements.67
Hume was not merely celebrating, although he certainly did, the colonial enterprise as
beneficial to English commerce. He was actively celebrating the colonies as invaluable
67 Ibid., p. 245.
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English possessions, without any hint that they could or should exist independently of the
metropole. To say so in 1754 was, of course, entirely unexceptionable; it was a passage
'that wicked madman Pitt' could have written himself.68 This passage, intriguingly, was
allowed to remain unaltered from the first edition as late as his final revised edition,
published posthumously in 1779. By this time we know, thanks to correspondence
between Hume and his publisher, that the historian no longer held such views. He felt
that the job of policing the American colonies was a lost cause many times over, whose
attempt could only throw the present ministry into even greater disrepute than it was in
already. Hume's ironic position was that the urgent need to preserve authority at home
required a radical concession of liberty across the Atlantic. Yet the passage remained. It
was not that Hume was ever a reluctant self-editor. He made much, in letters to Strahan
of retooling the text at length, casting to the flames as sophistry and illusion all passages
revealing latent vulgar Whig prejudices. Such self-revisionism, however, was largely
confined to domestic constitutional matters, and seldom occasioned any substantial
alteration of his narrative of foreign transactions. It cannot credibly be maintained that
Hume had refrained from adjusting his text out of fear of offending his readers. An
author, or indeed a publisher, with such scruples would scarcely have presented such a
work to the public in the first instance. In any case it was the general effect of Hume's
later alterations to render his text more offensive to his readers. The issue here is not to
challenge received wisdom concerning the unique brand of anti-imperialism of Hume's
twilight years, but to point out the curiously sharp disconnection between Hume's own
later opinions and those expressed in his literary tnagnum opus. David Hume may well
have concluded an 'American in his principles'. His History ofEngland, however, did
68 The Letters ofDavid Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford, 1969) II, 300-01.
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not.
We do not know if Hume and Robertson ever discussed the American problem, or
the Jesuits, or the European balance of power, or any number of questions common to the
historiography of the two. What can be said is that, if Robertson were aware of his views
on the matter, such knowledge in no ways altered his own views. While the view of
English empire advanced in Hume's History and that in Robertson's own narratives were
far more closely aligned than has been supposed, Hume's historiography of prudence and
priestcraft remained suggestive yet ultimately unacceptable to the Presbyterian minister.
Hume had provided the European states system and its guiding motive, the balance of
power, with the most sophisticated and philosophical history it had yet received. But that
history remained one of the carcinogenic nature of all priestcraft on politics, and hence, a
history unremittingly and fundamentally hostile to the institutions of all revealed religion.
Robertson, the foremost ecclesiastical politician of his generation, with a highly
developed understanding of the arcana imperii based on personal experience, would have
found such a narrative highly unsatisfactory, if not personally insulting. Yet Hume had
correctly identified many of the questions upon which enlightened British policy should
be based, and an enlightened British imperium pursued. The history of the balance of
power and of imperial expansion in an age of commerce and religion urgently needed
rewriting.
105
Chapter Three: Robertson's Scottish Contexts
The previous chapter sought to provide an overview of Hume's historical narration of the
development of Britain's foreign policy in the wake of the emergence of a Europe of
independent states united by commerce. It was suggested that The History ofEngland
would arouse a mixed response from any philosophically-minded cleric. Hume had
provided a compelling account of the evolving interests over which Europeans went to
war in a way that deftly tied together the personal psychology of his characters with the
organic progress of society. Yet no Christian could accept his account of the effect of
priestcraft on policy, or of that of superstition and enthusiasm on the social order.
Robertson's relationship to history was naturally conditioned by both his Reformed
theology and by his social standing as the leading ecclesiastical politician of his day.
This chapter will suggest how Robertson's views on Church government and his vision
of the international order were informed by his early exposure to the Stoic philosophy
pervasive of his milieu. It will proceed to consider how these perspectives were brought
to bear on the work that served as the blueprint for his overall historical theodicy, The
Situation of the World at the Time ofChrist's Appearance, a work that addressed the
possibility of the providential reunion of all God's children through the workings of
European empire. The chapter will conclude with a brief look at Robertson's early
reviews and the light they shed on the formulation of his historical orientation.
If the always highly personal, occasionally distinctly wayward reminiscences of
his grand-nephew, Lord Brougham, can be trusted, William Robertson got his stoicism
from his mother. 'More stern, and even severe, than amiable', the domestic regime of
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Eleanor Pitcairn instilled in her son an 'inclination towards the Stoical system of morals,
and even to a certain degree of Stoical feeling".1 A possibly less rigorous if more
cerebral introduction to the stoic world-view rested upon his father's book shelves, in the
theological works of the Arminian divines Le Blanc, Limborch, Turrentine and Samuel
Werenfels. Werenfels, Professor of Divinity at the University of Basel, and weary
footsoldier of the paper wars of religion, had despaired of the 'party-zeal' that frustrated
the Grotian project of re-unification of the reformed churches. Theological disputation,
far from providing consolation to the spiritually disorientated, had only managed to
exacerbate antagonisms and provide cover for the baser passions. Werenfels had
lamented that,
how very apt to corrupt Men's Judgments are the Emulation, and Envy,
and Suspicion, the Hatred and Anger, and Jealousy, and all those inveterate
Passions which reign so much amongst men of Learning? 'The Understanding
certainly must be Clouded and Reason fettered, where these Passions have the
upperhand?' They deprive the most Judicious of that Clearness of Apprehension,
that Easiness and Sedateness ofMind, that Candor and Moderation and Fairness,
and that upright Intention, which are much more necessary to make a right
Judgment, than the Knowledge of Languages, of History, of Arts, and the
abstrusest points of Learning.3
Academic theology had become for Werenfels a cesspool of 'intestine commotion';
honest Christians in search of inward equilibrium, let alone the keys to the kingdom,
should give such disputants a wide birth. 'Let Divines enjoy these darling Fancies',
Werenfels recommended, 'the Thistles and Briars in their Schools, which common
1 H. Brougham, 'Robertson', in Miscellaneous Works and Commentaries, ed. Jeffrey Smitten, p. 258.
2 Robertson was apparently particularly taken with Werenfels' De Logomachiis eruditorum, et de
mereteoris orationis. One must bear in mind, of course, that the orthodox Erskine, keen to maintain the
reputation of his friend in Presbyterian circles, would not have been inclined to stress a formative role for
Werenfels' potentially heterodox theological works, cf. John Erskine, 'Apendix to a Funeral Sermon on
Dr. Robertson' in Miscellaneous Works and Commentaries, in Works, p. 264.
3 Samuel Werenfels, Three Discourses: One, a Defence ofPrivate Judgment; The Second, Against the
Authority of the Magistrate over Conscience; The Third, Some Considerations concerning the Reuniting
of Protestants (London, 1718).
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Christians may safely be ignorant of and despise.'4 In religion no less than in politics, the
temptation of faction could be resisted through the cultivation of the stoic virtues. More
speculatively, the Professor's mindset suggested that weariness of theological disputation
that was a psychological pre-requisite of toleration. Robertson and his fellow Moderates
were to take Werenfels' message to heart, and to scrupulously avoid direct theological
controversy throughout their ministerial careers.
However intense Robertson's youthful embrace of the Stoa was, it was certainly
reinforced at University. John Stephenson, the well loved professor of logic at
Edinburgh, read from Diogenes Laertius' Lives of the Philosophers, and Thomas
Stanley's History ofPhilosophy, both of which elaborated the tenets of Hellenic and
Hellenistic Stoicism in depth.5 Robertson's first literary project, an aborted translation of
the Meditations of the Roman Emperor and stoic philosopher, Marcus Aurelius (1742),
reflected the philosophical orientation of his education. His translation was a partly auto-
didactive endeavour; Robertson seems to have learned to write in English by translating
into it. Yet, as was to be the case throughout his career, he offered his writings as
vehicles for practical instruction. The Meditations was not an abstract or systematic work
of philosophy, but a series of improving vignettes on how to come to terms with one's
inner development and social obligations.
The central tenet of stoic cosmology and ethics was the inter-connectedness of all
things, ofman with nature and man with his fellow man. Marcus Aurelius had discerned
4 Ibid., p. 19
5
Jeffrey Smitten 'Introduction to the Miscellaneous Works' in Miscellaneous Works, p. xiii.
cf. Thomas Stanley The History ofPhilosophy: Containing The Lives, Opinions, Actions and Discourses
of the Philosophers ofEvery Sect (Third Edition, London, 1701).
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in all of nature the same spark of the divine; no object within it alienated from the larger
whole. 'All things,' he had rhapsodised,
are linked & bound together by a sacred knot, & nothing is foreign or strange
to another. For all things are arranged and disposed with reference to each other,
& jointly contribute to adorn the world. For there is but one order thro' all things,
one God in all things, one substance, one law, one common principle of reason &
truth to all intelligent creatures, & one perfection to all creatures of the same species
& endowed with the same reason.6
An eighteenth-century readership was unlikely to take this as literally as Marcus Aurelius
had probably intended; logos, or the celestial mind-fire that for ancient Stoics physically
permeated the material world, could be understood metaphorically as that aspect of the
divine shared by all of God's creation. This more theocentric reading found support in
other passages that could be understood as providing a more orthodox understanding of
God's particular providence in human affairs. The Emperor had continued that,
the works of the Gods are full of marks of their providence; & even those things
which are attributed to chance & fortune, do not happen without a natural concatenation
& connection with those things which are established by providence. From it do all
things flow. Besides this there is an inevitable Necessity which always advances the
good of that Whole of which you are a part and that which the happiness & preservation
of the whole requires must needs be for the good of every particular.7
Such a view left little room for contingency in the interconnected operations of the world,
an insight that had a powerful ethical implication. The Emperor had discounted the
possibility of divergence of interest between component part and larger whole;
providence worked toward the common good. This in turn had informed the Emperor's
conception of history. Understanding the workings of providence in human affairs
required grasping the benign continuity of its temporal framework. Marcus Aurelius had
emphasised that there could be no sharp dislocation between past, present, and future:
In the Universe whatever events succeeded, they follow naturally upon what went before.
They are not like a series of distinct independent numbers taking place by a fatal necessity.
6 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, translated by W. Robertson, NLS: MSS 3954.
7 Ibid.
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But it is a beauteous arrangement. And as things are linked & united together with harmony
& proportion, so there does not appear only a hated succession, but an admirable
correspondence & connection of events.8
History, for Marcus Aurelius, did not merely reveal a fundamental logic;
historical change was the unfolding of that very logic. The enjoyment of the detached
observer in the unfolding of events was both cerebral and aesthetic. 'Accustom yourself
to reflect', enjoined Marcus Aurelius, 'that there is nothing so agreeable to the nature of
the Universe, as to delight in changing the things that are, & unmaking others like unto
them. Every thing that is, in some respect, is the seed of what is to be.' All history was a
narrative not only of change but also of progress.
Marcus Aurelius expounded an ethics built upon his cosmology. His first
injunction was to comprehend and move in harmony with the larger whole of which one
was a part. If men were united through a common logos, he had written, 'then we have
one common law, & must be fellow citizens, & if fellow citizens we must be members of
the same political society, & consequently the World is like to a great City.' In the view
of a sovereign who had counted himself Dominus Mundi, the world as single civitas
might have seemed an expression of mundane reality. In a modern Europe of
independent states, however, the assertion amounted to a declaration of cosmopolitanism.
The Emperor's own ethical model was, appropriately enough, the virtuous Roman
statesman; Stoic virtues were in effect the civic virtues required of a sincere and patriotic
steward of the common good. Virtue required active engagement with the world; to
neglect public affairs was to ostracise oneself from one's fellow citizens and to act out of
step with both nature and one's inner light, for man was inescapably sociable. The
8 Ibid.
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Emperor had thus commended living in harmony with others and avoidance of
unnecessary personal disputes or political factions as the cardinal duties of the individual
to his society. This required a healthy measure of patience and tolerance of others'
foibles and folly, as well as the humbling realisation that one's own deepest passions and
most cherished interests were the natural by-product of an ephemeral state of affairs. 'The
World is a perpetual changing', Marcus Aurelius had reminded, 'and Life is but
opinion.'9 Living in harmony with the world entailed nothing less than the humble
contextualisation and subordination of one's particular passions and partisanships to the
larger interest of the whole. Even for the committed Stoic, this required almost heroic
feats of humility and self-command. Robertson was not to finish his translation, as he
had now to prepare for his ministerial 'trials', as well as because the translation of Francis
Hutcheson had beaten him to the presses, but all the historian's subsequent writings were
to bear witness to the moderate and sociable cosmopolitanism of the Emperor's
philosophy.10
Robertson would not find these abstract concerns as he entered upon his
ministerial career. Theological faction in Scotland, far from having been neatly
eliminated by the re-establishment of Presbyterianism in 1690, was, if anything, on the
increase throughout the eighteenth-century. At the age of twenty-two, Robertson
followed his father into the ministry at a turbulent juncture in the Kirk's history.11 It was
a mark of Robertson's skill at riding the choppy waters of religious faction that the
worldly and urbane minister rose to prominence and eventually to eminence within the
9 Ibid. pp. 12-13.
10 J. Smitten, 'Introduction to the Miscellaneous Works,' Miscellaneous Works and Commentaries, in
Works, p. xvii.
" S. J. Brown, 'William Robertson and the Scottish Enlightenment, in idem, William Robertson and the
Expansion ofEmpire (Cambridge, 1997), p. 9.
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General Assembly during an age of religious revival and populist evangelical fervour.
The developments of the 1740s were crucial in the formation of the mindset of a group of
young ministers that would assume the title of 'Moderates' and dominate the
ecclesiastical politics of Scotland. The spiritually transformative experience of the
weavers of the small parish of Cambuslang, near Glasgow, spearheaded a general
'awakening' that engulfed much of the west of Scotland. Ned Landsman has argued that
to a degree not properly appreciated by modern scholarship, both Moderate and Popular
parties developed as a reaction to this unsettling development, and differed primarily in
their contrasting methods of containing this burst of enthusiasm. Moderates chose to fall
back on the firm discipline of the laws of the Kirk, the members of the Popular party to
the equally firm discipline of the tenets of Calvin. Robertson's Popular opponent and
fellow minister at Gladsmuir, John Erskine, had initially celebrated the millennial
implications of awakening on both sides of the Atlantic, yet soon repented as the prospect
12of Awakening corrupting into Methodism shook him to his core. The commonality
between the young Moderates and Evangelicals was fatally obscured, however, by their
sharp disagreement over the issue of the lay patronage of ministers. Lay patronage had
provoked a major secession movement from the Kirk in 1733, a movement that was itself
divided in 1747 over the acceptability of the Burgess Oath, a public affirmation of the
legally established religion. Both 'Burgher' and 'Anti-Burgher' movements gained
momentum as the century progressed, highlighting in the minds of Moderates the
problematic relationship of modern Presbyterianism with the Covenanting dynamic, and
12 N. Landsman, 'Presbyterians and Provincial Society: The Evangelical Enlightenment in the West of
Scotland, 1740-1775', in J. Dwyer and R. Sher (eds.) Sociability and Sociability in Eighteenth-Century
Scotland, pp. 197-198.
112
even calling into question the future integrity of a unified and reformed Scottish Kirk.'1
Thus the prism through which perceived theological tensions within the Kirk revealed
themselves was the conflict over Patronage.14 At bottom, the question was who had the
right to choose a replacement for a departed minister: the crown, the propertied elders of
the Kirk sessions, or the congregation as a whole? While the departure in 1733 of the
followers of Ebenezer Erskine largely removed the last of the three options from
contention, proponents of crown patronage remained in constant fear that to give ground
to the 'middle' option was, in fact, to remove any effective barrier against a populist and
Covenanting rear-guard assault. This was the position of a circle of young ministers who
were to go on to establish a formidable literary reputation and to a surprising degree set
the cultural agenda of the Scottish Enlightenment.'5 The irony was that Robertson and
his circle, who wished, at least as a practical matter, to support enlightened lay patronage,
had to confront directly the arguments not of latter day Melvilles, but of a kindred spirit
and intellectual hero, the philosopher Francis Hutcheson.
Hutcheson was no evangelical. An Ulster-Scot and member of the republican
circle of Viscount Molesworth, he arrived in 1730 as professor of moral philosophy at the
University of Glasgow under a storm cloud of controversy. From the moment of his
arrival unto the hour of his death, Hutcheson's commitment to the letter of Glasgow's
distinctly stern variant of Calvinism had been held in constant question. Hutcheson's
own beliefs, certainly latitudinarian, possibly Arminian, had necessitated that discretion
overrule candour in his own discussion of theological specifics. He made a virtue of
13 J. H. S. Burleigh, A Church History ofScotland (Oxford, 1960), p. 263.
14 R. Sher and A. Murdoch, 'Patronage and Party in the Church of Scotland, 1750-1805', in
Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408-1929 (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 197-220.
15 R. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati ofEdinburgh
(Edinburgh, 1985).
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necessity, negatively contrasting the sectarian enthusiasm of his detractors with his own
more ecumenical love of civic liberty. Hutcheson lamented that 'the warm zealots of all
sides have represented all schemes of religion opposite their own, opposite also to all
goodness.' Yet. he insisted, 'Virtue ever was and will be popular, where men can vote
freely.'16 The philosopher of benevolence and the moral sense nonetheless was an
ardent foe of crown patronage, not for theological but for political reasons.
Hutcheson's position on patronage was that enshrined in the 'old Whig'
settlement of 1690, reaffirmed by the General Assembly in 1732. He understood the
attempt of the crown to meddle in the selection of church ministers as yet another
encroachment of the royal prerogative, which all friends of liberty and supporters of the
independency of the landed interest need resist at all cost. It was this civic humanist
inspired metaphor of the Kirk elder as freeholder that dominated the anti-patronage
rhetoric of the eighteenth century, and it was this conception that Robertson's circle had
to confront in their written dissent against a ruling by the General Assembly which they
regarded as a dangerous appeasement to popular enthusiasm. In 1752 the Commission of
the General Assembly had ruled not to punish the presbytery of Inverkeithing for refusing
to induct Andrew Richardson as its new minister. The Reasons ofDissent in the
Inverkeithling Case (1752), printed in the Scots Magazine and as a separate pamphlet, not
only represented Dr. Robertson's first introduction to the public sphere but provides a
reasonably concise precis of his political philosophy. The arguments Robertson deployed
demonstrated his familiarity with juridical discourse as well as a true Stoic's appreciation
for order and subordination.
16
Op. cit. in Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman, p. 194.
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Robertson began by acknowledging populist fears. He conceded that there had
been past instances of abuse of patronage, and granted that of all possible tyrannies,
ecclesiastical tyranny was 'the most grievous and insupportable.' Yet, having
acknowledged these concerns, Robertson proceeded to turn the populists' own patriotic
rhetoric against them. If the populists could implore the elders of the Kirk as citizens to
resist patronage as tyrannical corruption of first principles, so the Moderates could defend
adherence to the practice as 'the only means of insuring that the present most excellent
Constitution of this Church may be preserved; and may be handed down to posterity, as
free and uncorrupted, and as sound and vigorous, as they have received it from their
Ancestors.'17 The deployment of 'ancient-constitutionalist' rhetoric not only turned the
tables on their opponents by portraying them as 'dangerous innovators', but also provided
an opportunity to redescribe that constitution in reference to contractarian Whig
principles with a neo-stoic gloss. The ordered system of the Scottish Kirk, Robertson
argued, paralleled and reflected the ordered system of society generally. The two leading
principles of the 'Kirk by law established' were the 'parity of its ministers and the
Subordination of its Judicaries.' Robertson insisted that the degree of liberty provided by
the first principle made rigorous defence of the second principle all the more vital.
Membership in any society entailed duties as well as rights, and the imperative to 'follow
the judgment of society' held whenever an individual voluntarily entered into society.
'There can be no Union, and by consequence there can be no society,' Robertson warned,
18'where there is no Subordination.' Presbyteries had a firm obligation to acknowledge
the sovereignty of the General Assembly and to subordinate itself to its command.
17
'Reasons of Dissent in the Inverkeithing Case, 1752' in Miscellaneous Works, p. 26.
18 Ibid., p. 33.
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For Robertson, the principle of subordination had never been in graver danger, as
the Inverkeithling case had revealed that, 'a Spirit of Disobedience to its Laws and
Orders has most unaccountably prevailed, and grows stronger and bolder every day.'19
This spirit of disobedience hid behind the popular rhetoric of liberty of conscience,
interpreted as a species of ecclesiastical resistance theory by which any directive of the
General Assembly perceived as inconsistent with the 'Laws of Christ' could be with
impunity subjected to the will of heaven. For Robertson, this amounted to Epicureanism
in principle, to anarchy in practice. Liberty of conscience was the false mantra of
dangerous evangelicals who threatened to subvert the basic principles of society on their
head, by sacrificing the integrity of the whole for the narrow interest of the part.
Subordination was total, or it was nothing. At one level, Robertson had employed a stoic
and juridical idiom against the republican language of the Popular party. This allowed
him to subtly shift the argument from patronage to discipline. More fundamentally, his
reasons for dissent portrayed popular enthusiasm as an enemy of true religion, which
could only be protected by a secure rule of law. A General Assembly secure in its
sovereignty would not lead to Erastianism through the back door, but prove the securest
defence against it.
Robertson and his circle did not win the day, but the Inverkeithling affair secured
his reputation as a major player in the ecclesiastical politics of the Kirk. His reputation
within the Kirk had reached the point where he was invited in 1755 to preach to the
annual assembly of The Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge. The
Situation of the World at the Time ofChrist's Appearance, Robertson's only published
sermon, has most often been read in the context of posthumously collected complete
19 Ibid., p. 26.
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editions, and has become divorced from its contemporary context, the civilising mission
of the Scottish Kirk to the infidel populations of the Highlands and of North America.
Contemporaries could have made no such mistake, for Robertson's sermon, as with all
sermons published by the society, came attached with a short history of the organisation,
which spelled out its aims and objectives.20 These aims were genuinely ambitious,
amounting to nothing less than the total transformation of highland society through
21
missionary activity and instruction in the 'useful arts' of agriculture and manufacture.
Yet the transformation of highland society was not the extent of, or perhaps even the
most ambitious aspect, of the societies remit. The conversion of the similarly barbarous
indiginous populations of North America was popularly understood as no less crucial to
the national interest.
At a time, when the friendship of the Indian nations appears to be of so great
consequence towards the security and preservation of our American colonies,
no attempt to instruct them, however feeble, ought to be regarded with
indifference. Every person among them whom we gain over to the belief and
practice of true Christianity, becomes from that moment the ally of Britain,
and is bound to its interests by a powerful and sacred tie.22
At one level, this revealed a conventional invocation of the socially cohesive powers of
confession; at another, a strategic apprehension that the scramble for the Americas among
the great powers, if won by the French, would turn the Native Americans into a new
Popish bulwark against British expansion and commerce.
For, considering it in a political view, it seems the best calculated, in a consistency
20 'State of the Society in Scotland , For propagating Christian Knowledge, for the Year 1754.' in
W. Robertson, The Situation of the World at the Time ofChrist's Appearance, to which is attached, a
briefHistory of the Society (Edinburgh, 1755), pp. 50-51.
21
Posterity has not been altogether kind to their endeavours. Allan Macinnes informs us that, ' In equating
gaelic with barbarity and in claiming that other religious denominations in Gaeldom were outwith the
Christian pale, the Kirk was virulently supported from 1709 by the shocktroops of Presbyterianism - the
Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge in Scotland, whose Gaelic acronym was
appropriately C.C.C.P.' A. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce, and the House ofStuart 1603-1788
(Melksham, 1996) p. 178.
22 'State of the Society in Scotland,' p. 57.
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with the genius and spirit of Britons, to secure the peace and inland trade of our
colonies, and balance the growing power of the French in North-America. Indian
scholars would apparently be so many new subjects to his Majesty. -They would
greatly strengthen that chain which binds the Indians to our interest.
Yet the members of the society were under no illusion concerning the difficulty of the
task. The path to the successful conversion of the Indian lay strewn with a thousand
obstacles.
The Indians have not the knowledge of GOD. -They have no mode of worship.
They are scattered over the continent in small tribes. Each tribe has a
different language. They are strangers to agriculture. Hunting is their chief
employment. They follow their game to a great distance from the ordinary place
of their abode. When at home, a whole tribe is not collected into one town, nor
within a small compass of ground; but each little town has its own inhabitants.
These towns are for the most part many miles distant from each other, and the
nearest of them some hundred miles from the American shore.
Nor were these the extent of the difficulties. Scottish missionaries sent across the
Atlantic had discovered a troublingly latitudinarian sensibility among the feathered
heathens that rendered them stubbornly resistant to conversion. 'For just at that time the
Indians pretended to have received a revelation from heaven; which, after having
represented the evil of some particular vices, and recommended to them the sacrificing of
a deer, and other superstitious and idolatrous practices, concludes by telling them, that
GOD made two worlds, one for the white people, and one for the Indians: and that the
white people had no business to come into the Indian country, much less to persuade
them to embrace their religion; for that he had commanded the white people to worship
GOD in their own way, and the Indians to worship GOD in theirs'. More alarmingly still,
the Indians had taken a distinctly dim view of those who professed nothing but a
disinterested view to the futurity of their immortal souls. Previous ill treatment had left
the Indians thoroughly jaded concerning missionary intentions, professing that 'though
the white people made some pretences of instructing the Indians; yet they had no design
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of doing them good, but to put money in their pockets, and make the Indians much
worse.' One might have thought that the presumably insurmountable logistical, not to
mention attitudinal. barriers to the work of the S.P.C.K would have proved sufficient to
provoke a crippling crisis of confidence. Domestic events, however, provided the
spiritual shot in the arm that overseas success could not.
For the work of the Society gained an entirely new and pressing relevance in the
wake of the Jacobite rebellion of 1745. The Rebellion was unquestionably the formative
event in the political education of the Moderates, an event that clarified allegiances and
underscored existing prejudices. An aspect of the Rebellion not always sufficiently
emphasised was that it was always seen as auxiliary to an imminent French conquest. In
1739 Walpole's government had declared war against Spain, and a group of disaffected
Jacobites had sought to seize the opportunity of likely British conflict with France to urge
the French crown to support a Stuart Restoration. Upon the death of Fleury, Cardinal
Tenacin assumed responsibility for organising support for Charles Stuart's invasion.
Tenacin's project was reported in the London press to entail winning the support of
disaffected Scots with the promise of independence and the disaffected English with the
promise of cheaper beer. While effective French support for the Jacobites never
23 'To stir up the Scots, by enforcing to them, in the strongest Terms, the many Disadvantages they labour
under from the Union of the two Kingdoms: The Misery they are reduced to, from a slavish
Dependance upon the English Court: Their Nation drained of its Money, by sending Members to the
Parliament held at Westminster; who, by that means, are cajoled and bribed into the Interests and
Purposes of designing Ministers, and leave their own Country bleeding in Shame and Poverty: That a
Prince, descended from the Royal Race of their own Kings, is now an Exile! his only Support the
Benevolence of Foreign Courts! to the eternal Ignominy of so warlike and brave a People, who
repelled the fierce Assaults of the Romans, when the most powerful and distant Empires of the East
could not resist their spreading Conquests: That the national Affronts they daily receive from the
English are insupportable: That there is no Expedient left to redress their Injuries, than a Dissolution of
the Union, and restoring themselves to their ancient Independence upon the English. . . [and to win over
the English] All Taxes, which have the least Appearance of a Grievance to the inferior People, to be
taken off; particularly Excise upon Malt: This will have great Weight upon the laborious Part of
the Kingdom, who consume most of their little Income in drinking Strong-beer, and in which consists
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materialised, fear of French invasion became a lasting aspect of Scottish political
psychology, one Robertson was later to address head on with his Charles V. Robertson
experienced the conflict not as a neutral observer but as an armed combatant and member
of the college volunteers. While the volunteer's practical contribution to the defence of
the city hovered awkwardly between ineffectual and non-existent, the warmth of their
commitment to the Whig-Hanoverian regime against what they perceived as a last-ditch
rear-guard assault by the forces of political and religious reaction should not be
underestimated.24 The immediate legacy of the rebellion, following the decisive victory
at the battle of Culloden was an unprecedented degree of determined intervention on the
part of the British state in Scottish affairs, uncomfortably acquiesced to by the lowland
25
Whig establishment, but earning the lasting enmity of partisan historians of Gaeldom.
In the years following the rebellion, the Society's annual fundraising sermon served as an
occasion for public meditation on the 'highland problem.' These sermons explored the
issues surrounding how to bring the underdeveloped civilisation of the northwest into the
British fold, and how to pacify it through religious, cultural and economic incorporation.
Highlanders fully won round to Whig Presbyterian culture would not prove amenable to
the French interest.
While the first published sermon by the young minister Adam Ferguson was not
sponsored by the Society, it addressed many of the same issues, having been preached in
their greatest Happiness.' Cardinal Tenacin 's Plan Presented to the French King, for Settling the
Pretender's Family Upon the British Throne, and Compleating the Long-concerted SCHEME of
UNIVERSAL MONARCHY in the HOUSE ofBOURBON (London, 1745), pp. 10-17.
24 Richard B. Sher, Church and University in the Scottish Enlightenment: The Moderate Literati of
Edinburgh (Edinburgh, 1985), pp. 37-44.
25 'The immediate aftermath of the 45 was marked by systematic state terrorism, characterised by a
genocidal intent that verged on ethnic clensing; by banditry as a form of social protest; and by cultural
alienation as chiefs and leading gentry abandoned their traditional obligations as protectors and patrons
in pursuit of their commercial aspirations as proprietors.' Allan Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce, and
the House ofStewart, p. 218.
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1745 in the 'Ersh' language to a highland regiment of the British army. The puipose of
the sermon was twofold, to inculcate enthusiasm for military service, and to show that
such service was necessary to resist a rebellion directly resultant from French attempts to
impose a 'popish tyranny' upon the British Isles. Ferguson was eager to counter the
notion that the French crown was a neutral party in a localised dynastic conflict, and that
those who thought otherwise were the hapless dupes of a cynical power far shrewder than
they.26 Ferguson's purpose was to dislodge any residual loyalty, or, as was more likely,
any residual sense of grudging duty towards the House of Stuart, by painting them as
servile pawns of an entirely alien interest. As added disincentive, Ferguson stoked up
fear of the inevitable religious persecution following a Jacobite victory:
What can we expect in our civil or religious Concerns from a Popish King,
but the Subversion of our Liberty, and the entire Corruption of our Religion?
May we not expect to have our Bibles snatched from our Hands, ourselves
dragged to the Stake and the Gibbet for perusing the Word of God? Ignorance
and Superstition again resume their Tyranny in these Lands, and we and our
Posterity bend to the unnatural Dominion of Priests and Churchmen?27
The sentiment had a self-subverting implication, and Ferguson was not long to continue
in his capacity as a Presbyterian minister. But the thrust of his message was to be taken
up by others.
The Reverend Robert Wallace, though he was to become an ecclesiastical
opponent to Ferguson, strongly seconded his understanding of Jacobite rebellion as
popish plot in his sermon Ignorance and Superstition a Source of Violence and Cruelty
(1745), preached to the Society at its annual meeting. Though he was to come to
prominence in the 1750s as a critic of David Hume's theory of ancient population,
26 A. Ferguson, A Sermon Preached in the Ersh Language to his Majesty's First Highland Regiment
of Foot, Commanded by Lord John Murray, At their Cantonment at Camberwell, on the 18lh Day of
December, 1745 (Edinburgh, 1745), p. 16.
27 Ibid., pp. 17-18.
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Wallace at the time occupied the semi-official position of government 'Correspondent' at
the pleasure of the leader of the 'Squadrone' intrerest. the Marquees of Tweedsdale, and
could thus be seen as offering within the Kirk a perspective smiled upon by the
28establishment..
Wallace began his sermon by emphasising that knowledge was not in itself any
guarantor of good behaviour. Knowledge was morally neutral, indeed the less men of
'bad principles and wicked Dispositions' knew, the better. This highlighted the urgent
necessity of correct education; for Wallace no small responsibility for the recent
disturbances lay in the inculcation of false principles. He was particularly keen to
underscore the contrast of Stoic principles of subordination with Epicurean anarchical
notions of human conduct. Wallace maintained that the firmer one's conception of the
'exact regularity' and 'necessary subordination' of all the various parts of the natural
world, the more one would feel aesthetically drawn to that order and conform one's
conduct in accordance with it.29 Wallace was here implying that the utter lack of a proper
education amongst the highlanders had led them to the paradox of rebellion in the cause
of absolutism, which led him to reflect more generally concerning the relationship
between superstition and despotism. 'Now, these tyrannical Governments have fixed
their Seat,' Wallace contended, 'and taken the firmest Root in Nations blinded by
Heathenish Superstition and Mahometan Darkness: Ignorance and Error is their firmest
Support; nor could they have submitted during so many Ages, had men enjoyed the pure
Light of the Gospel, and been blessed with just and reasonable Notions of Morals and
28 Ian D. L. Clark, 'From Protest to Reaction: The Moderate Regime in the Church of Scotland, 1752-
1805' in N. T. Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison, (eds.), Scotland in the Age of Improvement
(Edinburgh, 1970), pp. 200-224.
29 Robert Wallace, Ignorance and Superstition a Source of Violence and Cruelty (Edinburgh, 1746).
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Religion; and for this Reason, these Governments knowing their own Interest, cherish
30
Ignorance and Error with a superstitious Care.'' The delusion of the highland rebels was
ample proof for Wallace that possession of Christianity in itself was insufficient for the
preservation of liberty and order. He could conceive of no better illustration of ignorance
as the assiduously courted handmaiden of tyranny than the rise and progress of the Popish
tyranny, as even the most cursory glance at the history of Europe would illustrate.31 Now
was no time for apathea, but rather a vindication that some principles were benign and
improving, others pernicious and all too recently on the march. In Wallace's mind, the
'45 rebellion was entirely the fruit of the 'ignorance and superstition' of those who lived
north of the barbarian frontier. These 'savages' had no just notion of religion or morals,
merely a supine submission to the law of their chieftain.
This passivity and lack of discernment rendered them susceptible to a would- be tyrant
who would gleefully have overthrown the constitution and rendered Britain a true
30 Ibid., p. 21.
31 'And here we should recall to our Thoughts the tyrannical Dominion this Church hath usurped, and
exercised over Mankind, her unjust and exorbitant Demands, and Exactions ofMoney, under the
Pretence of the Service of God and his Church, but in Reality for maintaining the numerous Swarms,
and various Orders of the Clergy in lazy Opulence, and the Affluence and Magnificence of worldly
Power, in which Design she hath also succeeded; (tho' by the vilest Arts and most shameful
Impositions) and by amassing so great a Part of the Wealth of Christians, hath drained and impoverished
the People in a most merciless manner. We should remember likewise the cruel Persecutions she hath
raised in ancient and modern Times, against all who presumed to differ from her, and refused to submit
to her Authority; the bloody Massacres which she excited in France soon after the Reformation, and in
Ireland, in the Time of our Civil Wars; the Cruelties exercised against the Protestants of France, after
the Edict of Nantz was recalled, by one of the bigotted Princes of her Communion, out of pure Zeal to he
Church; especially we should remember a standing Monument of her Violence and Cruelty, in the
dreadful Tortures and horrible Executions of the Court of Inquisition, and the pernicious Doctrines of
that Church, by which Breach of Faith, annulling and violating the most sacred Oaths, and all Sorts of
Barbarities for the sake ofReligion, are justified. Now, these Cruelties are a lively Example of the
Psalmist's Observation. As this tyrannical Hierarchy was raised up at first, made gradual Advances,
always has been and still is supported by ignorance and Error; as it began and came to its Height in dark
and ignorant Ages, and was built upon the Ruins of Knowledge and Learning; and 'tis only in this Sense
that we ought to understand and allow the Maxim, That Ignorance is the Mother ofDevotion, meaning a




tyranny. The present rebellion was thus also a supreme vindication of the urgent and
pressing need of the work of the Society. 'Should we not therefore, even for our own
Sakes, support a Society for the Reformation of these Highland Clans?' Wallace asked
rhetorically, 'when we have seen and felt that they are capable of doing so much
Mischief.' Wallace concluded his sermon by inviting the congregation to bow their
heads and join him in the prayer that,
God in his Providence would enlighten the dark Places of the Earth with true
Knowledge, and especially the Knowledge of true Religion: that he would put an
End to Pagan and Mahometan Superstition and Darkness, deliver the Christian
Churches from Popish Ignorance and Tyranny, put a Stop to Persecution for
conscience Sake, and to all the Cruelties which flow from Bigotry, Ignorance and Error:
That he would preserve the reformed Churches from all the secret and open Attempts
of the Church ofRome, and bring the Reformation to a greater Ripeness and Perfection;
and that he would raise up Instruments, and give Success to all Means and Endeavours
for enlightening the Highlands and Islands of Scotland.33
In 1750, the young minister and Robertson's closest intellectual friend, Hugh
Blair, seconded Wallace's prayer with a qualified Amen. Five years on, the sense of
danger and apprehension was in great measure dissipated, and Blair was in a position to
offer to the Society more positive arguments for the benefits of Christian knowledge.
After a mildly ironic invocation of the howls of protest raised against the twin scourges
of superstition and enthusiasm, Blair posed the question to the sceptics, 'Is this then the
Case, that all Principles, except good ones, are supposed to be of such mighty Energy?
Strange! that false Religion should do so much, and true Religion so little.' For Blair,
religion was the rock upon which every society was necessarily built, and without which,
sociability would falter. 'For, first of all' Blair argued,
32 'The Pretender is a most bigotted Papist, and has been educated in the most superstitious and tyrannical
Maxims of the Courts of France and Rome; That he lyes under the most strict of Obligations to both
these Courts, the most dangerous Enemies of the British Nation, That he must have conceived the most
bitter Enmity agaisnt the Form of our Government in Church and State.' Ibid., p. 33.
33 Ibid., p. 35.
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it forms them for Society. It civilizes Mankind. It tames the Fierceness of their
Passions, and wears off the Barbarity of their Manners. Without some Notions
of Religion, it is much to be questioned, whether any regular Society ever subsisted,
or could subsist, in the World. All those who, in early Times, attempted to reduce
wandering and scattered Men unto Society, found it necessary to begin with some
Institution of Religion: And the wisest Legislators of old, thro' the whole Progress
of their Systems of Government, treated it as necessary and essential to Civil Polity.
If even those imperfect Forms of Religion, mixed with so much Error, were important
to Society; how much more, that reasonable and true Worship of God which the
Gospel teaches? True Religion introduces the Idea of regular Subjection, by
accustoming Mankind to the Awe of superior Power, in the Deity, joined with the
Esteem of superior Wisdom and Goodness. It is, by its Nature, an associating Principle,
creating new and sacred Bonds of Union amongst Men. Common Assemblies for
religious Worship, and the joint Veneration of one God; the Sense of being all,
in common, dependent on the same supreme Protection, and bound by the same Ties to
Duty, Sharers of the same Benefits of Religion, and Expectants of the same Reward;
all this has a Tendency to awaken the Sense of our friendly Relation, to knit us together,
and strengthen our mutual Connection.34
Religion, for Blair, not only brought people together but also kept them together, by
providing the psychological foundation of the rule of law. Without hope of reward and
fear of punishment in a future state, no form of contract could carry any weight, as all
moral obligation drew its inspiration from God.35 This was the voluntarist view of the
source of moral duty espoused by Samuel Pufendorf, and Blair, who had written his own
student thesis combating the 'pernicious system' of Hobbes, would have been entirely
familiar with the lineage of his argument. While the thrust of this defence of the social
utility of religion was broadly neo-stoic and natural jurisprudential, it would be very
wrong to imply that Blair was any more successful in avoiding the temptation of factious
dispute in voicing his own ecclesiastical preference than Pufendorf himself had been.
34 H. Blair, The Importance ofReligious Knowledge to the Happiness ofMankind (Edinburgh, 1750), pp.
23-24.
35 'That last and greatest Pledge of Veracity, an Oath, without which no Society can subsist, derives its
whole Authority from the Reverence of God, to whom it is a solemn Appeal, banish religious
Principle, and you loosen all the Bonds of Society: You shake the fundamental Pillar of all mutual Trust
and Confidence amongst Men; nay, you destroy the Security arising from Laws themselves. For human
Laws and human Sanctions cannot extend to numberless Cases, in which the Safety of Mankind is
highly concerned. They would be very ineffectual Means ofmaintaining the Order and Peace of
Society, if there were no Checks upon Men, from the Sense of Divine Legislation; if no Belief of Divine
Rewards and Punishments were to come in Aid, of what human Rewards and Punishments so
imperfectly provide for.' Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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Wallace would have found little to quarrel with in Blair's stinging denunciation of
systems of ecclesiastical polity not in keeping with British liberty. Indeed. Blair seemed
to paraphrase Wallace in his denunciation of 'nations blinded by Mahometan and Pagan
darkness,' under which head he seemed to classify the 'darkness, oppression and slavery'
of feudal Europe prior to the Reformation. Popish sovereigns fully understood this and
trembled at the prospect of Protestant liberty unleashed within their domains, which was
why free nations could never rest while the papal tyranny endured."'6
Blair did not need to remind his audience how the recent rebellion confirmed this
through negative example. Highland Jacobites had never been anything more than pawns
in Louis XV's ambitious scheme to re-establish a more hospitable government at
Westminster. He was at pains to insist, however, that the programme of pacification
commenced by the Whig government required the long-term committed backing of the
Society if the Highlands were to remain obedient.
A Part of the Country, which may be considered as yet rude and uncivilized;
where Society has scarcely got beyond its Infant State; and whither the Influence
of Government and Order has very imperfectly reached: Where the Inhabitants,
hitherto accustomed to no Subjection, except a slavish Dependence on their
Chieftains, are inured to Rapine, totally negligent of the Arts of Peace, and
Strangers to cultivated Life: Where the grossest Ignorance and Superstition
have remarkably reigned, and have nourished, as their proper Offspring, a blind
Attachment to some pernicious Notions of Government, artfully instilled into
their Minds. If ever the Aid of religious Knowledge was necessary to establish
and assist Society, it must be allowed to be necessary here: Especially, as we
know Popish Emissaries have not been wanting among them, to sow their
poisonous Principles; and to foment that disaffected Spirit, the violent Effects
of which were felt a few Years ago; when we saw them rushing, like a Torrent
from their own bleak Mountains, to spread Confusion and Terror through a
peaceful Land. -If so many of our Countrymen have hitherto been not only
useless, but even dangerous to the rest of the Society, ought not all wise and good
Men to encourage the Design of propagating among them those Principles of true
religious Knowledge, which may reform them from Barbarity, and unite them to
the rest of the Society? Regard to our own Safety and Tranquillity might alone
recommend this Design, tho' no higher Motive were applied to/7
36 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
37 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
The transformation of highland culture was indeed a political imperative, but need not be
justified solely on prudential grounds. Blair further appealed to the Christian charity of
his audience, 'What a melancholy View does it give of human Nature, to think of so
many dark Places of the Earth that are full of the Habitations ofCruelty; where, either
sunk in total Darkness, or enslaved to wild Superstition, Mankind pass their wretched
38
Days, scarcely rais'd a Degree above the Beasts thatperish!'' Virtue demanded that one
dig deep into one's pockets to aid the cause of civilisation.
Robertson's own sermon, preached before the society in 1755, ten years after the
rebellion, was more successful than Blair's in lowering the theological and political
temperature of debate on the 'highland question' while still offering an endorsement of
the good work of the Society. The Sermon, entitled 'The Situation of the World at the
Time of Christ's Appearance' spelled out how human affairs are artfully contrived by
God to further his own ends. 'God manifested the mystery of the Gospel,' Robertson
began, 'at a time when the world stood most in need of such a revelation, and was best
39
prepared for receiving it.'" That time, it could be no accident, coincided with the
expansion of the Roman Empire. 'At last', Robertson continued, 'the Roman ambition
undertook the arduous enterprise of conquering the world, and conducted it with such
refined policy, irresistible courage, and inimitable perseverance, as in the end crowned
the attempt with success. They trode down the kingdoms, according to Daniel's prophetic
description, and by their exceeding strength they devoured the whole earth.'40 The
Roman Empire, therefore, for all its sundry crimes against liberty, nevertheless achieved
38 Ibid., p. 35.
39 Sermon Upon the Situation of the World at the Time of Christ's Appearance, &c. in Miscellaneous
Works and Commentaries, in Works, p. 9 .
40 Ibid. p. 15 (italics in the original).
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its divinely allotted purpose. It prepared the world for the coming of a more profound
and lasting imperium, the empire of God. This was an argument familiar to Christian
universal history since Orossius, that Christ condescended to be born in the reign of
Caesar Augustus and thus bestowed legitimacy upon the Roman Empire. As discussed in
Chapter one, this was also an argument employed by sixteenth-century apologists for
English imperium..
'By means of their victories,' Robertson intoned, 'the over-ruling wisdom of God
established an empire, that really possesses the perpetuity and eternal duration, which
they vainly arrogated to their own: He erected a throne which shall continue for ever; and
of the increase of that government there shall be no end.'41 Robertson's citation of the
Book of Daniel at this point could not have been done in innocence. The dream of
Nebuchadnezzar, prophesising the coming of the four great world empires, one
translating to the next according to the divine will, was the scriptural inspiration and the
thread of narrative continuity of Mosaic universal history. Robertson seemed to imply
that the establishment of Christianity was the final translatio imperii, or transferral of
empire. But the polite and worldly clergyman was not simply rehearsing the eschatology
of the Fifth Monarchy Men, rather he was pointing out that the vainglory of the Romans
had ironically created the social and commercial conditions through which the Good
News could be most efficiently propagated. The legitimacy of the Kingdom of Heaven
would justify itself through moral improvement; it would not, Robertson insisted, 're¬
establish virtue upon the same insecure foundation of civil government, but to erect it
upon the eternal and immoveable basis of a religion, which teacheth righteousness by the
41 Ibid., p. 19.
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authority of God.' ~ While Robertson banished imperial apologetic to the realm of
theology, he had not laid out a blueprint for any simple return to Mosaic historiography.
For Robertson, God did not intervene directly in human affairs. Moral improvement
would largely be the result of human endeavour; Christianity would re-establish virtue by
rendering the people of the Earth polite.
Robertson was quite explicit that this providentially sanctioned dynamic was the
potential corollary of European colonisation. 'Under all disadvantages,' Robertson
continued, 'the genius of the gospel exerts itself, civilizing the fiercest and most
barbarous nations, and inspiring a gentleness of disposition, unknown to any other
religion . . .It not only sanctifies our souls, but refines our manners; while it gives the
promises of the next life, it improves and adorns the present.'43 Yet Robertson proceeded
to moderate his fervour; he was not so much celebrating the evangelical successes of
empire as suggesting a potential it had not hitherto achieved:
That part of the world, wherein Christianity is established, infinitely surpasses
the rest in all the sciences and improvements which raises one nation above
another in reputation and power. Of this superiority the Europeans have availed
themselves to the utmost, in every project for extending their empire or commerce;
and have brought a great part of the globe into dependence, either upon their acts
or their arms. Now the same attainments in science or policy, might be employed
to good purpose, on the side of religion: And though hitherto subservient to the
designs of interest or ambition, may we not flatter ourselves, that, at last, they shall
become noble instruments in the hand of God, for preparing the world to receive
the gospel.44
But, remembering the context of his address, Robertson insisted that this was a project to
begin at home, a project only now possible because 'laws have been enacted with a most
humane spirit, in order to retrieve that part of the kingdom from ignorance and barbarism,
and to introduce the same regular government and independence which are the blessings
42 Ibid., p. 23
43 Ibid., p. 48
44 Ibid., p. 51.
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of other British subjects.'43 The Rebellion had shown that the highlands were in need of
a "new' revelation. But now, Robertson allowed his audience to hope, through the work
of the Society that they may be at last prepared to receive it.40 The highly punitive post-
'45 legislation in Robertson's mind had made possible the success of that project began
by James VI a century and a half previously, the pacification of Gaeldom.
The literary public was evidently prepared to receive Robertson's own revelation;
the sermon went through five editions in his lifetime, and went some way towards locally
establishing his reputation as a man of polite letters. In this new capacity Robertson
made several important contributions to the short-lived first Edinburgh Review of 1755-
56, a journal established to promote new Scottish literary efforts. The debut issue of The
Edinburgh Review opened not only with a laudatory review of Robertson's own sermon,
but also with a lengthy notice of an Aberdonian publication of a new work by Alexander
Gordon of Auchintoul, a retired Scottish officer of the Russian army, written by
Robertson himself. The History ofPeter the Great Emperor ofRussia; to which is
prefixed, a short general history of the Country, from the rise of that Monarchy; seemed
to promise great things: 'The attempt of Peter the Great towards civilizing that vast
Empire, of which he was the Sovereign', Robertson gushed, 'is perhaps the most
interesting object that the history of mankind presents to the view of a Philosopher.'47
From the vantage point of philosophical history, the scale of the Czar's achievement was
almost incredible; he had turned the laws of historical development, the lumbering
'casual operation of undesigned events' on their head through sheer force of will. 'The
45 /bid., p. 54.
46 'New', that is, to the Highlanders, not of course to reformed theology.
47 W. Robertson, 'Eight Book Reviews from the Original Edinburgh Review, 1755-56', in Miscellaneous
Works and Commentaries, in Works, p. 49.
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Czar of Muscovy is the first man who, unenlightened by science, and uninstructed by
example'. Robertson reminded his readers, 'conceived the vast design of civilizing
sixteen millions of savages, and who, by operations the most amazing and adventurous,
introduced armies and fleets, commerce and science, into an Empire where they were all
unknown.'48 Robertson's interest in Peter would have been piqued by passages in
Voltaire's History ofCharles XII (1732). Voltaire was later to write an official history of
Peter for the Russian court, but his volume on the Swedish monarch contained a full
panegyric to the Russian achievement.49 Gordon's volumes had clearly raised high
hopes, and they just as clearly proved deeply disappointing. The General's lifelong
preoccupation with things military had left him, Robertson tactfully concluded, bereft of
'those sciences which inspire taste and elegance in composition.' As well as being badly
written, the scope of the work was distressingly narrow. Gordon gave little space to the
politics of domestic transactions, and Peter's vision of empire. The work was not entirely
without interest for Robertson, however. He admired the complexity of Gordon's
psychological portrait of the man himself, where with the obvious virtues of the hero
'were mingled, and often in extraordinary proportion, the vices of the man, the violence
of the tyrant, and even, on some occasions, the fierceness of the Barbarian.'50
If Robertson found the link between history and manners unsatisfactorily
developed in the popular narrative history of his day, he found a more satisfactory
marriage of the two in the less likely context of a work of historical jurisprudence. In
48 Ibid., p. 50.
49
'He established schools, academies, printing-works and libraries; the towns were civilized; clothes and
customs changed little by little, although with difficulty. The Muscovites gradually came to know the
meaning of organized society. Even superstitions were abolished; the patriarch was deprived of all
authority, and the tsar proclaimed himself the religious head of state.' Voltaire, The History of Charles
XII (London, 1976), pp. 44-45.
50 Ibid., p. 56.
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1759 Robertson published in the Critical Review a lengthy review of the Historical Law
Tracts of his friend Henry Home, Lord Karnes. This work exemplified what had become
a niche industry for Scottish publishers, historical jurisprudence. There were a number of
factors conditioning the subject's remarkable flourishing in the years following the
Jacobite rebellion: the independence of the Scottish bench, the inspiration of
Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois, a long history of contact with the state of the art at
continental universities, and more immediately a patriotic thirst for the keys to
improvement. In 1746 Karnes had inaugurated the modern Scottish pursuit of historical
jurisprudence with his Essays on Several Subjects Concerning British Antiquaries (1746)
as a patriotic exercise intended to undermine Jacobite political opinions by showing they
had no foundation in history.51 If jurisprudence was the critique of law in terms of its
rationality, historical jurisprudence added a temporal dimension to the subject's
comparative approach to investigate the original conditions that had rendered rational
52those laws or institutions that later became antithetical to improvement. The intense
Scottish interest in the origins of the feudal system was born out of the need to explain
those anachronisms that persisted in Scottish law and Scottish manners. The 'barbarian
invasion' which the burghers of Edinburgh witnessed in 1745 drove home in the most
painful fashion that Scotland had been only imperfectly civilised and that the possibility
51 'He has at Heart to raise a Spirit in his Countrymen, of searching into their Antiquities, those especially
which regard the Law and the Constitution; being seriously convinced, that nothing will more contribute
than this Study, to eradicate a Set of Opinions, which, by Intervals, have disquieted this Island for a
Century and a Half. If these Papers have the Effect intended, it is well: If not, they may at least serve to
bear Testimony of some Degree of Firmness in the Author, who, amidst the Calamities of a Civil War,
gave not over his Country for lost; but trusting to a good Cause, and to good Dispositions in the Bulk of
his Countrymen, was able to compose his Mind to Study, and to deal in Speculations, which are not
relished, but in Times of the greatest Tranquillity'. Henry Home, Lord Karnes, Essays Upon Several
Subjects Concerning British Antiquities, (Bristol, 1993), unpaginated introduction.
52
'Jurisprudence is the theory of the rules by which civil governments ought to be directed. It attempts to
shew the foundation of the different systems of government in different countries and to shew how far
they are founded in reason.' A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and
P. G. Stein (Indianapolis, 1982), p. 5.
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of improvement required understanding why this was so. The science of historical
jurisprudence as practised by the Scots could thus be seen, in part, as the intellectual wing
of the S.S.P.C.K.
Robertson began his review by remarking that while some aspects of law were
universal, others were demonstrably specific to their cultural and political origin. 'There
is not a greater difference between two beings of a contrary species,' Robertson claimed,
'than there is between a man considered as a member of a Grecian commonwealth, of a
feudal kingdom, or of a despotic monarchy . . . Laws made for men in such opposite
situations must differ as much as if they were framed not for the same beings.'
Robertson was making the Montesquieuian point that laws should be in keeping with the
spirit of the society that produced them. Karnes, however, had pushed the historical
aspect of Montesquieu's thought much farther in arguing that changes in the nature of
civil institutions were the by-product of changes in social formation as a response to
53need. Robertson proceeded to narrate briefly the trajectory of this development:
Men, in their progress from their first savage state, have passed through many and
successive stages of refinement. They united, perhaps, very easily, as hunters,
and subsisted like the Indians in America upon the game which they caught.
The pastoral state, of which we have still an example among the Tartars, was
probably next to that; and may be considered as a great step beyond the former,
towards the perfection of society. Then followed the state ofagriculture, such as
subsisted among the first Romans. Lastly, commerce was introduced and extended;
great cities were erected; the arts and sciences, with all their train of elegance, luxury,
and refinement, made their appearance. How different from each other must be the
wants, the desires, and the passions of men accustomed to such various forms of
society? How few and simple the regulations of law in the first state? How numerous
and complicated the last? How powerfully must the genius of every particular form
influence the spirit of the laws which are peculiar to it? How different, for instance,
the regulations with regard to property, which take place among a society which
subsist by hunting, from those which would be proper in a society of shepherds,
of husbandmen, or of merchants? Nor is the spirit of laws influenced only by such
great variations in the form of government. It is possible to trace the effects of
53 The vexed and probably unanswerable question of the exact extent of Karnes' - as well as David
Dalrymple's - reliance upon Adam Smith's Edinburgh lectures of the early 1750's in their development
of Montesqueiu lies beyond the scope of the present chapter. There is no fully satisfactory study of this
issue, but see R. L. Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 98-130.
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slighter and more imperceptible changes in a constitution, though it requires greater
attention and acuteness to discern them.54
This was a projectus for a sophisticated science of society, and Robertson thus felt that
the study of jurisprudence had clearly developed beyond the capacity of the 'practical
lawyer' to cope. Robertson stated that no one 'but a sound philosopher, or a well
informed historian' should undertake an historical jurisprudence attentive to the complex
interplay of law, history, and manners. No commentary on the progress of the science of
jurisprudence in the early modern period was immune from Whiggish complacency, the
practice of lambasting past error while extolling present insight, and Robertson himself
was hardly immune. He lamented that the study of law had been so long left to lawyers
devoid of historical or philosophical training, but suggested that thanks to Karnes, that
unhappy situation had at last been rectified.
The character of Robertson's histories would be profoundly shaped by the agenda
of the Edinburgh intelligentsia, as well as by the political and religious developments of
the period. The contemporary reorientation of natural jurisprudence towards the study of
the progress of civilisation would particularly inform Robertson's vision of philosophical
history as the 'history of the human mind.' However the most important external
influence on Robertson's choice of historical topic had yet to come, one that would throw
into sharper relief the political obstacles to the vision of polite, stoic and cosmopolitan
modernity that Robertson embodied. This was the upheaval caused to the international
state system and to Britiain's commercial empire brought about by the Seven Years War,
and to this we now turn.
54 W. Robertson, 'Review of Henry Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law Tracts, 1759,' in Miscellaneous
Works and Commentaries, in Works, pp. 96-7. Cf, Henry Home, Lord Kames, Historical Law Tracts,
(Edinburgh, 1758), 1,77.
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Chapter Four: Charles V and origins of the balance ofEurope
Part I: Robertson and the Seven Years War
The previous chapter attempted to explore themes in the historiography of David Hume
of relevance to the Robertsonian oeuvre, namely the establishment of a European states
system, the role of superstition, enthusiasm, and priestcraft in an age of confessional war,
the role of Britain as arbiter of the European balance of power, and the establishment of
European empire in the New World. It has been advanced that key to understanding the
intellectual, as well as the polemical thrust of Hume's pronouncements in these areas was
Hume's own position as a keen and prominent observer of the politics of his day,
particularly in his understanding of the implications of Britain's struggle for military and
economic hegemony over France throughout the world. The present chapter will address
these themes in Robertson's first mature work, his History of the Reign of the Emperor
Charles V. It will be advanced that Robertson, no less than Hume, positioned his
historiography as counsel to the statesmen of his day, and that specifically, Britain's
'Machiavellian moment' following her overwhelming successes in the Seven Years War
provided the matrix of problems that informed Robertson's history of the international
order. In its own more moderate, less incendiary fashion, Charles V emerges as a text as
probing and subversive of the tenets of conventional Whiggery as had Hume's own
history.
Any discussion of Charles V must first address the question of subject matter.
That the author of the surprise sensation The History ofScotland should next have turned
his attention to the reign of Charles V raised the curious eyebrow ofmany a
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contemporary, and still can seem a counter-intuitive choice, particularly in the face of
much contrary advice.
It is not clear that Charles V, per se, was Robertson's first choice as a subject. In
a reply to a query raised in a letter from Robertson in 1759, David Hume informed the
newly feted historian that Thomas Warton not only had not, but also probably would not,
ever begin his projected Age ofLeo X. Hume understood that in saying so he was
indicating the ground was clear for Robertson to tackle the same project without fear of
competition. This he was disinclined to do, as he felt Robertson lacked the necessary
background. 'How can you acquire Knowlegde of the great Works of Sculpture,
Architecture, Painting, by which that Age was chiefly distinguished?' Hume asked. 'Are
you versd in all the Anecdotes of the Italian Literature? These Questions I heard
proposed in a Company of Literati, when I enquird concerning this Design of Warton.
They applied their Remarks to that Gentleman, who yet, they say, has traveld. I wish
they do not all of them fall more fully on you.'1 Hume clearly believed that for all his
success, Robertson remained a bit of a provincial.
On the surface, Hume was entirely correct; Robertson had no particularly detailed
knowledge of sixteenth-century art or of continental sources. Indeed, Robertson,
throughout his career, was to write relatively little about the progress of art for arts sake.
Further, as will be noted below, Robertson was far from intimate with much foreign
scholarship on the subject. It is questionable, however, whether Hume fully
comprehended the type of project Robertson began to conceive. Perhaps Hume,
following the proposed title, understood Warton's project as an attempt do for the early
sixteenth century what Voltaire had done for the late seventeenth, namely to provide an
' Letters ofDavid Hume, p. 46.
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historical narrative of a political reign whose glory seemed to sum up an age of glittering
cultural achievement. In short, it was an understandably abandoned project that
Robertson, for all his talent and ambition, was ill positioned himself to take on. Hume
suggested he would be better off to attempt a history of ancient Greece, as the popular
French historian Rollin did not provide much serious competition.
Robertson does not seem to have placed any great stock in Hume's proposal. Nor
was he much interested in Hume's second suggestion, that he write short potted
biographies of modern political characters in the manner of Plutarch. Nor did Robertson
take up his fellow Moderate John Jardine's mischievous call for a biography of Oliver
Cromwell compiled entirely from foreign sources, which would proudly boast to contain
not one true sentence. One suggestion that Robertson was forced to take very seriously
indeed, however, and one put to him with some force and persistence, was for a new
history of England. The story of how Robertson ruminated over then rejected the English
history commission has been told before. Of interest here is how the commission
reflected the historian's rapid rise in reputation and prominence, both in literary and in
political circles, and how this in turn affected the nature of the history he was to compose.
John Blair, antiquarian and chaplain to the Princess-dowager of Wales first suggested that
Robertson should follow up his Scotland with a new history of England. Blair's
proximity to those in power left him well placed to assist in the distribution of copies of
the work prior to publication as presents to those capable of ensuring positive word of
mouth advertising, and to report reporting the good news back to the author. Blair sensed
2
Most recently in Jeffrey Smitten, 'Introduction' The Collected Works of William Robertson (Bristol
1997)
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an opportunity. It would be foolish to think there could ever be a gap in the market for
English history.
I must confess the Reasons you give for declining the History of England
are by no means sufficient, or at least satisfactory to me. For you must
consider that this is a favorite Subject to every Englishman, Even wretched
and contemptible Performances on this Subject meet with astounding
Encouragement & their Number does not lessen the thirst of Purchasers,
Mr Hume with all his merit is liable to many Exceptions & as long as he lives
will never be in possession of the general approbation of the Publick, which is
a Situation you have all the reason in the world to expect, nay I might
venture to say that a very little application to the Ministry might perhaps
procure you a settled Income to enable you to undertake that Task as
necessary for the purchasing Books & the Expence of copying Papers
wherever they are to be found.3
Blair was not alone in seeking to advance Robertson at the expense of Hume. That the
most polite, up-to-date, philosophically sophisticated history of England seemed to be
little more than a multi-volume calculated insult to revealed religion clearly remained
something of scandal to many members of the English establishment.4 In a subsequent
letter Blair claimed that Lord Chesterfield was so convinced of the superiority of
Robertson to Hume as an historian that he would personally attempt to push a motion
through the Lords providing Robertson with the financial means to accomplish such a
grand enterprise. While such appeals to Robertson's sense of personal interest had not
proved sufficient, Robertson's would-be patrons had other means of persuasion. Blair
had previously boasted to Robertson that every member of the royal family had received
a copy of The History ofScotland, and that Prince Edward had taken a particular delight
in the work. Another 'Westminster Scot', the ninth Baron Cathcart, a protege of the
Duke of Cumberland and recently raised to the post of lieutenant general, was an intimate
3 J. Blair to Robertson, NLS 3942, ff 21-22.
4 The most persistently virulent criticisms of Hume's History were as much religious as political in
character. For an extended early example, see Daniel MacQueen Letters on Hume's History ofGreat
Britain, (Bristol, 1990). For a recent discussion of the History's, British reception, see Philip Hicks,
Neo-classical History and English Culture: From Clarendon to Hume (London, 1996) pp. 193-201.
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of the newly installed Lord Bute, and thus, an intimate once removed of the new King,
George III. Cathcart again let it be known to Robertson that the historian's future
prospects were very much on the table, and that his efforts had indeed received a
favourable royal notice. As Cathcart wrote to Robertson,
Upon the Reception your Name would not fail to be mentioned, and I have
the Pleasure to assure you that you have the Lordship's esteem good esteem
and good Wishes, and every light in which you can consider yourself, in as
great a Degree as you can desire. He told me the King's Thoughts as well as
his own with regard to your History of Scotland, and a Wish his Majesty had
espoused to see a History of England by your Pen. His Lordship assured me
every Source of Information which Government can command would be
opened to you, and that great Laborious and extensive as the Work must be,
he would take Care your encouragement should be proportioned to it.5
Such a history, Cathcart clearly hoped, would render that of Hume largely redundant.
Not all of Robertson's patrons sought to exploit Robertson's competitive ambition quite
so nakedly. Robertson's principal supporter in the Commons, Gilbert Elliot, possessed a
keener understanding of the complex personal and intellectual relationships between the
Edinburgh literati, and knew better than Blair how little Robertson relished any full¬
blown Querrelle entre les Humistes et les Robertsonistes. Hume himself was aware of
the possibility, and had taken steps to pre-emptively congratulate Robertson for his
generosity of spirit in avoiding any such publicity- seeking temptations. Elliot, for his
own part, merely argued that the resultant work would undoubtedly be so very different
from Hume's work that the two would not truly be in competition. It is not possible to
ascribe to a single cause why Robertson ultimately declined the commission. We know
he was concerned about writing under the shadow of Hume, who he no doubt genuinely
wished not to offend or follow too closely. We also know that he had little relish for
extended absences from Edinburgh, which was the locus of his social, professional, and
5 Cathcart to Robertson, July 1761, NLS MSS 3942, ff 40-41.
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political life. Whatever the final calculus. Robertson could congratulate himself, as he
was to congratulate his sovereign, for the possession of 'such self-command, and
maturity of judgment, as to set bound to his own triumphs, and to prefer the blessings of
peace to the splendour of glory.'6
Whatever the case, the general assumption that Robertson would naturally turn to
English history was a misreading of Robertson by his contemporaries. It would also be a
misreading of Robertson's intentions to parallel too closely the historiographic purpose of
Charles V with that of Hume's own History ofEngland. Hume's History was a response,
in large part, to what he considered the barbarous state of English letters, and the
particularly barbarous state of English historiography. There is no evidence to suggest
that Robertson held the historiography of sixteenth-century Europe in a similar contempt
as Hume did his predecessors. Robertson had not studied the general history of Europe in
the sixteenth century in any depth since his student days with Charles Mackie, and he
lacked at this point a specialist's intimacy with the relevant historiography. That relative
ignorance is revealed through Robertson's contacts with the prominent antiquary, the
Reverend Thomas Birch, Secretary of the Royal Society from 1752 to 1765. Birch had
attended Marischal College, Aberdeen, and had retained Scottish contacts, which
included such friends of Robertson's as David Dalrymple and Dr. Davidson. Robertson
began his correspondence with Birch in September 1757 with a short letter of
introduction, both for himself and his yet to be completed History ofScotland, in which
the historian offered reciprocal aid in tracking down collections of documents. The then
minister of Gladsmuir, unable to spare the time and cost necessary for lengthy research
6 The words are those of Robertson, dedicating his History of the Reign ofthe Emperor Charles V to King
George ID. Works, III, p. a3.
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travel, had considerable need for such well-placed contacts. The contact proved highly
fruitful, with Birch a useful fact-checker, and an even more important introduction to
others such as the second Lord Hardwicke, with whom Robertson also exchanged
scholarly favours. When Robertson revealed his projected plan to Birch, he requested
from him a list of relevant books on the subject, on the grounds that 'your knowledge in
this regard is far the superior of my own.' Birch duly replied with a copious list of Latin.
French, Spanish, and Italian language texts, the vast majority of which Robertson made
use of in his researches. Robertson, in effect, acquainted himself with the bulk of his
secondary sources only after his subject had been chosen.
A better indication of Robertson's thinking was provided in a letter to Horace
Walpole, in which Robertson revealed his own infectious enthusiasm for the period, as
well as the organisational usefulness of a focus on the reign of Charles. It was not
Charles' character, but his situation, that fascinated. 'The Emperor Charles V',
Robertson explained,
though neither the most pleasant nor the most perfect character
of that age, is on account of the extent of his dominions, and the
length of his reign, the most proper person for occupying this
capital place. I have therefore some thoughts of writing the history
of his reign. The events are great and interesting. The struggle of
the Spanish cortes for their liberty; the Reformation in Germany;
the wars in Italy; the revival of letters; the conquest of the new world;
the rise of the piratical states in Barbary, and the Emperor's expedition
against them; his wars with the Turks; the rivalship between Charles
and Francis; their intrigues with Henry VIII, are all splendid objects in
history. The inferior characters too are good, Leo X, Luther, the
Constable Bourbon, the marquis de Pescara, etc., are pleasant or
(which is as lucky for an historian) strange figures. The field is wide
and I shall have many books to read, but as I shall not be plagued with
the endless controversies which perplexed me in my last work, I am not
dismayed at mere labour. Allow me to ask the favour that you would
bestow an hour upon me; that you would consider this plan, and give me
your opinion how far it is possible to render this subject useful and
interesting. If you think of any other subject that would be more
proper for me to attempt, I shall esteem it an important addition to your
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former favours, if you will take the trouble of writing me concerning it.7
In short, the opening of the sixteenth century was littered with important and interesting
events, and if Charles himself was not the most dignified of subjects, the centrality of his
position in so many of the great set pieces of the age rendered his reign a useful fulcrum
in the organisation of a compelling narrative. It may seem naive on Robertson's part to
presume that the historiography of sixteenth-century Europe contained none of the
controversy of sixteenth-century Scotland. It was unlikely that Robertson thought none
existed, more that such incidental controversies did not particularly engage him, and were
not his primary reason for interest in the topic. Walpole was sceptical, preferring a
history of Greece. Hume, who had likewise suggested that topic, felt the need to progress
to a more advanced criticism of the project.
I own, I like still less your Project of the Age of Charles V. That Subject
is disjointed; & your Hero, who is the sole Connexion, is not very interesting.
A competent Knowledge, at least, is required of the State & Constitution of
the Empire, of the several Kingdoms of Spain, of Italy, of the Low Countries;
which it would be the Work of half a Life to acquire. And tho' some Parts of
the Story may be entertaining, there would be many dry & barren, and the
g
whole seems not to have any great Charms.
For Hume, Charles was simply not a suitable character for such a project, and such a
work ran the risk of immense tedium. Hume was certainly in a position to know, having
himself addressed sixteenth-century European affairs at great length in his own Tudor
volumes. Yet tellingly, this time Hume's scepticism was focused as much on the
subject's lack of literary interest as on Robertson's lack of qualification. Yet Robertson
was, if anything, spurred on by Hume's criticism. The historian had in the meantime
7 Robertson to Horace Walpole, 20 February, 1759. W. S. Lewis (ed.) The Yale Edition ofHorace
Walpole's Correspondence, Vol. 15 (London, 1952), pp. 55-56.
8 Hume to Robertson, 1759. J. Y. T. Grieg, (ed.) The Letters ofDavid Hume (Oxford, 1932),
vol. I, p. 315.
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developed a far more ambitious conception of the potential import of his work. In a letter
to Lord Hardwicke in January 1760 Robertson wrote:
I have ventured to undertake the History of the Emperor Charles V,
whose reign contains the opening of modern History, and the
establishment of the present systems of policy, laws, manners and
religion in Europe. I shall do everything in my power to render it
worthy of the publick attention, though I must execute it more slowly,
and perhaps, more imperfectly, than if I were in a situation which
allowed me more hours of leisure.9
This was something altogether grander and more engaged than a proposal for an
interesting story well told, it was self consciously the project of a man of affairs. Only
the most innocent political observer could have been unaware of the totemic figure
Charles cut in contemporary discourse, and political innocence did not number among the
many charges levelled at Robertson over his long career.
To understand how the young minister might have conceived a history of the
reign of the emperor Charles V as the establishment of the present system of policy, laws,
and manners, it is useful to turn our attention to the contemporary state of the policy
Robertson believed his reign had introduced. As discussed earlier, British foreign policy
had already produced its own legitimating discourse concerning the continuity of its
purposes and aims. This was the history of Britain's providential custodianship of the
scales of balance in Europe against the threat of Popish universal monarchy. The
European narrative of universal monarchy began with the attempt of Charles V to crush
the Reformation and 'give law' to all Europe. According to this view, Charles' ambition
was passed onto his son, whose attempts to conquer and re-catholicise Britain and the
Netherlands were thwarted only by the providential wisdom and strength of Elizabeth I.
Elizabeth was refashioned, by Whig pens, into the emblem of the English sovereign who
9 Robertson to Hardwicke, 19 January 1760. BL 35350, ff 58-59.
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correctly accepted her providential role as protector and saviour of Europe and the
Protestant religion. The official history of the balance of power was every inch as
totemic, mythopoetic, and altogether Whiggish as the domestic history of the ancient
constitution. Yet, more fundamentally, it was no less an argument from history, and the
doctrine's historicity lent it a flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances. It
will be argued that Robertson in his Charles V engaged with this historical paradigm, in a
distinct yet comparable way as Hume had grappled with the parallel doctrine of the
ancient constitution.
Just as it is a caricature to present all Whiggery with which the Edinburgh literati
disagreed as statically and monolithically 'vulgar', so it would be a serious distortion to
view Whig rhetoric concerning the balance of power as incapable of adapting itself to
changing geo-political circumstances. British balance of power discourse emerged
within the context of the European wars of religion, and never entirely shed its
confessional charge. In the seventeenth century, balance of power discourse became
entangled with the jealousy of trade, and remained at its most powerful when
confessional and commercial conflict could be presented as flip sides of a single
contested coin. Within the context of post-Utrecht Europe, however, considerations of
the European balance became inextricably linked with economic competition in the New
World. As with the rhetoric of the ancient constitution, British discourse concerning the
balance of power is deprived of most of its meaning if divorced from the reality of bi¬
polar conflict with France. Just as the story of the rise and progress of French despotism
had long served as an antithesis to the story of the matchless constitution, so the
economic, military, and religious belligerence of a French empire of conquest and
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expansion provided the foil for a British empire of commerce and preservation. Perhaps
paradoxically, the very adaptability of balance of power discourse kept the image of
Charles as the fount of the ambition to universal monarchy surprisingly salient.
The natural forum of balance of power politics was the debate over the conduct of
war. It would be highly counter-intuitive that Charles V, a text whose theme was the
origins of European balance, was not informed by the war fought under that very banner
at the time Robertson was casting about for ideas, that is the Seven Years War of 1756-
1763. The war, as had all wars of the eighteenth century, had reintroduced the figure of
Charles into the historical debate over foreign policy. Hostilities with France
commenced with a relatively minor incident, the taking of two British ships in July 1755.
The official British response was livid. France had acted 'in contempt of the laws of
nations, the faith of treaties, the usages established among civilized nations, and the
regard they owe to each other'.10 'The same motive of self defense hath forced the King
to seize the French ships and sailors, in order to deprive the court of France of the means
of making a descent, with which their ministers in all the courts of Europe have menaced
England.'11 By March the court leaked worries of a possible French invasion. On 17
May, 1756, the crown made an official declaration of war, citing the 'ambitious views' of
12
France now operating without 'regard to the most solemn treaties and engagements.'
The following month saw a parallel declaration from Versailles, also couched in the
language of international law. Britain herself had adopted a belligerent stance 'in
contempt of the law of nations, and the faith of treaties.' Versailles effectively accused
Britain of behaving as if the law of nations only applied in Europe.
10 Scots Magazine, Jan 1756, p. 43.
" Scots Magazine, Feb 1756, p. 81.
12 Scots Magazine, May 1756, p. 37.
145
Whilst the French soldiers and sailors were treated with the greatest severity
in the British islands, and, with respect to them, the bounds which the law of
nature, and the common principles of humanity, have set to the most rigorous
rights of war, were violated; the English travelled and resided freely in France,
under the protection of that regard which civilized people reciprocally owe to
each other.1''
This Anglo-French maritime dispute was never likely to remain a localised issue,
particularly in that it coincided with the instability resultant from the Diplomatic
Revolution, the successful coup of Count Kaunitz of Austria to reverse hundreds of years
of Habsburg strategic thinking, and join into a defensive alliance with France against
Frederick IFs Prussia. At a stroke, the 'Utrecht system' was rendered a dead letter. This
necessitated something of a sea change in Britain's German policy. No longer was the
house of Austria the bulwark against Bourbon aggression - it had not effectively been so
for some time - it was now a hostile force. This in turn transformed Prussia into an
ally.14 Crucially, these developments had the effect of intensifying the confessional
nature of the balance of alliances, with the European states now for the first time divided
neatly into Protestant and Catholic blocs. Not all were convinced that a Prussian
entanglement was wise. One opposition MP worried that 'the balance of power at land,
that plausible pretence formerly made use of, for involving us in expensive alliances and
bloody wars, does not now seem to be in any danger.'15 Such sentiments produced many
vitriolic rejoinders from the Whig supporters of continental measures, who extolled such
treaties as the basic test of the sociability of nations.
13 Scots Magazine, June 1756, p. 290.
14
D. B. Horn 'The Diplomatic Revolution' in J. O. Lindsay (ed). The New Cambridge Modern History,
Vol. VII: The Ancien Regime (Cambridge, 1963) pp. 440-464.
15 Scots Magazine, June 1756, p. 293.
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We know from the testimony of John Erskine that Robertson was a keen follower
of parliamentary debates.16 Robertson, during his 1759 trip to London, had been able
personally to attend a number of debates, where he was able to witness first hand the
effects of the heated rhetoric of the war's principal apologist and architect, the Secretary
of State William Pitt. 'What great things have I to say of Mr. Pitt,' Robertson drolly
intoned, 'who yesterday brought all Tories to approve of continental measures as the
only thing for the good of old England!'
The War became increasingly controversial as a minor stand-off in the colonies
became enmeshed in a continental war at root a conflict between a newly ascendant
Prussia and a declining Habsburg Empire. Many Tories already suspicious of the depth
of dedication of the house of Hanover to British interests felt Britain was being drawn
17into conflict for local German reasons. The war raised additional anxieties within a
Scottish context. Scottish troops contributed disproportionately to the war effort, and
local discourse ruminated nervously over the dangers of depopulation and potential
invasion. This in turn gave particular resonance to the clamour for a Scottish militia,
18which was desired for reasons as much practical as psycho-political.
Scottish periodicals took a keen interest in the conflict. Indeed, periodicals
provided a better indication of the direction of contemporary discourse on the balance of
power took than any re-publication of older, semi-canonical treatises on the subject.
Additionally, there was a blurred line between journalism and historiography. Not only
16 In arguing that the debates over Robert Walpole's administration were crucial in helping to form the
sensibilities of Robertson's circle, Erskine wrote that 'the speeches of Argyle, Carteret, Chesterfield,
Walpole, Pultney, Littleton, Polwarth, and others, in both houses of Parliament, were read with avidity;
and many a younger reader caught their manly animated manner'. J. Erskine 'Appendix to the Sermon:
The Agency of God in Human Greatness', in J. Smitten (ed) Miscelleneous Works, p. 268.
17 R. Pares, 'American versus Continental Warfare, 1739-63', The English Historical Review, 51 (1936),
pp. 436-437.
18 J. Robertson, The Scottish Englightenment and the Militia Issue (Edinburgh, 1985), chapter four.
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did coverage of current affairs focus on the same sort of war and diplomacy as did
literary productions covering more remote events, but the two forms of writing shared the
common name of 'history'. The Scots Magazine in particular covered the war
extensively, cobbling together materials from other Edinburgh and London periodicals,
publishing original correspondence, and often reproducing parliamentary speeches in
their entirety. One such speech, that of one of Robertson's warmest supporters in the
Lords, the Earl of Chesterfield, merits quotation at length, both because it illustrated the
views of one of the historian's most prominent English patrons, and because it placed the
present conflict in its full politico-mythological context. In doing so. Chesterfield's
oration further illustrated how parliamentary debates concerning the war was conducted
on both sides within the paradigm of the balance of power. He did not doubt that the
question of balance lay at the heart of the present conflict.
Our joining in a way upon the continent for preserving the balance of power,
may sometimes be wise and necessary. . . One sole monarch of Europe might
soon render himself master of this island, because he would be superior to us
at sea. By sole monarch, Sir, I do not mean his being in actual possession of
every kingdom and state upon the continent of Europe; but his being in
possession of so much power and so great riches, as to give the law to all the rest,
by menacing the nearest, and bribing, or in modern language, subsidizing the most
remote. And whether the monarch of France might not soon become such a
monarch, if this nation should lay aside all regard for the balance of power,
I hope your Lordships will seriously consider.
While modern circumstances may well have rendered permanent territorial conquest
unlikely, the orientation of Bourbon ambition towards a universal dominance could be
taken as given. Chesterfield further assumed that any such explosion of aggressive
behaviour by the French threw the balance between states into disarray, a situation that
could only be rectified through the concerted action of the British state. The history of
Europe both told and validated such a role for Britain. At this point Chesterfield
solemnly invoked the history of Britain's special relationship with the balance of Europe.
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Chesterfield began this story in the customary fashion by invoking the novel aspirations
of the Emperor Charles V:
The present, Sir, Is not the first time that such a design has been formed.
The house of Austria attempted it in the reign of Charles V.; and he would
have accomplished it had it not been for the wisdom and vigour of Francis II.
His dividing his power, and afterwards resigning his crown, put an end to any
such design in the house of Austria.
This was not a preview of the seventeenth century likely to be shared by German
Protestants or their Whig sympathisers, nor did it provide a view of Charles and Francis
with which Robertson was to have much sympathy. In the traditional narrative, such as
expressed here by Lord Chesterfield, Britain only fully took up her providential role as
defender of the balance, and thus of international Protestantism, during.the reign of the
watchful and decisive Elizabeth. Charles V may have been personally thwarted, but his
ambition lived on in the dark heart of his offspring.
.. .But his son, successor in Spain, Phillip II resumed the design; which
our wise Queen Elizabeth quickly perceived; and notwithstanding her
having much to do at home, she soon took proper measures to defeat it.
For this purpose, she did not hesitate for a moment upon engaging in a
war on the continent, and by assisting the Protestants in France, against
the Spanish faction in that kingdom; afterwards supporting the
malcontents in the Netherlands, against the King of Spain, their then
sovereign.
Chesterfield followed convention by relating the translatio tyrannae from Spain to
France. However, disastrously for the European balance, the long constitutional struggle
within the three British kingdoms had rendered English policy ineffective. Perhaps the
strongest accusation a staunch Whig could level at the house of Stuart was that its
negligence had allowed French power to expand unchecked. As Chesterfield put it,
Upon the decline of the power of Spain, the power of France rose apace;
so that even Cardinal Richelieu began to form the design of making the
King of France monarch of Europe. Our Charles I did something against it,
but he did nothing in the right way; and by his aiming so openly at absolute
149
power at home, he rendered himself unable to oppose any foreign design,
or to support himself upon the throne. His immediate successor Oliver
Cromwell was indeed a usurper; but he was a man of sense, and great cunning:
for by not seeming to aim at it, he got what Charles lost both his crown and his
life for, by too open aiming at it. He indeed for his own glory, and the good of
his country, joined at first with France against Spain; but it is thought, that
before his death he began to think of joining in a confederacy against France.
Whereas Charles II instead of endeavouring to preserve the balahce of power,
became himself a pensioner of France; and was never right but once, I mean
when he entered into the triple alliance, But he soon became sorry for it;
and I am sorry to say, that through his whole reign he seems to have been an
enemy to his country, a friend to his most dangerous enemies. His brother and
successor again lost his crown by refusing to join in a war against Lewis XIV.;
for indeed both the brothers seemed successively to desire only to be the delegate
tyrant of these kingdoms, under the supreme tyrant of Versailles.
This was the central contention of the Whig version of the history of foreign
affairs. English monarchs who neglected the European balance did not long keep their
thrones. Closely following the traditional narrative, Chesterfield continued that with the
Revolution of 1688 England regained her providential role.
After them, by good luck, or rather by a remarkable providence, we got
a sovereign who had some regard to the liberties of Europe, as well as
the liberties of this country. The Prince of Orange, from the moment he
got the better of the French party in Holland; for it is now evident, that
those who in that country called themselves republicans, and were thought
to be so by the deluded populace, were all in the interest, and some of them
perhaps in the pay of France. But the Prince of Orange, by his own address,
and the contempt which the French court in all their measures shewed for
the Dutch, got at last the better of the French pensioners in England, as well
as Holland; and the last of the many great actions of his life was, the
concluding of the grand alliance, which, under the wise conduct of the Duke
ofMarlborough, put an end to the ambitious views of France, and prevented
them being renewed, until we fatally took it into our heads, that the overgrown
power of Austria was becoming dangerous to the liberties of Europe.
Only at this point did the subversive thrust of Chesterfield's remarks become clear. The
process of becoming tied to events on the continent, particularly with the controversial
treaty with Prussia, Britain had taken her eye off the true threat to the European balance -
the growth of a French overseas empire.
I say upon ourselves Sir; because by an attack upon our trade and plantations
in America, the balance of power in Europe may now be irrevocably overturned.
The power of France by land is now become so much superior to that of any of
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her neighbours, that is to say, to all those they can immediately attack by land:
so that now they want nothing for rendering their monarch the sole monarch of
Europe, but money enough to bribe some of those powers that are at a distance;
and this they will get, if they can possess themselves of our trade and plantations,
for this will not only increase their fund for bribing, but put it out of our power to
bribe against them.19
For Chesterfield, then, French trade served her continental ambition. Britain's preferred
method of continental engagement, granting large subsidies to allies, threatened to
become ineffectual if France were to substantially augment her capacity to counter-
subsidise. The most salient aspect of the present war, for men such as Chesterfield, was
imperial competition pursued for continental purposes. The European balance had never
been more precarious.
Such views were by no means universal north of the Tweed. Despite the bullish
intervention in favour of Pitt and his measures made by Robertson's fellow moderate
Alexander Carlyle, the Scottish Kirk had been ambivalent in its support for the war in the
difficult early stages. A General Assembly address from 1759 had been pointedly critical
of the conduct of the German war. When the General Assembly next addressed its
sovereign on the subject of the war, Robertson himself wrote the text. Much had
transpired between the two addresses. George III had succeeded his grandfather, and as a
result, the Earl of Bute succeeded Pitt as prime minister. The new monarch had inherited
a war he was keen to be rid of, both for its expense and the increasingly unrealistic
prospect of attaining substantially better terms from France. Britain had made
spectacular gains against the French in Canada, and stood to gain little by continuing the
conflict. The resultant Treaty of Paris was seen by staunch Whigs as a betrayal, however,
and became the stick with which to beat the increasingly unpopular ministry of Lord
Bute, who was soon forced to resign. The treaty also became a stick with which to beat
19 Scots Magazine, May 1757, pp 289-31.
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the entire Scottish nation, as John Wilkes endlessly lambasted the traitorous treaty and
the enemies of English liberty who had conceived it. Robertson, in contrast, was keen to
emphasise the Scottish Kirk's support for a British monarch who acted to further the
common good of all his subjects:
We thankfully ascribe the Return of the inestimable Benefits of Peace
to the Blessing of divine Providence, upon the Wisdom and Steadiness
with which your Majesty hath carried on the Negociations for that
salutary Purpose; and of great Importance to your Crown, which far
exceed the most sanguine Expectations of your Subjects at the
Commencement of the War, and are fully adequate to the great Success
of the British Arms, it hath been, and shall be our Care at this Juncture,
to instil into the Minds of our People proper Sentiments of Gratitude
towards your Majesty, and of Thankfulness to Almighty GOD, whose
Hand they discern and bless in the Conduct of this great Event.20
In his support for a comprehensive peace ending the conflict of the Seven Years War,
George III had proven himself a model stoical monarch. Robertson flattered the king
further in lauding his ability to discern the true British interest through this difficult
period:
After a long War, the most extensive, and the most successful, but, at
the same Time, most burthensome ever carried on by Great Britain,
Peace became a desirable Object to a Nation whose Wealth and Power
are derived from its Commerce. Your Majesty, undazzled by the
Splendour of continual Victories, and always attentive to the true
Interest of your People, took early Measures for procuring this
necessary Blessing; and your Magnanimity and Steadiness have
accomplished salutaryWork which your Wisdom and Humanity
prompted you to undertake.
By a definitive Treaty with your Enemies, the great Objects for which
War was undertaken are attained; the Possessions of chief Consequence
to Britain are secured, new Sources of Commerce are opened; and
Territories are added to your Crown, more extensive and of greater Value,
than have been acquired by any Nation since the Division of Europe
into great Kingdoms, and the Establishment of a Balance of Power,
have put a Stop to the Rapidity of Conquest; and as your Majesty can
now turn your whole Attention towards the Cultivation and Encouragement
of Arts of Peace, which, even under the Pressure, and amidst the
Avocations ofWar, you did not neglect, these, under your royal Patronage,
must revive and flourish, and Britain, as it is the greatest, will become the
most polished and illustrious nation in Europe.
20 W. Robertson, 'General Assembly Address, 1763' in Miscellaneous Works and Commentaries,
ed. J. Smitten, p. 116.
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In saying as much. Robertson placed himself squarely against the populist Whig criticism
of the treaty as a betrayal. The historian implied that, on the contrary, the treaty had
served as a necessary check on the potentially destabilising success of the British at the
expense of the French. The timely peace had. hopefully, preserved the European balance
and, just as fundamentally, allowed Britain at last to refocus her imperial energies on
more worthwhile projects. And no project was dearer to the heart of the Kirk than the
propagation of Christian Knowledge. 'As the chief Obstacles which have hitherto
prevented the Instruction of the American Nations are now removed,' Robertson wrote,
'we trust to your Majesty's known Zeal for promoting true Religion, and to the Blessing
of the Almighty upon your Endeavours, that the People under your Dominion which
know not GOD, shall at length receive the Knowledge of that Holy Faith, which civilizes
and refines the Manners of Men, at the same time that it improves and sanctifies
their Hearts'.21
That the fortunes of Robertson's choice of historical subject and that of British
policy had by this time become firmly linked is now demonstrable through internal
evidence; the preface of the text of Charles V seems to pick up where the General
Assembly address had left off:
HISTORY claims it as her prerogative to offer instruction to KINGS, as well
as to their people. What reflections the Reign of the Emperor CHARLES V.
may suggest to your Majesty, it becomes not me to conjecture. But your
Subjects cannot observe the various calamities, which that Monarch's
ambition to be distinguished as a Conqueror, brought upon his dominions,
without recalling the felicity of their own times, and looking up with gratitude
to their Sovereign, who, during the fervour of youth, and amidst the career of
victory, possessed such self-command, and maturity of judgement, as to set
bounds to his own triumphs, and to prefer the blessings of peace to the
splendour of military glory.22
21 W. Robertson, 'General Assembly Address' Miscellaneous Works, pp. 118-119.
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The judicious 'bound-setting' to which Robertson referred, clearly signified the
limited territorial gains Great Britain reaped as a result of her victory over France in the
Seven Years War. " Yet behind Robertson's endorsement of his sovereign's policy lie a
none too concealed and distinctly subversive warning: any ruler, French or otherwise,
who failed to subordinate glory to interest was likely to suffer the same fate as Charles.
22 W. Robertson, The History of the Reign ofthe Emperor Charles V (London, 1769) Vol. I.
23 R. Sher, 'Charles V and the Book Trade' in S.J. Brown, (ed) William Robertson and the Expansion of
Empire.
154
Part II: The Narrative ofCharles' Reign
If the first great question facing any modern interpreter is the choice of subject, the
second is the historiographical genre to which it made a contribution. Robertson
expanded on both his message and the intended audience for that message in his Preface.
In the first instance, he claimed, political history was the necessary subject of politicians.
But if history was not to prove prohibitively time consuming, the man of affairs needed to
be judicious in the selection of topics for study, choosing only those periods of truly
general utility and interest.
It is necessary, then, not only for those who are called to
conduct the affairs of nations, but such as inquire and
reason concerning them, to remain satisfied with a general
knowledge of distant events, and to confine their study of
history in detail chiefly to that period, in which the several
states of Europe having become intimately connected, the
operations of one power are felt by all, as to regulate their
measures.
This placed Charles V squarely within that historiographical mode popularised by
Samuel Pufendorf, modern history as the training of statesmen. Yet while the Einleitung,
Pufendorf s vehicle for instruction in the art of discerning true interest, took the form of
disparate national narratives cobbled together between two covers, Robertson's own
choice of subject allowed him to pursue the same end with more elegance, economy, and
point.
Some boundary, then, ought to be fixed in order to
separate these periods. An area should be pointed out,
prior to which, each country, little connected with those
around it, may trace its own history apart; after which,
the transactions of every considerable nation in Europe
became interesting and instructive to all. With this
intention I undertook to write the history of Charles V.
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It was during his administration that the powers of
Europe were formed into one great political system,
in which each took a station, wherein it has since
remained with less variation, than could have been
expected after the shocks occasioned by so many
internal revolutions and so many foreign wars.
The great events which happened then have not
hitherto spent their force. The political principles
and maxims, then established, still continue to
operate. The ideas concerning the balance of power,
then introduced or rendered general, still influence
the councils of nations.
The age of Charles V. may therefore by considered
as the period which the political state of Europe began to
assume a new form. I have endeavoured to render my
account of it an introduction to the history of Europe
subsequent to his Reign.24
The modern diplomat required a history of modern diplomacy, and such a history only
became possible as a result of Charles' reign. As presented in chapter two, Pufendorf s
Einleitung presented modern statecraft as a series of decisions either rational or irrational
to the extent that those decisions corresponded to true interest. Robertson's own
Einleitung promised to go beyond Pufendorf, by transcending the calculus of correct
versus incorrect notions of state interest through a history of the key interest of the states
of Europe, the preservation of balance. In an important sense, Charles V was the history
of an idea. Robertson's periodisation, taken on its own, was not controversial, and was
consistent with the schema of European history presented in his earlier The History of
Scotland, where he had stated that the evolution of Scottish history from its 'third' to
'fourth' phase, i.e., from relating transactions of purely local interest to one relating
transactions of universal significance, had taken place in the first half of the sixteenth
century, the age of Charles V and Francis I. With that in mind, a history of the Reign of
Charles V could be presented as a logical continuation of a history of the Reigns ofMary
24 Charles, I, preface.
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Queen of Scots and James VI. The sixteenth century 'introduced' the history of modern
Scotland precisely because it introduced the history of modem Europe. Yet the reign of
Charles V required a history of history of a very different type than had Mary's'.
Robertson contrasted his own approach with that of his predecessors by writing that
while 'his [Charles V's] numerous biographers describe his personal qualities and
actions; while the historians of different countries relate occurrences the consequences of
which were local or transient, it has been my purpose to record only those great
transactions in his reign, the effects ofwhich were universal, Or continue to be
25
permanent'. The statesman had little use for biography or local history, and Robertson
set his own type of universal history in contrast to both.
Charles V was intended, then, as a turning away from the type of sentimental
history of personal character exemplified by The History ofScotland, where Robertson's
aim had been to engage with such biographers, particularly on the subject of the relative
guilt of Mary. He further made clear that it was neither to be the civil history of any
particular country, the transactions of which must always remain in some sense,
parochial. His work, strictly speaking, was neither a history of Spain nor a history of the
Habsburg Empire. The History of the Reign of the Emperor Charles V was a self
consciously universal history of great transactions. To claim Charles V as a universal
history of a particular sort is not, however, to presume the work was an exercise in the
still popular model of Mosaic universal history that began with the Creation and ended in
eschatology. There remained a classical model of how to narrate universality, a model
more Polybian than Eusebian, which presented as foundational the narration of the rise of
universal empires. As Polybius considered his Rise of the Roman Republic universal in
25 Ibid.
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that it rendered any treatment of earlier periods largely redundant, so Charles V would
provide all the European history prior to his reign any statesmen was likely to require.
If Charles V can be read as an introduction to universal history, this does not
imply that it was a history indifferent to the progress of national constitutions towards
regularity and liberty. However, Robertson inverted the traditional historiographical
paradigm regarding the relationship between domestic and foreign politics. He was less
interested in how the preservation of the balance of power kept monarchs on their
respective thrones as he was in how the rise of regular monarchies themselves led to the
creation of a durable equilibrium. This difference in perspective, coupled with their
obviously contrasting assessments of the role of religion in public life, led Robertson to
post-date Hume's account of the emergence of this balance. David Hume had not argued
that the balance of power in Europe began with the reign of Charles V; rather he had
rehearsed the Guicciardinian trope of the balance of power as a settled aspect of the
political landscape prior to the upheavals of sixteenth-century warfare. As discussed in
Chapter Two, Hume had understood these wars as the result of the uniquely calamitous
poisoning of statecraft by religious enthusiasm. Robertson was to turn Hume's analysis
on its head and to portray the religious conflicts of Charles' reign as themselves
productive of a stable balance that would later provide security for commerce.
Robertson was no less keen than Hume to stress that the Reign of the Emperor
Charles V had commenced a new age of war. At first it seemed that Robertson, like
Hume, would introduce these wars as a fateful fall from grace. He wrote that the death in
1519 ofMaximilian, Charles" predecessor on the Imperial throne, 'broke that profound
and universal peace which reigned in the Christian world; it excited a rivalship between
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two princes, which threw all Europe into agitation, and kindled wars more general, and of
longer duration, than had hitherto been known in modern times'.26 Yet for Robertson that
profound and unbroken peace had been more slumber than repose, and the events to
follow had proven more constructive to the development of modern Europe than Hume
had been prepared to acknowledge. In Robertson's mind, the accession of Charles as
Emperor had revealed the unimproved nature of European statecraft. The Imperial crown
of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation had been Christendom's highest
secular honour, and upon its vacancy, both Charles, King of Spain, from ambition, and
Francis, King of France, from jealousy, had been eager to claim it as their own. So far as
the peace of Europe was concerned, it had been evident that the success of either would
have been disastrous. But the various rulers of Europe lacked either the power or the
27
political understanding that would have enabled them to intervene:
Their common interest ought naturally to have formed a general
combination, in order to disappoint both competitors, and to
prevent either from obtaining such a pre-eminence in power and
dignity, as might prove dangerous to the liberties of Europe.
But the ideas with respect to the proper distribution and balance
of power were so lately introduced into the system of European
policy, that they were not hitherto objects of sufficient attention.
The passions of some princes, the want of foresight in others,
and fear of giving offence to the candidates, hindered such a
salutary union of the powers of Europe, and rendered them either
totally negligent of the publick safety, or kept them from exerting
themselves with vigour in its behalf.28
Henry VIII's behaviour had been particularly illuminating. England, by virtue of the
relative strength of her position, should have been capable of preventing the imperial
261bid.,vol. II, p. 48.
27 J. Robertson is thus misleading when he claims that the jealousy of the princes of Europe displayed
that a notion of the balance of power existed prior to Charles' reign, rendering his threat of universal
monarchy chimerical. While Charles' ambition might have been dreaded, Robertson was keen to point
out that the the failure to prevent Charles' election demonstrated that a stable balance of power had yet
to be achieved. Cf. J. Robertson, 'Gibbon and the Universal Monarchy of Rome' in R. McKitterick and
R. Quinault, (eds) Edward Gibbon and Empire (Cambridge, 1997), p.259.
28 Charles V, vol. II, p. 52.
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crown from falling into dangerous hands, but Henry had proven far too capricious and
tempestuous to perceive correctly his own interest or to take the appropriate measures.
For reasons Robertson was to explain in his introduction the Pope alone had correctly
understood what was at stake. Leo X had been 'the only prince of the age who observed
the motions of the two contending monarchs with a prudent attention, or who discovered
29 ,
a proper solicitude for the public safety.' Robertson emphasised that Leo's superior
discernment had not sprung from superior virtue, as he had none, but rather from his
world-weary cynicism.
This failure of statecraft on the part of Europe's rulers had meant that when the
imperial crown fell to Charles, Europe would be plunged into a state of general conflict.
Robertson explained that the elimination of faction and the development of regular
government had transformed the way in which war was financed and conducted.
Standing armies had greatly increased the cost of campaigns, and had transformed the art
of war into 'a very intricate science' of protracted sieges.30 However, there had been a
distinction between the efficiency of the two kingdoms; Francis enjoyed an inestimable
advantage against the new Emperor, as France could sustain a heavy tax-burden, while
Spain and Germany could not. As a near-absolute monarch, Francis had been better able
than Charles to increase royal revenue: 'Several new offices were created, and exposed
to sale; the royal demenses were alienated; unusual taxes were imposed; and the tomb of
St. Martin was stripped of a rail of massive silver, which Lewis XI., in one of his fits of
-2 1
devotion, had encircled it.' The relatively superior fiscal autonomy of the French
29
Ibid., vol. II, p. 54.
30 Ibid., vol. II, p. 199.
31 Ibid., vol. II. p. 149. This was an insight Robertson drew from Voltaire: 'To find resources for
answering his purposes, and to enable him to undertake asecond time the conquest of the dutchy of
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crown was the decisive military asset vis a vis her rival. While Charles and Henry had
required the approval of their legislatures to fund their armies, Francis had in contrast
been able to quickly employ his own forces.32 Charles' position had been less favourable.
Robertson reminded his readers that at that point the Spanish constitution had been in a
period of transition; her cities had grown independent and jealous of their liberties, and
her burgesses had been represented within the Cortes to check the power of the nobility.
Spain at that time had been more urbanised than France, and her burgesses had been more
resistant to paying exorbitant taxes. The citizens of Toledo had considered themselves
33
guardians of ancient liberties, and had thus been particularly intransigent.'' The result
had been the Revolt of the Comuneros of 1520, in which representatives of the cities had
listed their grievances and had proposed a set of remedies that would have ultimately
resulted in limiting the power of the crown.
Robertson was intrigued by how the revolt had proven decisive in the completion
of Charles' political education. Charles had proved capable of making the best of a weak
hand through outmanoeuvring his political enemies, a talent he would ultimately employ
to greater effect against Francis, and one that would allow him to compete with him as
more than an equal. Robertson understood the revolt to have significance for European
history generally, namely the clash of privilege and prerogative universal to European
governments as they slowly and painfully shook off the feudal yoke.34 Robertson was
Milan, at the very time when France was attacked on every side, the creation of twenty new
employments in the law, and St Martin's silver grate, were insufficient. The King's demenses were
alienated for the first time; the land tax, and othe imposts were raised. This was a great advantage
which the kings of France had over their neighbours; Charles V was not so despotic in any of his
dominions: but his unhappy facility of exhausting the subject, was productive of several calamities to
France.' Voltaire, The General History and State ofEurope, p. 190.
32 Ibid., II., p. 190.
33 Charles, II, p. 210
34 'As the feudal institutions in the several kingdoms of Europe were originally the same, the genius of
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eager here to demonstrate the interconnectedness of British with European history, by
hinting at the different lines along which British history might have developed had
Britain possessed a monarch more prudent than Charles Stuart. Luckily for Charles the
Junta overextended itself and offended the sense of entitlement among the nobility.
There was ultimately no meeting of minds possible between the comuneros and the upper
echelons of the nobility. Robertson emphasised that the lack of subordination among the
perpetrators rendered them incapable of either effective organisation or of concerted
action, and that, therefore, Charles had been able to divide and conquer. The King's
success had precipitated a dramatic rupture in the history of the Spanish constitution;
both the Cortes and the cities themselves had now forfeited much of their ancient liberty.
Charles had gone some way towards rendering the Spanish crown absolute.
Charles' successful handling of the revolt may well have made him a tyrant in the
eyes of those who sought to defend the old constitution, but he had become a tyrant free
to pursue his dynastic ambitions abroad without fear of further civil unrest at home.
Robertson pointed out, however, that depriving a state of its liberty was not sufficient to
render it efficient. Charles had found it no easier to raise sufficient revenue after the
junta, much to the detriment of his struggle against Francis. It ultimately mattered little
that Charles had been the finer and more ambitious strategist or that he had possessed the
those governments which arose from them bore a strong resemblance to each other, and the regulations
which the Castilians attempted to establish on this occasion, differ little from those which other nations
have laboured to procure in their struggles with their monarchs for liberty. The grievances complained
of, and the remedies proposed by the English commons in their contests with the house of Stuart,
particularly resemble those upon which the Junta now insisted. But the principles of liberty seem to
have been better understood, at this period, by the Castilians, than by any other people in Europe; they
had acquired more liberal ideas with respect to their own rights and privileges; they had formed more
bold and generous sentiments concerning government; and discovered an extent of political knowledge
to which the English themselves did not attain until more than a century afterwards'. Ibid., vol. II,
pp. 220-21.
35 Ibid., vol. II, p. 239.
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better trained of the two armies, for he could rarely pay them. The Imperial armies, while
not in a state of open mutiny, had often been prevented from attaining their ends through
running short of supplies at crucial moments. For Charles, rhetoric, address, and
dissimulation had to suffice in lieu of funds; instead of payment, Charles had offered
them a portion of the spoils of victory. The gambit had proved surprisingly successful in
the short term, but Charles' armies, had now become 'the scourge of Europe' and a
warning to all of the dangers of a tyrant with a mercenary army barely kept in check.36
Robertson made the traditional point that the battle of Pavia in 1525 had turned
the tide of the conflict between the two combatants. For Voltaire, the incident had been
illustrative of the limitations of Charles' ambition; he had taken Francis prisoner only to
release him, demonstrating in the Frenchman's mind the foolishness of imputing to him a
desire for universal monarchy. Voltaire had naturally viewed the entire affair as
0-7
something of a farce. Robertson preferred to emphasise how others had perceived
Charles' actions. At the same time the Scottish historian was keen to point out how the
incident revealed the fatal flaw in Charles' statesmanship; his victory had been total, yet
it had left him insatiate. 'Ambition, not generosity, was the ruling passion of his mind,'
Robertson wrote, 'and the victory at Pavia opened such new and unbounded prospects for
36 Charles, II., p. 225.
37 'Charles V had not as yet drawn his sword, when he had not only a king, but a hero, his prisoner at
Madrid. He seems to have neglected, on this occasion, to improve his good fortune: fo rinstead of
marching ito France, to reap the benefit of the victory obtained by his generals in Italy, he loses his
time in Spain; instead of seizing at least on the Milanese for himself, he thinks proper to fell the
investiture thereof of Francis Sforza, that he may not give too much umbrage to Italy. Henry VIII.
instead of joining with him to dismember France, grows jealous of his greatness, and enters into a treaty
with the regent. Upon the whole, the captivity of Francis I which ought naturally to have been followed
by extraordinary revolutions, came to nothing more than this: the King was ransome, contumelious
language ensued; Charles and Francis gave each other the life; a pulic challenge was sent, but not
accepted; so that the terror of those great events ended in ridicule, whereby the two chief personages in
Christendom greatly demeaned themselves.' Voltaire, The General History and State ofEurope, vol.
II, p. 194.
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gratifying it, as assured him with irresistible forced' Now that Francis had been taken
prisoner he was no longer in any position to serve as a shield against Charles' ambition,
and it appeared for the first time as if nothing remained that could hinder his pursuit of
power. The situation appeared so grave, that even the normally terminally capricious
Henry VII had finally understood the danger:
He saw all Europe in danger of being over-run by an ambitious
Prince, to whose power there now remained no counterpoise;
... He was sensible that if Charles were permitted to add any
considerable part of France to the vast dominions of which he was
already master, his neighbourhood would be much more formidable
to England than that of the ancient French Kings; while, at the
same time, the proper balance on the continent, to which England
owed both its safety and importance, would be entirely lost."'9
Robertson was describing a moment of epiphany in Henry's mind of epoch-making
importance for future English policy. Henry would from this point reorient his policy
away from jealous opposition to neighbouring France towards thwarting the ambition of a
monarch that now threatened Europe as a whole. If Henry had belatedly come to realise
that the maintenance of the balance of power was important to the prestige and security
of England, the importance of this maxim had long been understood as key to the very
survival of the Italian states in an age of foreign intervention. If Charles' victory over
Francis threatened the European balance, it had already shattered that in Italy. From this
point onwards the Papacy would rightly understand its interest as fundamentally opposed
to Charles' further aggrandisement.40
Italy had been right to be concerned; 'intoxicated with prosperity,' Charles had
imposed upon Francis the Treaty of Madrid of 1526, where Francis had been forced to
38 Ibid., vol. II, p. 230.
39 Ibid., vol. II, p. 232.
w Ibid., vol. II, p. 234.
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concede the cities of Naples, Milan, and his own person to Charles as prisoner. Only the
overwhelming superiority of Charles' position had allowed for such an agreement, or
indeed for any sort of agreement, given the complete breakdown of trust between the two
monarchs.41 The specifics of the treaty had ultimately mattered for little, as Francis had
only signed the Treaty as a temporising measure. 'By this disingenuous artifice,'
Robertson noted sternly, 'for which even the treatment he received was no apology,
Francis endeavoured to satisfy his honour and conscience in signing the treaty, and
providing at the same time a pretext on which to break it.'42 The statesmen of Europe had
held their collective breath in watchful anticipation of the unresolved question: Would
Francis abide by the law of nations and honour his treaty commitments, and in so doing,
expose Europe to Charles' unchecked ambition?
The decision, as it transpired, had been taken out of his hands, as Leo had
summarily absolved Francis of the impolitic oath that would have required his
surrendering a clearly unacceptably large amount of territory. Leo's act had been
squarely in keeping with the interests of Italian liberty, yet had embodied what Robertson
found most pernicious in Popery, the habit of cloaking a ruthless reason of state under the
mantle of theology. He added that such contempt for legality was entirely in keeping
with the nature of the Papal authority:
This right, how pernicious soever to morals, and destructive
of that integrity which is the basis of all transactions among
men, was the natural consequence of the Powers which the
Popes arrogated as the infallible vice-regents of Christ upon
earth; and they having, in virtue of these, often dispensed
with obligations which were held sacred, the interest of
some men, and the credulity of others, led them to imagine
that the decisions of a sovereign pontiff authorised and
justified actions which would, otherwise, have been
41 Ibid., vol. II, p. 248.
42 Ibid., vol. II, p. 250.
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criminal and unbecoming.4.
Such artifice Robertson felt had the effect of banishing good faith from diplomacy, a
development as dangerous to public order and to public virtue. Yet if the moral failing
had belonged to Leo and in a lesser degree, to Francis, the political failing had belonged
to Charles alone. Charles, whose deft manipulation of address, dissimulation, and
subterfuge had for so long played Francis for the fool, had here become undone through
an inability to check his own ambition. Fie had overplayed his hand through his
dishonourable treatment of Francis, needlessly heaping upon himself the jealousy and
enmity of the lesser monarchs of Europe. Charles was never to repeat his victory at
Pavia.
The contest between Fiabsburg and Valois had opened a new chapter in the
history of European war and diplomacy, a chapter that had terminated with the death of
Francis in 1547. Robertson emphasised the novelty of these conflicts both in terms of
their unprecedented rancour and unprecedented ability to draw in the better part of
Europe as belligerents. This had been due not only to the opposition of their interest, but
also to the near perfect balance of their resources: 'The Emperors dominions were of
great extent, the French King's lay more compact; Francis governed his kingdom with
absolute power; that of Charles was more limited, but he supplied the want of authority
by address; the troops of the former were more impetuous and enterprising; the latter
better disciplined, and more patient of fatigue.'44 The contest between the two monarchs
had been predetermined to end in stalemate. A conquest of France never had been a
possibility for Charles, yet his constant pursuit of that end had put all Europe on its guard.
43 Ibid., vol. II, p. 267.
44 Charles, III, p. 132.
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In concluding the first arc of the narrative of Charles V. Robertson had introduced
many of the work's principal themes. The rivalry between Charles and Francis lay bare a
number of the fault lines of a political society in transition. The two had not only offered
a display of contrasting passions at work, but also had revealed two contrasting
understandings of the art of politics. The odd moment of weakness aside, the statecraft of
Francis had been informed by the Ciceronian virtue of honestas; the French king had
sought to defend his realm while maintaining an honourable good faith with adversaries.
On Robertson's account. Francis had been sincerely astonished and outraged by Charles'
repeated violations of the law of nations. Robertson's Charles, in contrast, had fully
imbibed the new politics of reason of state; there had been no treaty, no personal
understanding, no diplomatic or military convention he had not been prepared to
subordinate to his interest. Robertson did not hesitate to censure Charles for his breaches
of good faith, but any censoriousness subordinated itself to the need to explicate the fact
that Charles' 'address' had proved crucial in creating terms of relative equality between
the two men and the two realms. Relying on a series of assumptions concerning the
development of civil and military institutions that he was to explore more fully in his
long introduction, Robertson could argue that the two had been at that point perfectly
matched, the one the beneficiary of progressive institutions, the other actively employing
the new arts of politics. Any ruler who would wish to attain a lasting advantage would
need to prove progressive and adaptable regarding both, but for the moment Charles and
Francis had enjoyed the stage to themselves.
This was not to last. The first great tableau of Robertson's work, the wars
between Charles and Francis, described how the 'Italian' art of war and 'Italian' policy
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had expanded to include the great northern monarchies. Yet territory and glory, the
reasons of state over which these wars had been fought, had been as traditional as their
financing and universality of reach had been modern, and as such were for Robertson
transitional events in European history. The historian's interpretive point was that
Providence had tied Charles' hands through the jealousy of Francis, so as to distract him
from the progress of Reformation in Germany. The second great tableau of Robertson's
narrative, Charles' operations in the Empire, revealed a dynamic altogether new to
European war: religion as a reason of state.
Robertson presented the Reformation as the most important event of European
history, the success of which the power politics of the age had ironically made possible.
While it could be argued that the experience of the Moderator of the General Assembly
was by no means irrelevant to the historian's understanding of the interplay between
religion and political interest, Robertson emphasised the transformative role of the
Reformation in the history of the human mind. The break with Rome had 'produced a
revolution in the sentiments ofmankind, the greatest as well as the most beneficial that
has happened since the publication of Christianity.' To provide a satisfactory explanation
for the rise and progress of the Reformation within the terms of civil history seemed to
Robertson an impossible task, and he thus chose to sidestep temporarily the issue by
invoking the agency of Providence:
To overturn a system of religious belief founded on ancient and
deep rooted prejudices, supported by power, and defended with
art and industry, to establish in its room doctrines of the most
contrary genius and tendency; and to accomplish all this, not
by external violence or the force of arms, are operations which
historians the least prone to credulity and superstition, must
ascribe to that divine Providence which can, with infinite ease,
bring about events that to human sagacity appear impossible.
The interposition of Heaven, in favour of the Christian religion
at its first publication, was manifested by miracles and prophecies
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wrought and uttered in confirmation of it. Though none of the
reformers possessed, or pretended to possess, these supernatural
gifts, yet that wonderful preparation of circumstances, which
disjoined the minds of men for receiving from their doctrines,
that singular combination of causes which secured the success,
and enabled men destitute of power and of policy to triumph over
those who employed both against them, may be considered as no
slight proof that the same hand which planted the Christian religion,
protected the reformed faith, and reared it, from beginnings
extremely feeble, to an amazing degree of strength and maturity.45
Robertson's view of the Reformation as the result of the slow and imperceptible
workings of Providence led the historian to a discussion of the German constitution; the
Empire had both stood in need of a new Revelation and had become prepared to receive
it. The Empire had become ripe for revolt. As Germany had been divided into disjointed
principalities, no Imperial church had emerged to hold Rome at bay as had the churches
Spain and France. Rome had not hesitated to seize the opportunity to strengthen its hold
over a divided Germany, and had thus left itself open to wide resentment. The
irregularity of the German constitution had further allowed its sovereignty to be
constantly and often successfully challenged by ecclesiastical institutions and an over
powerful local clergy. This led Robertson to a Humean observation concerning the
alienating effects of the steady increase of the priestly prerogative:
As they were consecrated to the priestly office with much outward
solemnity; were distinguished from the rest ofmankind by a peculiar
garb and manner of life; and arrogated to their order many privileges
which do not belong to other Christians, they naturally became the
objects of excessive veneration. As a superstitious spirit spread, they
were regarded as beings of a superior species to the profane laity,
whom it would be impious to try by the same laws, or to subject to
the same punishments. This exemption from civil jurisdiction,
granted at first to ecclesiastics as a mark of respect, they soon
claimed as a point of right.46
Priestly immunity from prosecution and from taxation had palled with both civil authority
and with the people at large. While Robertson presented the German church as a
i5Ibid., vol. II, p. 78.
46 Ibid., vol. II, p. 143.
tottering tyranny ripe for conquest, he nonetheless emphasised the irony of its conquest
by a most unlikely general, a bookish and unworldly monk.
As noted in the previous chapter, Robertson was fascinated by historical
characters that presided over ruptures in human affairs in apparent ignorance of the laws
of history. He emphasised the power of Luther's personality in the distribution of his
ideas, presenting him as he had Knox in The History ofScotland, as a character perfectly
in tune with the rough manners and sensibilities of his audience.47 Robertson added that
improvement of manners had by the early sixteenth century rendered Luther's audience
sufficiently refined to allow them to receive his message. Printing had diffused learning
down the social order, and learning itself had made great headway since the days of the
schoolmen. 'Mankind seem, at that period, to have recovered the powers of inquiring
and thinking,' Robertson remarked, a result of which was a heightened sense of
intellectual enterprise.48 This was a polite discussion of the origins of Reformation,
lacking the acrimonious ideologiekritik of earlier partisan accounts such as found in
Pufendorf's Introduction. Robertson did not enter into either the theology or the
institutions of the Roman church, let alone suggest as had Pufendorf that there might
have been an unholy alliance between the two. Robertson preferred to condemn the
Church as a political institution that stifled liberty; he condemned the pontificates of
Alexander VI and Julius II as tyrannical, castigated the venality and the 'gross ignorance
and low debauchery' of the clergy generally, and derided those corrupt magistrates who
had commodified the forgiveness of sin.49
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Ibid., vol.11, p. 114.
48 Ibid., vol.11, p. 116.
49
'In this long enumeration of the circumstances which combined the resistance of his adversaries, I have
avoided entering into any discussion of the theological doctrines of popery, and have not in favouring
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While banishing theology from civil history certainly had prudential merits for a
Presbyterian minister who sought a European audience, Robertson's discussion of the
causes of the Reformation was only intended to introduce a new reason of state to
European warfare. The second great arc of the narrative shifted the scene to Germany,
and Charles and Francis were to have the stage to themselves no longer. The wars of the
Emperor against the Smalkaldic league would prove sufficiently indecisive to result in a
settlement protecting the Protestant religion, and just as importantly for the future of
European statecraft, the wars would further produce statesmen who would assimilate and
successfully emulate Charles' dissimulation against him.
As noted in the first chapter, Pufendorf had been baffled as to how Charles could
have so misunderstood his true interest as to side with Rome against the princes of his
own realm. Robertson preferred to emphasise that the Emperor, whatever way his
personal sentiments might have inclined him, had understood his interest to rest upon the
authority he garnered as defender of the established religion. In February 1531, a league
of Protestant Princes and representatives of cities had formed at Smalkalde to resist the
Emperor's insistence on religious conformity, and Charles had thus understood the new
heresy primarily as a threat to his authority. In Robertson's portrayal, Charles understood
that if he was to maintain his grip on an Empire newly torn by religious strife, he would
have to begin to lie like a Pope. He portrayed Charles' first act of dissimulation
regarding religion as something of a double deceit. While it was true that Charles had
the progress of Luther's opinions, or in weakening attempted to show how repugnant they are to the
spirit of Christianity, and how destitute of any foundation in reason, in the word of God, or in the
practice of the primitive church, leaving these topics entirely to the ecclesiastical historians, to whose
province they peculiarly belong. ... it is evident, that their success was the natural effect of many
powerful causes prepared by particular providence and happily conspiring to that end'. Ibid., vol. II,
p. 120.
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been interested in maintaining the religious unity of the Empire only as a means of
maintaining its political unity, acknowleging that religion had any role in his calculation
of interest would have been to imprudently provide a rallying cry for the Protestant
princes. Ironically then, Charles had needed temporary recourse to honesty in the pursuit
of dissimulation, and had thus insisted that he was only engaged in the punishment of
disobedient princes.
At this point, a new character, Prince Maurice of Saxony, had appeared upon the
stage. The statecraft of Maurice was the fulcrum of Robertson's narrative. Maurice, a
statesman with most of Charles' political virtues and few of his political vices, was to
prove a far worthier adversary than Francis in the art of dissimulation. As a committed
Protestant, Maurice had understood that his interest and that of Charles were
diametrically opposed. Yet while he had been shrewd enough not to place any faith in
Charles, he was far more importantly prudent enough to know it was not in his interest at
this point to act against him.50 Maurice's duplicity had exemplified the sort of policy
required of a German Protestant prince who could flourish under Charles' rule. A
Protestant statesman motivated purely by zeal, unable to separate political interest from
religious conviction, such as Maurice's kinsman, the Elector of Saxony, could never have
50 'This young prince, then only in his twentieth year, had, even at that early period, begun to discover the
great talents which qualified him for acting such a distinguished part in the affairs of Germany. As
soon as he entered upon the administration, he struck out into such a new and singular path, as shewed
that he aimed , from the beginning, at something great and uncommon. Though zealously attached to
the Protestant opinions both from education and principle, he refused to acede to the league of
Smalkalde, being determined, as he said, to maintain the purity of religion, which was
the original object of that confederacy, but not to entangle himself in the political interests or
combinations to which it had given rise. At the same time, foreseeing a rupture between Charles and
the confederates of Smalkalde, and perceiving which of them was most likely to prevail in the combat,
instead of that jealousy and distrust which the other Protestants expressed of the Emperors designs, he
affected to declare in him an unbounded confidence; and courted his favour with the utmost assiduity.
When the other Protestants, in the year 1542, either declined assisting Ferdinand in Hungary, or
afforded him reluctant and feeble aid, Maurice rushed thither in person, and rendered himself
conspicuous by his zeal and courage. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 20.
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acted with sufficient flexibility." Whereas the Elector had foolishly plunged into direct
conflict with the Emperor and had been quickly defeated and taken captive, Maurice had
decided to play a longer game with Charles, and had instead secured a temporising treaty.
Robertson was suitably grave concerning Maurice's duplicity, condemning the treaty as a
'manifest violation of the most powerful principles which ought to influence human
actions.' Yet Robertson qualified his judgment, quietly suggesting that Maurice's
dissimulation might ultimately have served the Protestant cause. He further remarked
that Maurice may well have originally intended to keep his word, but subsequently found
this impossible.52 Whatever Maurice's actual intentions, if had placed his trust in
Charles, that trust had been savagely mocked by the Emperor's subsequent conduct.
Charles' subsequent military operations in Germany had been brutal and unrelenting, the
grim manifestation of 'the Emperor's exorbitant ambition, restrained neither by the
scruples of decency, nor the maxims of justice.' Adopting the 'haughty and imperious
tone of a conqueror' Charles had successfully sought the 'unconditional submission' of
his subjects.53
The role of conqueror had prepared Charles for the role of tyrant. 'The Emperor,'
Robertson related, ' having now humbled, and as he imagined, subdued the independent
and stubborn spirit of the Germans by the terror of arms and the rigour of punishment,
51 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 60.
52 'Nor was the Prince who ventured on all this, one of those audacious politicians, who, provided they can
accomplish their ends, and secure their interest, disregard avowedly the most sacred obligations, and
glory in condemning whatever is honourable or decent. Maurice's conduct, if the whole must be
ascribed to policy, was more artful and masterly; he executed his plan in all its parts, yet endeavoured
to preserve, in every step which he took, the appearance of what was fair, virtuous, and laudable. It is
probable, from his subsequent behaviour, that with regard to the Protestant religion at least, his
intentions were upright, that he fondly trusted to the Emperor's promises for its security, but that,
according to the fate of all who refine too much in policy, and who tread in dark and crooked paths, in
attempting to deceive others, he was, in some degree, deceived.' Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 100.
53 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 158.
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held a diet at Augsburg, in order to compose finally the controversies with regard to
religion, which had so long disturbed the Empire.'54 Charles had now felt his position
strong enough to enforce religious uniformity by the sword. The imperial cities that had
provided the most resistance, such as Augsburg, had received the most severe treatment.
Robertson felt that at the moment the Emperor had forced each citizen to swear an oath
on his provisional religious settlement, his hubris had reached its apogee. The German
cities had long cherished their liberty, and had thus submitted in frustrated outrage to an
act that had no constitutional validity whatever. It had become clear that Charles had
come to recognise no limitation to his authority. The newly elected Paul III, had been
quick to see Charles' new ceasaropapist ambitions as a direct threat to his spiritual
supremacy. Yet Paul had been as astounded by the imprudence of the Emperor's
subjection of Germany as he had been fearful of the assertion of raw power.55 Despite the
pontiff's urging of caution, Charles had been unwilling to relent in his suppression of the
Protestants.56 Yet Charles had realised that the seeds of resistance had remained, and in a
57show of force, had kept the German burghers under the armed guard of Spanish troops.
All might well have been lost for the Protestants had it not been for Maurice's
well-plotted manoeuvrings. Robertson was careful to emphasise how his prudent
restraint had allowed Maurice, now Elector of Saxony, to slowly augment his standing
and capacity for action. The Elector's earlier caution had further allowed him to observe
the Emperor at close quarters so as to comprehend his ambition to subordinate Germany
as he had Spain, and to forcibly reinstate the Roman rite. Maurice's jealousy had been
54 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 162.
55 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 177.
56 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 192.
57 Ibid., vol III, p. 193.
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peeked at Charles' presumption, and his own vanity had disallowed any possibility of
further subservience. He had patiently studied the political landscape, and had realised
the hour of necessity had arrived.58 Robertson applauded the Elector's decision to
formally declare against the Emperor, noting that 'his passions concurred with his
interests in confirming this resolution.' Robertson no longer described Maurice's
opposition in terms of breach of treaty; one was under no obligation to honour a contract
with a tyrant who did not honour his. And so it had proven; Robertson reserved his
sharpest criticism for the Emperor's breach of faith in tearing up the treaties made with
the German princes:
No pretension to a power so pernicious to society as that of abrogating
at pleasure the most sacred laws of honour, and the most formal
obligations of public faith, had hitherto been formed by any of the
Roman Pontiffs, who, in consequence of their claim of infallibility,
arrogate the right of dispensing with precepts and duties of every kind.
All Germany was filled with astonishment, when Charles assumed the
same prerogative. The state of subjection, to which the Empire was
reduced, appeared to be the most rigorous as well as intolerable than
that of the most wretched and enslaved nations, if the Emperor by an
arbitrary decree might cancel those solemn contracts, which are the
foundation of that mutual confidence whereby men are held together
in social union59
In his perfidy Charles had become indistinguishable from a Pope. This last tyrannical act
served as something of a point of no return in Robertson's estimation. From this point
onward, the tragic dimension of Charles' hubristic ambition was impossible to ignore.
It had proven that the established pattern of Charles' character was to remain unsatisfied
with success, before undoing that success by overreaching himself, and this he had done
again. Having won a substantial military victory over the Smalkaldic league, the
Emperor had sought to transform the German crown into one of pure despotism.60 Here
58 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 194.
59 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 200.,
60 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 204
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Robertson's reader would be reminded of the work's dedication, and the parallel between
the moments of decision faced by Charles and George III. George, Robertson
maintained, had set a prudent limit to his ambition, and had consolidated a great success.
Charles could do no other than continue to press on. long after it would have been
prudent to cease. He had alienated his brother Ferdinand through an attempt to secure the
Imperial title for his son Philip. Ferdinand, who, as King of the Romans and as Archduke
of Austria had been fully entitled to expect that the crown would fall to him, was
justifiably perturbed, and began to turn a friendly ear to the appeals of Maurice.
The Elector, meanwhile, had been making enormous strides on the battlefield, and
had soon proceeded to liberate the cities of northern Germany and to re-establish their
Protestant churches.61 Charles in contrast had again found himself undone by lack of
funds, and had been thus unable to reverse the tide against him. Support for Charles had
quickly evaporated, as even the Catholic Princes had begun to question whether loyalty to
Charles was worth the cost of their liberty and the peace of the Empire. Charles too had
grown apprehensive of future conflict, as he had come to realise that the new league
under Maurice promised to be far more formidable than had the league of Smalkalde.
The 1552 treaty of Passau had thus marked an end to Charles' ceasaropapist ambitions in
Germany, and signalled the final consolidation of the triumph of Maurice and of the
Protestant religion. The absurdity of the fact that Charles and Maurice had ironically
acted in concert as handmaidens to the birth of the first codified protection of the
Protestant faith elicited from Robertson a bemused aside:
It is a singular circumstance, that the Reformation should be indebted for its
security and full establishment in Germany, to the same hand which had
formerly brought it to the brink of destruction, and that both events should be
61 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 238.
176
accomplished by the same acts of dissimulation. The ends, however, which
Maurice had in view, at these different junctures, seem to have been attended
to the means by which he attained them; and he was now as universally extolled
for his zeal and public spirit, as he had lately been condemned for his
indifference interested policy. It is no less worthy of observation, that the French
King, a monarch zealous for the Catholick faith, should, at the very time when he
was persecuting his own Protestant subjects with all the fierceness of bigotry,
employ his power in order to protect and maintain the Reformation in the Empire;
and that the league for this purpose, which proved so fatal to the Roman catholick
bigotry. So wonderfully doth the wisdom of God superintend and regulate the
caprice of human passions, and render them subservient towards the accomplishment
of His own purposes.62
Robertson understood all the base foibles of his protagonists, the over-reaching ambition
of Charles, the jealousy of Francis and the calculation of Maurice, as equally unaware
instruments of providence. The historian thus effectively cut the Gordian knot of
reconciling the dark arts of reason of state with governance for the common good; the
issue became redundant when no politician could fall so low as to render himself an unfit
vessel for the fulfilment of God's will.
The liberty of conscience granted the Protestant Princes at Passau had been
officially confirmed with the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, when the doctrine of cujus regno,
cujus religio had become the law of the Empire. Robertson was careful to emphasise that
legal toleration was in no way the daughter of the Dutch view of philosophical toleration
that gained acceptance a century and a half later; the Peace of Augsburg had been a
simple triumph of calculated politique. It would be expected that a Presbyterian minister
might find a treaty that expressly forbade his own faith to fall some way short of the full
light of reason.63 The statesman had recommended toleration for reasons of policy, not of
theology. Robertson had earlier prepared his readers for this message by defending the
right of the Anabaptists to exist in peace, as they had professed nothing 'inconsistent with
62 Ibid., vol. III. p. 260.
63 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 333-7.
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the peace and order of human society.'64 The philosopher understood that tolerance was a
reason of state.
Robertson continued his narrative up to the Treaty of Cateau-Cambresis of seven
years later, but by that point the tragedy of Charles' career as a politician had long since
reached its climax. The ambitious tyrant had abdicated due to the ill heath brought on by
a life in pursuit of conquest; his career as a statesman had ended in stark failure. For
Robertson, Charles had been no visionary Lycurgus, laying down the principles on which
the new international order would operate. At no point had he registered the slightest
understanding that he had established a durable dynamic of relations between states. Yet
Robertson held his history to have a contemporary political relevance far transcending the
cautionary tale of his protagonist. Had he concluded his text at this point, the reader
would be left with the conclusion that the eighteenth-century system rested upon nothing
more solid than the folk memory of resistance to a dangerous would-be hegemon.
Charles Vwould have still laid claim to the status of philosophical history through its
psychology of personal emulation and the complexity of its causal analyses, but its claim
as a foundational narrative for subsequent politics would have been tenuous. Robertson
attempted to address this lacuna in the valedictory passages of Book XII, entitled a
'general review of the period.' The greatest European conqueror since Charlemagne had
produced no lasting conquests, a fact which had little to do with Charles and everything
to do with the fact that lasting conquest was no longer possible upon the European stage:
Upon reviewing the transactions of any active period, in which the history
of civilized nations, the changes which are accomplished appear wonderfully
disproportional to the efforts which have been exerted. Conquests are never
very extensive or rapid, but among nations, whose progress is improvement
is extremely unequal .. . But when nations are in a similar state, and keep pace
with each other in their advances towards refinement, they are not exposed to
64 Ibid., vol. II, p. 350.
the calamity of sudden conquest. Their acquisitions of knowledge, their
progress in the art of war, their political sagacity and address, are nearly equal.
The fate of states in this situation, depends not on a single battle. Their
internal resources are many and various. Nor are they themselves alone
interested in their own safety, or active in their own defence. Other states
interpose, and balance any temporary advantage which either party have
acquired. After the fiercest and most lengthened contest, all the rival
nations are exhausted, none are conquered. At length a peace is concluded,
which re-instates each in possession of almost the same power and the same
territories.65
Europe had attained a state of equilibrium, and the wars of Charles V had set the pattern
for the subsequent 'managed conflicts' of the early modern period. In essence, the
kingdoms of modern Europe had little to fear from each other, as all were now on a
substantially similar footing. The balance of power achieved by the early sixteenth
century rested on the fact that the key 'enormous monarchies' were roughly congruent in
their military capabilities:
Such was the state of Europe during the reign of Charles V.
no Prince was so much superior to the rest in power, as to
render his efforts irresistible, and his conquests easy. No
nation had made progress in improvement so far beyond is
neighbours as to have acquired a very manifest pre-eminence.
Each state derived some advantage, or was subject to some
inconvenience, from its situation or its climate; each was
distinguished by something peculiar in the genius of its
people, or the constitution of its government. But the
advantages possessed by one, were counterbalanced by
circumstances favourable to others; and this prevented any
from attaining such superiority as might have been fatal to all.
The nations of Europe in that age, as in the present, were like
one great family; there were some features common to all, which
fixed a resemblance; there were certain peculiarities to each,
which marked a distinction. But there was not among them
that wide diversity of character of genius which, in almost
every period of history, hath exalted the Europeans alone above the
inhabitants of the other quarters of the globe, and seems to have
destined the one to rule, the other to obey.66
Europe enjoyed both cultural and constitutional uniformity, amidst the variety of national
difference, and this uniformity prohibited the efficacy of any lasting conflict of the type
65 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp 430-31.
66 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp 431-32.
Charles was widely feared to have pursued. Conquest presupposed instead that
fundamental inequality in national force that distinguished European from non-European
peoples. The passage can be read as a partial celebration of national difference, but it
was far more a celebration of European cultural unity. If empire over the other peoples
of the earth fulfilled a providential purpose, that providence did not make neat
distinctions on the basis of nationality; no special claim was advanced or implied for the
superior virtues of one European empire over another.
Thus far Robertson has contended that by the early sixteenth century, universal
monarchy was not possible due to cultural and developmental congruence between
national competitors. To say so might explain why Charles, or any future monarch
similarly ambitious, might never have posed a serious threat to an existing European
balance, but still did not explain why Charles' reign itself had brought this about.
Robertson was keen to emphasise in this context that Charles' reign had been an active
catalyst in the promotion and encouragement of his competitors; this fusion of the
structural with the psychological was the conceptual fulcrum of Charles V:
It was during his reign, and in consequence of the
perpetual efforts to which his enterprizing ambition
roused them, that the different kingdoms of Europe
acquired internal vigour, that they discovered the
resources of which they were possessed, that they came
to feel their own strength, and to know how to render
it formidable to others. It was during his reign, too,
that the different kingdoms of Europe, formerly
single and disjointed, became so thoroughly
acquainted, and so intimately connected with each
other, as to form one great political system, in which
aach took a station, wherein it has remained since that
time with less variation than could have been expected
after the events of two active centuries.67
67 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 432.
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The passage was an obvious nod to Voltaire, but Robertson was advancing a more
sophisticated argument than that of his predecessor. In a world of newly sociable
enormous monarchies, the psychological desire for personal emulation led in turn to a
sort of national emulation. Robertson was not merely arguing that the states of Europe
achieved regularity and vigour of action during Charles' reign, he was advancing the far
more ambitious claim that the improvement of the states of Europe had transpired
because of his reign. European princes, such as Maurice, had jealously studied the means
by which Charles' had achieved his ends and the means by which Francis had been able
to thwart them, and had emulated those policies that had proven successful. This national
emulation played out as a sort of new international sociability; a complex web of war and
diplomacy newly possible as princes rendered their states more regular, their acquisition
of revenue more efficient and their foreign policies more vigorous. It was thus war, not
commerce, which had served as the original focus of international competition and source
of improvement. Robertson's analysis might seem to take the great man theory of history
to absurd lengths within the context of a philosophical history, and in partial realisation
of the insufficiency of his narrative thus far to explain how this emulation had proven
possible led him to follow up that narrative with a lengthy discussion of how the uniform
progress of society in Europe had resulted in an approximate balance of military
capacities.
All that remained for Robertson in concluding the narrative portion of his history
was to drive home some of the more obvious political lessons to be drawn from the
impossibility of universal monarchy in a Europe that had attained equilibrium. The irony
was that however formative Charles' reign may have been in the creation of the state
181
system; the long shadow of his reign in the memory of subsequent European statesmen
had become responsible for a fundamental misreading of the European scene:
A family so great and so aspiring became the general
object of jealousy and terror. All the power as well as
policy of Europe were exerted during a century,
in order to check and humble it. Nothing can give a
more striking idea of the ascendant which it had
acquired, and of the terror which it had inspired, than
that after its vigour was spent with extraordinary
exertions of its strength, after Spain was become only
the shadow of a great name, its monarchs sunk into
docility and dotage, the house of Austria still
continued to be formidable. The nations of Europe
had so often felt its superior power, and had been so
constantly employed in guarding against it, that the
dread of it became a kind ofpolitical habit, the
influence of which remained, when the causes, which
had formed it, ceased to exist.68 (italics mine)
Fear of a Habsburg bid for universal monarchy had become more Pavlovian than
perceptive. It would have been an unnecessary provocation to Robertson's Pittite
opponents to point out that the rise of Frederick's Prussia had recently rendered the
House of Austria less formidable still. But if the cliched trope of the decline of Spain
suited Robertson's purposes nicely, its corollary, the ascendancy of France surely did not.
Recent conflict over colonial possessions in the Americas was clearly based on
something rather more pertinent to the national interest than 'a kind of political habit', the
Bourbon menace required a more subtle dismissal.
Robertson's problem here was particularly acute, for the period immediately
following Cateau-Cambresis had been something of a high point for France. She had
recently recovered Calais and Metz, and had emerged better fortified against invasion
than at any previous point in her history. Robertson conceded as much, and even insisted
that this moment had represented the peak of her potential threat to 'European liberty.'
68 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 436-7.
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But ultimately, Robertson insisted, it had come to nothing, for France's political fortunes
were soon to decline sharply as she slid into civil war.69 France was of course to recover
her position in the next century under the guiding influence of Cardinal Richelieu and
Colbert, but by then, Robertson argued, the moment was past, and the opportunity for
conquest slipped away. He insisted that French recovery was no threat; it was rather to
be celebrated as well deserved and no less than 'the extent of the kingdom, the nature of
her government, and the character of her people, entitle her to maintain.'70 This was an
extraordinary claim for Robertson to have advanced, quietly making the point that the
century old Whig spectre of a Bourbon universal monarchy had been so much froth, and
that the European equilibrium had been sufficiently stable to absorb any shocks created
by the economic reforms of Colbert or the personal ambition of Louis XIV.
Yet even if Robertson's Whig readers were able to countenance such a 'Tory'
argument, such arguments did little to counter those in specific terror of French Popery as
a threat to the religious liberties of Europe. It was of crucial tactical importance for
Robertson to insist that the late sixteenth-century French Wars of Religion and all the
images of blood soaked butchery they invoked were the consequence of ambition, and
not of Counter-Reforming enthusiasm.71 They were conflicts different in degree, but not
in kind, from those fought between Charles and the Protestant League earlier in the
century. Of even greater importance was to diffuse the idea that any of the modern
69 Robertson was equally firm that these civil wars had been politique affairs, and not inspired by
enthusiasm. 'But how formidable soever or fatal to the other nations of Europe the power of such a
monarchy might have been, the civil wars which broke out in France saved them at that juncture from
feeling its effects. These wars, ofwhich religion was the pretext and ambition the cause; wherein great
abilities were displayed by the leaders of the different factions, and little conduct of firmness were
manifested by the crown under a succession of weak Princes, kept France embroiled for half a
century'. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 440.
70 Ibid.
71
see note 327 above.
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Catholic monarchies could anymore be Popish satellites of Rome. Robertson insisted
that, no 'secondary power' in Europe had undergone a greater revolution during the
course of the sixteenth century than the Papacy itself, and he underscored the importance
of this to his argument by according equal space to the Papacy as to all the rest of Europe
combined. The Reformation had dealt a blow to the papacy both spiritual and temporal;
doctrines of Papal infallibility had fallen into disrepute, and Rome had suffered
devastating material losses undermining her power of patronage. Accordingly, all
subsequent Popes were to find their potential spheres of influence sharply truncated, and
were obliged to limit their ambition accordingly.
It was never, however, the minister's attempt to dismiss entirely the real threat
Popery had caused in the past; he remained too much of a Presbyterian and too much of a
revolution Whig for that. A tension thus crept in to Robertson's discussion of the state of
the Low-Countries and Sweden in regard to their celebrated reputations as resisters of
Popish tyranny. He seemed to seek simultaneously to celebrate past resistance, while
softly suggesting that not only had these conflicts been fought over secular concerns but
also that they had constituted a chapter of history no longer relevant to the policy of
Europe. It may seem at first glance that Robertson was pursuing two contradictory lines
of interpretation, first that the threats of lasting conquest of first the house of Austria and
then the house of Bourbon were simply illusory, and second to celebrate the history of the
first half of the seventeenth century as a series of successful revolts against militant
political Catholicism. This was not, however, a necessarily confused strategy. It was not
essential to Robertson's argument that either Phillip II or the emperor Mathias correctly
understood the limits of the hand they had been dealt in terms of material resources; it
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was the logic of Robertson's thesis that this had been unlikely. Nor had the alleged
personal bigotry of Phillip or Mathias fundamentally altered the fact that ambition was
the cause, and religion the pretext of these conflicts. As Robertson had emphasised in his
discussion of the imperial policy of Charles V, maintaining confessional uniformity had
been a reason of state in its own right and, even more significantly, Rome had been in no
position to coordinate such efforts. Perhaps most fundamentally, it was no part of
Robertson's thesis that the stability of Europe was predicated upon the cessation of such
defensive wars against ill-founded ambition. Whatever else Charles may have
inaugurated, it had not been an age of peace. Robertson's text introduced an age not of
the diminution of ambition, but of its limitation.
Robertson could be thought of as applying a Fergusonian, as opposed to a
Humean, notion of conflict from the sphere of domestic constitutional thought to that of
the international stage. For Ferguson, whose Essay on the History ofCivil Society
Robertson had read and admired in manuscript well before its 1767 publication, had
advanced a Machiavellian understanding of how civil conflict and faction was essentially
creative and conducive to liberty. In the section of his work entitled 'The History of
Subordination,' Fergusson discussed how the common good is the result of contested
interests vigorously pursued.
To bestow on communities some degree of political freedom,
it is perhaps sufficient, that their members, either singly, or as
they are involved with their several orders, should insist on their
rights; .. .the citizen should either maintain his own equality with
firmness, or restrain the ambition of his fellow-citizens within
moderate bounds...The public interest is often secure, not because
individuals are disposed to regard it as the end of their conduct,
but because each, in his place, is determined to preserve their own.
Liberty is maintained by the continued difference and oppositions
of its members, not by their concurring zeal in behalf of equitable
government. In free states, therefore, the wisest laws are never,
perhaps, dictated by the interest and spirit of any order of men:
they are moved, they are opposed, or amended, by different hands;
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and come at last to express that medium and composition which
contending parties have forced one another to adopt.7'
This insight had potentially troubling implications for any peaceful equilibrium between
states. Extrapolating from Fergusson's reading, even if one granted that lasting conquest
was no longer possible, conflict between states was not merely unavoidable but a pre¬
requisite to the exercise of liberty. If Robertson recognised the force of this insight, he
was careful to moderate its prescriptive implications; it remained the core of Robertson's
thesis that British fears of French conquest and Popish universal monarchy were
chimerical. Yet as much as the historian may have wished to guide the behaviour of
statesmen towards a disinterested pursuit of the general good, he did not maintain that the
balance of power required a Europe of stoical actors. Charles V was a text intended to
moderate and place limits upon conflict; it was not a manifesto for perpetual peace.
As mentioned above, if one reads Charles V in the order of its composition, the
preceding passages do not support the explanatory weight Robertson sought to give them.
The conventions of neo-classical narrative were ill suited to the type of structural
explanation Robertson required. To flesh out the history of European equilibrium, and
hence of European liberty, required a history of laws, not simply ofmen. After
completing the narrative portions of the text, Robertson proceeded to provide an
introductory survey of the laws and manners of a newly carved out longue duree that
Pocock has termed 'the Christian millennium', the period from the fall of the Roman
Empire to the time of Charles V. Robertson's purpose in so doing was to explain how
prudent statesmen had found it in their capacity to emulate successful competitors. In so
72 Adam Fergusson, An Essay on the History ofCivil Society, edited by Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh, 1966),
p. 128.
7 ' Pocock, Barbarism and Religion: Narratives ofCivil Government (Cambridge, 1999), p. 278.
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doing, he brought the resources of Scottish natural jurisprudence for the first time to bear
on the history of the balance of power and of European equilibrium.
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Part 111: The Progress ofSociety as the development ofequilibrium
As remarked above, Robertson's Charles V is noteworthy for its "broken back'. That the
work's two component parts belong to such demonstrably distinct genres led many
contemporary and most modern readers to consider the introductory 'A View of the
Progress of Society in Europe' independently from its companion volumes as a free¬
standing exemplary model of the new histories of civil society' written by Ferguson or
Millar.74 However, that the composition of the View followed that of the narrative
portion of the history suggests that Robertson was able to provide his narrative with
precisely the focused thematic introduction it required. That theme was the development
of the constitutional pre-conditions for modern warfare.
Adam Smith's denunciation of the View as a plagiarism of his own lectures on
jurisprudence often overshadows its modern reputation as a work of original erudition.
Smith's charges, while of course interesting and highly revealing in their own right, need
not detain us overlong. Smith was jealous of his unpublished intellectual property to the
point of pathology. He angrily and often denounced those 'scribblers' who sought to
record his lectures for their own study purposes. Even if largely accurate, however, the
charge is at present impossible to verify. The relevant section of the lectures, on arms
and warfare, is entirely missing from the 1762 lectures that form the basis of our
understanding of Smithian historiography.
74
Although one should add that Millar's Observations concerning the Distinction of Rank in Society does
not squarely belong to that genre either, intending at least to be a much more focused study of the
history of women.
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We do know that Robertson attended Smith's early Edinburgh series of lectures in
the 1750s. but we do not have a detailed account of their content.7:1 On the evidence of
the student notes taken in Glasgow, by 1762 the European balance was not a major
intellectual preoccupation for Smith: his only mention of it in his lectures was rather
dismissive. Nor is there much to support the fact that he would have viewed the reign of
Charles V as particularly important in shaping that balance. Where Smith did explicitly
mention Charles in his lectures, it was as Puffendorf had done, emphasising his
contribution to the arrested development of a centralised Imperial government. The
failure of Germany to develop a regular constitution was, from Smith's perspective, a
rupture with the European norm as fundamental as any English exceptionalism.76 While
this was an important corrective point to make, it did not accord Charles a uniquely
pivotal role in European history. Furthermore, there is little to suggest that Smith viewed
the balance ofmilitary capacities between states as the crucial outcome of the progress of
civilisation in Europe. Far from seeing the balance of power as the principal on which
both the history and historiography of Europe hinged, Smith made mention of the concept
only to explain the rise of the resident ambassador.
Though one country might attain some kind of pre-eminence by the influence
and assiduity of its ambassador, no attention was for a long time given to it,
and that balance of power which has of late been so much talked of was never
then heard of. Every sovereign had enough to do within his own dominions
and could bestow little attention on foreign powers. Before the institution of
residents they could have little intelligence. But ever since the beginning of
the 16th century the nations of Europe were divided into two great alliances.
On the one hand were England, Holland, Hungary, Muscovy, etca. On the
other France, Spain, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, etca. In this manner a kind
75 John Callander of Craigforth had remarked that 'Dr. Robertson had borrowed the first volume of his
history of Charles V from them as every student could testify', and quoted Smith as having remarked
that the historian 'was able to form a good outline but he wanted industry to fill up the plan.' quoted in
W. R. Scott, Adam Smith as Student and Professor (Glasgow, 1937), pp. 55-56.
76 A. Smith, Lectures on Jursiprudence (Indianapolis, 1982), pp. 264-265. The other mention of Charles
in the lectures is a mistake, the transcriber (revealingly) having confused 'Charles the 5th' with 'Charles
the Great, or Charlemagne', cf p. 288.
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of alliance was kept up, sometimes one leaving the one side and another joining it,
as at present Prussia is with England and Hungary on the other side. A system of
this kind was established in Italy about the 15th century among the great families
there. The resident ambassadors of these nations hinder any one country from
dominating another either by sea or land, are formed into a kind of council not
unlike that of the Amphictyons in ancient Greece.77
Smith, then, like Robertson, saw the early sixteenth century as the moment when the
balance of power emerged as the goal of statesmen. But the great alliances Smith
referred to were those of the late seventeenth century, not those of the early sixteenth,
when the European system, such as it was, was characterised by the rivalry between the
7R
houses of Habsburg and Valois. In any case, the two texts did not belong to the same
genre. Smith fleshed out a system of jurisprudence with examples from European
history. Robertson employed the conceptual framework of Scottish jurisprudence to tell
the history of Europe.
A View of the Progress ofSociety in Europe, from the Subversion of the Roman
Empire, to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century was itself divided into three sections,
moving from a discussion of 'interior Government, Laws, and Manners,' to 'the
command of the national force required for foreign operations,' and ending with an
analysis of 'the political Constitution of the principal States in Europe, at the
Commencement of the sixteenth Century.' The first section famously narrated the rise of
'regular government' throughout Europe as a consequence of the transition from feudal to
commercial society, the second revealed the new capacities available to the emerging
independent states. The third section discussed the relative regularity of governments,
with a view to demonstrate how their recent constitutional history set the parameters of
their effective action. While the View remained a work of history rather than of
77 A. Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, pp. 552-553.
78 France and Spain, for example, remained on opposite sides until the reign of Louis XIV.
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jurisprudence in that it remained at all times tied to specific historical transactions, it was
nonetheless a mode of historical narrative at the farthest possible remove from the
chronicle. Indeed, to turn from the tight, intricate narrative proper to its introductory
essay is to sense a general opening up. as the philosophers gaze casts more widely and
the tone, if possible, becomes even more solemn and portentous. The heightened tone
served to illustrate the broader scope and greater philosophical ambition of a
macronarrative of the operation of general causes over space and time. Robertson's
discussion of the relative lack of importance of precise chronology echoed that of the
Universal History of Voltaire, and more distantly, that of Bossuet. 'In pointing our and
explaining these causes and events it is not necessary to obscure the order of time with a
chronological accuracy', Robertson remarked, 'it is ofmore importance to keep in view
their mutual connection and dependence, and to show how the operation of one event, or
79of one cause, prepared the way for another, and augmented its influence'. There was
some irony in the fact that Robertson expressed the philosopher's contempt for mere
factual exactitude within the section of his work that owed as much to the antiquarian as
to the narrative historian.
Robertson opened with a sweeping historical generalisation that would assume
greater significance in his subsequent The History ofAmerica: 'Two great revolutions
have happened in the political state, and in the manners of the European nations. The
first was occasioned by the progress of the Roman power; the second by the subversion
80of it.' He opened with an ambivalent portrait of history's most lasting conquest, the
universal monarchy of Rome, in order to contrast it with the barbarian conquest that
19 Charles V, vol I, p. 22.
80 Ibid., vol.1, p. 1.
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followed. Robertson provided a civil, as opposed to a civic, interpretation of Roman
expansion, conquest and consolidation; progress had been the precondition of empire.
Roman military expansion had resulted from the relative progress of her civilisation, not
primarily from any martial enthusiasm. Robertson was disinclined to connect the liberty
under the law enjoyed by a Roman citizen and that anarchy in which wild Germans in
their forests indulged. Neither was there space for parallels between their contrasting
modes of conquest. 'When nations subject to despotic governments make conquests,
these serve only to extend the dominion and the power of their master. But armies
composed of freemen conquer for themselves, not for their leaders'. While her
republican institutions endured, Roman conquest of the latter variety, and had thus
proved relatively benign. 'The Roman Commonwealth', he wrote, 'had conquered the
world by the wisdom of its civil maxims, and the rigour of its military discipline. But
under the Emperors, the former were forgotten or despised, and the latter was gradually
o 1
relaxed'. A corruption of constitutional status had transformed the manners of the
Roman conquerors, with lasting repercussions for the nature of that empire itself. The
Roman imperium had become Janus faced, it tyrannised as it civilised; 'the dominion of
the Romans, like that of all great empires, degraded and debased the human species.'
Robertson cited the case of the Britons, who had once roundly seen off the invading
Romans, but upon succumbing to the Roman jurisdiction had no energy thereafter to
resist the encroach of the Saxons.
The real drama, however, in Robertson's thumbnail sketch of Roman history lies
in the clash between Roman civilisation and German barbarity. As always for Robertson,
cultural comparison served to explain the nature of conflict and imbalance between
81
Ibid.., vol.. I, p. 6.
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forces. The Romans, while partly sunk into a decadence of manners, still engaged in
battle for eminently 'civilised 'concerns of calculated national interest.
Civilised nations which take arms upon cool reflection,
from motives of policy or prudence, with a view to guard
against some distant danger, or to prevent some remote
contingency, carry on their hostilities with so little rancour,
or animosity, that war among them is disarmed of half it terrors.82
Barbarian conquest was fundamentally different from that of the Romans - and altogether
more horrible. The barbarian hordes, in the sharpest contrast, lived and fought for the
moment. 'They rush into war with impetuosity, and persecute it with violence. Their sole
Q-2
object is to make their enemies feel the weight of their vengeance.' Robertson famously
chose this period, from AD395 to 571, as the lowest ebb of all human history, painting
the waves of barbarian invasions as a series of natural disasters. He even gently chided
the historian of late antiquity, Procopius, for allowing 'a principle of benevolence' to
prevent him portraying what amounted to a near universal genocide. Robertson himself
recoiled from disgusting his readers with a 'minute narration' of barbarian atrocities.
Attila, 'one of the most enterprising conquerors mentioned in history' perhaps
represented the nadir, laying waste to whole cities. Robertson was one son of the manse
who emphatically had no time for the Huns, 'It is endless, it is shocking, to follow these
destroyers of mankind through so many scenes of horror, and to contemplate the havoc
which they made of the human species.'
The urgent moral need to explain the radical gulf between civilised and savage
modes of conquest pushed Robertson beyond the conceptual world of Germania into that
of the relationship between constitutions and manners, that of Montesquieu and his
82 Ibid., vol.. I, p. 9.
83 Ibid.
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L'esprit des Lois. The consequent exploration - relegated to a footnote - of the jurist's
classic parallel between the similarity of manners between the German barbarian and the
American savage led Robertson to first state a claim which was to be fleshed out with
greater sophistication in future writings, that of the causal relationship between 'national
character' and the 'state of society.'
That the characters of nations depends on the state of society
in which they lie, and on the political institutions established
among them; and that the human mind, whenever it is placed
in the same situation, will in ages the most distant, and in
countries the most remote, assume the same form, and be
distinguished by the same manners.84
The study of national character was thus the domain of historical jurisprudence. This was
85
as succinct - and as explicit - a statement of the 'stadialist' methodology as Robertson
was ever to produce, and its relative lack of prominence in the preceding narrative of
Charles V. is better imputed to lack of relevance than to lack of availability. Robertson
had already, in his portrait of the devastation brought by the Huns, pointed his readers'
attention to the congruence of certain martial customs with those of the 'savages of North
America' such as scalping. Drawing from the sixth book of Ceasar's Commentaries and
Tacitus' Germania, Robertson explained this congruence by the fact that like that of the
American savages, German society 'was of the rudest and most simple form.' On the
whole, the invading barbarians did not practice agriculture. Without landed property to
protect, the Germans had little need for civil government. Weak kings lacked the power
to compel troops to battle. Of course, they had little need. Each German took to the field
to give vent to 'all the rights of private resentment and rage.' The savages of America
engage in military enterprises, not from constraint, but choice.'
84 Ibid., vol.. I, p 211
8:1 It is important to note, however, that no variant of this word occurs anywhere in Robertson's writings.
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For Robertson, national 'character' was an offshoot of national constitution, the
broad set of institutions he collected under the broad-catch all term 'the state of society'.
The 'state of society', as discussed by Robertson in the View, was intimately related to
the type of property held, and it was to the dramatic revolution in property holdings that
Robertson next directed his attention. The fact that disparate barbarians were roughly at
the same stage of development explained the otherwise astonishing uniformity of the
feudal system throughout Europe. The brief discussion of the rise of feudal tenures
directed itself squarely to the nature of feudal conflict. At first, of course, the invading
barbarians held no property at all, until which point as land recently conquered was given
entirely by military leaders in exchange for service in battle. These land grants, benifices
or honores, initially held 'during pleasure', by mutual convenience in time became
permanent. The consequence of this was nothing short of a political revolution. The
original feudal system was an almost impromptu extension of military to pseudo civilian
government, with the subordination required to defend against invasion.
This revolution in property occasioned a change corresponding to
it in political government; the great vassals of the crown, as they
acquired such extensive jurisdictions usurped a proportional degree
of power, depressed the jurisdiction of the crown, and trampled
upon the privileges of the people. It is on account of this connection,
that the tracing the progress of feudal property becomes an object
of attention in history; for upon discovering in what state property
was at any particular period, we may determine with precision
what was the degree of power possessed by the King or by the
nobility at that juncture.86
That property was power, and that any analysis of the balance of power quickly
transformed into an analysis of the balance of property was the conceptual innovation of
the seventeenth-century English republican James Harrington. For Robertson, however,
86 Ibid., vol. I, 222.
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the matchless constitution could not be read back into feudal tenures. The rise of an
unfettered military aristocracy was a corruption of the neat subordination of the original
feudal contract. The balance of power was doomed to perpetual oscillation and
uncertainty, there being no 'many' who could pivot between the 'one' and the 'few.'
Robertson's innovation was repeatedly to force the analogy between this transition and
the natural juristic narrative of the transition of natural to civil society. Robertson
described the feudal decline into a 'state of nature' in language not far removed from
Hobbes. 'The feudal state was a state of perpetual war, rapine, and anarchy; during
on
which the weak and unarmed were exposed every moment to insults and injuries.'
The comparison was more than rhetorical flourish, for in perhaps the most
important sense, medieval Europe was a state of nature. The rule of law, as regarded
personal security and security of property, was unknown. A society where private war
could break out at any moment would always remain potentially a state of war of all
against all. The chaos and instability of private war was the terminus of the feudal
system, a state that held little romance for Robertson. 'This rude practice,' sneered
Robertson, 'suitable only to the violence of a state of nature, was tolerated longer than
oo
one can conceive possible in any society, where laws and order were at all known'.
Private war was beneath the dignity of history, its accomplishments were in equal
measure parochial and ephemeral. The crucial index of the depths to which feudal
society had succumbed was that its wars were 'trifling, and insignificant,' the narration of
which could provide neither amusement nor instruction. When the human mind became
shackled by fear and resentment, it closed in upon itself, atrophied, and produced nothing
87 Ibid., vol. I, p. 69.
™ Ibid., vol.1, p. 255.
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of value for over four centuries. The Christian religion itself degenerated into witless
ceremonial. This Gothic state of nature was a state of utter corruption. It was as if man
had fallen a second time.
For the historian, narrative history required a modicum of intercourse between its
protagonists. The fallen 'natural' man of the dark ages required the rule of law if his
sociability were to be properly cultivated, and his passions properly restrained. The
climax toward which Robertson had been driving in this first section was the
reestablishment of commerce and sociability in all its varieties. Such a development had
been impossible in the anxious climate of feudal Europe. In the first stages of society,
needs had been simple and locally attainable; such societies felt no need to look
outwards. As such when barbarians invaded and conquered Europe, they destroyed the
unity of Roman civilisation, rendering Europe disjointed and fragmentary. For five
centuries European sociability lay moribund. 'Society and manners must be considerably
improved, and many provisions must be made for public order and personal security',
89
Robertson explained, 'before a liberal intercourse can take place between nations.'
Another proof of the insularity of Europe during this period was the fact that positive law
rigidly enforced hospitality. Above all, the nature of feudal ties greatly militated against
travel or relocation. The weak state of justice rendered any travel highly dangerous.
Several events combined to wake the states of Europe from their solipsistic
slumber, the crusades, the development of cities, and the revival of Roman Civil Law.
89 Robertson was here aware he was compressing an important theme. In an endnote, one of the first
volume's 'Proofs and Illustrations', Robertson invoked Montesquieu's similar sentiment upon
commencing his own history of commerce. 'The subject which follows would require to be discussed
more at large; but the nature of this work does not permit it. I wish to glide on a tranquil stream; but I
am hurried along by a torrent.' In this proof, Robertson trawled volumes of German jurisprudence for
instances of lack of geographical knowledge. Ibid., vol. I, pp.76-7.
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Somewhat surprisingly, Robertson accorded the crusades most extensive coverage. Yet,
given the ironic position these adventures held vis a vis Robertson's general theme of
international relations, perhaps their prominence in the narrative was irresistible. 'The
only common enterprise in which the European nations ever engaged, and which all
undertook with equal ardour, remains a singular monument to human folly.'90 That the
crusades were not only ludicrous but absolutely pivotal for European progress further
made a philosophical point concerning the relationship between individual intentions and
universal consequences. The unintended consequence of these adventures was of course,
the stimulation of the European taste for eastern luxury, a key moment in the stage of
western commerce. More fundamentally, the natural desire to emulate the prosperity of
the east provided the psychological impetus to western improvement.
The Crusades reopened communication between East and West, and occurred in
tandem - Robertson implied but did not belabour any causal link - with the revival of
independent cities and the formation of merchant communities. The second great catalyst
of progress was the growth of urban centres. These centres did not come to truly make
their mark, however, until they had acquired a political voice in the parliaments of
Europe.
The acquisition of liberty made such a happy change in the condition
of all the members of communities, as roused them from that stupidity
and inaction into which they had been sunk by the wretchedness of
their former state. The spirit of industry revived. Commerce became
an object of attention, and began to flourish. Population increased.
Wealth was attended by its usual attendants, ostentation and luxury;
and though the former was inelegant and cumbersome, and the later
indelicate, they led gradually to greater refinement in manners, and
in the habits of life. Togather with this improvement in manners, a
more regular species of government and police was introduced.
As cities grew to be more populous, and the occasions of intercourse
among men increased, statutes and regulations multiplied of course,
and all became sensible that their common safety depended on
90 Ibid., vol.1, p. 25.
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observing them with exactness, and on pursuing such as violated them,
with promptitude and rigour. Laws and subordination, as well as
polished manners, took their rise in cities, and diffused themselves
insensibly through the rest of society.91
Once unleashed, the forces of progress begat further improvements. Most important,
perhaps, was the monopolisation of violence by the state, what Robertson referred to as
the 'regularisation of justice'.
The first considerable step towards establishing an equal administration
of justice, was the abolishment of the right which individuals claimed of
waging war with each other, in their own name, and by their own authority.
To repel injuries, and to revenge wrongs, is no less natural to man than to
cultivate friendships; and while society remains in its most simple state,
the former is considered as a personal right no less unalienable than
the latter.92
The growth of urban centres and the subordination they engender began as a
primarily Italian affair, but quickly diffused throughout Europe through the agency of
colonising Lombard merchants. 'They became the carriers, the manufacturers, and the
qo
bankers of all Europe.' Subsequent cooperation between the northern Hanseatic
League and the Lombards increased the importance of the city of Bruges and
consolidated the link between north and south. The English monarch Edward III admired
Flemish commerce and sought to import it by way of Flemish artisans; in so doing he
established England as an important producer of woollen manufactures.
Commerce was never for Robertson, however, an end in itself. This new 'liberal
intercourse' was a transaction worthy of 'the dignity of history' to the extent that it
helped set the scene for a new type of war and diplomacy.
91 Ibid., vol. I, p. 35.
92 Ibid., vol. I, p. 43.
93 Ibid., vol. I, p. 95.
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Commerce tends to wear off those prejudices which maintain
distinction and animosity between nations. It softens and polishes
the manners of men. It unites them, by one of the strongest of all
ties, the desire of supplying mutual wants. It disposes them to
peace, by establishing in every state an order of citizens bound
by their interest to be the guardians of publick tranquillity,
as soon as the commercial spirit begins to acquire vigour,
and to gain an ascendant in any society, we discover a new
genius in its policy, its wars, and its negotiations. 94
Commerce was a development of great import, in that it dramatically altered both the
extent and the nature of intra-state communication. Commerce united the interests of an
international merchant class towards pacific reciprocity. That commerce itself could
become a reason of state, a source of distinction and animosity between nations, was a
possibility Robertson chose not to entertain. In a sense he did not need to. Robertson
was introducing an already written account of the war and diplomacy of the mid
sixteenth- century, in which religion, not commerce, had recently become the primary
reason of state. To insist on the pacific tendency of commercial interests within a state
would of course have been untenable had he chosen to continue his narrative down to the
late seventeenth century. By keeping within the historiography of the sixteenth century,
however, Robertson neatly sidestepped any need to address jealousy of trade. Indeed,
dating the European balance in the mid-sixteenth century effected a sharp separation
between balance of power and balance of trade. Commerce could remain an
unproblematic blessing. It was the ultimate index of the progress of interior government
toward regularity that drew the nations of Europe out of their respective shells, to seek
out new modes of interaction.
These new modes of interaction were hardly pacific. The View's second section,
concerning 'national force requisite in foreign operations'; demonstrated the relevance of
94 Ibid., vol.1, p 97.
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the story told in the first section for a history of transactions. Primitive peoples easily
harnessed the material and emotive energies, extended states could only do so under
despotic rule or under the influence of 'regular policy', such as the old Roman Republic
or eighteenth-century governments. Regular government allowed, for the first time, the
effective collection of revenues, and hence, for war on an altogether grander scale. 'The
Prince, by the less violent, but no less effectual operations of laws and a well regulated
government, is enabled to avail himself of the whole force of his state, and to employ it in
enteiprises, which require strenuous and preserving efforts'.95
This process was only beginning to unfold. At the commencement of the fifteenth
century, the state of the European constitution did not allow for concerted policy. The
jealousy of the nobility thwarted the possibility of any concerted national - that is to say,
royal, endeavour. Crucially, sovereigns lacked the financial resources to properly
maintain armies. The other monarchs of Europe did not take, for example, any great
notice of the One Hundred Years War or the unfolding Spanish reconquista. 'This
amazing inactivity', Robertson was keen to impress, was due to the structural limitations
of the feudal constitution, emphatically not due to any personal limitations. 'The power
of judging with sagacity, and of acting with vigour, is the portion of men in every age.'
The fact that European monarchs did not adopt balance of power considerations into their
long-term strategic thinking had nothing whatsoever to do with any scarcity of statesmen
as watchful, clever, and adaptive as Maurice of Saxony.
This situation only began to alter with the consolidation of the French state. The
English loss of the One Hundred Years War was fundamental to the establishment of a
general European liberty. Throughout sections two and three of the View, Robertson
95 Ibid., vol. I, p. 81.
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went further than his Whig readers might have wished in insinuating that progress was a
narrative written in French concerning the rise of French national strength. For France
developed the first standing army in Europe. The great revolution in warfare of this
period was the shift from use of cavalry to use of infantry, a development that predicated
the rise of standing armies. 'The strength of an army formed either for conquest or
defence,' Robertson noted with the approval of an orthodox humanist,
lies in infantry. To the stability and discipline of their
legions, consisting chiefly in Infantry, the Romans
during the times of the republick were indebted for
all their victories; and when their descendants, forgetting
the institutions which led them to universal dominion, so
far altered their military system as to place their principal
confidence in a numerous cavalry, the undisciplined
impetuosity of the barbarous nations who fought mostly
on foot, was sufficient, as I have already observed, to
overcome them.
Cavalry was the form of military organisation of Rome under the emperors. In feudal
Europe, cavalry was an extravagance of the silly pride of chivalric nobility. For a
monarch to achieve great ends, Robertson continued in distinctly unorthodox humanist
fashion, he needed a standing army, the first of which had appeared in France under the
rule of Charles VII, through his personal imposition of an 'extraordinary subsidy on his
people'. The introduction of the standing army tolled the death knell for the feudal
constitution. 'By taking from the nobles the sole direction of national military force,
which had raised them to such a high authority and importance', Robertson argued, 'a
deep wound was given to the feudal aristocracy, in that part where its power seemed most
complete.'96 The other monarchs of Europe, motivated from self-defence, had little
choice but to attempt the emulation of French practice. Robertson, by firmly associating
this revolution in French government with Charles, rather than - as was more common -
96 Ibid., vol. I, p. 113.
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with his far more controversial son Louis, bestowed upon the standing army a more
immaculate conception than was common. For Louis had been a model tyrant:
Adorned with schemes to oppress his people, and to render
his own power absolute. Sagacious, at the same time, to
discern his true interest, and influenced by that alone, he
was capable of persuing it with a persevering industry,
and of adhering to it with a systematic spirit from which
no object could divert and no danger could direct him.97
Louis had taken six thousand Swiss infantry, and made them into the scourge of Europe.
'From the jealousy natural to tyrants, he confided in these foreign mercenaries, as the
most devoted instruments of oppression, and the most faithful guardians of the power
98which he had acquired.' An army of citizens, needless to say, would have had an
interest in preventing such an extension of the royal prerogative.
The rulers of Europe were in no better a position to put up resistance to Louis'
encroachments than his own subjects had been."
Louis negotiated in all the courts of Europe; he observed
the motions of all his neighbours; he engaged either as
principal, or as an auxiliary, in every great transaction; his
resolutions were prompt; his operations vigorous; and upon
every emergence he could call forth into the action the whole
force of his kingdom. From the aera of his reign, instead of
the feeble efforts of monarchs fettered and circumscribed
by a jealous nobility, the Kings of France, more masters at
home, have exerted themselves more abroad, have formed
more extensive and foreign conquests, and have carried on
war with a spirit and vigour long unknown in Europe.100
Robertson was keen to emphasise, however, that it was not so much lack of
understanding as lack of opportunity, which had rendered European rulers inactive. 'It
97 Ibid., vol. I, p. 97.
98 Ibid., vol. I, p. 99.
"ibid., vol. I. p. 90.
100 Ibid., vol. I, p. 101.
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was owing entirely to the imperfections, and disorders in the civil government of each
country, which made it impossible for sovereigns to act suitably to those ideas which the
posture of affairs, and their own observation, must have suggested."
The political career of Louis revealed the darker potential of progress - that
regular government made possible a new and more absolute mode of tyranny. For the
modem tyrant, with his ability to tax and raise armies, was no longer a threat to the
liberties of his own subjects alone, but to those of all of Europe. Providentially, his own
'tragic' flaw, intoxication with his own art of dissimulation, undid Louis. Fie 'had been
accustomed so long to the intricacies of a crooked and insidious policy, that he could not
be satisfied with what was obvious and simple; and was so fond of artifice and
refinement, that he came to consider these as his ultimate object, not as the means of
conducting affairs.'101 The pursuance of an overly refined reason of state, such as
Robertson identified with Rome, was not always in a monarch's interest. The ironic
effect of Louis' ambition was that it set in place the marriage of Maximilian with the
heiress of Burgundy. With Louis, Robertson had set the stage in more than one sense for
Charles.
Yet probably the most momentous transaction of the period immediately
preceding that of Charles' reign was the invasion of Italy instigated by Charles III of
France in 1494. Here Robertson enters into the sea of events narrated by Guicciardini in
his History ofItaly, which he curiously did not cite. Charles, 'a weak but generous
Prince,' had, largely through his laxity, presided over a national revival, and thus was
well positioned to succumb to the machinations of Ludovico Sforza and gallantly agreed
to invade the peninsula on his behalf. First, the Italian campaigns gave birth to a new
101 Ibid., vol. I, p. 105.
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type of warfare, increasingly destructive through its exploitation of new technologies.
'The train of artillery, however'. Robertson wrote, 'the ammunition, and warlike stores of
every kind provided for its use, were so great as to bear some resemblance to the
102immediate apparatus of modern war.' " The Italian wars had a surprising legacy for
European diplomacy. They did not so much embroil Italy in European politics as embroil
Europe in Italian politics.
They had now extended to the affairs of Europe,
the maxims of that political science which had
hitherto been applied only to regulate the operations
of the petty states in their own country. They had
discovered the method of preventing any monarch
from rising to such a degree of power, as was inconsistent
with the general liberty; and had manifested the importance
of attending to that great secret of modern policy, the
preservation of a proper distribution of power among all
the members of the system into which the states of Europe
are formed.103
The French and Imperial monarchs, for all their huffing and puffing daring-do, were
never really a match for the wily and dissembling Italians. They were, however, capable
of learning, and, indeed, one can read the entirety of Robertson's narrative as the slow,
faltering apprehension of the rulers of northern Europe of the maxims of Italian statecraft.
The third section of the View moves from universal to particular history, to the variety
amidst the uniformity. The first two sections of the View could only be told as universal
history, as the 'institutions and occurrences' that had 'formed the people of Europe to
resemble each other, and conducted them from barbarism to refinement, in the same path,
along the same steps.' The 'surprising resemblance among the nations of Europe' indeed
resulted from 'causes and events, whose influence was universal.' 104 Yet the importance
102 Ibid., vol. I, p. 109.
103 Ibid., vol.1, p. 112.
104 Ibid., vol. I, p. 123.
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of the particular to the general could be fully comprehended only if the 'constitution and
political state' of each nation was discussed in its own right. To do so, Robertson
adopted the plan of that other great work of universal history, Pufendorf s Einleitung,
briefly discussing the constitution and recent political history of each polity, less with an
idea of determining the 'true interest' or raison d'etat of each, than to pinpoint the precise
status of each constitution relative to capacity for action.
Robertson did follow Pufendorf, however, in viewing the Roman pontiffs as the
key political players, and accordingly allotted the 'spiritual dominium' of Rome the most
extensive coverage. This was only natural, for they had, after all, not only been the only
truly universal monarchs of Europe but the first truly modern politicians. Robertson was
fascinated by this curious fusion of the cleric and the monarch, 'so blended together, that
it was difficult to separate them even in imagination.' In one important sense
Robertson's analysis of the papacy conformed to bullish Whiggery. The papal
government was a tyranny built upon superstition. The psychological spark of
'adventurous and well-directed ambition' lit the see of Rome from within. Fortunately,
the resources at its disposal did not match papal ambition. Ironically, however, the very
vigilance of the Roman barons in checking the physical encroachments of the papal
prerogative brought into prominence the argument Rome would successfully exploit in
the future. Ecclesiastics should not seek property, but should be economically sustained
by the population as a whole. Prudent bishops of Rome would learn to make cynical use
of the means at their disposal. 'Pontiffs,' Robertson explained, 'accomplished those great
things which rendered them so formidable to the Emperors with whom they contended,
not by the force of their arms, or by the extent of their power, but by the dread of their
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spiritual censures, and by the effect of their intrigues, which excited rivals, and called
forth enemies against every Prince, whom they wished to destroy.'105
In address, dissimulation, far-sightedness, and above all keen ambition, the
Papacy possessed all the modern political passions and artifices. 'It was in the Papal
court,' Robertson maintained, 'that address and subtlety in negotiation first became a
science; and during the sixteenth century, Rome was considered the school in which it
could be acquired.'106 This capacity for dissimulation, duplicity, and dishonesty, coupled
with 'unrelaxing constancy of pursuit' made possible 'success in the boldest attempts
ever made by human ambition.'107 The efficacy of the papal administration was limited,
however, by an endemic short-sightedness. No 'schemes of public utility or
improvement' were furthered. The son of the manse most emphatically did not find
anything to celebrate in papal encouragement of the arts. This perhaps goes some way
towards revealing why a celebratory cultural history of the reign of Leo X would never
have been a serious temptation for the historian. Of all the principal states of Europe, it
was the Papacy that underwent the most thoroughgoing revolution over the course of
Robertson's history, and Robertson was keen ultimately to present the papal power in
Europe as a past catastrophe.
Venice came second in the ranking of degree of 'connectedness' with the rest of
the Italian balance. Robertson's discussion of Venice was noteworthy primarily for its
hostility; he cared little for her 'rigid and partial aristocracy, which lodges all power in
the hands of a few . . . while it degrades and oppresses the rest.' Robertson understood
that Venetian oligarchy was a club that would not have him as a member. The Venetians
105 Ibid., vol. I, p. 128.
106 Ibid., vol. I, p. 130.
107 Ibid., vol.1, p. 129.
207
were also to be lamented their inappropriate aborted attempt at empire building. As ever
for Robertson, the constitution of the conqueror determined the nature of the conquest.
'When the Venetians' Robertson wrote, 'so far forgot the interior defects in their
government, as to aim at extensive conquests, the fatal blow, which they received in the
war excited by the league of Cambray, convinced them of their imprudence and danger of
108
making violent efforts, in opposition to the genius and tendency of their constitution.'
Robertson's point here was not that Venice was unfit for empire due to any lack of
liberty, but rather that its much lauded 'mixed constitution insufficiently harnessed the
creative energies of Venetians to allow for such 'extensive operations' as those thwarted
by the League of Cambray.
If Venice had served primarily as a cautionary tale, ofmore direct bearing on
Robertson's subsequent narrative was the nature of the Spanish constitution, which had
come to assume its present 'regular and uniform appearance' following the reconquista
and the Union of Crowns of Castile and Aragon. As we have seen, the state of the
Spanish constitution vis a vis that of the French was of decisive importance to the wars of
Charles and Francis, an importance greater than a narrative of events could properly
elucidate. In crushing the Junta, Charles had forever wrecked the ancient Spanish
constitution. Robertson devoted more space to the erstwhile Spanish constitution than
any other section of the View, providing what one might have assumed would prove a
love letter to a lost system of liberty. He did not. The salient feature of that constitution
was the astonishing and debilitating weakness of the crown.
The regal prerogative, extremely limited in every feudal kingdom,
was circumscribed in Spain, within such narrow bounds, as reduced
the power of the sovereign almost to nothing. The privileges of the
108 Ibid., vol. I,
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nobility were vast in proportion, and extended so far, as to boarder
on an absolute independence. The immunities of the cities were
likewise greater than in other feudal kingdoms, they possessed
considerable influence in the Cortes, and they aspired at obtaining
more. Such a state of society, in which the political machine was so
ill adjusted, and the several members of the legislature so improperly
balanced, produced internal disorders in the kingdoms of Spain, which
rose beyond the pitch of turbulence and anarchy usual under the feudal
government. The whole tenor of Spanish history confirms the truth of
this observation; and when the mutinous spirit, to which the genius of
their policy gave birth and vigour, was no longer restrained and
overawed by the immediate dread of the Moorish arms, it broke out
into more frequent insurrections against the government of their princes,
as well as more outrageous insults on their dignity, than occur in the
annals of any other country.109
The history of the Spanish constitution was paradoxical. At one level, Robertson was
keen to emphasise that Spain had emerged from the feudal system exactly as had the
other states of Europe. Yet it was something of a problem for such an ardent
constitutionalist that eight hundred years of Moorish rule contributed so little to the
present manners and government of the Spanish. While intriguingly adopting the
Humean vocabulary to describe the Moors as Islamic 'enthusiasts', Robertson did not
portray the Moorish invasions as particularly harsh or anything like as devastating to the
native population as previous Gothic invasions. Robertson honoured the Moors to
mitigate their historical importance. While the invaders brought with them 'the manners
of the east' and 'love of elegance and splendour,' they had not fully consolidated their
conquest, partly because they were unwilling to employ the necessary cruelty to do so.
'The followers ofMahomet,' Robertson declaimed, 'are the only enthusiasts who have
unified the spirit of toleration with zeal for making proselytes.'110 In keeping Spain
independent of the Caliphate, the Moors lost contact with Africa, and began to decline.
109 Ibid., vol. I, p. 178.
110 Ibid., vol.1, p. 175.
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Robertson ascribed the Moorish decline - rather unconvincingly - as stemming from a
deterioration of their martial spirit resultant from excessive luxury.
Yet if Moorish rule had not itself, largely through its own admirable restraint, re¬
formed Spain in its own image, the fact that the development of Spanish institutions
coincided with a period of reconquista had the most profound effects on the nature of the
Spanish constitution. In fact. Aragon had only the fa§ade of monarchical rule; true
sovereignty lay almost entirely with the cortes. Robertson was particularly fascinated by
the role of the Justiza, or supreme judge - in many ways a grander figure with greater
civil responsibility than the king - as he was with the privilege of Union, a codified
'dangerous right' of resistance against the crown. The burgesses had been represented in
the Cortes probably from their point of origin, and certainly more than a century before
they had been in any other European assembly of note, including of course, that of
England, 'the rights of the people, personal as well as political, were, at that period, more
extensive, and better, understood, than in any kingdom of Europe.' Aragon was at that
time the only European country, England included, that did not practise torture.
Robertson was equally impressed by the fact that the Aragonese had stoutly resisted the
establishment of Ferdinand and Isabella's Inquisition, on the grounds that its proceedings
lacked any due process. Robertson seems to have been genuinely and pleasantly
surprised by the quality of erudition and degree of integrity of the early Spanish
historians 'extremely accurate in tracing the progress of law and constitution of their
country.'
It is vain to consult the later historians of Spain, about any point with respect
to which the excellent historians whom I have named are silent. The ancient
constitution of their country was overturned, and despotism established on the
ruin of its liberties, when the writers of this and the preceding century composed
their histories, and on that account they had little curiosity to know the nature of
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those institutions to which their ancestors owed the enjoyment of freedom,
or they were afraid to describe them with much accuracy.1"
This relative lack of Spanish progress was to play a crucial limiting role in Charles'
ability to wage war.
It was unnecessary for Robertson to dwell at similar length on the French
constitution, as much of that material had already been presented. There did remain a
point to score: if Robertson had been pleased in his surprise discovery of kindred spirits
among the Spanish historians of an earlier age, he was mildly scandalised by the gross
anachronisms of Bourbon hired pens.
Nothing is more common among Antiquaries, and there is not a more
copious source of error, than to decide concerning the institutions and
manners of past ages, by the forms and ideas which prevail in our own
times. The French lawyers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
having found their sovereigns in possession of absolute power, seem to
think it a duty incumbent on them, to maintain that such unbounded
authority belonged to the crown in every period of the monarchy...
It is impossible , however, to conceive two states of civil society more
unlike to each other, than that of the French nation under Clovis, and
that under Louis XV."2
The fact was that the French crown, during its formative periods, was every bit as subject
to the limitations imposed by the corrupted state of the feudal constitution as had been
Spain. Almost all power lay in the general assembly, or champs. There was a natural
corollary in the inability ofMerevingian and Carolingian kings to collect revenue. For
Robertson, a key index of the level of barbarity was the degree of resistance to paying
taxes. 'Among nations whose manners and political institutions are simple, the public, as
well as individuals, having few wants, they are little acquainted with taxes, and free
111
Ibid., vol. I, p. 410.
112 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 430-431.
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113uncivilised tribes disdain to submit to any states.' " Invoking the authority of the
thirteenth book of Montesquieu's L'Esprit des Lois and Mably's Observations sur
I'Histoire de France, Robertson concluded that no Frankish property was subject to
taxation. Furthermore, Charlemagne himself held annual meetings of the general
assembly, an example followed by his successors.
'What has been said with respect to the admission of the people or their
representatives into the supreme assembly merits attention, not only in tracing the
progress of the French government, but on account of the light which it throws upon a
similar question agitated in England, concerning the time when the commons became
part of the legislative body in that kingdom.'114 It was entirely characteristic of
Robertson's mildly subversive brand of Whiggery that the ancient constitution of
England could be best defended against Tory revisionism by raising parallels with the
ancient constitution of France. At all points in this discussion, Robertson was at pains to
show that the French constitution could be explained in terms universal to the crumbling
of the feudal constitution. French kings did slowly extend their prerogative over
legislation, but it was a far slower, more halting process than either arch royalists in
France or old Whigs in England were inclined to acknowledge. Only by the beginning of
the fifteenth century had the French crown felt capable of levying taxes with relative
impunity. Yet even as the French constitution ascended to a pure monarchy, it was never
entirely without external checks. The cultural prestige of the nobility remained, and the
jurisdiction of the parlement of Paris prevented any decline into eastern style despotism.
Crucial to Robertson's these royale was that the rise of the regal power was an essentially
m Ibid., vol.1, p. 435.
{U Ibid., vol I, p. 442.
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progressive development, not only in terms of the rights of the individual, but more
pertinently here, to the capacity of the state for external action. If the progress of
civilisation possessed a national vanguard, that vanguard was the development of the
French constitution, as it passed through stages first of democracy, then of aristocracy,
then on to pure monarchy.
If the French constitution had an antipode, it was the German Empire.
Robertson's discussion of the German constitution lacked the specificity accorded Spain
or France, a fact that he, with some discomfort, defended by insisting that he was not
writing a German national history.""^ Robertson followed the example first set by
Pufendorf in finding the German constitution, 'that inextricable labyrinth' a most 'feeble
and irregular' construction, a polity that utterly defied the classical typology. He
specifically denied it the status of 'regular confederacy' as there had never been an
historical union of independent states. Neither true confederacy nor true empire, 'the
Empire felt every calamity which a state must endure when the authority of government
is so much relaxed as to have lost all vigour.'116 Thus, a sovereign of the German empire
would have no greater ease raising troops than a king of Spain.
Robertson then entered into far more politically and theologically perilous
territory with his concluding comments on the Ottoman constitution. The relationship
between the Ottoman Empire and Europe was unclear, as a Muslim polity had, strictly
115 'With respect to the diets or general assemblies of the Empire, it would be necessary, if my object were
to write a particular history ofGermany, to enter into a minute detail, concerning the forms of
assembling it, the persons who have a right to be present, their diversion into several colleges or
benches, the objects of their deliberation, the mode in which they carry on their delegates or give their
suffrages, and the authority of their decrees or recesses. But in a general history it is sufficient to
observe that, originally, the Diets of the Empire were perfectly the same with the assemblies of March
and May, held by the kings of France'. Ibid., I, p. 383. A not negligible factor here was that
Robertson, probably the most able linguist of the Scottish literati, read no German
116 Ibid., vol. I, p. 179.
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speaking, no place in a universal history of Christian Europe. As Voltaire had shown,
one need not be orthodox in one's Christianity to view the Turk as a threat to Europe's
collective security and shared cultural inheritance. Yet the source of Robertson's Euro¬
centric hostility, however, - it could of course be called nothing else - was more political
than theological. 'It is the distinguishing and odious characteristick of Eastern
despotism,' Robertson scowled, 'that it annihilates all other ranks of men, in order to
exalt the monarch; that it leaves nothing to the former, while it gives everything to the
latter; that it endeavours to fix in the minds of those who are subject to it, the idea of no
relation between men, but that of a master and a slave, the former destined to command
and punish, the latter formed to tremble and obey'.117 It would have been surprising for
such an avowed Montesquieuian to avoid in this context the distant invocation of the
Lettres Persanes. Yet intriguingly for Robertson, the Ottoman Empire was a polity of
astonishing regularity and military effectiveness. In spite of this, Robertson noted, in a
Humean vein, that there were practical limits on even the most 'absolute' of despotisms.
When the form of government in any country is represented
to be despotick, this does not suppose that the power of the
monarch is continually exerted in acts of violence, injustice
or cruelty. Under governments of every species, unless
when some frantick tyrant happens to hold the sceptre, the
ordinary administration must be conformable to the principles
of justice, and if not active in promoting the welfare of the
people, cannot certainly have their destruction for its object."8
Thus, Robertson allowed explanatory room for the otherwise (for Robertson) astounding
military success of Solymann's armies against the house of Austria. Robertson emerges
as an historian considerably more tolerant than his French predecessors. The Ottomans
111 Ibid., vol.1, p. 188.
118 Robertson was quick, however, to assert that the term despotism very much retained its analytic
usefulness: 'A state, in which the sovereign possesses the absolute command of an extensive revenue; in
which the people have no privileges, and no part either immediate or remote in Legislation; in which
there is no body of hereditary nobility, cannot be distinguished by any name but that of a despotism'.
Ibid., vol. I, p. 377.
214
may not have been Europeans, but they were certainly key players in the history of the
European balance, and hence, the necessity of their inclusion in any history of Europe.
As a whole. Robertson's view thus had the effect of supplying the key defect of
the narrative sections of Charles V, that it was too concerned with individuals to provide
the explanatory framework for the relationship between the personalities of monarchs and
the context in which they found themselves. Robertson was himself quite explicit that a
central function of his introductory essay was to prioritise the structural over the personal.
Those active scenes which the following history will exhibit,
as well as the variety and importance of those transactions
which distinguish the period to which it extends, are not to be
ascribed solely to the ambition or the abilities, or to the rivalship
of Charles V and of Francis I. The kingdoms of Europe had
arrived at such a degree of improvement in the internal
administration of government, and princes had acquired such
command of national force which was to be exerted in foreign
wars, that they were in a condition to enlarge the sphere of their
operations, to multiply their claims and pretensions, and to
increase the vigour of their efforts. Accordingly the sixteenth
century opened with the certain prospect of its abounding in
... 110
great and interesting events.
119 Ibid., vol.1, pp. 144-5.
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Coda: Charles V, the Jesuits and the wider world
It has been argued that the British experience of the Seven Years War was decisive in
framing the set of political questions with which the text of Chales V engaged. Yet it
should be remembered that hostilities between Britain and France took place in the New
World, and the subsequent war was fought as much in the name of commerce, colonies,
and religion as it was to protect the liberties of Europe. The fact that Robertson
originally intended to include the conquest and settlement of the Americas within the text
of Charles V achieves a new significance when seen in this light. For in much the same
way that Italy had absorbed all Europe into her system of balance at the dawn of the
sixteenth century, so by the mid-eighteenth had Europe drawn much of the world into the
European balance. It was the task of the chronicler of the hand of providence in guiding
the emulation of nations to explain how this had come to pass. While the text of Charles
V did not address the voyages of discovery or the conquest of the New World, it did
narrate Charles' own crusades against the infidel in defence of Christendom, and the
impact of the Society of Jesus in the New World.
Robertson, ever a polite historian, normally felt the need to explain to his public
the grounds for any extended break in the political narrative, typically on grounds of the
availability of new information, the need to weigh impartially the evidence behind a
particularly contested point of interpretation, or even of the intrinsic interest of the
subject. The case of the Jesuits richly satisfied all three requirements. Robertson
professed himself keen to exploit the circumstance that many of the important documents
previously so jealously guarded by the highly secretive order had been recently
published. Perhaps more importantly, though a point the historian had little need to
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underscore, the subject of the Jesuits remained a minefield of controversy throughout the
European republic of letters a generation after the order had been expelled. Long
denounced in Protestant, and later in anti-clerical polemic, as the Pharisees of
Inquisitorial Popery, for the philosophical historian they were a fascinating study in the
potential effectiveness of priestcraft tied to martial discipline.
The Jesuits particularly fascinated Robertson, and none more so than the order's
founder, the soldier turned religious leader, Ignatius Loyola. Loyola combined the
martial and the spiritual, forming an enthusiasm readily channelled into emulation of 'the
glory of the fabulous worthies of the Romish church'. His institutional creation, the
Society of the Lriends of Jesus, was accordingly neither fish nor fowl, an order of monks
engaged in a highly aggressive vita activa. The Jesuitical impact on the larger world was
as paradoxical as the order was itself. The order proved spectacularly successful, taking
root throughout Europe and her colonies, recognised as 'the most able and enterprising
order of the church'. Robertson declared them paradoxically 'the most political and best
regulated of all the monastic orders, and from which mankind have derived more
advantages, and received greater injury, than from any other of those religious
fraternities.'120
The Jesuits are taught to consider themselves as formed for action.
They are chosen soldiers, bound to exert themselves continually in
the service of God, and of the Pope, his vicar on earth.
Whatever tends to instruct the ignorant; whatever can be of use to
reclaim or to oppose the enemies of the Holy See, is their proper object.
. . . They are required to attend to all the transactions of the world,
on account of the influence which these may have upon religion; they
are directed to study the dispositions of persons in high rank,
and to cultivate their friendship; and by the very constitution, as well
as genius of the order, a spirit of action and intrigue is infused into all
its members.121
120 The History of the Reign of The Emperor Charles V, vol. II, in Works, p. 176.
121 Charles, vol. II, pp. 192-3.
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Other monastic orders were essentially voluntary associations, with mixed constitutions.
Executive power lay with individual Abbes, legislative power in all the members,
'justice' as such through conventual's chapters and general congregations. The Jesuitical
'national character" was determined, as were all others, by the nature of its singular
constitution. Robertson, a keen student of ecclesiastical polity, knew full well that
religious government was no less crucial than doctrine. However, a far different spirit
permeated the order. Jesuitical, like feudal, government, was fundamentally military in
organisation.
But Loyola, full of the ideas of implicit obedience, which he had derived
from his military profession, appointed that the government of his order
should be purely monarchical. A General, chosen for life by deputies
from the several provinces, possessed power that was supreme and
independent, extending to every person, and to every case. He, by
his sole authority, nominated provincials, rectors, and every other officer
employed in the government of the society, and could remove them at pleasure.
In him was vested the sovereign administration of the revenues and
funds of the order. Every member belonging to it was at his disposal;
and by his uncontrollable mandate, he could impose on them any task,
or employ them in what service so ever he pleased. To his commands they
were required not only to yield outward obedience, but to resign up to him the
inclinations of their own wills, and the sentiments of their own understandings.
They were to listen to his injunctions, as if they had been uttered by
Christ himself. Under his direction, they were to be mere passive instruments,
like clay in the hands of the potter, or like dead carcases incapable of resistance.
Such a singular form of policy could not fail to impress its character on all the
members of the order, and to give a peculiar force to all its operations.
There is not in the annals of mankind any example of such perfect despotism,
exercised not over monks shut up in cells of a convent, but over men dispersed
among all the nations of the earth.122
Robertson was particularly fascinated by the extent to which Loyola was concerned with
the socialisation of his followers. Jesuits were created and nurtured according to a
precise formula. First the novice needs 'manifest his conscience' to his superior
biannually, 'to discover the inclinations, the passions, and the bent of his souk' The
novice was under the strictest of surveillance, and remained so until (crucially) thirty-
122 Ibid., vol. HI, p. 194.
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three years of age. upon which he could 'profess' his membership. Jesuit spymasters
wrote regular reports on each member, which were sent directly to the general. 'These
reports, when digested and arranged, are entered into registers kept on purpose that the
General may, at one comprehensive view,' Robertson noted with wonder, and they
'survey the state of society in every corner of the earth; observe the qualifications and
talents of its members; and thus chose, with perfect information, the instruments, which
his absolute power can employ in any service for which he thinks meet to destine
them'.123
The Jesuits had their own perverse variant of civic virtue in abundance. Every
Jesuit fought against his personal private passions in favour of the public good, i.e. the
good of the order. Indeed, few private citizens of Europe could bear comparison with
their ardour and commitment on this score. One could not help but admire the Jesuit
commitment to public service. Yet in terms of personal morality, and in particular the
personal morality required of statesmen, the Jesuits rationalised and condoned the most
cynical casuistry.
As it was for the honour and advantage of the society, that its members
should possess an ascendant over the persons in high rank or of great power,
the desire of acquiring and preserving such a direction of their conduct, with
greater facility, has led the Jesuits to propagate a system of relaxed
and pliant morality, which accommodates itself to the passions of men,
which justifies their vices, which tolerates their imperfections, which
authorizes almost every action that the most audacious or crafty politician
would wish to perpetrate.
The Jesuits, as an order, were tied to the interests of their protector, the Vatican. For
Robertson, their views on ecclesiastical polity followed accordingly. Citing the article on
Jesuits from the Encyclopedic, Robertson castigated their general influence. 'Whoever
123 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 194.
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recollects the events which have happened in Europe during two centuries,' Robertson
somewhat presumptuously declared, 'will find that the Jesuits may justly be considered
as responsible for most of the pernicious effects arising from that corrupt and dangerous
casuistry, from those extravagant tenets concerning ecclesiastical power, and from that
intolerant spirit, which have been the disgrace of the church of Rome throughout that
period, and which have brought so many calamities upon civil society.'1 4
The ambitions of the order extended far beyond Europe, and the society made a
speciality of overseas missionary activity. In so doing, the Jesuits began to take on more
and more the trappings of a great private trading coiporation, eventually coming to
exercise soverignty over large indiginous populations. 'They plainly aimed at
establishing in Paraguay an independent empire,' Robertson explained, 'subject to the
society alone, and which, by the superior excellence of its constitution and police, could
scarcely have failed to extend its dominion over all the southern continent of America.'
The Jesuit presence in the Americas literally amounted to an empire of expansion.
Jesuits instilled fear and dislike of the Spanish and Portuguese, completely isolated the
Indians from their officials, created instead an Indian Esperanto.
As all these precautions, without military force, would have been insufficient
to have rendered their empire secure and permanent, they instructed their
subjects in the European arts of war. They formed them into bodies of cavalry
and infantry, completely armed and regularly disciplined. They provided a
great train of artillery, as well as magazines stored with all the
implements of war. Thus they established an army so numerous and well-
appointed, as to formidable in any country, where a few sickly and ill-
disciplined battalions composed all the military force kept on foot by
the Spaniards or Portuguese.125
Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 201-202.
125 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 206-207.
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Robertson was thus particularly fascinated by how Jesuits had managed to transform
savages into beings capable of conducting war as Europeans. As the next chapter will
suggest, the historian discerned in the art of war the most telling index of improvement.
But Robertson was in no doubt that the Jesuits had achieved something truly remarkable:
They found the inhabitants in a state little different from that which takes place among
men when they first begin to unite together; strangers to the arts; subsisting precariously
by hunting or fishing; and hardly acquainted with the first principles of subordination
and government. The Jesuits set themselves to instruct and civilise these savages.
They taught them to cultivate the ground, to rear tame animals, and to build houses. They
brought them to live together in villages. They trained them in the arts and manufactures
They made them taste the sweets of society; and accustomed them to the blessings of
security and order. These people became the subjects of their benefactors; who have
governed them with a tender attention, resembling that, with which a father directs his
children. Respected and believed almost to adoration, a few Jesuits presided over some
hundred thousand Indians. They maintained a perfect equality among all the members
of the community. Each of them was obliged to labour not for himself alone, but
for the publick. The produce of their fields, together with the fruits of their industry
of every species, were deposited in common storehouses from which each individual
received everything necessary for the supply of his wants. By this institution, almost all
the passions which disturb the peace of society, and render the members of it unhappy,
were extinguished.' ...An admonition from a Jesuit; a slight mark of infamy; or,
on some singular occasion, a few lashes of the whip, were sufficient to maintain
good order among these innocent and happy people.126
The spirit of Moore's Utopia can be discerned in Robertson's discussion of 'those
innocent and happy people' perhaps even more strongly than the corresponding passages
in Hume's History. Of course, Robertsonian utopianism, if one may speak of such a
thing, was of a distinctly practical bent. Robertson could not help but express a certain
envious wonder at the Jesuit missions, keenly aware of the nature of the gauntlet they had
thrown down. It is difficult to avoid the ironically Robertsonian point that the Jesuits
incited a mild spirit of jealous emulation in the minds of Protestants, a spirit from which
historians were not immune. How much more impressive an endeavour were the Jesuit
missions than the halting, equivocal efforts of the Scottish SCPK! The following chapter
126 Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 204-205.
will take up the fate of Robertson's understanding of his own most cherished prospect,
the spread of the Gospel amongst the American heathen.
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Chapter Five: The expansion of corruption?
Part I: Empire and Jealousy of Trade
If Robertson's Charles V has been under explored in relation to its political context, the
same cannot be said for its sequel, The History ofAmerica. When Robertson's America
appeared before the reading public in the year 1777. Britain was deep into what the
historian considered a painfully lamentable civil war between the metropolis and her
colonies. This concurrence has understandably caused the work to be read in the light of
that conflict, both then and now.1 To an extent, this is entirely justifiable. All of
Robertson's historical texts were intended, if not to preach on present party politics, then
at least to introduce, contextualise, and provide the framework within which that present
might be philosophically approached. Events did intrude upon the historian's publishing
timetable. The fact that the published text of The History ofAmerica addressed the
discovery and settlement of the Spanish empire alone, omitting projected sections on
British discovery and settlement, was due to the fact that Robertson no longer felt
comfortable introducing a present state of affairs so uncertain. Yet, by the point of his
decision to omit the British portion of his narrative, he had already composed, as he
described with no small amount of chagrin, 'some two hundred pages of excellent
history' on the subject. Yet it is important to bear in mind that a comparative overview
of Portuguese, Spanish and British discovery and colonial policy was not Robertson's
originally intended project. As discussed in the previous chapter, Robertson had
1 J. Smitten 'Moderatism and History: William Robertson's Unfinished History of British America'
in R. Sher and J.R. Smitten (eds) Scotland and America in the Age ofEnlightenment (Edinburgh, 1990),
pp. 163-179.
" R. A. Humphreys 'William Robertson and his History ofAmerica: A Lecture Delivered at Canning
House on 11 June 1954' (London), p. 14.
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originally intended the content of his eventual American history to be included within the
text of his Charles V. That he ultimately chose not to include it was an organisational
and practical decision. There is little to suggest that the decision was politically
motivated. At the time of the conception ofAmerica as a distinct work, sometime in the
early 1760s and before the termination of hostilities with France, there was no perceptible
'American crisis' to address.
More readily discernible was that Britain's colonial possessions had served as the
principal causus belli for an ultimately successful if unprecedentedly expensive war with
France and then with Spain. To the extent that The History ofAmerica had a dimension
that was both responsive to and prescriptive toward the politics of its day it was a text
that addressed the problem of how Britain should order her imperial policy in an age of
faction and potential overstretch. The History ofAmerica further problematised how that
imperial policy should be re-ordered in an age of economic competition in the New
World. The Seven Years War, we shall see, was defended as much for reasons of
jealousy of trade as for reasons of balance of power. Thus America, perhaps to an even
greater extent than Charles V, may be seen as an example of the Pufendorfian
understanding of modern history as tool for the discernment of the true interest of states.
As Robertson declared in his introduction, 'as the principles and maxims of the Spaniards
in planting colonies, which have been adopted in some measure by every nation, are
unfolded in this part ofmy work; it will serve as a proper introduction to the history of all
the European establishments in America, and convey such information concerning this
■7
important article of policy, as may be deemed no less interesting than curious.' Like
Charles V, America was intended to have profound implications beyond the events it
J W. Robertson, The History ofAmerica, vol. I, in Works, p. vi.
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narrated. The two works, taken together, served as the introduction to a universal history
narrating the development and expansion of a state system that promised to embrace the
entire globe.
As discussed in the introduction, the politically prescriptive aspect of the History
ofAmerica has attracted rather less comment than one might have expected for such a
patently didactic work. There are a number of plausible explanations for this. First the
work has long been the intellectual property of historians of social theory, rather than of
the historiography of the enlightenment. Additionally, the recent trajectory of the study
of historiography has emphasised the constructed over the ideological aspects of the
narratives as narratives. Perhaps most fundamentally, however, historians of the political
thought of the Scottish Enlightenment have been more concerned with the commitment
of eighteenth century-Scots to the British State than to her overseas holdings. It is
generally recognised that the Scottish Enlightenment subjected the Whiggery of its day to
a challenging analysis of many of its basic tenets from a perspective both sceptical and
sympathetic. How this perspective informed enlightened understanding of the British
overseas empire - Hume and Smith excepted - remains relatively under explored. It has
even been recently argued that Scottish political discourse on empire is of necessity
hostile towards its subject matter.4 This raises particular problems in the interpretation of
Robertson's most ambitious work, The History ofAmerica. In Robertson's view, it will
here be argued, the European empires may deserve censure for their excesses, but
promised to play a crucial role in the spread of civilisation.
There were several contexts within which an eighteenth-century lowland Scot
could have viewed the transformative effects of empire. As discussed in chapter three,
4 A. S. M. Du Toit, Patriotism, Presbyterianism, Liberty and Empire.
the aftermath of the Forty-Five rebellion witnessed a push to complete the project of
internal empire vis a vis the highlands. The Seven Years War lay bare how deeply
empire was embroiled with the economic hostilities between Britain and France. It is
widely understood that by the middle of the eighteenth century, commercial empire
became primarily a problem of political economy.5 Yet Scottish perspectives on the
advantages of overseas empire in the context of jealousy of trade did not begin with the
eighteenth-century literati. A backward glance at how the matrix of commerce, war and
empire first appeared on the Scottish scene may be useful in highlighting the weight of
inertia reinforcing the attitudes with which Robertson and others had to contend. The
Darien scheme has become a familiar trope both in the historiography of the Union of
1707 and of eighteenth-century 'North-Britishness' generally. The scheme has been
presented as the last ditch attempt of an independent Scottish nation to find an economic
niche of its own in an increasingly competitive economic field, the failure of which
rendered union with England inevitable. What is of more interest here is to demonstrate
not only that the rationale behind the scheme rested upon a precocious and sophisticated
critique of previous imperial adventures, but also that the anxieties that underpinned the
clamour for British war against France throughout the eighteenth century were to a
surprising degree continuous with those expressed in late seventeenth-century Scotland.
But while the Scottish vision of empire may well have originated from a
realisation of inferiority of position, it certainly did not manifest itself in a defensive
posture or course of action. Of course, the Proposals for a Colony in Darien was a single
text, but it was emblematic of a successful marketing operation that attracted an
1
A. Pagden, Lords ofAll the World.Ideologies ofEmpire in Spain, Britain and France, 1500-1800
(New Haven, 1994), ch 5.
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astonishing percentage of the available national capital. In any case. Robertson had a
professional appreciation of the adventurous spirit of the great speculators.
Scotland, for centuries a nation of emigrants, had been conspicuously slow in
establishing a presence in the New World, largely due to its extensive ties with Ulster and
the Continent.6 By the 1680s, a general concern emerged that Scotland might have
missed her opportunity to create settlements in America. The Scottish Parliament,
spearheading a concerted national effort, established in 1695 a Company of Scotland with
exclusive powers to trade with America, Africa and Asia. William Paterson, the financial
speculator instrumental in establishing the Bank of England, and now a director of the
new Company, successful directed it to the possibility of establishing a colony at Darien.7
Paterson did not rely on purely economic argument to win over a potentially sceptical
Dutch king or an impoverished Scottish population. Every Scot knew that Scottish trade
had ground to a halt as a result of King William's defensive crusade against the French
king Louis XIV. Paterson's strategy was to argue that preserving the balance of power
had as much to do with the restoration of Scottish trade as with conducting a defensive
crusade against the French. Invoking the spectre of empire dominated by a papist and
infernal Franco-Spanish House of Bourbon, Paterson turned his attention to the Spanish
colonial empire.
Paterson opened with a brief historical sketch of the interests of the various
European states in the New World. Paterson was acutely aware of the 'great game'
aspect to the scramble for possessions in the new world. The pretensions of Spain and
Portugal Patterson portrayed as all encompassing as they were ridiculous and even
6 Ned C. Landsman, 'Nation, Migration, and the Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the
Americas, 1600-1800', The American Historical Review, 104, No. 2 (1999), p. 467.
7 T. M. Devine, Scotland's Empire, 1600-1815 (London, 2003), p. 37.
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blasphemous, based as they were on the authority of Rome. He viewed the overseas
empires of Charles V and Phillip II through the prism of their twin threats to civil
liberties, namely the Inquisition and the spirit of monopoly. Fortunately, in Paterson's
analysis, tyranny was inefficient. Spanish avarice and bigotry did not ultimately prove
economically advantageous, and allowed the Dutch, from their 'piece of German bog' to
undercut the inefficient productions of their slave run mines at every turn. Slave labour
proved sufficiently inefficient as to more than double prices. As a result, Spain was left
Q
depopulated and on the brink of financial ruin. The shortsighted Spanish had forgotten
the prudent maxim of ancient Rome, that "people and their industry are the true riches of
a prince or nation, insomuch that, in respect of them, all other things are but imaginary.'9
Indeed, as Paterson arrestingly put it, 'the Indies may be said rather to have conquered
the Spaniards, than that they have conquered the Indies.'10 However, for Paterson the
explanation for Spanish decline was ultimately as much political than economic.
the want of people, the great distance and separation of their dominions, and
consequently the occasion of dividing their forces, and of double expense and
hazard, great debts upon a mismanagement of the public revenues, and the late
accession of power to the nobles or grandees, which have been commonly talked
of, and given out for the great and principal causes of the decadency and present
low ebb of the monarchy of Spain, are either but very superficial, or only effects
of their grasping at such vast dominions, without the so necessary helps of a
general naturalisation, liberty of conscience, and a permission trade; -but, on the
contrary, they have consumed their nations' and people's spirit and genius by
those two unheard of and monstrous monopolies, the one upon the neck of the other,
viz. that of the very souls of the Spaniards by their priests, and that again of the
Indies by the Spaniards."
8'By permitting all to go out and none to come in, they have not only lost the people which are gone to
that far distant and luxuriant region, but the remote expectation of so vast advantage hath likewise
rendered those that remained almost wholly unprofitable and good for nothing; for there is now-a-days
hardly a Spaniard of any spirit but had rather risk his person on an adventure to the Indies, than hazard
the staining his gentiltiy by the work and industry of Europe, and thus not unlike the dog in the fable, the
Spaniards have in a manner lost their own country, and yet not gotten the Indies'. William Paterson, 'A
Proposal to Plant a Colony in Darien, The Writings of William Paterson (New York, 1968), pp. 129-30.
9 Ibid., p. 130.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 132.
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To tell the tale of the Spanish troubles in terms of the spread of corruption was to enter
into the black legend, where the spirit of the Inquisition extended across vast oceans with
increased potency. It was for Paterson a scathing indictment of the lacuna of wisdom
among the statesmen of Europe that for so long the spectacular mismanagement of the
12
Spanish Indies was insufficiently understood. The practical importance for Paterson in
understanding the extent of Spanish decline was to reassure worried investors that Spain
could not be expected to put up serious resistance to a Scottish incursion upon her sphere
of influence.
Concerned observers would do better in Paterson's mind to concentrate on the
true threat to their commerce, the designs of Louis. France had not as yet cut such an
impressive figure in the New World, but that was not for Paterson any particular reason
for complaisance. The potential alliance of the vast Iberian holdings in the Americas
harnessed to the forces of the French fiscal military state would result in a dangerously
12 'And certainly it administers no small cause of wonder that he best and most capable spirits of
Christendom have hitherto been so stupid, so dull and little concerned in a matter of so vast weight and
consequence, that none of those we commonly call all the politicians of the last two ages have been at
any tolerable pains or expense to search into the source and original of this violent evil, this negative
kind of destruction, introduced into the rest of the world by their not only new, but new kind of
discoveries in the Indies; -that our ancestors, like so many intoxicated fishes and birds in a maze, should
so long sleep upon this precipice, and either not think at all, or think themselves secure with this razor at
their throats, -so quietly and unconcernedly to see Charles the emperor and Philip his son, even by the
untoward way he went to work, from those unparalleled mines within six or eight years to import gold
and silver sufficient, not only to conquer, but, by good directions, even to purchase the very property of
the rest of Europe; -to suffer Spain, by means of her Indies, during the course ofmore than an age,
besides what they may have done in America, to put the rest of Europe to the expense of so many
millions of lives, and so many hundred millions of money; -and that it should be in the nature of the rest
of mankind, especially of this nation, within the last fifty years, when it was plainly so very much in their
power to make it otherwise, calmly and implicitly to run the risk of the rising of some great prince, or
perhaps of some considerable subject of a suitable genius, or other like accident among the Spaniards, -
so to new model their Indies, instead of being so much a dead and insupportable burthen and weight to
themselves, to become, not only their firm and permanent support, but a most tempting and effective bait
to their neighbours, the which, to all human appearance, could not but have had the designed affect'.
Ibid., pp. 132-133
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formidable alliance.1' Paterson doubted the possibility of any peaceful coexistence with
states notorious for what he saw as bigotry, jealousy, and above all. rank stupidity in the
formulation of public policy. The consequences of peaceful coexistence with this
Bourbon bloc in the New World would be distinctly unpleasant. Moribund colonial
institutions could well be revivified. There was every possibility that a Popish free trade
zone might be created, dedicated to the elimination of all 'heretical' trading interests from
the New World, and disrupting the commerce and prosperity of Europe as a whole.
The very gravity of the situation, Paterson trusted, would prove sufficient to rouse
the Protestant bloc into action. The Dutch in particular had created commercial
institutions worthy of esteem, and as a result of them the United Provinces had
successfully created an overseas commercial empire where they had 'under their
command mighty fleets and armies, capable of controlling great potentates, shake
kingdoms, remove kings, and give laws to the eastern world, and all this not so much at
the labour and expense of their own as that of other people.'14 In part, Paterson would
have been appealing to the vanity of his patron, but the projector seemed to have
entertained a genuine admiration for Dutch techniques. English settlements in the Indies
certainly held out the promise of great riches, but they had never been properly exploited,
nor perhaps their importance properly understood.15 In a wartime context, a Scottish
13 'It is plain that this potent nation, which now for more than half an age has not only come up with, but
outstripped others in several things -but especially in the arts of war, intriguing, and taxing -have been
far enough from having the same success in matters of trade, and in designs to those more remote places
of the world. So it is hoped that Almighty God hath better things in store for the rest of mankind than
can possibly consist with a measure of knowledge and capacity suitable to the opportunity now in their
hands, by the means of this their new conjunction with Spain and Portugal'. Ibid., p. 123.
14 Ibid., p. 124.
15 'These plantations, which have already contributed so much to the wealth and support of this nation, and
at this time look as especially prepared by the Divine hand as harbingers to prepare the way for so great
a work as seems now to be ready and ripe for execution, have not, as some have vainly imagined, sprung
from the deep contrivances or designs of any one, or a party of men, but from various causes, at several
230
empire wouid now be consciously designed to provoke the Spanish deliberately and
confound their commercial aims. Paterson was well aware that his proposals to found a
Scottish colony at Darien (the isthmus of Panama) would be seen by the Spanish as a
naked land grab.
Paterson's apologia for what would clearly be seen by the Spanish as a breach of
the law of nations was twofold: firstly, Spanish claims to sovereignty rested upon a
theological reading of the power of the papacy to grant dominium not universally shared,
and secondly, King William would allow all to trade there 'upon reasonable terms.'
Reasonable terms could well be negotiated, but the fact would remain that Scotland
would now be in control of a new 'universal dominion' in the form of Atlantic
commerce.
Thus these doors of the seas and the keys of the universe would of course
be capable of enabling their possessors to give laws to both oceans, and to
become the arbitrators of the commercial world, without being liable to the
fatigues, expenses, and dangers, or of contracting such guilt and blood,
as Alexander and Caesar; since, as in theirs and all other empires that have
been anything universal, the conquerors have at least been obliged to seek
out their conquests from far; so the force and universal influence of those
attractive magnets are such as can much more effectually bring home to the
proprietors' doors.16
Not only would the new Scottish imperium of the seas prove morally above reproach, it
would be far more enduring as a result.
Of course, in the end, the scheme was a spectacular disaster, partly because of
inhospitable conditions, but even more fundamentally, because Paterson misread
William's level of enthusiasm for carrying out war with Spain. The Bourbon alliance
Paterson dreaded did not materialise, and William was unwilling to intentionally provoke
times; and, to say the truth, rather from our own or other people's weakness than from real virtue or good
conduct in the preceding age.' Ibid., p. 125.
16 Ibid., p. 159.
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a valuable ally in his struggle against Louis for the sake of a faraway swamp. 'I have
been very ill served in Scotland' was his considered assessment of the plan.17
The very devastation the Darien scheme wreaked upon the moneyed and landed
interests of Scotland does allow a few general observations upon the relationship Scots of
that period aspired towards with overseas empire. It certainly had a strongly defensive
component; Scottish commercial empire was desired as a bulwark against a militant
Catholic universal empire that would, if ultimately successful, give law to all Europe and
undermine civil and religious liberties. That sense of defensiveness, however, was a
response to the large Catholic monarchies of the continent; it was not, at this period,
1R
uniquely focused on English hostility. More important, a psychologically defensive
posture did not in any sense lead to hostility toward imperial speculation - quite the
reverse. Defensiveness gave rise to a rather powerful desire to emulate the successful, to
seek advantage in a highly competitive international arena. Behind this lay the zero sum
understanding of competition Smith would later condemn as 'mercantilist'. Colonies
required military backing because trade was seen as a form of property that could be
stolen. It was within this context of jealous that eighteenth-century Scots would come to
overwhelmingly embrace what became a British empire, 'protestant, maritime,
commercial, and free.'19
Pragmatic Scottish embrace of the opportunities provided by English overseas
possessions did not arrive all of a sudden. While the collapse of the Darien adventure
17
Devine, Scotland's Empire, p. 47.
18 for a contrary view see A. Du Toit 'Who are the Barbarians? Scottish Views of Conquest and
Indians and Robertson's The History ofAmerica ' Scottish Literary Journal, 26 (1999), p. 31.
19 D. Amitage, 'The Scottish vision of Empire: The Intellectual Origins of the Darien Adventure' in
J, Robertson (ed.) A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707 (Cambridge,
1997), pp. 97-118.
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ended all prospects for an economically viable independent Scotland in the eyes of
perceptive observers, Union with England was hardly a popular option. Scots negotiators
insisted that investors in the Darien project be compensated for their losses with interest.
The Unionism that subsequently gained in influence was powerfully supported by
Presbyterians who saw in the Treaty of 1707 the only realistic defence of the true Kirk
against popish universal monarchy. Yet confessional allegiance linked with economic
concerns, above all with the promise that Scotland could best pursue her interests within
20the context of a Great Britain that would most truly come to be across the seas. As the
eighteenth century progressed, such perspectives ceased to be the preserve of speculative
ideology, and became observable reality. By the middle of the eighteenth century,
21Scottish emigration to the Americas became substantial. The success of the
Chesapeake tobacco trade had by this time transformed the economy of the city of
22
Glasgow into one of the great emporia of the Atlantic. Scots were disproportionately
represented as colonial administrators and governors, as well as in the armies and navies
stationed in the new world. Ned Landsman has sketched out the attitudes of this Scottish
imperial elite, who remained deeply committed to imperial union, yet had their own
understanding of how that imperial union should best be administered. As seen in
Chapter three, evangelicals, particularly in the West of Scotland, would look to religious
awakenings in the Northern colonies for inspiration against a Presbyterian establishment
many had come to consider as fundamentally Erastian and corrupt.
20 D. Armitage, 'Making the Empire British: Scotland in the Atlantic World 1542-1707', Past and
Present 155 (May 1997), pp. 34-63; John Robertson 'An Elusive Sovereignty: The Course of the Union
Debate in Scotland, 1698-1707,' in Robertson, ed., A Union for Empire, pp 198-228.
21 N. Landsman, 'Nation, Migration, and the Province,' in Robertson (ed) A Union for Empire, p. 185.
22 T. Devine, The Tobacco Lords (Edinburgh, 1984).
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Scotland's economic and military relationship with overseas empire rendered her
intelligentsia particularly sensitive to the afterlife of Paterson's understanding of the
relationship between commerce and empire as played out in subsequent mercantilist wars
between Britain and France in the Americas. Whether economic nationalism was ever
the primary motivation of individual statesmen in moving their respective states towards
war, it was certainly deployed to defend such conflicts as the Seven Years War.
The declaration of war in 1756 was not an auspicious occasion for polite
discourse on enlightened commercial policy. If the Scottish press buzzed yet again with
reports of French invasions that never quite materialised, literature emerging from
London took great pains to drive home the dire effects of such a disaster. An impeccably
bigoted and alarmist little tract, The Progress of the French in their views ofUniversal
Monarchy sought to frighten the public into support of hostile measures against France.
The pamphlet's stated intent placed it squarely within the genre ofWhig writings on the
subject, namely 'to justify the Conduct of our Ministry in their present Hostilities against
France; to raise the Resentment of all true Britons, all Lovers of their Country, its
Religion, Liberties, and Laws; to excite the Animosity of all the Patrons of our Trade and
Commerce; and to set before the Eyes of all Europe, what they have to expect from that
insolent Power France, if it be suffered to run its Career of Violence and Robbery,
without Check or Controul'. 23
The author began with the assertion that France, that 'ambitious, perfidious,
restless, bigotted, persecuting, plundering Power' in aspiring after universal monarchy,
sought to regain Charlemagne's empire on the continent. As discussed in the previous
23
The Progress of the French, in their views of Universal Monarchy (London, 1756), p. 1.
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chapter, this was the brand of folkish Gallophobia Robertson felt had so poisoned the
British discussion of the balance of power. Such militant Whiggish understanding of
imperial conflict in its economic aspect manifested itself in a narration of the history of
the jealousy of trade. This parallel narrative borrowed - indeed could be seen as a variant
of - the folk legend of the sequence of attempts toward universal monarchy. The
polemical intent was to stoke up vigilance against foreign threats while reinforcing
correct ideas of liberty. Whereas the 'historiography' of universal monarchy naturally
began with the novel aspirations of the Emperor Charles V, jealousy of trade first
presented the reader with the sinister machinations of Cardinal Richelieu and their threat
to the European balance. 'Richelieu,' the pamphlet advanced,
seems to have been the first, who projected the raising a naval Power in France,
and the Extension of its Dominions. For this End, Colonies were to be planted,
Fisheries to be encouraged, and Commerce to be promoted. But in the mean Time,
'twas necessary to give England a Soporific, -to lull her to Rest; in Consequence
of which, a Dallilah was sent over to bind Sampson and shear his Locks.
A Daughter of France was married to Charles I. of England; and at this Marriage,
several Stipulations were agreed on, in Favour of the Commerce of France, by
which the Trade, Strength, and Riches of this Nation were to be sap'd. Every true
Britain saw it, and whisper'd to himself, Timeo Danaos & donna ferentes.24
The narrative of jealousy of trade thus also served as a useful stick with which to beat the
house of Stuart, criticised as equally negligent towards the threat of French commerce as
to that of French territorial expansion. The most telling degree to which England had
fallen behind France was the fact that the balance of trade reached a deficit of
£1,600,000. The very fact that the French economy underwent a period of destabilising
inflation was nothing but a cunning ploy to undercut British imports. Commerce might
24 Ibid., p 3.
25 'Tis true, this caused great Convulsions in the Kingdom at first, but in the Issue, it has been the
Instrument by which they have sapped the Foundations of our Trade; and if a Remedy be not applied,
which is every Day at hand, viz. a Bounty, this Artiface of the French will worm out British
Manufactures by gentle Degrees in every Market in the World. By this Artiface they have rendered
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now have become a reason of state, but a true Briton would do well to remember what at
all times was the end of French policy:
Conquest is the Design of the French; Trade is only attended to as the Instrument.
Surely all Europe ought to unite against these Plunderers of the World, and Bullies
of Mankind, who sacrifice every Thing to their savage Ambition. And as to England,
they have attacked out Settlements in the East Indies, robbed us of our Territories in
the West Indies, plundered our Colonies, murdered our People, violated our solemn
Treaties, by seizing the neutral Islands, and committing Hostilities against us in every
Quarter of the Globe. Arise, O Britain! Avenge thy Cause, and restrain the Rapine
and Violence of these Disturbers of the World."6
The vigilant Briton, the pamphlet further argued, would do equally well to remember the
certain result of such a conquest. French ambitions were as dangerous to the Protestant
faith as they were to Britain herself. Indeed, lack of vigilance in resisting economic
subordination to the French would lead to the grim Armageddon of the destruction of the
Protestant faith. National defence thus required repeated reminders as to the singular
unattractiveness of the popish creed. 'As to the Religion of the French, it is a System of
Pageantry, Buffoonery, Foolery, Stupidity, Idolatry, Blasphemy and Cruelty, all mix'd
together, and work'd up with Blood; fit only for stupid Fools and impertinent unthinking
Buffoons.' The confessional charge of imperial polemic emerged even more strongly
when the author turned towards Spain and the nature of Spanish holdings in the
Americas. One could not in practice separate economic aggression from the Inquisition.
To the extent that one can speak of a worldview common to an enlightened
republic of letters, it was one of antipathy to this manner of pugilistic political economy.
How David Hume attempted to propagate the new commandment to love thy neighbours'
economy as thine own was a theme of Chapter four. It is a thesis of this chapter that an
their Labour so cheap, that they reap a plentiful Harvest in every country, where they pay the same
Customs as the English, whilst the English Merchant is obliged to wait for the Gleanings of the Market,
after the Frenchman has finished his Sales.' Ibid., p. 22.
26 Ibid., p. 29.
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enlightened cosmopolitan history of the rise of commercial empire would face as a
principal challenge the fact that such empires caused potentially destabilising conflicts
between their parent nations. As seen in the previous chapter, the exorbitant cost of the
Seven Years War not only toppled a ministry but also threatened the very solvency of the
British state. Robertson was not the first historian of European reputation to try to come
to terms with the problem of how to write a history of new commercial policy that now
regulated the war and diplomacy of nations. To Robertson's great chagrin, that honour
belonged to the History of the Two Indies (1770) by the Abbe Raynal.
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of Raynal's work was its spectacular
commercial and critical success; it went through thirty-six editions in the original French,
and through eighteen in the English translation of J. Justamond. A German translation
went through three editions, and the work was additionally translated into Spanish and
Dutch. The Monthly Review of November 1776 declared,
It may suffice, to inform such of our Readers as are still unacquainted
with the work, that the manner in which it is executed is masterly, as
the materials of which it is composed are important, and the periods
and countries of which it treats are interesting; and that there are few
works in which the different excellencies of historical narrative and
philosophical disquisition are so happily united. Strength of thought,
vivacity of diction, and liberality of sentiment, are its leading charact¬
eristics, and render it one of the most pleasing historical productions
of the present age.. ..We have only to express our regret that the Abbe
Raynal has followed the example of his countrymen, in not giving his
authorities for the principal facts which he relates: on omission, which,
however fashionable, we cannot but think is an essential defect in any
historical work.27
From both a literary and a commercial calculus, it was undeniable that the Scottish
historian's thunder was stolen in the most spectacular fashion. Robertson seemed to
realise as much as he remarked in a letter to his French translator, Suard,
27 The Monthly Review, Vol LV, (November, 1776), p. 402.
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M. Hume and all savans here have read it with great eagerness. It is truly a work
of great merit, of deep research and extraordinary eloquence. I shall derive much
information from it in the work which I am carrying on, and though I am mortified
with observing that the author has sometimes occupied ground which I fancied was
entirely my own, I shall receive a full compensation for this by the pleasure as well
as information which he has conveyed to me. I regret, however, that he has not
quoted any other in support of the facts which he produces, nor mentioned the
sources from which he derives his knowledge of some very important particulars.28
It is difficult to gauge this letter with any precision. As argued in the previous chapter vis
a vis Voltaire, Robertson was far more likely to fault the referencing of works with which
he had other and more fundamental disagreements. As we shall see from a brief
discussion of the work itself. The History of the Two Indies was hardly a performance
Robertson could have been expected to approve without qualification. Yet Robertson
would have been well aware not only of the friendship between Suard and Raynal, but
also and perhaps more importantly of the debt he owed them both in the successful
reception of his Charles V. Raynal had been part of that Parisian circle in which Hume
had successfully 'sold' his compatriot as an author deserving of a European reputation.
To attack the work would have been not only impolitic but also ungrateful. By the same
token, Robertson was far too advanced in his project to abandon it; there was little choice
but to put the bravest face possible on the situation and proceed as planned.
Deux Indes has been a problematic text for modern scholarship due to the fact that
it evolved in the most spectacular fashion between its first and final eighteenth-century
editions. Most secondary scholarship has focused on its increasingly incendiary later
editions, where its secondary author Dennis Diderot provided most of the philosophical
and political fireworks. Raynal became in the meantime as much editor as author of a
grand, sprawling, and rather incoherent Encylopedie of the totality of the European
28 Robertson to Suard, 21 February, 1773, in New Monthly Magazine,. XIII, pt I, pp. 9-10, op. cit. in
J. Smitten 'Robertson's letters and the life of writing' in William Robertson and the Expansion of
Empire, p. 45.
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imperial experience. While the text by Raynal that first appeared in 1770 in French and
1776 in English was yet to be adorned with those purple patches that were later to create
'fanatics of liberty' among the French revolutionaries, it was nonetheless a text that
diverged sharply with Robertson's own preferences concerning sources, and as often,
message. While it would be beyond the scope of the present chapter to trawl Raynal's
text for every opinion or bit of information that might have interested Robertson during
his researches, a few points are of direct relevance to the themes Robertson pursued in his
own work on the same subject.
Raynal can in the first instance be seen as a participant in a distinctly French
tradition of colonial discourse, seeking to answer Montaigne's fundamental question
concerning overseas empire from the essay 'Of Cannibals', namely whether it could ever
29
justify the amount of blood and treasure it occasioned. Raynal further transmitted the
Montaignian theme of importing Tacitus' inversion of the civilised and the barbarian into
the relationship between the European and the Native American. There was for Raynal
no denying that the moment of discovery was itself an event of cardinal importance, but
whether the results of this exciting moment amounted to progress was another matter.
'Everything has changed, and must change again,' Raynal mused. 'But it is a question,
whether the revolutions that are passed, or those which must hereafter take place, have
been, or can be of any utility to the human race? Will they ever add to the tranquillity,
the happiness, and the pleasures of mankind? Can they improve our present state, or do
on
they only change it?' Raynal's text thus questioned whether the age of discovery stood
29 M. de Montaigne, 'Of Cannibals' The Complete Essays, edited by M. A. Screech (London, 1991)
pp. 228-241
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Raynal A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlement and Trade of the Europeans in the East
and West Indies, translated by J. Justamond (London, 1776), vol. I, p. 2.
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at the pinnacle of any development within European history. The French historian was
thus free in a way Robertson would not be, to condemn roundly and unproblematically
the initial Spanish invasions, conquests, and foolish policies as corrupt and above all
backward. This position could not but inform scholarly decisions concerning the
assessment of sources. Raynal dismissed out-of-hand as hopelessly self-serving the
'imperialist' conquest chronicles of Cortes, de Solis and Herrera that Robertson was to
rely on extensively.
While it would be misleading to characterise Raynal as unremittingly hostile to
every development that emerged as a result of the discovery of the New World, the
French historian argued that the original crimes of conquest had led to the continuing
criminality of wars needed to maintain them. Raynal saw these wars as the culmination
of centuries of European policy preoccupied with preserving the balance of Europe
against would-be hegemons. The logic of war based upon preservation of the balance of
trade was the unfortunate legacy of centuries of paranoid preoccupation over universal
monarchy. Raynal's overview was remarkably Robertsonian; the threat had always been
more apparent than real, and this fundamental misapprehension had begun with Charles
V. 'The ambition, the talents, and the rivalship of Charles the fifth, and Francis the first'
31
Raynal wrote, 'gave rise to the present system of modern politics.' Europe divided
between proponents of Habsburg and those of Valois. Charles' son Phillip attempted to
take on the task of his father, but Phillip was too narrow in his strategy to fulfil the task,
too much Rome's man to stake out an independent policy. Richelieu's France thus rose
at Spain's expense, which led in turn to European fears that Louis XIV was the first
31 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 435.
240
monarch since Charles V to have a realistic opportunity to pursue universal monarchy.
These fears were illusory; Raynal explained that
Charles the fifth had been accused of aiming at universal monarchy; and Lewis the 14'1'
was taxed with the same ambition. But neither of them ever conceived so high and so
rash a project. They were both of them passionately desirous of extending their empire,
by aggrandizing their families. This ambition is equally natural to princes of the
ordinary cast, who are born without talents, as it is to monarchs of a superior
understanding, who have neither virtue or morals. But neither Charles the fifth, nor
Lewis the fourteenth had that kind of determination, that impulse of the soul to brave
everything, which makes conquerors of heroes: they had nothing of Alexander in them.
Nevertheless useful alarms were taken and spread abroad. Such alarms cannot be too
soon thought of, nor too soon spread, when there arise any powers that are formidable to
their neighbours. It is chiefly among nations, and with respect to kings, that fear produces
safety.32
Raynal here employed the strategy of Robertson's Charles V, to lessen the fear of
Bourbon aggression by showing how the threat of universal monarchy had been
consistently misunderstood. The often-made connection between Charles V and Louis
XIV was not groundless as long as one bore in mind that both were princes of the modern
workaday sort who did what all princes sought to do, extend their dynastic influence.
True, Louis had proved formidable through divided opposition, but this was soon
corrected in the normal manner through the successful policy of William of Orange. The
policies of Charles and Louis were ultimately as traditional in outlook as Britain's were
revolutionary, namely the creation of a universal monarchy of the seas.
While the powers of the continent measured and parcelled out Europe into unequal
portions, which policy by leagues, treaties and alliances always kept in equilibrium;
a maritime people formed as it were a new system, and by its industry made the land
subject to the sea, as if nature herself has done by her laws. It formed, or unfolded
that extensive commerce, the basis of which is an excellent agriculture, flourishing
manufactures, and the richest possessions of the four quarters of the world. This is
the kind of universal monarchy that Europe ought to wrest from England, in restoring
to each maritime state that freedom, and that power it hath a right to have upon the
element that surrounds it. This is a system of public good formed upon natural equity,
and in this case justice is the voice of general interest.33
32 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 437.
33 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 441.
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The tables had turned in Europe, and the old protector of the European balance now
emerged through its jealous commercial policies as its greatest threat. Raynal did not at
all times seem to share Robertson's understanding of the balance of power as the
balanced capacities of states to wage war, but rather as so many flimsy agreements
cobbled out to reflect the results of the last battle. The French historian thus had no
reason to assume that the freedom of the seas would sort itself out as a result of the
natural jealousy and emulation of relatively equal states.,4 British pursuit of their
universal dominion meant continual war that threatened the stability of British
ic
government. Raynal, unlike Robertson, thus had a specific purpose in taking his
narrative up to the present and the Seven Years War, which the French historian followed
Voltaire in understanding to have begun with Britain's novel ambition for universal
monarchy on the American continent.36
For Raynal the freedom of European trade relied in practice upon the hit and miss
nature of British policy in the Americas. The causes of Britain's disastrous performance
during the first half of the war lay in her over reliance on sea power, in the lack of
34
'Perhaps even this system of equality may be nothing more than a chimera. The balance can only be
fixed by treaties, and treaties can have so solidity, when they are only made between monarchs, and not
between nations. These acts ought to bind the people themselves, because the object of them is their
peace and safety, which are the greatest good: but a despot always sacrifices his subjects to his anxiety,
and his engagements to his ambition.' Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 440-441.
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'During almost two centuries that have passes since the English established themselves in North
America, their country has been harassed by expensive and bloody wars; thrown into confusion by
enterprising and turbulent parliaments; and governed by a bad and corrupt ministry, ever ready to raise
the power of the crown upon the ruin of all the privileges and rights of the people. But notwithstanding
the influence of ambition, avarice, faction, and tyranny, the liberty of the colonies to raise their own
taxes for the support of the public revenue hath on all hands been acknowledged and regarded.' Ibid.,
vol. IV, 378.
~'6
'They [The British] began hostilities in the year 1755, by attacking the French upon the confines of
Canada; and, without any previous declaration of war, they took above three hundred merchant ships,
just as if they were vessels that carried on a contraband trade . . . Lewis XIV had been reproached with
an ambition which aimed at universal monarchy; Lewis XV made it appear that the English aimed at
being monarchs of the sea in effect. All nations then wished to see the power of England reduced, as
they had before desired to see the pride of Lewis XIV humbled.' Voltaire, The Age ofLewis XIV
(Glasgow, 1763), p. 356. Voltaire did not hold that the French government had any particularly
compelling claim to their holdings in the America, however.
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adaptiveness of the military to the American terrain, and above all, her utter inability to
engage profitably with the native population. As a historian hostile to this manner of
conducting a commercial war, Raynal was keen to point out that the failure of the British
to value sufficiently the worth of the indigenous natives was a strategic as well as a moral
failing.
These nations had always shewn a visible partiality for the French, in return
for the kindness they had shewn them in sending them missionaries, whom
they considered rather as ambassadors from the prince, than as sent from God.
These missionaries, by studying the language of the savages, conforming to
their temper and inclinations, and putting in practice every attention to gain
their confidence, had acquired an absolute dominion over their minds. The
French colonists, far from communicating the European manners, had
adopted those of the country they lived in: their indolence in time of peace,
their activity in war, and their constant fondness for a wandering life. Several
officers of distinction had got themselves incorporated with them. The hatred
and jealousy of the English has vilifyed them on this account, and they have
not scrupled to assert that these generous men had given money for the skulls
of their enemies, that they joined in the horrid dances that accompany the
execution of their prisoners, imitated their cruelties, and partook of their
barbarous festivals. But these horrid excesses would be better adapted to
people who have substituted national to religious fanaticism, and are more
inclined to hate other nations than love their own government.37
'The Indians pursued the English with as much eagerness as they did the wild beasts',
Raynal wrote. 'Glory was no longer their aim in battle, their only object was slaughter.'
Raynal's brief narrative of the remainder of the conflict put as brave a face on French
losses as possible. In the French historian's conclusion to his discussion of British
colonisation, he dispensed advice on how they could best be reformed. He approved of
the imposition of English justice upon the province, though he was sceptical of the
efficacy of any attempt to impose English manners. 'The only things necessary to make
the colony prosper, are that its lands should be cleared, its forests cut down, its iron mines
worked, its fisheries extended, its industry and exportations improved.' Raynal was
37
Raynal, Two Indies, vol. IV, pp. 149-150.
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more generally pessimistic concerning the effects of wars such as the Seven Years War
on the colonies and the colonial powers who waged them. Such wars, in Raynal's view,
were fought to support the narrow interests of exclusive companies and their jealous
spirit of monopoly. The cost of such wars would always prove too much for private
investment to sustain, and thus the financial burdens of such private companies would
always in the end have to borne by governments. This was a bad investment on the part
38of governments, who seldom recouped their losses through taxation or export duties."
Raynal's discussion of the corrupting effects of conquest upon the conqueror was
even more pertinent to Robertson's projected narrative. Raynal was fascinated by the
change in manners Europeans had experienced through their contact with the savage.
Ease of victory and riches too readily attained corrupted the manners of the Portuguese.
In such a depraved state, the very religious zeal that had previously been the spring of
their vigour now yielded nothing but wanton ferocity. The Portuguese, viewing the
Indians as idolaters, saw it as their privilege to rob and enslave them. The habit of
treating others in such a manner soon became entrenched; the Portuguese were now no
better able to trust each other than they were to trust the indigenous people. Faction
became rampant, and effective administration was the first thing to suffer. 'There
prevailed everywhere in their manners a mixture of avarice, debauchery, cruelty, and
devotion.' Collapse of virtue led necessarily to the decline and fall of good government.
The chiefs, and principal officers, admitted to their table a multitude of those
singing and dancing women, with which India abounds. Effeminacy introduced
itself into their houses and armies. . . That brilliant courage, which had subdued
so many nations, existed no longer among them. The Portuguese were with
difficulty brought to fight, except where there was a prospect of plunder...
Such corruption prevaded their finances, that the tributes of sovereigns, the
revenues of provinces, which ought to have been immense, the taxes they
38
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levied in gold, silver and spices, on the inhabitants of the continent and islands,
were not sufficient to keep a few citadels, and to fit out the shipping that was
necessary for the protection of trade. It is a melancholy view to contemplate
the fall of nations.3
This was to view the decline of European empire as analogous to the decline and fall of
Rome. The vigour of the Portuguese had been sapped through a degradation of the
warrior ethic, luxury and personal licentiousness. Robertson was to employ a variant of
this model in his own discussion of the corruption of the Spanish in the Americas, though
he was to go beyond Raynal in providing explanation for how this cycle of decline came
to repeat itself. For Raynal's part, though he at no point provided a developed account of
the transformation of the European personality in a savage environment, he did provide
hints of what had happened. He suggested that the sheer temptation of far-flung lands as
booty to be pillaged had proved too great to be resisted, that the absence of the sort of
restraint the European would have felt at home had unleashed a barbarism deeper than
that displayed by the Indians.
Raynal did not feel that Britain had any special immunity from this dynamic of
moral regression. In the British case, corruption stemmed from the behaviour of an
imperial merchant class that largely dictated British policy.40 The rapaciousness of this
set of men manifested itself in a policy of exploitation more refined but no less pernicious
than that of the much vilified Spanish. The resistance of the colonists themselves would
meet this tyranny. Raynal held that colonies should certainly pursue their own interest,
but not to the point of declaring their independence of the home country. Nor would it be
39 Ibid., vol.11, p. 115.
40 'The greatest injury to liberty arises from a set of ambitious men, who pursuing an interest distant from
that of the public and of posterity, are wholly bent on increasing their credit, their rank, and their estates.
The British ministry, from whom they have produced employments, or expect to receive from them,
finds them always ready to favour their odious projects, by the contagion of their luxury and their vices;
by their artful insinuations, and by the flexibility of their conduct.' Ibid., vol. IV, p. 382.
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in the interest of European states with colonial possessions act to speed this likely
development. First, independent colonies would most likely prove bolder in threatening
the interest of their own neighbours. Second, and perhaps more importantly, such a
revolution in affairs would no doubt serve as a model for other Creole populations.
Raynal, in short, did not see it as in the French interest to encourage the American
colonies in revolution, as the result would no doubt be to create new states that would be
even more formidable rivals than the previous colonies had been while under British
dominion. Raynal did not however see it as within France's power to prevent this general
turning of the tide against the Europeans in their far-flung territories. 'Everything,' he
wrote, 'conspires to produce this great disruption, the area of which it is impossible to
know. Everything tends to this point: the progress of good in the New Hemisphere, and
the progress of evil in the old.'41 Raynal did not believe that Creole revolt and the
consequent rupture of the European system was inevitable, but he held there was little
ground for optimism.
While there was much in Raynal's analysis with which Robertson would agree,
his was a troubling reading of the international order. In Raynal's telling, the impetus of
European colonolisation was not only avarice but also an imperial and persecuting
dynamic at the heart of Christianity. The history of European conquest and settlement
was a tawdry sequence of war crimes and atrocities that had as devastating an effect on
the morals of the conquerors as they had on the lives of the conquered. Furthermore,
imperial commerce had been seized upon as a principal reason of state in the jealous
rivalries between the European powers and thus served as a catalyst of a series of wars
that threatened to sap the financial strength of the combatants. Perhaps the best that
41 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 390.
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could be hoped for. if one accepted Raynal's logic, would be that Creole populations
would revolt and thus save European economies from default. One can thus see why
Hume would have found Raynal such a compelling read, just as one can see how
Robertson would have found the book a frustrating encounter. Robertson was a patriotic
North-Briton who understood as well as any of his contemporaries that the strength of all
the regions of Britain lay in her foreign commerce. He would have found it a particularly
bitter pill to have Britain's imperial ambitions characterised as a bid for universal
monarchy that required the collective will of enlightened Europe to counterpoise.
Robertson had hoped that the Bute ministry's controversial peace of 1763 had put an end
to Britain's territorial ambitions in the Americas, and to have successfully communicated
this fact to the rest of Europe. He had written his Charles V partly as an intervention in
public discourse to facilitate just such a realisation and acceptance.
Yet there was much in Raynal's analysis that Robertson was to build upon. The
historian would end up paraphrasing much of Raynal's narrative of the misdeeds of the
Spanish, even if he would be keen to emphasise those misdeeds as those of particular
men, and not of the Spanish state or of the Christian religion. Robertson would further
agree to many of the particular reforms Raynal advocated, above all an end to
commercial monopolies and their jealous notions of commerce that had done so much to
misdirect the imperial policies of Europe. But above all Raynal held out an inspiring
example of an attempt to comprehend European empire in all its foibles and successes as
a coherent whole.
Robertson's great historical ambition to bind the disparate histories of European
colonisation together was frustrated by the fact that he failed to complete his project.
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While it has been advanced at the beginning of this chapter that the 'American crisis' was
not an original impetus to Robertson's historical interest in empire, it certainly
conditioned the form his published writings on the subject were to take. On 4 July, 1776,
the political consequences of Bute's peace became apparent; the Continental Congress of
the thirteen American colonies declared themselves independent of Parliament. Raynal's
grim prediction had come to pass. Shortly thereafter, on 26 August 1776, Robertson
wrote to his long-time literary benefactor the Earl of Hardwicke:
I had determined to defer publishing part of my History ofAmerica until the whole
was completed. But the unfortunate situation into which we have got ourselves with
our colonies obliges me to alter that resolution. It is impossible to give any discussion
of their political or commercial situation, or to enter upon any speculation concerning
them while the conflict remains undecided. Instead of a History, one could only write
a conjecture on actions required of the day. For whatever way the dispute terminates
a new state of things must be introduced into British America. The colonies must
either become independent states, or be reduced to a more perfect dependence than
formerly. It becomes necessary then to wait for some time before one can publish
anything concerning them.42
As a citizen, Robertson had contradictory views concerning this development; as an
historian it was an unmitigated disaster. Robertson had intended his History ofAmerica
to be a panoramic survey of all the European empires as a guide to the statesmen of
Europe; this was not now possible. Robertson intended his histories as guides to
statesmen and magistrates, and this was untenable in the context of civil war and the
dissolution of government. The manner of counsel Robertson sought to provide his
readers always lay more in a deeper understanding of the principles that guided policy
than the minutia of policy itself. Therefore the portion of his history that Robertson did
choose to publish took on added resonances. He believed that he needed to publish what
he did have on Portugal and Spain quickly, while 'all the attention not only of Great
42 Robertson to the Earl of Hardwicke, 26 August 1776. (Hardwicke MSS. BL, Add.35350, ff. 60-61).
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Britain but all Europe is turned to America, and ... renders every publication concerning
it interesting.'4"1 Robertson, taking the political advice he often dispensed, seized the
opportunity to release his finished volumes on Spain. Of particular importance to release
at this critical juncture was his 'large detail of the state of the Spanish settlements, and
their principles of colonisation which have served as our model, and that of all other
nations in their establishments in the new world.'44 The history of Spanish colonisation
would thus serve as the history of European colonisation in microcosm. As such, it could
go some way towards fulfilling the task he had intended his larger unfinished work to
fulfil, namely to instruct British statesmen, both in London and in colonial positions in
the true nature of their project. Contrary to Robertson's intentions, however, The History
ofAmerica assumed a more immediate import than its author had intended, to influence
the course of state policy in time of war.
Part II: The Progress of Civilisation, Conquest, and Settlement
The text of the History ofAmerica was an advance on that of Charles V in its formal




styles of narrative, not all of which sit comfortably together. Book I contextualised
European discovery and conquest within a broader narrative of the progress of
civilisation. Books II, III, V and VI are narrative history of a discernibly neo-classical
provenance, even if their subject matter of discovery and conquest seem far removed
from classical models, and are written in a manner that moves beyond neo-classical
purity and elegance. Books IV and VII were pioneering exercises in historical
jurisprudence aimed at revealing the spirit of the savage law of war. The eighth and final
book was a survey of Spanish policy with recommendations on its reform. This final
book, it will be suggested, constituted the programmatic core of the work that binds
together its disparate elements to offer the statesmen of Europe instruction in the art of
imperial governance.
Book I can be seen as serving on a more modest scale a parallel function for the
remainder of the text ofAmerica as the View had done for Charles V, by providing a
universalising context for the more detailed and localised narrative to follow. The neo-
stoic teleology was the same, the progress of scattered disorder to organised, vigorous
action. The effect of this revival of vigour was to draw disparate peoples together in new
forms of interaction. As discussed in chapter three, Robertson strongly hinted at the post-
millennial implications of this development. Yet, perhaps in keeping with the greater
theological importance of the events to be narrated, Robertson made more frequent and
powerful allusions to the guiding hand of providence. Alone amongst Robertson's works,
The History ofAmerica began with the Creation. Robertson promptly proceeded to
sharply distinguish between the ancient and the modern motivation to discover. Whereas
the ancients had been drawn to empire by the prospect of conquest, primarily by land,
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moderns were driven by views of commercial interest. This schema is complicated,
however, if read in parallel with the opening of the View of the Progress ofSociety,
where Robertson had spelled out that Western history had its Old and New Testaments,
those developments that led to the rise of the Roman empire and those developments that
led from its collapse and the rise of a European states system in its wake. Book I can be
read as the progress of the latter over the former spring of discovery, a phenomenon that
had occurred twice in western history.
If discovery was for Robertson an event in the sacred history of mankind, it was
in the first instance an event in the history of commercial transactions. The prerequisite
of commerce was navigation. 'It is from this area,' Robertson remarked, 'that we must
date the commencement of such an intercourse between nations as deserves the
appellation of commerce.' In terms that prefigured more modern developments,
Robertson extolled the contribution made by commercial values to the progress of ancient
civilisation. Commerce and navigation had led to a new sociability between nations.
'The desire of gain became a new incentive to activity, roused adventurers, and sent them
forth upon long voyages, in search of countries, whose products or wants might increase
that circulation which nourishes and gives vigour to commerce'. 'Trade proved a great
impetus to discovery,' Robertson extolled, 'it opened unknown seas, into new regions,
and contributed more than any other cause to bring men acquainted with the situation, the
nature, and commodities of the different parts of the globe.'45
In the light of the eagerness of modern commentators to congratulate the
historiography of the Scottish Enlightenment for banishing the Lycurgus myth, that
lasting constitutions owed their genius to that of their original heroic founders,
45 Robertson, The History ofAmerica, vol. I, p. 5.
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Robertson's celebration of men who both personified and reinforced the spirit of the age
was remarkable. Robertson discerned the guiding hand of providence through the
endeavours of extraordinary new personages, and in doing so managed, nominally, to
give the historical perspective of Voltaire a Presbyterian gloss. This is most evident in
his curious and controversial discussion of Alexander the Great.
That extraordinary man, notwithstanding the violent passions which incited him,
at some times, to the wildest actions, and the most extravagant enterprises,
possessed talents which fitted him not only to conquer but to govern the world.
He was capable of framing those bold and original schemes of policy, which
gave a new form to human affairs. The revolution in commerce, brought about
by the force of his genius, is hardly inferior to that revolution in empire,
occasioned by the success of his arms.46
Robertson's contemporary, the Edinburgh brewer and burgess Hugh Bell, was sharply
critical of what he saw as the historian's deliberate anachronism and manipulation of
events to make thematic points. Bell pointed out that Robertson was not only entirely
contradicted in his interpretation by Livy, but that the political implications the historian
attempted to tease out were disturbing in the extreme. 'The empires of Alexander, of
Rome, of Mahomet, of Charlemagne, of Philip, of Lewes, and of George', Bell scolded,
'all prove how destructive or how vain are attempts to overgrown monarchies.
Philosophical historians ought to paint Alexander as an object of detestation; and
detestable no doubt he was, when we consider the desolation he brought.'47 Bell was an
authentic representative of a strand within Scottish civic humanist thought hostile to
empire and all its works. Even Paterson understood Alexander as a bloody conqueror
whose practice a Scottish empire would not seek to emulate. Robertson had no sympathy
46 Ibid., vol. I, p. 20.
47 H. Bell, Observations Upon the Character ofAlexander the Great, as Given by the Learned and
Reverend Dr. Robertson, in his History ofAmerica and in His Historical Disquisition, (Edinburgh,
1792), p. 5.
252
with this austere tradition. His Alexander was to be celebrated as the guiding force of the
commerce of the Hellenistic world, the commercial Lycurgus upon whose works the
Romans built. Modern commentators have been less concerned with Robertson's
questionable politics than his questionable philosophical history. Not only should
Alexander have stood in ironic relation to the international order he brought about, but he
also certainly should not have been portrayed as possessing a true understanding of
commerce, which for the Scottish literati was a fundamental difference between the
40
mindset of the ancients and the moderns. David Womersley has suggested that
Alexander was an example of the type of transitional character Robertson deployed to
explain the progress of one stage of human development to another; Neil Hargraves has
further suggested that in his combination of attributes he served as a literary
foreshadowing of Columbus.49 However, if one bears in mind that for Robertson,
Alexander's achievements were most fully brought into fruition by the Romans,
Alexander emerges as the Charles V of the ancient world - or rather, what Charles V
could have been had lasting conquest proved possible in a Europe of increasingly
balanced states.
The extent, however, of the Roman power, which reached over the greatest part
of the known world, the vigilant inspection of the Roman magistrates, and the spirit
of the Roman government, no less intelligent than active, gave such additional
security to commerce, as animated it with new vigour. The union among nations
was never so entire, nor the intercourse so perfect, as within the bounds of this vast
empire. Commerce, under the Roman dominion, was not obstructed by the jealousy
of rival states, interrupted by frequent hostilities, or limited by partial restrictions.
One superintending power moved and regulated the history of mankind, and enjoyed
the fruits of their joint efforts.50
48 Cf. D. Hume 'Of Commerce' Political Essays (Cambridge, 1994).
49 D. Womersley, 'Introduction' in Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman
Empire, ed. Womersley (Harmondsworth, 1994) I, pp. lii-lv; N. Hargraves 'Enterprise, adventure and
industry: the formation of 'commercial charcter' in William Robertson's History ofAmerica', History of
European Ideas, 29 (2003), p. 40.
50 America, vol. I, p. 26.
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Rome thus emerges in a less paradoxical and more positive light than it had in Charles V,
but Rome had here a different role to play. In Charles V, Robertson had described a
coiTupted Rome ripe for conquest; here he described a Roman functioning commercial
empire as the summation of his historical 'Old Testament.' If before he had hinted at
how the ancient world stood in need of revelation, now he described how it was prepared
and ready to receive it. Robertson did not make the point expressly, but his
theologically-minded readers, or readers familiar with his earlier sermon, would have
been well aware that the implication was that the birth of Christ coincided with the
perfection of commercial empire. Extending a theme from that sermon, Robertson
implied that it was commercially driven empire that prepared the world to hear Christ's
message. It was less important that a commercial spirit inform Roman government itself
- that claim would not have been tenable - but that the stability provided by Roman
universal monarchy allowed international commerce to flourish in safety without the fear
of being distorted by jealousy of trade. In this sense the international state system of
modern Europe had yet to match entirely the achievements of the ancients. Yet for all its
achievements in government and commerce, the geographical knowledge of the ancients
remained strikingly limited. 'It seems neither adequate to what we might have expected
from the activity of the human mind, nor to what might have been performed by the
power of the great empires which successively governed the world,' Robertson lamented.
The age of Christ's first appearance in the world was thus one in which only a limited
portion of the world would be in a position to receive Him.
With the progress of civilisation following the fall of Rome, this was at last in a
position to be corrected. Robertson briefly revisited the ground covered in the View,
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beginning with the key event of the growth of the free cities of Italy, and a revival of
international commerce. The zeal of the Crusaders had brought the rude leaders of the
West into contact with the more refined manners of the East, providing them with a first
taste of luxury and a new motive to pursue distant commerce. The culmination of this
development was technology. 'The compass may be said to have opened to man the
dominion of the sea, and to have put him in full possession of the earth, by enabling him
to visit every part of it.'51
Robertson believed that the question as to why it was the Portuguese, and not one
of the more eminent nations of Europe, that had made the first dramatic inroads towards
navigation and discovery, required some explanation. While it certainly could not be said
that the Portuguese constitution encouraged improvement, her system of government
became increasingly regular, and for this, the experience of war proved decisive. Like
Spain, Portugal had been under the yoke of the Moors for much of the Middle Ages and
the effects of recovering their liberty had a similar effect as had the recovery of liberty by
the Italian cities. The concerted national effort required to expel the Moors and to
successfully wage a civil war over a disputed succession increased the power of the
Portuguese crown at the expense of its nobility, giving the crown undisputed command
over its armies. National vigour had been raised to a fever pitch, and the collective
52
energies of the people seemed to burst out of their narrow territory onto the high seas.
The expeditions and discoveries of Henry the Navigator and particularly that of
Bartholomew Diaz were only the most striking manifestation of this energy.
51
Ibid., vol I, pp. 51-52.
52 Ibid., vol. I, pp 56-57.
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The Portuguese were not only precocious in encouraging national efforts
towards exploration and discovery, but also in making what would be the decisive
mistake of all European governments in formulating their colonial policy; outsourcing
overseas affairs to a corporate monopoly. The spectacular energies a national project had
unleashed could not survive the restrictions of a bad privatisation. Colonisation 'ceased to
be a national object, and became the concern of a private man, more attentive to his own
gain, than to the glory of his country.'5'' As a result, Portugal relinquished its position as
the vanguard of European discovery.
The decline of the Portuguese position was an opportunity readily seized by the
other states of Europe. In conformity with his general understanding of the dynamics of
international relations, Robertson portrayed Portuguese success as a provocation that
stimulated the jealousy of others. Portuguese discovery had occurred at that moment of
transition in the history of Europe when the governments of the great states were
becoming sufficiently regular to allow monarchs a freer hand in formulating their
policies. This development was beginning to draw the nations of Europe into a
heightened state of awareness concerning their mutual operations. Thus, 'the fame of the
vast discoveries which the Portuguese had already made, the reports concerning the
extraordinary intelligence which they had received from the East, and the prospect of the
voyage which they now mediated, drew the attention of all the European nations, and
held them in suspense and expectation. Others formed conjectures concerning the
revolutions which the success of the Portuguese schemes might occasion in the course of
trade, and the political state of Europe.'54 News of new discoveries reached the councils
53 Ibid., vol. I, p. 73.
54 Ibid., p. 82.
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of Europe at that moment when they first became prepared to receive them. The ground
was prepared for exploration to become a reason of state. The rulers of Europe were not
yet able to seize immediately upon the importance of Portuguese discoveries. Jealousy
and the drive to emulation were only beginning to materialise into coherent thinking
about national policy. Spain was to emerge as the second nation to undertake successful
exploration, but only due to the patience and constancy of an Italian, Christopher
Columbus. Columbus was one of the few to have fully understood the implications of
Portuguese endeavours, and to have been spurred on by them to even greater action.55
Columbus fulfils in the narrative of The History ofAmerica a function parallel to that of
Maurice of Saxony in Charles V, a man of unusual capacity who recognised that a major
paradigm shift had occurred in human affairs, and successfully internalised that shift and
put it into effective action. As such Robertson devoted an unusual amount of attention to
his personal psychology.
If the characters of Charles V were largely static vessels for particular passions in
operation upon the political stage, the personalities portrayed in America emerge far more
rounded, almost novelistic. Introducing Christopher Columbus, Robertson deftly tied
together biography with psychology. While Charles' ambition seemed to be sui generis,
Columbus, as would be the case with Cortes and Pizarro, was transparently the product of
his education, fittingly so, for America was the first work of history Robertson entirely
composed as the Principal of a great university. As Anthony Pagden has noted,
55 'The successful progress of the Portuguese navigators had wakened a spirit of curiosity and emulation,
which set every man of science upon examining all the circumstances that led to the discoveries which
they had made, or that afforded a prospect of succeeding in any new and bolder undertaking. The mind
of Columbus, naturally inquisitive, capable of deep reflection, and turned to speculations of this kind,
was so often employed in revolving the principles upon which the Portuguese had founded their schmes
of discovery, and the mode in which they had carried them on, that he gradually began to form an idea
of improving upon their plan, and of accomplishing discoveries which hitherto they had attempted in
vain.' Ibid., vol. I, p. 89.
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Robertson created a Columbus who personified the achievements of the progress of
European culture.56 It needs to be stressed, however, that for Robertson as a historian,
the progress of civilization achieved its apogee in the progress of the art of governance.
Robertson's Columbus combined the virtues of the scholar, the soldier, and perhaps most
crucially, the statesman in equal measure. The combination of theoretical and practical
knowledge led Columbus to his conclusion that one could reach the east by sailing due
west. His studies and experiences had further rendered Columbus adept at 'the arts of
57
governing the minds of men.'
Columbus' skill at rhetoric and address eventually won the backing of Queen
Isabella of Castile, who bestowed on Columbus the status of viceroy over any territory he
would discover for the Spanish crown. Columbus, however, proved himself a masterly
statesman long before the Santa Maria ever reached land. Robertson rehearsed the
metaphor of the statesman as captain (or rather admiral) of the ship of state and exploited
it at length. He presented Columbus' crew as a political society in microcosm, led by a
man who 'possessed a thorough knowledge of mankind', an attribute which 'formed him
for command.' Columbus knew well enough that fear and ignorance combined in the
hearts of his crew to threaten both his position and any hope of completing the voyage.
Fear travelled 'like a contagion' and at the tipping point wreaked all sense of
subordination. Columbus required all the intrigue and dissimulation of the new
diplomacy to prove successful. He fiddled with the navigation logs to assuage their
anxieties, appealed to their ambition and avarice, and failing that, resorted to all manner
56 A. Pagden, European Encounters with the New World: from Renaissance to Romanticism (New Haven,
1993), p. 100.
57
America, vol. I, p. 120.
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of threats to keep the crew on board. More impressively still, Columbus recognised the
58limits of his own power, and agreed to turn back if land was not reached.
Robertson's idealisation of Columbus served several purposes. He could be
shown as a nearly exemplary character that had played a key role in showing how the
achievements of the Portuguese could be emulated in practical terms. Perhaps more
importantly, however, he was able to show that Columbus' character had been essential
to the success of the voyage. Thus the Spanish discovery of the Americas emerges as one
aspect of the culmination of the progress of society in uncorrupted form. However, as
Robertson told it, the subsequent history of the Spanish empire was to be a story of the
corruption of those early heroic efforts. At the close of the work Robertson was to sum
up his assessment of the state of the Spanish colonies that Columbus had founded:
A spirit of corruption has infected all the colonies of Spain in America.
Men far removed from the seat of government; impatient to acquire wealth,
that they may return speeedily home from what they are apt to consider as a
state of exhile in a remote unhealthful country; allured by opportunities too
tempting to be resisted, and seduced by the example of those around them;
find their sentiments of honour and of duty gradually relax. In private life,
they give themselves up to a dissolute luxury, while in their public conduct
they become unmindful of what they owe to their sovereign and to their country.59
This was a straightforwardly republican account of how corruption led to decline,
although as we shall see, Robertson was not so convinced that the corruption was of such
deep root as to render renewal impossible. Yet the above passage displays much of what
Robertson saw as unfortunate in how Spain had squandered its opportunity to expand
civilisation outward to new peoples. In policy terms, the Spanish government had paid
insufficient heed to the need for strong government in its colonies. Executive power had
proven too lax to constrain citizens placed in conditions of unprecedented temptation.
58 Ibid., vol.1, pp. 125-128.
59 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 352.
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That temptation was the quick riches on offer in the mines: gold. The very initial success
of the Spanish settlements were only to further intoxicate the adventurers, and in their
minds to subordinate all other considerations to lust for acquisition. Not only had
Spanish policy failed to prepare for this, it had unwittingly encouraged it both in the types
of people brought over and above all in the flawed understanding of commerce as the
acquisition of species that made it possible.
Most fundamentally, however, the Spanish colonies in the Americas had
manifested their corruption in their commerce with its indigenous people. If The History
ofAmerica aimed to provide a narrative framework within which statesmen could extract
lessons on how to approach the problems of imperial governance, few such problems of
governance were as analytically and morally problematic as the question of how the
indigenous peoples were to be conceptualised and dealt with. As Chapters three and five
have demonstrated, the promise of the conversion of the native peoples of the Americas
was fundamental to Robertson's conception of the providential role of European empire.
As Robertsonian scholarship has often noted, the native peoples of the New World
occupied two distinct roles within the narratives of The History ofAmerica, receiving a
relatively sympathetic portrayal within the narrative sections and a far more severe
treatment within the scientific dissertations of Books IV and VII.60 It would remain an
open question whether neo-classical conventions allowed for any legitimate agency on
their part if agency were construed as an active role in war and diplomacy as traditionally
understood. Robertson first attempted to accommodate these newcomers to history with
60 S. J. Brown, 'An Eighteenth Century Historian and the Amerindians: Culture, Colonialism and
Christianity in William Robertson's The History ofAmerica', in Studies in World Christianity, 2 (1996),
204-222; A. Du Toit, 'Who are the Barbarians? Scottish Views of Conquest and Indians, and
Robertson's History ofAmerica, Scottish Literary Journal, 26 (1999). p. 34.
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a shift of tonal register. It has been remarked that The History ofAmerica is a stylistic
departure from the markedly drier and even austere style of much of Charles V, and is
seemingly precocious in its romanticism.61 This was not without puipose. For, in
Robertson's account, the point of contact between the Spaniards and the natives emerged
as a key event in sacred as well as in historical time.62
Robertson's language in narrating these first contacts became correspondingly
more overtly novelistic, invoking the glamour of an exotic and enticing world in the
sense of wonder it evoked.
The Europeans were hardly less amazed at the scene now before them.
Every herb, and shrub, and tree, was different from those which flourished
in Europe. The soil seemed to be rich, but bore few marks of cultivation.
The climate, even to Spaniards, felt warm, though extremely delightful. The
inhabitants appeared in the simple innocence of nature, entirely naked.
Their black hair, long and uncurled, floated upon their shoulders, or was
bound in tresses around their heads. They had no beards, and every part of
their bodies was perfectly smooth. Their complexion was of a dusky copper
colour, their features singular, rather than disagreeable, their aspect gentle
and timid. Though not tall, they were well shaped, and active. Their faces,
and several parts of their body, were fantastically painted with glaring colours.
They were shy at first through fear, but soon became familiar with the Spaniards,
and with transports of joy received from them hawks-bells, glass beads, or
other baubles, in return for which they gave such provisions as they had, and
some cotton yarn, the only commodity of value they could produce. Towards
evening, Columbus returned to his ships, accompanied by many of the islanders
in their boats, which they called canoes, and though rudely formed out of the
trunk of a single tree, they rowed them with surprising dexterity. Thus, in the first
interview between the inhabitants of the old and new worlds, every thing was
conducted amicably, and to their mutual satisfaction. The former, enlightened
and ambitious, formed already vast ideas with respect to the advantages which
they might derive from the regions that began to open to their view. The latter,
simple and undiscerning, had no foresight of the calamities and desolation which
were approaching their country.63
61 D. Womersley, 'The Historical Writings of William Robertson' Journal of the History of Ideas, 47,
(1986), 506. This aspect of Robertson was keenly appreciated by Roberton's early nineteenth century
readers, from Walter Scott to Keats. On this transmission see O. D. Edwards, 'Robertsonian
Romanticism and realism' in William Robertson and the Expansion ofEmpire, p. 112.
62 For a discussion of how events created their own subjective time frames, and the relation between sacred
and secular time in Western historiography more generally, see D. J. Wilcox, The Measure of Time
Past: Pre-Newtonian Chronologies and the Rhetoric ofRelative Time (Chicago, 1987).
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Both the Spaniards and the Indians naturally interpreted each other's actions according to
their own mental categories. Yet if Spanish and native were doomed to mutual
incomprehension, that was not to imply that they could not at a simpler level recognise
and respond to each other's humanity. The response of the natives to the sinking of one
of Columbus' ships was telling. They entered into a complete sympathy with the
Spaniard's loss, and acted quite selflessly in lending aid. Not only had the outward
behaviour of the Indians conformed to a perfect Christian charity, they revealed
themselves as sociable men of feeling.64
Columbus understandably felt sanguine about the prospect of securing the
compliance of the natives in establishing a Spanish settlement. It was of great
importance that Columbus' first settlement rested upon the explicitly negotiated consent
of Guacanahari. The agreement was feudal in nature, land in return for military
protection. That military protection worked both ways, however. The agreement was
sealed with an unsubtle display of the superior military technology at Spanish disposal,
leaving the natives fearful and trembling. Robertson spelled out the darker side already
implicit in the relationship, noting that in the physical preparation of the settlement, the
Indians had erected 'the first monument of their own servitude'.
64' As soon as the islanders heard of this disaster, they crowed to the shore, with their prince Guacanahari
at their head. Instead of taking advantage of the distress in which they beheld the Spaniards, to attempt
anything to their detriment, they lamented their misfortune with tears of sincere condolance. Not
satisfied with this unavailing expression of their sympathy, they put to sea a number of canoes, and under
the direction of the Spaniards, assisted in saving whatever could be got out of the wreck; and by the
united labour of so many hands, almost every thing of value was carried ashore. As fast as the goods
were landed, Guacanahari in person took charge of them. By his orders they were all deposited in one
place, and armed sentinels were posted, who kept the multitude at a distance, in order to prevent them
not only from embezzling, but from inspecting too curiously what belonged to their guests. Next
morning this prince visited Columbus, who was now on board the Nigna, and endeavoured to console
him for his loss, by offering all that he possessed to repair it.' Ibid., vol. I, p. 143.
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The unequal if pacific relations between Spanish and native did not survive
Columbus' absence on his return to Spain shortly thereafter. Upon his return from Spain
he had discovered the garrison at Hispaniola deserted: nothing but signs of struggle
remained. Tellingly, though, the story of the conflict came entirely from the brother of
the cazique, whose authority Robertson seemed to accept. The behaviour of the Spanish
left in isolation from their commander strikingly displayed through negative example
how government and the rule of law serve to regulate unsociable passions. The
unrestrained Spanish had dispersed into small units of bandits, marauding and pillaging
without fear of reprisal. The Indians had come to recognise their visitors as all too
human, had overcome their earlier reverence and had summarily burned the Spanish
village to the ground. None survived. The Spanish had been immediately seized with the
urge to revenge, the principal passion Robertson was to associate with the savage warrior
ethic. Columbus had proved the very model of stoical self-command, suppressing his
own resentment and persuading his men not to act upon theirs. There was to be no
revenge, rather rebuilding.
The episode was illustrative for Robertson of the challenges of civil governance in
a new colony. Spanish America had lacked effective institutions; power had been
entirely personal. This would have proven less of a problem had the early Spanish
visitors been peaceably predisposed. Unfortunately, peaceful contentment had been quite
antithetical to the spirit of a loose assortment of gentlemen adventurers whose heads had
spun with superstitious visions of gold. The patient industry necessary for prospecting,
let alone for agriculture, had not counted among their virtues. Added to this the hot
climate had sapped much of what little industry they possessed. They had been, as
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Robertson described them, lazy, impatient, and mutinous.65 No power structure that
required the genius of a Columbus to function steadily could long be expected to endure.
Economic necessity had soon driven the Indians to war. Rudimentary levels of
Indian production had been inadequate for more developed Spanish appetites, and self-
interest had required the natives to drive out the Spanish. However, the Indians had
become undone as much by their lack of refinement in the art of war as they had been by
lack of technology. They had taken to the open field in full daylight. Columbus, against
his own more prudent judgment, had been compelled to exact tribute from the Indians in
the form of gold and cotton. Robertson felt such an imposition had been the height of
folly, and had showed no understanding of the nature of the 'barbarians' they had forced
into such an unequal commerce. Regular taxation required regular industry on the part of
the taxed to support it, and such regular industry was altogether alien to the spirit of
barbarism. The first consequence of the foolishness of Spanish policy had been more
violence and unrest. However, the stratagem of the Indians to abandon their rudimentary
agriculture and flee to higher ground proved catastrophic to their own population.
Columbus himself, as it transpired, had not been entirely blameless in setting
policy. Robertson was sharply critical of Columbus' proposal to populate the new colony
with convicts. Fully aware that present British policy approved similar measures
regarding the deportation of Britain's own convicts, Robertson spelled out his
disapproval at length. If the opportunities for easy gain available in the Americas were a
temptation for the best of men to throw off the shackles of all reason and morality in its
pursuit, flooding a new colony with those who could not avoid such temptations under
the more rigorous rule of Spanish domestic law seemed wilfully negligent. Yet in the
65 Ibid., vol. I, p. 169.
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short term. Columbus' iron fist in enforcing discipline prevented the worst abuses. This
would not prove the case under Columbus' successor as governor, Nicolas Ovando. who
abandoned the 'severe discipline' prudently imposed by Columbus, as well as his
arrangements for the rights and persons of the Indians. For Robertson this was to result
in a development of crucial importance in colonial jurisprudence, and one that would
condition the manner in which the Spanish waged war against a people they did not
understand.
Upon assuming the post of governor of Hispaniola, he had granted the Indians the
status of free citizens whose labour could not legally be compelled, a policy in keeping
with the wishes of the Crown. The free status of the Indians, however, had threatened the
economic viability of the settlement at Hispaniola. As Robertson wrote of it, Ovando
had attempted to improve the efficiency of the plantation by prudently reducing the royal
slice ofmining proceeds, and making a more equal distribution of Indian labourers
among the settlers. The new governor had been keen to maintain a fa§ade of propriety
however, and had directed 'their masters' to provide a minimal compensation to their
Indian labourers.66 Ovando's policies, however, directly led to outright war with the
Indians, a conflict that confounded Robertson's powers of narration. Robertson retained
a humanistic understanding that the proper subjects of historical narration were war and
diplomacy. But this understanding made key assumptions concerning the relationship
between war and the warrior. The issue prompted from Robertson the historiographical
aside that
when war is carried on between nations whose state of improvement is in any degree
similar, the means of defence bear some proportion to those employed in the attack;
and in this equal contest such efforts must be made, such talents are displayed, and
66 Ibid., vol. I, p. 252.
265
such passions roused, as exhibit mankind to view in a situation no less striking than
interesting. It is one of the noblest functions of history, to observe and to delineate
men at a juncture when their minds are most violently agitated, and all their powers
and passions are called forth. Hence the operations of war, and the struggles between
contending states, have been deemed by historians, ancient as well as modem,
a capital and important article in the annals of human actions.67
War thus particularly merited the attention of a philosophical historian, for it was in war
that the active powers of man could be witnessed in full cry. War between Ovando's
men and the Indians did not satisfy these narrative aspirations, as neither side supplied
the sort of behaviour that could be celebrated in humanistic terms. In European terms, a
prerequisite of glory in war was a genuine competition, a prerequisite of honour a shared
sense of each side playing the same game and abiding by its rules. In this war, however,
the Spanish and natives in contrast had viewed each other with mutual incomprehension.
What remained for Robertson was a critique of the conduct of the Spanish in terms of the
European ius gentium. The Spanish viewed the natives as subhuman, and thus felt no
compulsion to obey the laws of war in treating with them.
They conceived the Americans to be animals of an inferior nature, who were not
intitled to the rights and privileges of men. In peace, they subjected them to servitude.
In war, they paid no regard to those laws, which, by a tacit connection between
contending nations, regulate hostility, and set some bounds to its rage. They considered
them not as men fighting in defence of their liberty, but as slaves, who had revolted
against their masters. .. This war was occasioned by the perfidy of the Spaniards, in
violating a treaty which they had made with the natives.. 8
Robertson was thus uncharacteristically legalistic in his critique of Spanish behaviour. In
the text of Charles V, Robertson had often criticised Francis I's credulity in believing
Charles would recognise any legal or honourable restraint to his pursuing his own
interest. But then Charles, whatever his faults, had at least recognised the humanity of
his adversaries, and when Robertson criticised the behaviour of Charles it was in terms he
would himself have understood. Like Charles, Ovando had utterly violated the law of
67 Ibid., vol. I, p. 253.
68 Ibid., vol. I, p. 254.
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hospitality. The female cazique, Anacoana, had received Ovando and his men in a spirit
of friendship. This act of generosity was met with sabotage and slaughter. The Spanish,
in their barbarous conduct of war, had utterly cast aside whatever civility they had been
educated to possess. At one level Robertson could be seen as invoking the standard
Tacitean or Montaignian inversion of the civilised and the barbarian employed by
Raynal, while emphasising that when civilised man left the environment that made his
civility possible, he emerged far more savage than his savage enemy. Robertson pushed
this argument further, however, by pointing out that it was a failure in the understanding
of the Spanish concerning the nature of the natives that lay at the root of their slip into
barbarism. Robertson had not yet solved the problem concerning the possibility of
introducing intelligibility into a narrative of tragic mutual incomprehension. The only
vocabulary humanist historiography had to offer was one of corruption. War was a
dignified subject for the humanist historian, cold-blooded massacre was not.
Cold-blooded massacre was also the effect of considered policy, as defeated
Indians were sent to the mines. The very horror of what the Spanish had unleashed had
informed their reclassification of the Indian as an inferior creature. For Robertson the
paradox was that the very cruelty of Ovando's methods had rendered the colony initially
prosperous. He had governed the Spanish as well as he had treated the Indians
unconscionably. He had established what in the short term proved a secure rule of law
and introduced a more varied commerce. Under his tutelage a plantation system had
began to prosper and would eventually arouse the attention of the crown. The political
education of Ovando and Ferdinand had developed in parallel. Increased revenues won
Ferdinand over to the value of overseas possessions, inspiring him to develop what
267
Robertson described as 'that profound, but jealous, policy by which she governs her
dominions in the new world.' He gave careful attention to the composition of such
institutions as the Board of Trade and the structure of ecclesiastical government, carefully
ensuring its independence from Rome. A spirit of jealousy similarly informed
Ferdinand's commercial policy, heavily restricting both imports and personages, securing
Hispaniola as a captive market for the Spanish crown. Yet at the moment when the
plantation system of Hispaniola began to show profits, it also began to sow the seeds of
its own collapse through the astonishingly high mortality rate of its slave labour.
Robertson did not query the figure that as many as forty thousand may have died within
the first generation of the system. He did not attempt to arouse the sympathy of his
readers with the plight of the Indians in the manner Raynal had done.69 Polite history had
reached the limits of what it could narrate with dignity.
Spanish imperialism had thus produced a diabolical dialectic of conquest and
exploitation. Robertson described the drive for new conquests as fuelled by a need to
create a new labour force to replace that which had been eliminated in the genocide.
Here the key player was the new governor and Columbus' kinsman Don Diego. After the
extent of the initial genocide was realised, Don Diego spearheaded the importation of
forty thousand native bodies to Hispaniola.70 Robertson's narrative at this point seemed
to have lost its bearings under the weight of the contradictory themes he attempted to
69
'They were indiscriminately chained together like beasts. Those who sank under their burdens, were
compelled to rise by severe blows. No intercourse passed between the sexes but by stealth. The men
perished in the mines, and the women in the fields, which they cultivated with their weak hands. Their
constitutions already exhausted, with excessive labour, were still further impaired by an unwholesome
and scanty diet. The mothers expired with hunger and fatigue, pressing their dead or dying infants to
their breasts, shrivelled and contracted for want of a proper supply of milk. The fathers either poisoned
themselves; or sought death on those very trees on which they had just before seen their wives or their
children expire.' Raynal, Two Indies, vol. II, pp. 158-159.
70
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pursue. On one side, Robertson portrayed Don Diego as suffering similar trials to
Columbus, his own native prudence being insufficiently recognised or allowed to flourish
by inconsiderate metropolitan authority. Don Diego's notions of prudent policy,
however, included comprehending genocide in terms of an unfortunate labour shortage
resolvable through the importation of more bodies to be used up and discarded.
Robertson seemed to wish the reader to sympathise, nonetheless, with his plight at being
undercut at every turn by Ferdinand. This reached its absurd conclusion when the reader
was asked to sympathise with Don Diego's frustration at having his power, 'the most
valuable prerogative which the governor possessed,' of distributing Indians amongst
retainers curtailed. This might have been presented ironically as the conversion of an
obtuse monarch who had presented a thousand obstacles to Columbus now insisting on a
change of policy to ensure the lasting viability of those settlements, but this was an irony
Robertson did not pursue. The wars of Ovando and the policies of Don Diego
represented a crisis both in Spanish history and in Robertson's narrative. At this point
Robertson's task of presenting the founding fathers of Spanish imperialism as exemplars
of statesmanship broke down. This was an incomprehension that Robertson had to
explain before he addressed the more extended commerce between peoples of Books V
and VI. Robertson was soon to move away from narration altogether to attempt to
provide an explanation of the principles of savage society that informed their conduct of
war.
All that remained for Robertson in concluding Book III was a brief attempt to
distance the clergy from these events. Perhaps to rebuff Raynal's continuous assertion
that a fundamental intolerance within Christianity led to the inhumane treatment of the
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Indians by the Spanish, it was of great importance for Robertson to be able to show that
ecclesiastics had begun the outcry against these brutalities. Sectarian rivalry among the
different monastic orders, however, had the unfortunate effect of ensuring that religious
authority backed both sides of the Indian question. Franciscans tending towards criticism
of the plantation system, the Dominicans towards support of government. Called in to
arbitrate, Ferdinand found in favour of the Dominicans, adding that slavery was
necessary to thwart idolatry, and that the Franciscans should now prudently keep their
own counsel. The Dominicans for their own part now saw that it was pointless to preach
the gospel to a people whose spirits were broken.
Continuing his theme of clerical misgiving at the Spanish treatment of the natives,
Robertson threw the problem into sharp relief by ending his Book III with a brief
narrative of the tribulations of the fierce critic of the plantation system and defender of
Indian rights, the bishop of Chiapas, Bartolome de las Casas. In order to fit Las Casas
into his book on the initial problems of imperial governance faced by the Spanish in the
New World, Robertson had to radically rearrange chronology. It would have been more
conventional to introduce Las Casas, as Raynal had done, in the aftermath of the conquest
ofMexico. He could then have appeared, as Raynal had described him, as a uniquely
71virtuous opponent of unmitigated Spanish perfidy. Robertson's own treatment of Las
Casas was more ambivalent than has sometimes been described, an ambivalence that
71 'As he was more a man than a priest, he felt more for the cruelties exercised against them, than for their
superstitions... .This courageous, firm, disinterested man cited his country to the tribunal of the whole
universe. In his treatise of the tyranny of the Spaniards in America, he accuses them of having destroyed
fifteen millions of Indians. They ventured to find fault with the acrimony of his style, but no one
convicted him of exaggeration. His writings, which indicate the amiable turn of his disposition, and the
sublimity of his sentiments, have branded his barbarous countrymen with a disgrace, which time hath
not, and never will efface.' Raynal, Two Indies, vol. II. p. 191.
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72underscored the difficulties in narrating this chapter of the Spanish experience. First,
Robertson admired Las Casas as an adroit advocate for his cause. He was successful in
having his case heard at the highest levels and effectively answered; on his word Cardinal
Ximenes effectively overturned the entire system of government in the New World. Yet
Robertson admired rather more the clarity of insight of the brothers of St Jerome sent by
Ximenes to conduct a thorough audit of imperial governance, principally their argument
that the Spanish colonial system in the New World was based upon slave labour, and to
abandon it would effectively mean to abandon America. Their perspective had the added
virtue of an accurate assessment of the capacities of the Indians; they would never labour
if not compelled. The brothers had recommended a prudent moderation of such forced
labour. Las Casas had dissented, arguing that such measures subordinated natural justice
to prudence to an unacceptable degree.
Robertson began his discussion of Las Casas' policy with a forthright
condemnation of slavery in all its forms. He explicitly compared Las Casas' project to
create an economically viable yet not exploitative colonial system with that of the Jesuits.
'He supposed that the Europeans, by availing themselves of that ascendant which they
possessed in consequence of their superior progress in science and improvement,'
Robertson wrote, 'might gradually form the minds of the Americans to relish those
comforts of which they were destitute, might train them to the arts of civil life, and render
73them capable of its functions.' As discussed in previous chapters, Robertson found
such a project highly attractive. He had given a qualified endorsement of this project in
72
B. P. Lenman, 'From Savage to Scot', in Expansion ofEmpire, p. 203; Brown, 'An Eighteenth Century
Historian' p. 210. From different perspectives, both see Robertson's attitude as fundamally
condescending, if not hostile.
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his only published sermon, and painted it in glowingly Utopian terms in the text of his
Charles V. The project was not, however, a success. Las Casas' intended site, the
province of Cumana, now found itself victim to Spanish revenge attacks following the
slaying of two Dominican missionaries by the natives. He had no choice but to attempt
to salvage what he could of the unfortunate situation, but the natives of Cumana, already
provoked beyond endurance, attacked the settlement at first opportunity. Forced to
abandon his project, las Casas entered a monastery with his reputation in tatters. For
even the most sympathetic of observers, the gulf between Spanish and native
understandings was insurmountable.
Robertson closed his third book with the multiple tragedies of the career of Las
Casas. It would be difficult to close The History ofAmerica at the end of this book
confident that one had gained an understanding of the guiding hand of providence in
human affairs. What Robertson had supplied was a catalogue of human folly and
misunderstandings with the most appalling of consequences. Neil Hargraves has
remarked that Book III constituted 'something of a nadir in the narrative.'74 The reasons
for this were something more fundamental than imprudence. Spanish policy had clearly
suffered from a number of misapprehensions, concerning the nature of true wealth and
the need for a firm rule of law in conformity with metropolitan standards, but these
failures of policy were the natural foibles of a Spanish state in a period of transition
facing altogether new problems of governance. More troubling altogether for a narrative
of the providential joining together of the human species was that the Spanish in America
had been so corrupted by a superstitious reverence for gold that they became unable to
recognise the humanity of the Indians. With the genocide of the natives of Hispaniola the
74 N. Hargraves, 'Enterprise, adventure and industry', p. 46.
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sentimental network between author, character and reader had ceased to operate.
Narrative history even at its most sentimental had no effective method of explaining this
rupture in human sociability. Nor did humanist historiography possess the resources to
explain how Indian society was so tragically incapable of putting up any kind of serious
resistance to its own annihilation. Robertson seems to have understood as much, and at
this point he broke off his narrative altogether to commence a lengthy digression on
Indian manners in the language of the Scottish science of society.
To suggest that Robertson embraced Scottish social science to resolve problems
that arose within his narrative is to reverse one of the most often repeated claims in
Robertsonian scholarship, namely that Robertson chafed at the formal constraints of
Scottish science, and employed the greater freedom of narrative to escape from them.75
Such a view takes as granted not only that Scottish social science was at that point
understood as a single formal entity, but also that Robertson understood his writings as a
response to it. It is ironic that those who most insist that Robertson was fundamentally a
narrative historian tend in practice to assume the conceptual primacy of philosophy over
narrative. The argument that Robertson primarily sought in his writings to qualify the
claims made by conjectural history has been buttressed by the assertion that it was by
nature sceptical and materialist. There is certainly something in this, but it is worth
bearing in mind that Robertson was as committed an opponent to immoderate religious
zeal as was Hume, and that a materialism guided by the hand of providence was not
altogether alien to Presbyterian thinking. The extent to which the Presbyterian minister
75 Nicholas Phillipson, 'Providence and Progress: an intoduction to the historical thought ofWilliam
Robertson, in WREE; p. 56 Karen O'Brien, Narratives ofEnlightenment: Cosmopolitan History from
Voltaire to Gibbon, (Cambridge, 1997) p. ; A. Du Toit, 'Who are the barbarians', p. 42; Hargraves,
'Enterprise, adventure, and industry,' p. 35.
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chose to accept and embrace what was most cutting edge in Scottish social theory is as
illuminating as what he chose to reject.
t
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Part III: American savages and European barbarians
Robertson's discussion of the savage state in Book IV has attracted more attention and
controversy than anything else the historian put to paper. As stated previously, much of
this resulted from historians of social theory finding within Robertson's exploration of
savagery a pioneering example of analysis worthy of study in its own right. While the
trend in recent Robertsonian historiography has been to view the historian's works more
holistically, the precise relationship between Books III and IV remains something of a
puzzle. As seen in the previous chapter, Robertson was a narrative historian who only
departed from narrative to address a specific point. Robertson's isolation of the 'savage'
resolved a series of crucial questions unresolved and perhaps irresolvable within the
confines of humanist narrative. As we have seen, Robertson was unable adequately to
account for the incapacity of the Spanish and the natives to establish a reciprocal network
of sympathy and sociability. More fundamentally, he was unable to account for the utter
inability of Indians to engage effectively in war against the Spanish or to survive the
trauma of forced labour. The discussion here will present Book IV as a study that
brought all aspects of the savage mind to bear on the conduct of war.76
When Robertson sought refuge in science to resolve what sympathetic narrative
could not, the historian only reflected the unease and uncertainty on the topic that
characterised his generation. The nature of the savage mind had achieved a strategic
urgency during the Seven Years War that it had not previously possessed. The conflict
76 This discussion owes a great debt to that of Neil Hagraves. What Hargraves does not sufficiently
account for, in the present author's view, is the extent to which Robertson's inability to bring the Indians
into his narrative, and his consequent retreat into philosophy to address this lacuna, hinged on the
issue of war. See Hargraves, 'The Language of Character and the Nature of Events', chapter 5.
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originating out in the disputed territories of the Ohio Valley became entangled with the
territorial claims and ambitions of three empires, the British, the French, and the Iroquois.
The diplomacy of the Seven Years War was as influenced by negotiations between
Quakers and the Delaware as it had been by those between the English and the Prussians.
The superiority of French 'Indian policy' had long been a major strategic success, and
was feared by British observers to prove potentially decisive in the conflict, as British
military intelligence was at what seemed a nearly insuperable strategic disadvantage vis a
vis the French on the field. British forces were at a loss how to predict and control Indian
movements, as The Scots Magazine in April of 1763 reported with news of the infamous
raid against the forces of General Amherst:
A private letter from Philadelphia, dated July I informs us that Gen. Johnston, among many others,
had left his habitation, and come to Albany. He reported the insurrection to be so general, that even the
Mohaks, among whom he lived, till then our best friends, had joined the rest of the pillage and destroyed
the country. The letter adds, that Gen. Amherst was set out from New York for Albany; and that every
officer and soldier able to walk had been ordered forthwith to the rendezvous at this latter place in order to
march against the Indians in those parts. The Indians are said to have been so long, and so carefully
employed in providing for this scheme, that they have now by them great quantities of provision, and as
much ammunition as, it is thought, will serve them for five years.
It seems their intention was, to have made a general attack upon the back settlers in the time of
harvest, to have destroyed all that came in their way, and to have cut off the subsistence of those who might
escape; but the precipitancy of their young warriors has, in a great measure, frustrated this horrid design.
As it is, many whole families have been barbarously murdered, and the crops, habitations, stock, and
provisions, of them and many more destroyed or carried off. A good many hundreds of families have fled
from the back settlements to different places down the country, without either subsistence or money. The
number of British traders murdered is great, and the value of the effects they have been plundered of is
reckoned at 500,0001 sterling.77
Such incidents had the effect of portraying the Indians as unsettlingly inscrutable
objects of fear and anxiety. Yet Linda Colley has recently written about how
contemporary Scottish novels such as Tobias Smollett's Expedition ofHumphrey Clinker
(1771) and Henry Mackenzie's Man of the World (1773) conveyed the highly ambivalent
nature of eighteenth-century Scots to the 'Red Indian'. Reflecting popular attitudes,
77 The Scots Magazine (April 1763), p. 463.
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such novels represented the savage as at times an object of fear, at other times on object
of beguiling fascination, but at all times something fundamentally mysterious and
inexplicable. The captivity narratives of the Aberdonian Peter Williamson proved a
highly popular source for eighteenth-century Scots concerning the nature of the Indians.
As a child Williamson had been kidnapped and transported to Pennsylvania, where he
was kidnapped a second time by the Delaware Indians, after which he took up British
78
arms in the Seven Years War. For Williamson the negative attributes of the French and
the Indians, allied as they were against Britain, naturally blended together into a
composite sketch of viciousness. 'Terrible and shocking to human nature were the
barbarities daily committed by the savages, and are not to be paralleled in all the volumes
of history! Scarce did a day pass but some unhappy family or other victims fell to French
79
chicanery, and savage cruelty.' Fear of the savage revealed itselfmost tellingly in
repetition of horrific tales of torture of prisoners.
The third unhappy victim was reserved a few hours longer, to be, if possible,
sacrificed in a more cruel manner; his arms were tied close to his body, and
a hole being dug deep enough for him to stand upright, he was put therein,
and earth ram'd and beat in all round his body up to his, neck, so that this
head only appeared above ground; they then scal'd him, and there let him
remain for three of four hours in the greatest agonies; after which they made
a small fire near his head, causing him to suffer the most excruciating torments
imaginable, whilst the poor creature could only cry for mercy in killing him
immediately, for his brains were boiling in his head: Inexorable to all his plaints
they continued the fire, whilst shocking to behold! his eyes gushed out of their
sockets; and such agonizing torments did the unhappy creature suffer for near
two hours, 'till he was quite dead!80
Williams made much rhetorical play concerning the inefficacy of language to transmit his
feelings of horror. Williams condemned even more acidly, however, 'those who thro'
perfidy, inattention, or pusillanimous and erroneous principles, suffered these savages at
78 L. Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire and the World 1600-1850 (London, 2002), pp. 188-192.
79 P. Williamson, French and Indian Cruelty (Bristol, 1997).
80 Ibid., p. 19.
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first, unrepelled, or even unmolested, to commit such outrages and incredible
depredations and murders.' Yet, as Colley has shown, Williamson did go some way
toward contextualising Indian cruelty by showing how it was partly the result of cynical
French manipulation. More fundamentally, Williamson understood that making peace
with the Indian was a crucial problem of imperial governance, without which, the British
presence in North America was unlikely to prove successful. Robertson's views on
Williamson's work have not been recorded, but he could scarcely have been unaware of
it. French and Indian Cruelty became an international bestseller, going through a dozen
editions in Edinburgh alone. As Colley has remarked, 'if there was a popular British
81classic about Native Americans in this period, this was certainly it.'
Unfortunately for Robertson, the Scottish science of man to which he turned for
resources was no less Janus-faced in his approach to the nature of the savage than the
larger culture from which it emerged. Robertson's friend and professional colleague
Adam Ferguson in his Essay on the History ofCivil Society (1767) offered a far more
challenging exploration of the nature of savagery. Ferguson's account of the history of
rude nations was a corrective against the cultural arrogance of more civilised
commentators, who could only see in earlier modes of society the lack of virtues since
82
acquired. Ferguson was a critic of Adam Smith's historical jurisprudence that had
rigidly indexed the history of civilisation to the evolution of the security of property. In
Ferguson's view, the effect of such flawed analysis was radically to overstate the gulf
81 L. Colley, Captives, p. 190.
82 'Our method, too frequently, is to rest the whole upon conjecture; to impute every advantage of our
nature to theose arts which we ourselves possess; and to imagine, that a mere negation of all our virtues
is a sufficient description of man in his original state. We are ourselves the supposed standards of
politeness and civilization; and where our own features do not appear, we apprehend, that there is
nothing which deserves to be known.' A. Ferguson, An Essayon the History ofCivil Society
(Edinburgh, 1963), p. 75.
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between the manners of the savage and of the refined citizen. In an historical account
such as Smith's, the triumph of commercial virtues necessary came at the expense of
more heroic martial sentiments. Ferguson came to his understanding of savage society
from a standpoint unique to the Scottish literati. Not only was he a Gaelic speaking
highlander who was sensitive to the virtues of a precommercial society, but also he had
indirect personal experience among the natives of the New World. While his text cites
the traditional authorities of Tacitus, Charlevoix and Lafitau. the posthumous 1814
edition of the work adds the following appeal to the authority of contrary witnesses.
'This account of Rude Nations,' he wrote, 'in most points of importance, so far it relates
to the original North Americans, is not founded so much on the testimony of this or the
other writers cited, as it is on the concurring witnesses, who, in the course of trade, of
0-2
war, and of treaties, have had ample occasion to observe the manners of that people.'
For all his attempts to muddy the distinctions the Scots had drawn between the principles
on which savage and civilised societies rested, Ferguson did admit that there was a
fundamental distinction between propertied barbarians and savages. Savages entirely
lacked any sense of rank, station, or subordination. They relished equality, and would
84submit to no source of authority. Drawing on Colden's History of the Five Nations,
Ferguson wrote 'Power is no more than the natural ascendancy of the mind; the discharge
of office no more than a natural exercise of the personal character; and while the
community acts with an appearance of order, there is no sense of disparity in the breast of
83 Ibid., p. 284.
84 Ibid., p. 84.
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any of its members.'' Love of equality inculcated a sense of justice no less pure than
that which existed in an advanced commercial state.
Yet paradoxically this did not mean that the North American Indians were entirely
incapable of forming unions or acting in concert. Indeed, their diplomacy was no less
intricate than that of Europe itself. Ferguson wrote,
they appeared to understand the objects of confederacy, as well as those
of a separate nation; they studied a balance of power; the statesman of one
country watched the designs and proceedings of another; and occasionally
threw the weight of his tribe into a different scale. They had their alliances
and treaties, which, like the nations of Europe, they maintained, or they broke,
upon reasons of state; and remained at peace from a sense of necessity or
expediency, and went to war upon any emergence of provocation or jealousy.86
As discussed in the previous chapter, central to Robertson's narrative of the revival of
civilisation in Europe was the argument that improvements in internal police led to the
concerted national vigour requisite for any sustained foreign policy. The native
Americans in Ferguson's account seemed to have effortlessly attained the result of
centuries of European development. To an extent that Hume or Smith would have found
difficult to account for in a people with no sense of propertied interest, they fully
possessed that careful reason of state necessary to determine their 'national interest' in a
broader sense.87
According to Ferguson there was one crucial sense in which savage understanding
of diplomacy differed from that of a European; the savage mind was geared to short term
thinking about interest and advantage; savage peoples were unable to see beyond the next
hunt or the next battle. Savage males had no interest in any sort of productive activity;
85 Ibid., p. 85.
86 Ibid,, p. 86.
87
'They carry a penetrating eye for the thoughts and intensions of those with whom they have to deal; and
when they mean to deceive, they cover themselves with arts which the most subtile can seldom elude.
They harangue in their public councils with a nervous and figurative elocution; and conduct themselves
in the management of their treaties with a perfect discernment of their national interests.' Ibid., p. 89.
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they saved their passion for conflict. Ferguson's Native Americans were perpetually
engaged in war over points of honour that it was difficult for Europeans to comprehend.
The savage did not face the enemy in open battle on equal terms, relying instead on
stealth and ambush. Fortitude instead came into its own in the stoicism with which the
savage endured the pains of torture in captivity. It was not uncommon for great displays
of fortitude on the part of a prisoner of war to be rewarded with adoption. As fortitude
was so honoured among savage society, it was the virtue inculcated into youth with the
greatest attention.
The lesson Ferguson wished to drive home was that all that was best in human
nature was there in the beginning. Man in earlier stages of society was not a child, was
not necessarily corrupt, and did not consider himself lacking in any important respect. 'If
mankind are qualified to improve their manners, the subject was furnished by nature; and
the effect of cultivation is not to inspire the sentiments of tenderness and generosity, nor
to bestow the principal constituents of a respectable character, but to obviate the casual
abuses of passion; and to prevent a mind, which feels the best dispositions in their
greatest force, from being at times likewise the sport of brutal appetite and ungovernable
oo
violence.' In truth, savage man lacked only one decisive quality, the quality that would
forever render him prey to the forces of a more advanced civilisation: discipline.
Superior discipline did not imply any sort of moral superiority or right of dominion,
however. Nor did it imply any duty of improvement on the part of the civilised. The
hunter had no more wish to trade places with the merchant than vice-versa.
A point on which Ferguson was more circumspect was the extent to which the
mind of the American Indian had been forged by climate. Ferguson followed orthodoxy
88 Ibid., p. 94.
in holding that man flourished best within the temperate zone, while unduly warm
weather brought sloth and inactivity. As such, under extremes of either heat or cold,
Ferguson wrote, 'the active range of the human soul appears to be limited; and men are of
r 89inferior importance, whether as friends, or as enemies.'
The climates of America, though taken under the same parallel, are observed
to differ from those of Europe. There, extensive marshes, great lakes, aged,
decayed, and crouded forests, with the other circumstances that mark an
uncultivated country, are supposed to replenish the air with heavy and noxious
vapours, that give a double asperity to the winter, and during many months,
by the frequency and continuance of fogs, snow, and frost, carry the
inconveniences of the frigid zone far into the temperate.'90
Ferguson seemed to follow those natural scientists that had understood the flora and
fauna of the Americas to be fundamentally degenerate. While Ferguson believed there to
be a materialist explanation for contrasting manners under different climates, he did not
feel comfortable in spelling out what that connection could be. Nor did he feel
comfortable in spelling out the consequences of this line of climatic conditioning for the
indigenous inhabitants of the European empires. Yet one piece of data was striking, 'the
Hollander is laborious and industrious in Europe; he becomes more languid and slothful
in India.'91
Ferguson's study of the savage could only be of limited use to Robertson, a fact
revealed through the historian's only limited reliance on it. Yet it was a highly
suggestive account, persuasively revealing that savage warfare was the best index of
savage manners. His discussion had the inestimable merit of understanding savage war
from the inside, and of offering an explanation of its internal logic. Ferguson's analysis,
however, in blurring so many of the distinctions between the psychologies of the savage
w Ibid., p. 112.
90 Ibid., p. 116.
91 Ibid., p. 118.
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and the citizen, offered little help in explaining why the Spanish adventurers and their
subsequent historians had found the gap between the two so difficult to bridge. A
discussion that sought partially to redeem savage society was ill-disposed to account
satisfactorily for its utter incapacity to hold its own. In moving away from property as
the index of improvement, Ferguson had found little to replace it, or to successfully
account for the historical evolution he understood in such ambivalent terms. Among the
literati of eighteenth-century Scotland. Ferguson was always somewhat out on his own.
He was a useful reminder, however of Robertson's own tenet of historical ethics, namely
that actions should be judged within the ethical framework of the actor, and not that of
the observer. His example was, at least, an incentive to moderation.
Robertson began his Book IV where Ferguson had left off, with a brief discussion
of the relationship between man and his environment. Robertson's introduction to this
topic elicited one of his most grandiose statements, and one that revealed he had entered
into quite another mode of narration:
In order to complete the history of the human mind, and attain a perfect
knowledge of its nature and operations, we must contemplate man in all
those situations wherein he has been placed. We must follow him in his
progress through the different stages of society, as he gradually advances
from the infant state of civil life towards its maturity and decline. We
must observe, at each period, how the faculties of his understanding
unfold, we must attend to the efforts of his active powers, watch the
various moments of desire and affection, as they rise in his breast, and
mark whither they tend, and with what ardour they are excited.92
To speak in terms of the history of the mind was to invoke the discourse of a natural
history of man that took its bearings from Lockean epistemology.93 Yet a key recourse
for Scottish natural history was the categories and methods of natural jurisprudence; and
92
America, vol. II, p. 50.
93 Locke's Essay claimed to offer a 'historical plain Method' for study of the 'Faculties of ...Man'. Op. cit.
in P. B. Wood, 'The Natural History of Man in the Scottish Enlightenment' History of Science, 27 (1989)
p. 96.
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the passage has further been claimed to suggest the comparative approach of
Montesquieu.94 It further seconded Raynal's observation that America provided a rich
supply of materials for the jurist and the natural historian.95 The situation in which the
Indian had been placed resembled the fabled state of nature. 'That state of primeval
simplicity, which was known in our continent only by the fanciful description of poets,'
he wrote, 'really existed in the other.'96 For Robertson, the physical terrain of the New
World astonished for two reasons, its sublime immensity and its bitter cold. Robertson's
purpose here was not to instil a sense of wonder at God's undiscovered country, rather to
survey the land with the cold eye of an improver. This strangely imposing, strangely cold
terrain was admirably suited to improvement and commercial development, largely due
to the number and extent of its waterways. Robertson likened the Gulf of Mexico to the
Mediterranean and the Hudson to the Baltic, and noted American rivers had great
potential utility for trade. Yet Robertson was not of the impression that these vast tracts
were particularly pleasant. As noted in the discussion of the View, Robertson entertained
no Tacitean romance of the forest and even less for what emerged from it. If America
was unpleasant, however, it was more importantly abundant, a fact that yielded two
conclusions. First, it revealed the possibilities and legitimacy for future improvement by
94 N. Phillipson, 'Providence and Progress', p. 61.
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Raynal, however, felt such inquiries now to be impossible. 'The discovery of a new world would
alone be sufficient to furnish employment for our curiosity. A vast continent entirely uncultivated,
human nature reduced to the mere animal state, fields without harvests, treasures without proprietors,
societies without policy, and men without manners, what an interesting and instructive spectacle would
these have formed for a Locke, a Buffon, and a Montesquieu! What history could be so wonderful, so
delightful, so affecting as the detail of their journey! But the stamp of rude unpolished nature is already
disfigured. We shall endeavour to collect the features of it, though now half effaced, as soon as we have
made the reader acquainted with those rapacious and cruel Christians, whom an unhappy chance first
brought to this further hemisphere.' Raynal, Two Indies, vol. Ill, p.141.
96
America, vol. II, p. 51.
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Europeans, and second it hinted why the native Indians had not felt the need to do so.''1
A society blessed with abundance would have its subsistence needs readily satisfied, and
would thus not be driven to improve either itself or its surroundings. Natural abundance
above all required minimal mental effort to ensure survival. The thrust of Robertson's
argument was that any insight into the savage mind lay in grasping the rudimentary
nature of its needs, and the most primary of man's needs was for subsistence. Robertson
elaborated in a celebrated passage that the manner in which a society procured its
simplest needs contained the key to interpreting the structure of that society:
in every inquiry concerning the operations of men when united together
in society, the first object of attention should be their mode of subsistence.
Accordingly as that varies, their laws and policy must be different. The
institutions suited to the ideas and exigencies of tribes, which subsist
chiefly by fishing or hunting, and which have as yet acquired but an
imperfect conception of any species of property, will be much more simple
than those which must take place when the earth is cultivated with regular
industry, and a right of property not only in its productions, but in the soil
itself, is completely ascertained.98
In essence, all information concerning the savage needed to be seen through the lens of
his occupation; action made the man and the savage hunted. This statement revealed a
formal sophistication not in evidence from the 'philosopher' of the View. Dugald Stewart
has misled commentators in categorising this section of Robertson's text as a 'natural
history'. From this point on, Book IV is better understood as an application of a
particularly Scottish model of historical jurisprudence, one that took its bearings from the
writings of Samuel Pufendorf. The juridical origins of Book IV are revealed in its
structure. It abandoned humanist narrative altogether in favour of a geometrical mode of
argumentation - one of axioms followed by proofs - favoured by the natural jurist. More
97 'The European colonies have cleared and cultivated a few spots along the coast, but the original race of
inhabitants, as rude and indolent as ever, have done nothing to open or improve a country, possesing
almost every advantage of situation and climate.' Ibid., vol. II, pp. 15-16.
98 Ibid., vol. II,"'p. 111.
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fundamentally Book IV dealt with all the categories of Pufendorfian natural
jurisprudence, the individual, family, children, political obligation, form of government,
natural religion and war and peace. Yet Book IV was no straightforward Pufendorfian
exercise in delineating the rights and duties of citizens and sovereigns. Savage society of
the type Robertson was to describe lies utterly beyond the reach of a seventeenth-century
jurist; it lacked property, subordination, and a regular system of government. Yet by the
mid-1770s, Robertson had a developed body of Scottish historical jurisprudence on
which to draw in this context. Both Karnes' Sketches of the History ofMan and John
Millar's Origin of the Distinction ofRanks had by then appeared, two works that took
conjectural history beyond the study of thefeuda towards a more universal narrative of
the improvement of human sociability and refinement. Robertson deployed the insights
of these works to his very specific narrative ends, to show that the savage method of
warfare had the deepest possible roots in savage society. The hunter fought like he
hunted.
The hunter was a relatively improved savage, whose art introduced a new ethos to
savage life. Hunting was a dangerous, manly pursuit, and the successful hunter enjoyed
veneration second only to that reserved for the warrior. For hunting further required skill,
patience and a certain ingenuity, and served to strike the first beat in the march of the
savage mind. 'While engaged in this favourite exercise,' Robertson wrote, 'they shake
off the indolence peculiar to their nature, the latent powers and vigour of their mind are
roused, and they become active, persevering, and indefatigable.'99 Ingenuity 'sharpened
by emulation' then led to that rudimentary technology that aided the hunt. Hunting alone,
however, was rarely sufficient to procure subsistence, and the experience of deprivation
99 Ibid., vol.11, p. 115.
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soon - Robertson's timeline was here somewhat unclear - drove the savage to limited
cultivation. The fruits of cultivation, principally maize and that poisonous parsnip
manioc, could only serve as a sporadic supplementary food source. Developed
agriculture required the domestication of animals and the employment of metal tools, but
being unnecessary to subsistence, these advances remained as yet beyond the hunter's
reach. It had become a truism of Scottish historical jurisprudence that the invention of
animal husbandry was a crucial stage in the progress of society, and one that could not be
bypassed. The animal kingdom had been man's first and most necessary conquest,
without which, Robertson claimed man was a 'monarch who has no subjects; a master,
without servants, and must perform every operation by the strength of his own arm.'100
Indians did not lack tameable beasts; rather they would not exploit the bison and reindeer
that roamed in abundance. But instead of being the sovereign; he was the enemy of his
non-human fellow creatures. Robertson understood the life of the hunter as poorly in
tune with the balance of nature; 'he wastes and destroys,' Robertson wrote, 'but he does
not know how to multiply or govern them.'101 Book III had shown that the technological
gap between the savage and the citizen was no small contributor to the latter's
supremacy, and to account for this Robertson complicated the stadial model by
suggesting that metals were perhaps as important as animals to the conquest of the natural
world. The most useful metal, iron, required human industry to become useful, and this
the savage conspicuously lacked. Metals were necessary for two reasons; first as
102
weapons and second as agricultural tools.
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Ibid., vol. II, p. 123.
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102 Ibid., vol.11, pp. 125-127.
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Thus, Scottish science, with its emphasis on the causal relationship between need
and refinement, rendered the study of the savage as an investigation into absences as
much as positive qualities, thus opening itself up to Ferguson's criticism that all a
property based stadial history could accomplish would be to peel off layers of civility.
Robertson seemed relatively unperturbed by this criticism, and highlighted four key
political consequences for a people who lacked a system of agriculture. First, no society
of hunters could be very large or cohesive; as the 'beast of prey' was a solitary creature,
so was the hunter he resembled. Robertson's second point hinted at the logic of
dispossession; the savage had no conception of the property he did not possess. 'As long
as hunting continues to be the chief employment ofman to which he trusts for
I Q-3
subsistence' Robertson wrote, 'he can hardly be said to have occupied the earth.' This
was a crucial point for any argument that sought to present natives as undeserving of the
land at their disposal; occupation had long been the primary juridical foundation of
property rights. Third, with no meaningful sense of subordination, every savage
possessed a keen sense of his own independence. Personal qualities may well have risen
up a temporary leader on the battlefield, but such status did not outlive hostilities.
Fourth, that sense of independence rendered the subordination necessary to any
government impossible. 'Where the right of separate and exclusive possession is not
introduced,' Robertson maintained, 'the great object of law and jurisdiction does not
exist.'104 To the extent that any sort of justice may be said to have existed among
savages, it was the private justice of families motivated from revenge. The apparently
superior capacity for subordination to tribal chiefs evident in such tribes as the Natchez
103 Ibid., vol. II, p. 130.
104 Ibid., vol. II, p. 133.
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and the Bogata could he explained as a function of their small steps toward improvement,
and even more decisively as a function of priestly powers exercised by their chiefs and
the superstitions in which it was embroiled. Just as true religion was the building block
of the social order, so superstition served as the chains of despotism. 'By its fatal
influence, the human mind, in every stage of its progress, is depressed, and its native
vigour and independence subdued,' Robertson wrote. 'Whoever can acquire the direction
of this formidable empire, is secure of dominion over his species.'105
The nature of savage superstition was thus key to understanding their notion of
political obligation. Unfortunately, in Robertson's mind, missionaries, who were only
interested in establishing links, however tenuous, between the belief systems of the
savages and revealed doctrine, had primarily carried out the study of savage religion.106
The three hundred and forty seven 'tedious pages in quarto' of Lafitau represented for
Robertson the nadir of this naively neo-Thomist and Jesuitical approach.107 Using the
categories of natural religion, Robertson introduced his discussion with the two cardinal
theological tenets on which rational agents based their religious beliefs, namely the
existence of a single God and the immortality of the soul. The undeveloped state of the
savage mind was such as to find these concepts unintelligible, and it was notable that
many of the simplest tribes did not acknowledge the existence of a Creator or even have
the word in their language. Robertson followed Hume's Natural History ofReligion in
maintaining that the original impulse towards religion was the sense of dread that arose
105 Ibid., vol. II, p. 143.
106 The prevalense of such a tendency in European tendency has been described by Anthony Pagden as 'the
principle of attachment. It was just this tendency that Robertson sought to combat. A. Pagden,
European Encounters with the New World, pp. 17-49.
107
America, vol. II, p. 470. For the contrast between the Augustinian and the Neo-Thomist approach to the
study of the American Indian, see P. Goddard, 'Augustine and the Amerindian in Seventeenth-Century
New France', Church History, 67 (1998), pp. 662-681.
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from the unseen. Benevolent deities could be left to perform their good offices unaided
by sacrifice, but malicious spirits required appeasement. If the Presbyterian minister
fascinatingly did not hold monotheism itself natural, he did find belief in the immortality
of the soul to be so. The least cultivated of savages imagined an afterlife more pleasant
108than the present; even the hunter pined for his happy hunting ground. To the extent
that there existed a savage priestcraft, this was the preserve, in the first instance, of the
witch doctor, who alone could channel the necessary magic to cure disease. In time,
however, the witch-doctor would become a priest with the power to secure access to the
afterlife.109 Robertson was quietly making the point that a religious culture of this sort
was not one that was favourable for nurturing Christian belief. A mind unprepared for
the abstract thought revealed doctrine relied upon was not to acquire such a capacity at
gunpoint; the attempt forcibly to convert the natives was a fool's errand. A further
implication was that the traditional Spanish legitimating discourse of just war against
infidels fell apart because, from the vantage point of Indian conversion, it could not be
effective.
Delivering the savage from his pathological lius gentium' was a more compelling
rationale for intervention. For Robertson, America, perhaps even more than the Europe
of the dark ages, was in a state of nature such as Hobbes or Pufendorf would have
recognised. Both were locked into a condition of perpetual ferocity, rapine and war. On
the other hand, for Robertson, man living in such a state was hardly living naturally,
according to the principles of his own sociable nature. He might have claimed that
lacking property or sense of interest, the savage lacked the patience, industry, or sense of
108 Ibid., vol.11, pp. 191-192.
109 Ibid., vol.11, pp. 196-198.
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wronged entitlement required to engage in a war of all against all. If that had been the
case, however, the Indian and the Spaniard would never have found themselves in
conflict. Instead. Robertson argued that the savage possessed a ferociously keen sense of
entitlement regarding his use of traditional tribal hunting grounds and was careful to note
these were considered perfect rights that it was legitimate to preserve by force.110 Like
John Millar, Robertson was taking issue with Smith in holding these 'natural rights'
adventitious and was able to conclude, this time against Ferguson, that a society of
hunters would entirely lack a sense of interest.111 But tribal interest was not the only, or
even the primary, spring of savage warfare; more powerful was the passion for revenge.
If resentment was the guiding passion of the mind in the feudal state, revenge was the
mechanism through which conflict in the state of nature needed to be understood.
Savages carefully inculcated the duty of revenge to their children. The very simplicity of
the savage mind rendered its fixation on this principle all the more intense and all the
more dangerous. 'When under the dominion of this passion,' Robertson wrote, 'man
112becomes the most cruel of all the animals. He neither pities, nor forgives, nor spares.'
This was to suggest that Adam Ferguson was right in believing that if savage
society possessed any sort of 'policy' it was to preserve tribal hunting territories. Such a
view naturally had the most important implications for the sort of statecraft Britons
should follow in their dealings with Indians. A savage was simply incapable of statecraft,
113
as a European would recognise it. The savage mind seemed for Robertson to be
110 Robertson would have been well aware of the natural jurist's distinciton between 'perfect' and
'imperfect' rights.
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Ibid., vol. II, p. 146.
112 Ibid., vol. II, p. 147.
113 Robertson stated that the exception to this rule was the Iroquois, which he promised to discuss at a later
point but frustratingly did not. His exception of the Iroquois was particularly maddening in that this
was the very tribe in which both Britain and France had been in vexed negotiation for the duration of
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formed for dissimulation. 'Impenetrably secret in forming their measures, they pursue
them with a patient undeviating attention, and there is no refinement of dissimulation
which they cannot employ, in order to ensure their success.'114 Robertson here employed
the language of reason of state to drive home the point that savages were unreliable allies,
the belated recognition of which had caused Britain much blood and treasure.
So far as Robertson was concerned, all other aspects of savage warfare could be
reduced to the principle that savages fight as they hunt. Savage armies, such as they
were, were small, swift and unencumbered. Their warfare, initiated by a desire for
revenge, required tactics antithetical to the tactics of wars fought for honour or glory. To
the savage, European martial practice seemed merely foolish. No hunter could see the
point of meeting the enemy face to face, or feel that he had gained anything by dying in
accordance with certain formalised procedures. What was fame to a mind that could not
conceive of it? Robertson criticised those who argued that the principles of savage
warfare were evidence of their lack of courage; it was only natural for small communities
not to seek to expend life capriciously. On the other hand, he commented ominously,
their military culture made them vulnerable to armies possessed of a sense of discipline
and subordination.115 Thus, savage societies could not be expected to respect laws of war
that were alien to their culture. For Europeans, the most frightening aspect of savage war
lay in its treatment of prisoners. Indians felt a right to replace warriors they had lost.
For early modern European commentators, and in this Robertson was no exception, the
practice was most notable as a violation of one of the most cardinal tenets of the ius
gentium, the injunction not to torture prisoners. Even a commentator such as James
the Seven Years War.
114
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115 Ibid., vol.11, p. 168.
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Adair, whose History of the American Indians principally sought to present his subjects
as 'red-Hebrews' could not resist a direct comparison between savage and Popish
methods of torture."6 Yet Robertson was equally fascinated by savage torture and the
capacity of savages to endure that torture. Savages, after all, primarily tortured other
savages. 'They talk, they eat, they sleep, as if they were perfectly at ease, and no danger
was impending.'117 While Adair mocked savage indifference to pain by comparison to
crazed, self-flagellating Portuguese women, for Robertson the savage never seemed more
truly human as when demonstrating an 'invincible constancy' unto the hour of his
118death. The savage heathen knew how to die. Robertson thus rendered intelligible that
aspect of savage society European observers found so abhorrent and perplexing. What
seemed the most vicious was actually the most virtuous aspect of savage morals. This
savage constancy was the result of a distinct process of socialisation. Native American
society carefully inculcated the virtue of constancy in their youth. Young warriors would
vie with each other to prove themselves the most patient, and thus constancy became
honourable and deserving of esteem. Had Robertson concluded his discussion of the
treatment of prisoners with this poetic description of savage constancy, the historian
116 'The women make a furious onset with their burning torches: his pain is soon excruciating, that he
rushes out from the pole, with the fury of the most savage beast of prey, and with the vine sweeps
down all before him, kicking, biting, and trampling them, with the greatest despite. The circle
immediately fills again, either with the fame, or fresh persons: they attack him on every side -now he
runs to the pole for shelter, but the flames pursue him. Then with champing teeth, and sparkling eye¬
balls, he breaks through their contracted circle afresh, and acts every part, that the highest courage,
most raging fury, and blackest despair can prompt him to. But he is sure to be over-powered by
numbers, and after some time the fire affects his tender parts. -Then they pour over him a quantity of
cold water, and allow him a proper time of respite, till his spirits recover, and he is capable of
suffering new tortures. Then the like cruelties are repeated till he falls down, and happily becomes
insensible of pain. Now they scalp him, and dismember and carry off all the exterior branches of the
body, (pudendis non exceptis) in shameful, and savage triumph. This is the most favourable
treatment their devoted captives receive: it would be too shocking to humanity either to give, or
peruse, every particular of their conduct in such doleful tragedies -nothing can equal these scenes, but
those of the mericful Romish inquisition.' James Adair, A History of the American Indians, p. 264.
117
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would have struck a distinctly Rousseauian note. But in his next sentence. Robertson
sharply changed key with a discussion of savage cannibalism. Savages did not consume
their enemies from necessity, but to placate their lust for revenge. Yet this practice too
was tinged with some humanity. Warriors only ate respected enemies; women and
children were typically spared. Robertson had thus again gone some way towards
demystifying what seemed most horrible and unfathomable in savage behaviour."9
It was Robertson's intention to render savage society intelligible, not to render it
praiseworthy. Fundamental to Robertson's understanding of the savage and fundamental
to his justification of a modified version of Spanish practice was that savage society was
locked in time and place. The North American Indian was incapable of autonomously
sustainable development and was even, perhaps, in a state of decline. The population of
the Indians was declining as a result of incessant warfare and was in any case no match
for the armies ofmore developed nations. The Aztecs and Incas had easily over-run their
less developed neighbours, and were themselves easily over-run by the Spanish. The
worry was that the savage himself was locked into a cycle of violence, yet, as the events
120of Book III revealed, was most at risk from the violence of others. As discussed in the
introduction, the otherwise highly sympathetic Edmund Burke found Robertson's
handling of the character of the savage a little one sided, as would Dugald Stewart in his
biographical sketch of the historian. An otherwise friendly Monthly reviewer voiced a
similar reservation.
One omission in this enquiry into the state of the Americans we cannot help
taking notice of, and that is, a total silence concerning their eloquence and
their songs, which forms such an important article in the history of savage
nations. We are of opinion also that, upon the whole, he under-rates the
119
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savage character.121
As any reader of Ossian would have noticed immediately, Robertson's primitives hunted
and fought, but they did not sing.
Yet this truncated portrait of the savage character was necessary to Robertson's
purposes. Comprehension of the spectacular failure of savage society to maintain itself in
the face of Spanish aggression would not be aided by garnishing it with primitivist
romance. A society without a system of property and a developed agriculture lacked the
technology, discipline and subordination necessary to prevail against a regiment of
citizens. Lacking the capacity for jealousy and emulation, the spurs that had led to the
spread of improvement in Europe, they were incapable of learning from the Spanish. It
was this that allowed Robertson to argue that European intervention was essential to the
improvement of American civilisation and it was this that forced Robertson, in spite of
his hatred of slavery, to support the plans of the Brothers of St. Joseph to moderate, but
not eliminate, the practice of forced labour. The analysis of Book IV gave support to the
prudence of their notion that a prerequisite of Indian improvement was to treat them as
they were, not as one would wish them to be. And while this did not lessen the scale of
the evils the Spanish had inflicted on the Americans, it did go some way towards
suggesting how these crimes might have been part of God's plan. The most sordid
crimes, however, were yet to come.
Having thus performed an unprecedented exercise in enlightened jurisprudence to
delineate the principles from which the savage waged war, Robertson was in a position to
employ these insights in the two large set piece confrontations of Spanish conquest, the
conquests of the empires of Mexico and Peru. One would have expected an historical
121 The Monthly Review, Vol. 57 (August, 1777), p. 128.
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narration of these conquests to address head-on the issue that had long provided the crux
of debate over their significance for the legitimacy of Spanish empire, whether the wars
of Cortes and Pizarro were just wars and the possibility of the derivation of dominium
122from conquest. As has been discussed in terms of the relationship between Books III
and IV, Robertson rejected the Spanish notion that just war could be waged against the
Indians on grounds of their idolatry, or that those wars had been conducted in accordance
with the his gentium. Robertson had instead hinted that the traditionally British argument
for imperium based upon the promise of improvement provided a more secure basis for
the legitimacy of Spanish actions. Legitimacy thus rested upon prudent conduct, which
had not been the resource Spain had thus far chosen to mine in the Americas. Robertson
wanted to concentrate on the statesmanship of Cortes and Pizarro, which would be tested
most profoundly in dealing with a civilisation they could not understand. The conquest
narratives of Books V and VI continued the theme of the corruption of what had been an
inspiring moment in human history. For the spirit of enterprise had been corrupted by the
love of gold and the desire to convert pagans, a combination of superstition and
enthusiasm that had produced the most dreadful results. As Robertson was put it in the
conclusion of his narration of the conquest of Mexico: 'In almost every district of the
Mexican empire, the progress of the Spanish arms is marked with blood, and with deeds
123
so atrocious, as to disgrace the enterprising valour that conducted them to success.' It
remained to be seen whether Mexico and Peru were sufficiently underdeveloped to
sanction a Spanish imperium to improve them.
122 A. Pagden, Lords ofall the World, p. 93.
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Most of what Robertson wished to applaud in this part of the narrative was the
statesmanship of Cortes. Cortes, once a dissolute youth, had grown more confident and
prudent as his responsibilities had grown.124 As ever, for Robertson, it was a mark of a
man's greatness to be able to arouse fear and jealousy in his rivals, and this Cortes was
able to instil. The suspicion and hostilities of the governor of Cuba, Diego Velasquez,
nearly thwarted Cortes' mission before it began. Only Cortes' superior ability to
ingratiate himself with his own men, to appeal to their honour and their avarice, salvaged
his personal authority. In European terms, Cortes' forces were small in number, lightly
armed and without armour. But even so, Robertson pointed out, they had an easy and
rewarding early victory over the natives of an offshore island; one of the women captives
was to prove invaluable as a translator. In Book II, Robertson had emphasised the cultural
gulf that separated the Indians and the Spanish. Cortes and the Mexicans had found it
easier to understand each other, and Robertson was able to write of their dealings in terms
of a language of diplomacy as traditionally understood. Even so, cultural difference
continued to provide a constant source of misunderstandings that Robertson noted with
care. On their first encounter with the Spaniards, Mexican emissaries had offered their
trinkets in the hope that they would go away. The effect of these gift offerings was to
trigger Cortes' avarice and lead him to insist that he be given an audience with the Aztec
emperor in his remote capital. It was a diplomatic episode that led Robertson to
124 'The impetuosity of his temper, when he came to act with his equals, insensibly abated, by being kept
under restraint, an dmellowed into a cordial soldierly frankness. These qualities were accompanied
with calm prudence in concerting his schemes, with persevering vigour in executing thm, and with what
is peculiar to superior genius, the art of gaining the confidence and governing the minds of men.' Ibid.
vol. II, p. 235.
125 Ibid., vol. II, p. 247.
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marvel at the efficacy of the Mexican intelligence networks that made such rapid
communications with the capital possible, and exceeded that of Europe126
Robertson pointed out that Mexico needed such impressive resources and
described the organisation of Mexican government as one that resembled a great
monarchy. Mexico was vast in territorial scope and comparatively recently established.
Its ruler. Montezuma himself had all the attributes Europeans feared in an absolute
monarch:
Of all the princes who had swayed the Mexican sceptre, he was the most haughty,
the most violent, and the most impatient of control. His subjects looked up to him
with awe, and his enemies with terror. The former he governed with unexampled
rigour, but they were impressed with such an opinion of his capacity, as commanded
their respect; and, by many victories over the latter, he had spread far the dread of
his arms, and had added several considerable provinces to his dominions.127
For the other peoples of the mainland, like the Zempoallans, Montezuma was primarily
an object of fear; 'a tyrant, as the cazique told him with tears, haughty, cruel, and
suspicious; who treated his own subjects with arrogance, ruined the conquered provinces
by excessive exactions, and often tore their sons and daughters from them by
violence.'128 Hearing the groans of the Zempoallas, 'a ray of light and hope broke in
upon the mind of Cortes'. He realised that Montezuma would be loathed by these
peoples and persuaded them that he had come as their liberator. His policy was nearly
undermined by religious enthusiasm, however, when Cortes and his men stripped and
tore down local altars and statues. The Zempoallans would thenceforth view their
liberators with some suspicion.
126
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Cortes' also sought an alliance with the Tlascalans, a Spartan people possessing a
129
deep suspicion of strangers who greeted the Spaniards with drawn swords. Robertson
did not narrate the war, as 'no power of words can render the recital of a combat
interesting, where there is no equality of danger; and when the narrative closes with an
account of thousands slain on the one side, while not a single person falls on the other,
the most laboured description of the previous disposition of the troops, or of the various
130
vicissitudes in the engagement, command no attention.' Now that the reader had the
advantage of the philosophy of Book IV, narration of such conflict was no longer
necessary. Relations with this people followed the pattern established with the
Zempoallans, Cortes offering military alliance against the Mexicans in return for their
oath of loyalty to the Castilian crown. Again Cortes nearly wrecked the arrangement
through an imprudent display of zeal. A thoughtful cleric, Robertson was happy to note,
cautioned him against such an imprudent act against such a proud people and thus
preserved their alliance.131
The most salient feature of the eventual taking of the city of Mexico was the
striking ease with which it was accomplished. Robertson's narrative provided a number
of explanations for this. It was the nature of a despotic monarchy such as the Mexican's
to be loathed by is subject peoples who provided necessary intelligence at key moments
concerning Montezuma's intentions. More fundamentally, the superstition of the
129 'A fierce people, shut up within narrow precincts, and little accumstomed to any intercourse with
foreigners, is apt to consider every stranger as an enemy, and is easily excited to arms'. Ibid., vol. II,
p. 277.
130 Ibid., vol. II, p. 279.
131 'Amidst scenes, where a narrow-minded bigotry appears in such close union with oppression and
cruelty, sentiments so liberal and humane soothe the mind with unexpected pleasure; and at a time
when the rights of conscience were little understood in the Christian world, and the idea of toleration
unknown, one is astonished to find a Spanish monk of the sixteenth century among the first advocates
against persecution, and in behalf of religious liberty.' Ibid., vol. II, p. 288.
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Mexicans caused them to see the Spanish as divinities more formidable than the real
virtues of their superior technology and discipline actually rendered them. A savage
emperor, no matter how great, was incapable of true statecraft, and in this fundamental
sense, Montezuma was no match for the superior abilities of Cortes.
Robertson stressed the fact that the fall of Montezuma was almost achieved
without the loss of blood. Unable to understand the consequences of this or to seize the
opportunity to prevent it, the Emperor allowed himself to be captured and shackled. The
population would probably have submitted passively, were it not for another disastrous
act of policy motivated solely by superstition and enthusiasm, the destruction and looting
of Mexican holy places. Open hostilities with the Mexicans ensued, with predictably
132
bloody results, exacerbated by the Spanish contagion, small pox.
Robertson bestowed a stoical dignity on Montezuma, who acquiesced to his fate
'neither with the sullen fierceness of a barbarian, nor with the dejection of a supplicant.'
The importance of this moment was such that Robertson accorded him a dignity he
afforded to precious few of his characters, the power of speech. 'I have done', said he,
addressing himself to the Spanish general, 'what became a monarch. I have defended my
people to the last extremity. Nothing now remains but to die'.13j Unto the hour of his
death, Robertson's Montezuma had shown a true nobility of character.
But Robertson was careful not to sentimentalise the death of Montezuma and the
fall of Mexico. Considering the extent of his empire and the sophistication of the society
over which he ruled, Montezuma should have proven a truly formidable enemy. Yet
132 'This distemper, which raged at the time in New Spain with fatal malignity, was unknown in that quarter
of the globe, until it was introduced by the Europeans, and may be reckoned among the greatest
calamities brought upon them by their invaders.' Ibid., vol. II, p. 361.
133 Ibid., vol. II, p. 386.
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Montezuma's nobility was not that of a European; he remained a savage in the grip of the
very superstition that provided the base of his rule. Montezuma, the savage emperor was
overturned by the jealousy of neighbours who dreaded his power, and by the revolt of
subjects impatient to shake of its yoke.1 '4 This, together with advanced military
technology, disease and, above all, Cortes' skilful generalship had had more to do with
the conquest of Mexico than the supposed heroism of Spanish soldiers. It was not a
conclusion that modern Spaniards could be expected to find comfortable.135
Robertson now presented Cortes as a Mexican legislator, creating a New Spain as
flawed as the parent colony of Hispaniola. After he had rebuilt Tenochtetlan, his men
discovered a series ofmines, and it was on the basis of these discoveries that Cortes
established his plan for the settlement of Mexico. Robertson emphasised that settlement
was to be on the basis of grants of property in the form of Indians rather than land and he
noted that with the remaining provinces, the Spaniards had become increasingly
imperious in their treatment of the natives that stood in their way.136 As Robertson
commented,
fatally for the honour of their country, the Spaniards sullied the glory
redounding for these repeated victories by their mode of treating the
vanquished people. After taking Guatimazin, and becoming masters of his
capital, they supposed that the king of Castile entered on possession of all
the rights of the captive monarch, and affected to consider every effort of
the Mexicans to assert their own independence, as the rebellion of vassals
against their sovereign, or the mutiny of slaves against their master. Under
the sanction of those ill-founded maxims, they violated every right that
should be held sacred between hostile nations. After each insurrection,
they reduced the common people in the provinces which they subdued, to
134 Ibid., vol. II, p. 387.
135 'How much soever this account of the reduction of Mexico may detract, on the one hand, from the
marvelous relations of some Spanish writers, by ascribing that to simple and obvious causes which
they attribute to the romantic valour of their countrymen, it adds, on the other, to the merit and
abilities of Cortes, who, under every disadvantage, acquired such an ascendant over unknown nations,
as to render them instruments towards carrying his schemes to execution.' Ibid. vol. II, p. 388.
136 Ibid., p. 404.
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the most humiliating ofall conditions, that ofpersonal servitude.'"'7
As the Spanish considered all Indians subhuman, the Mexicans were naturally outside the
sphere of the ius gentium and their persons and possessions were ripe for destruction.
Therefore, all was permissible. The mass burnings were no crime of passion but a
calculated military decision against a people whose cultural integrity they simply did not
1 >8
acknowledge. "
Yet it was not Robertson's purpose to condemn too harshly. He was at pains to
point out that the treatment of Mexican labourers moderated over time, incorporating
139
'many useful and humane regulations for the preservation of the Indians.' He noted
that as the number of mines had increased and the problems of working them became
increasingly difficult, the Spaniards learned to value Indian labour more and treated the
workforce with greater humanity. Cortes' statesmanship had been far from perfect, but
had laid the foundations of an empire that had improved in time. He had died, Robertson
noted, as Columbus had died, ill-treated and under-appreciated by a court for which he
accomplished so much.
In turning to the conquest of Peru, Robertson had to confront the very different
personality of Pizarro. His character, Robertson thought, was due to a faulty upbringing;
'he had been so totally neglected in his youth by the author of his birth, that it seems to
have destined him never to rise beyond the condition of his mother.'140 As a result he had
grown up to be a character nearly devoid of positive qualities. Pizarro's true education
occurred at Hispaniola, where he was inculcated in the superstition of gold and the
137 Ibid., vol. II, p. 403.
138 Ibid., vol. II, p. 404.
139 Ibid., vol. II, p. 406.
140 The History ofAmerica, vol. Ill, p. 3.
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viability of Indian slavery. The conquest of Peru itself was. as Raynal had seen, a blend
of religious enthusiasm and imperial excess. In a passage worthy of Voltaire, Robertson
described how Pizarro's chaplain 'celebrated mass, divided a consecrated host into three,
and reserving one part to himself, gave the other two to his associates, of which they
partook; and thus, in the name of the Prince of Peace, ratified a contract of which plunder
and bloodshed were the objects.'141 Pizarro's men were portrayed as a gang of
adventurers and not a disciplined force, sharing the vices and lacking the virtues of
Cortes men. It was no small part of their crimes that they destroyed a civilisation that
was far more advanced than any other in the New World. Robertson portrayed an
organised, ingenious people with a system of husbandry, where animals had been
domesticated and metal tools were used and where there was evidence of refinement that
surpassed that to be found in Europe.142
Like the Aztec empire, the Incan empire showed signs of corruption, but not of a
sort to arouse the indignation of a European observer. Incan civil society was still
essentially functional and capable of improvement.14. Indeed, its empire was run on a
principle that any Whig could approve. 'It was not the rage of conquest, if we may
believe the accounts of their countrymen, that prompted the Incas to extend their
dominion, but the desire of diffusing the blessings of civilization, and the knowledge of
the arts which they possessed, among the barbarous people whom they reduced.'144
141
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143 Monco Capac and Mama Orollo, for such were the names of the extraordinary personages, having thus
collected some wandering tribes, formed that social union, which, by multiplying the desires, and




The contrast between Inca and Spaniard could not have been more pronounced. In
their hunger for gold 'the Spaniards pursued them towards every quarter, and with
deliberate and unrelenting barbarity continued to slaughter wretched fugitives, who never
once offered to resist.'143 Their suhjection of a province complete. Pizarro's men divided
their treasure as pirates graced by the Almighty to loot and destroy.146
Robertson's indignation rose to fever pitch on the murder of the Inca; he
characterised the incident as 'the most criminal and atrocious that stains the Spanish
name, amidst all the deeds of violence committed in carrying on the conquest of the New
World'.147 For him, the incident was the most complete example of the role reversal
between civilised and barbarian that the conquest of America had to offer. The Inca was
a person of sensibility, fully able to respond sympathetically to Pizarro and to penetrate
his thoughts. But efforts hit up against a brick wall. Pizarro, consumed with resentment,
was incapable of the slightest feeling of pity.148 Even his own men were horrified and
implored him not to execute the Inca. Their own protests were ineffectual, but Robertson
was careful to note them, remarking that history 'records even the most unsuccessful
exertions of virtue with applause'.149 Once again Robertson carefully noted the effect of
the execution of a ruler on a society whose organisation was entirely dependent on his
will. Wild anarchy resulted from seeing the Inca in chains. From their perspective, the
145 Ibid., vol. HI, p. 37.
146 'The festival of St James, the patron saint of Spain, was the day chosen for the partition of this
enormous sum, and the manner of conducting it strongly marks that strange alliance of fanaticism with
avarice, which I have more than once had occasion to point out as a striking feature in the character of
the consequences of the New World. Though assembled to divide the spoils of an innocent people,
procured by deceit, extortion, and cruelty, the transaction began with a solemn invocation to the name
of God, as if they could have expected the guidance of heaven in distributing those wages of iniquity'.
Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 40.
147 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 43.
148
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Incas had lost not only their king but also their God. Religion being the driving force of
their culture, and outrage at the murderous blasphemy of the Spanish proved the turning
point in terms of collective psychology. The Incas now secretly prepared a concerted
national effort to expel the Spanish.
In telling the history of the conquest of Peru, Robertson's interest was less in
rehearsing a grim story of genocide, than in emphasising that these were events
perpetrated by thugs who were beyond the control of the Spanish court. Ferdinand and
Charles V had been preoccupied with European affairs and Charles had been horrified to
learn of what had transpired.150 These were hardly conditions in which successful
colonisation was possible. These adventurers were motivated by greed, and the logic of
their greed was genocide. 151 As Robertson pointed out, the irony of this was that this
greed could only be satisfied with an effective labour force. With Charles' express
approval, prudent men such as Mendiza and Sandoval put in place legislation to promote
humane working conditions for the natives.
Events did not allow Robertson to end on this relatively conciliatory note. The
civil unrest that was perhaps inevitable in a colony so ill-founded provided the
philosophical historian with a display of 'such an uncommon state ofmanners, as to merit
particular attention.' The Spanish had succeeded in reproducing in America the rapine
150 'It is manifest from all the events recorded in the history of America, that rapid and extensive as the
Spanish conquests had been, they were not carried on by any regular exertion of national force, but by
the occasional efforts of private adventurers. After fitting out a few of the first armaments for
discovering new regions, the court of Spain, during the busy reigns of Ferdinand and Charles V., the
former the most intriguing prince of the age,, and the latter the most ambitious, was encumbered with
such a multiplicity of scemes, and involved in war with so many nations of Europe, that it had not
leasure to attend to distant and less interesting objects'. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 98.
151 'The rude conquerors of America, incapable of forming their establishments upon any general or
extensive plan of policy, attentive only to private interest, unwilling to forego present gain from the
prospect of remote or public beneift, seem to have had to object but to amass sudden wealth, without
regarding what might be the consequences of the means by which they acquired it'. Ibid, vol. Ill, p. 99.
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and turmoil experienced in Europe after the fall of Rome from which the feudal military
monarchies had developed. 'Every adventurer in Peru considered himself a conqueror.'
Robertson explained, and. like the warriors of the early feudal age he was valued by
himself and by those who followed him for his success on the battlefield. As modern
Spaniards assumed the role of their feudal ancestors, so their minds regressed to the
values of that more barbarous form of civilisation. 'Amidst the disorder and turbulence
which accompanied this total dissolution of the frame of government,' Robertson
remarked ruefully, 'the minds of men, set loose from the ordinary restraints of law and
authority, acted with such capricious irregularity that events no less extraordinary than
1 S"?
unexpected followed in a rapid succession.' Robertson's language to describe this
dissolution of the ties of obligation employed the insights of Scottish social theory to
produce a newly enriched description of corruption.
Such a rapid change of fortune produced its natural effects. It gave birth to new
wants, and new desires. Veterans, long accustomed to hardship and toil, acquired
of a sudden a taste for profuse and inconsiderate dissipation, and indulged in all
the excesses ofmilitary licentiousness. The riot of low debauchery occupied some;
a relish for expensive luxuries spread among others. The meanest soldier in Peru
would have thought himself degraded by marching on foot.153
This did not mean that the Spanish were no longer capable of their old valour on the field,
but such bursts of vigour were short-lived, and there was no true glory to be found in
them. Spanish corruption had progressed to such a point that all sense of shame was lost.
Not only had the Spaniard regressed to the point at which his capacity for sympathy and
moral exchange became impossible, but 'during their dissentions, there was hardly a
Spaniard in Peru who did not abandon the party which he had originally espoused, betray
the associates with whom he had united, and violate the engagements under which he had
152 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 116.
153 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 140.
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come." 154 There was no honour even among thieves; mutual faith and trust had collapsed
under the weight of unleashed animal appetites. As discussed in chapter four, Hume had
found late sixteenth-century France in the height of religiously inspired civil war to have
experienced a similar dissolution of society. Robertson was unlikely to have felt
comfortable with Hume's reading of that chapter of history, and spent a considerable
portion of his Charles V undermining the premises of Hume's analysis, but the two did
share a horrified fascination in the mechanism of such dissolution.
Instances of such general and avowed contempt for the principles and obligations
which attach man to man, and bind them togather in social union, rarely occur in
history. It is only where men are far removed from the seat of government, where
the restraints of law and order are little felt, where the prospect of gain is unbounded,
and where immense wealth may cover the crimes by which it is required, that we can
find any parallel to the levity, the rapaciousness, the perfidy and corruption prevalent
among the Spaniards in Peru.155
That men flourish when subordinated to law was a point Robertson had made often
enough over the course of his narrative. Only at this point, however, did he make plain
just how urgently man's social passions required the discipline of regular government. A
headily destructive concoction of antisocial passions had conspired to precipitate this
dissolution of society. 'Vanity, avarice, emulation, envy, shame, rage, and all the other
passions which most vehemently agitate the minds of men when both their honour and
their interest are deeply affected,' Robertson advanced, 'conspired in adding to its
violence.'156
The grim spectacle of dissolution ended the narration of events of The History of
America. Robertson did not enter into a detailed retelling of them; it was enough to have
revealed their internal logic. To have ended his work there would have rendered the
154 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 142.
155 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 143.
156 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 145.
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narrative one of bitter tragedy, a tale of how immoderate enterprise fell prey to avarice
and barbarism. But Robertson did not consider his work a bitter tragedy, and did not end
his work with the collapse of Spanish civility. It bears pointing out in this context that
lengthy sections on British America would have followed, but that these were ultimately
omitted for reasons to be explored below. In the version eventually published, two
weighty analytical books did follow, the first on the manners of the Mexicans and the
Peruvians, the second an overview of that Spanish colonial policy emulated by the other
states of Europe. The purpose of the first of these books was to show why Mexican and
Peruvian methods of conducting war left them so defenceless against the Spanish, the
purpose of the second to encourage the difficult project of Spanish renewal.
Book VII stands in the same relation to Books V and VI as Book IV had to book
III; namely a retreat from narrative into science to explain how the nature of the savage
mind left it ripe for easy conquest by men who were by no means their betters. Book VII
was a briefer excursion into science than book IV had been, for the simple reason that
Book VII presupposed its more general analysis of the savage mind and savage warfare.
The specific task Robertson set himself in this book was to establish that despite the
many and various advances of the civilisations of these two great empires, their method
of war revealed them to be essentially unimproved. As the wars of Cortes could only
with difficulty and the wars of Pizarro could not at all be described in terms of the
European ius gentium as just, the legitimacy of the colonies the Spanish crown had
planted in the New World rested upon an analysis of the arrested development of
157Mexican and Peruvian society.
157 'But if the comparison be made with the people of the ancient continent, the inferiority of America in
improvement will be conspicuous, and neither the Mexicans nor Peruvians will be entitled to rank with
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The nature of the conduct of war collapsed any distinctions between savages
across the Americas that their unequal development in other areas might suggest. 'Like
the rude tribes around them', Robertson explained, 'the Mexicans were incessantly
engaged in war, and the motives which prompted them to hostility seem to have been the
same. They fought, in order to gratify their vengeance, by shedding the blood of their
ico
enemies'. For Robertson this was the key to understanding Mexican culture:
In proportion as mankind combine in social union, and live under the influence
of equal laws and regular policy, their manners soften, sentiments of humanity arise,
and the rights of the species come to be understood. The fierceness of war abates,
and even while engaged in hostility, men remember what they owe one to another.
The savage fights to destroy, the citizen to conquer. The former neither pities nor
spares, the latter has acquired sensibility which tempers his rage. To this sensibility
the Mexicans seem to have been perfect strangers, and among them war was carried
on with so much barbarity, that we cannot but suspect their degree of civilization to
have been highly imperfect.159
Robertson can be seen here to have turned Ferguson's paradigm against itself. Robertson
again followed his friend in holding that war rather than property was indeed built into
the telos of any stadial theory, but in doing so sought to reclarify waters Ferguson had
wished to muddy. For Ferguson, the savage self possessed a rounded integrity of
character that for the specialised modern military man was but a distant memory. The
savage method of war might seem perplexing to civilised man, but it had no less honour
and integrity in its own right. For Ferguson, savage man was fully socialised after his
own fashion, while for Robertson he remained an imperfectly socialised individual partly
inhabiting a Hobbesian realm.
those nations which merit the name civilized'. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 152.
158 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 183.
159 Ibid., p. 184.
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The paradox of the Aztecs was that these imperfectly socialised beings were
subjects of a powerful military monarchy whose organisation bore an uncanny
resemblance to that of early feudal Europe.160 Under the Smithian model of development
often taken to be orthodox among the Scottish literati, Aztec society should thus not be
classified as savage. Savage society, subsisting on hunting or fishing, did not yield the
rigid division between meum and tuum that government was instituted to protect. Yet
Smith's model was at all times tied to the teleology of the internalisation of property
rights, a model to which Robertson did not feel entirely beholden. Robertson was explicit
that under the empire of the Aztecs, private property 'was perfectly understood, and
established in its full extent.' However, although land was held to be entirely alienable,
in practice most land was held in common.
Robertson was convinced that Cortes and the other Spanish had grossly
overestimated the size ofMexican cities. However, he did admit that life in these cities
was highly complex, and that a division of labour had taken place.161 A reasonably
advanced state of commerce existed within these cities, both a product of and productive
of a 'persevering and inventive' urban class. However, in contrast to the European
developmental model, industrious urbanised life in Mexico was no catalyst for the liberty
of the individual. The countryside was in an even more depressed state, resembling the
160 'The Mexicans, long after they were established in their new possessions, continued, like other martial
tribes in America, unacquainted with regal dominion, and were governed in peace, and conducted in
war, by such as were entitled to prominence by their wisdom or their valour. But among them, as in
other states whose power and territories became extensive, the supreme authority centred at last on a
single person; and when the Spaniards under Cortes invaded the country, Montezuma was the ninth
monarch in order who had swayed the Mexican sceptre, not by hereditary right, but by election'. Ibid.,
vol. Ill, p. 159.
161' In proportion as refinement spreads, the distinction of professions increases, and they branch out into
more numerous and minute subdivisions. Among the Mexicans, this separation of the arts necessary in
life had taken place to a considerable extent'. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 164.
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land-tied peasantry of Eastern Europe.16- Even more wretched than these Mexican serfs
was the slave class, the killing of one not counted a criminal offence under Mexican
jurisprudence. Unsurprisingly for a society with such a rigid distinction of ranks, forms
of social deference were ingrained into every aspect of human interaction, and permeated
through Mexican language. Such a society, in Robertson's view, was perfectly prepared
to suffer the yoke of despotism.
This despotism was of surprisingly recent origin. Previously, Mexican monarchy
had been elective, with the approval of the nobility requisite in any declaration of war.
The astute Machiavel in Cortes had intuited the nature of this lingering resentment, and
played nobility against monarchy in his successful conquest. The despotism of the
Mexican monarchy went some way towards rationalising its conquest as a just war and
thus providing the Spanish empire with a modicum of legitimacy. Robertson prudently
implied rather than declaimed this last point; it was only a partial mitigation of the crimes
of the Spanish that the Mexican people had passed from one despotism to another.
The level of Spanish guilt vis a vis the Incas was considerately higher; Pizarro
could not be held, even in retrospect, to have been a liberator. This had as much to do
with the structure of Incan society as with the criminality of the Spanish adventurers. In
Robertson's analysis, the Incas did not conform to the pattern established by the
Mexicans. Incan society presented a greater puzzle, a gentle and in many respects a
refined civilisation that nonetheless lacked an indigenous motor for its own improvement.
Mexican civilisation had been revealed as fundamentally and distastefully savage through
162 'The great body of the people was in a most humiliating state. A considerable number, known by the
name of Marizeques, nearly resembling in condition those peasants who, during the prevalence of the
feudal system, as instruments of labour attached to the soil. The Marizeques could not change their
place of residence without permission of the superior on whom they depended'. Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 165.
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its manner of waging war. The Incas however did not wage war like savages should.
'They fought not,' Robertson explained.
like savages, to destroy and exterminate, like the Mexicans, to glut
blood-thirsty divinities with human sacrifices. They conquered, in
order to reclaim and civilize the vanquished and to diffuse the
knowledge of their own institutions and arts. The Incas took the
people whom they subdued under their protection, and admitted
them to a participation of all the advantages enjoyed by their
original subjects. This practice, so repugnant to American ferocity,
and resembling the humanity of the most polished nations, must be
ascribed, like other peculiarities which we have observed in the
Peruvian manners, to the genius of their religion.163
The Incans, when they did fight, fought to conquer, but it was questionable for Robertson
whether this meant that they could truly be described as citizens. The mildness of Incan
religion, not collective vigour or a more precocious sense of justice based upon secure
property rights, provided the explanation for their curious approximation of civility. This
was not an entirely incongruous assertion for a cleric who held that the progress of
Christianity was chiefly responsible for Europe's present state of civility. Robertson
insisted that, unlike the Mexicans, the Incas did not understand private property in the
European sense. Families enjoyed annual use rights in allotments granted according to
rank. The social consequences of this retrograde land tenure were entirely beneficial.
'By this singular distribution of territory,' Robertson explained,
as well as by the mode of cultivating it, the idea of a common interest,
and ofmutual subserviency, was continually inculcated. Each
individual felt his connection with those around him, and knew that he
depended on their friendly aid to increase what he was to reap. A state
thus constituted may be considered as one great family, in which the union
of the members was so complete, and the exchange of good offices so perceptible,
as to create stronger attachment, and to bind man into closer intercourse, than
subsisted under any form of society established in America.154
163 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 209.
164 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 210.
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This was language reminiscent of More's Utopia, and the second time Robertson had
used it to commend a form of communism that seemed to emulate the practice of the
Church fathers. The first had been in his treatment of the Jesuits in Charles V, where the
Society of Jesus had been lauded for establishing a pattern of rule on the basis of a
similar system of property, drawn directly from the example of the Paraguayans. But
what had seemed within the context of Charles V a conciliatory gesture to a form of
religious organisation whose time had past now emerged as a more practical lesson in the
art of imperial governance. The Jesuits had understood the nature of Indian society and
had modelled their rule accordingly. Robertson was particularly impressed by the fact
that in both Indian and Jesuit society the sense of each individual working toward the
common good was so entrenched that even the children of the emperor and the most
senior members of the Society of Jesus employed their own labour in agriculture.165
There was a tension in Robertson's discussion of the Incans. At times he was keen
to emphasise the close social connectedness of this society, at other times to emphasise
how their relative unworldliness was due to the very limitations of that social
connectedness. He was condescending concerning their low level of artistic
achievement, which he attributed to the fact that such a simple society produced few
wants and did not specialise sufficiently to produce an independent class of artisans.166
More germane were the political deficiencies of Incan society. However admirable they
might have been as a people, the Incan empire itself was lacking in riches and military
165 Ibid., vol. HI, p. 214.
166 'I have reason to believe that the workmanship is more to be admired on account of the rude tools with
which it was executed, than on account of its intrinsic neatness and elegence; and that the Peruvians,
though the most improved of al the Americans, were not advanced beyond the infancy of arts'. Ibid.,
vol. Ill, p. 223.
313
power, a fact Robertson attributed to their low level of commercial development.
Reiterating an argument from his View concerning the relationship between urbanisation
and the growth of commerce, Robertson wrote:
The activity of commerce is coeval with the foundation of cities; and from the
moment that the members of any community settle in considerable numbers
in one place, its operations become vigourous. The citizen must depend for
subsistance on the labour of those who cultivate the ground. .. .There was hardly
any species of commerce carried on between different provinces, and the community
was less acquainted with that active intercourse, which is at once a bond of union,
and an incentive to improvement.'167
The salient deficiency of Incan society was that it utterly lacked martial vigour.
Robertson seemed reticent to ascribe this to any one particular cause. Perhaps it lay in its
constitution; perhaps in its enervating climate. 'Whatever may have been the cause,'
Robertson insisted, 'the fact is certain, and there is not an instance in history of any
people so little advanced in refinement, so totally destitute of military enterprise.'168 The
logic of Robertson's explanation led to the sad conclusion that Incan society was a
delicate flower that could not have been expected to survive long in the wild. Its fall was
not only inevitable but also willed by providence.
161 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 225.
168 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 226.
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Part IV: British America
If the Spanish sections of The History ofAmerica have understandably attracted a
disproportionate degree of attention, the sections on British America have equally
understandably attracted far less. These sections seem incomplete and were not
published in the historian's lifetime. Yet the balance of probabilities lie in favour of the
notion that Robertson wished for the eventual publication of his two books on British
America. It would certainly have been in his power to destroy the manuscripts had he
wished to do so; he had done as much with the remainder of his drafts and working
papers. By the time of his death, Robertson had sat on the manuscript for over fifteen
years. With an eye toward posterity, had the historian taken the opportunity to revise or
alter his text in the light of unfolding events? The question remains unanswerable. The
modern commentator is left with little more than the remaining text itself. The following
discussion works on the assumption that Robertson was unlikely to have made substantial
alterations in his text. First, the historian's health was shattered by the pressure of
rendering the Spanish sections of his history ready for publication, and it was several
years before he was able to return to any sort of composition. By the time his health and
mental energies had partly returned, other projects occupied his attention, namely the
aborted completion of Hume's History ofEngland down to the reign of Queen Anne, his
substantially altered eleventh edition of The History ofScotland, and his final work on
India. If this is correct, than the sections on British America would have been completed
before the problematic valedictory book VIII of the published text, which provided an
overview and critique of European colonial practice. The two volumes on the settlement
of colonies in British North America were unique in Robertson's oeuvre in dealing
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primarily with the politically and religiously tumultuous seventeenth century, a period the
historian had previously sought to introduce at a safe chronological distance. The history
of British America is of additional interest in view of the light it cast on the great history
of England he never wrote. But what matters in the present context, is the light this text
throws on Robertson's views about the history of Empire in America. One might have
thought that Robertson's original strategy in combining the narration of Spanish and
British settlement would have been to sharply contrast the brutality of Spanish conquest
and the folly of a policy that amounted to little more than lust for gold and souls for their
own sake with a glowing providential narrative of patient industry prudently pursued.
Such a theme would have been in keeping with the mainstream Whiggery of the day, but
this was not Robertson's theme. Robertson, following Raynal, understood a common
system of policy informing the various European empires, and understood their histories
as fundamentally entwined. Robertson was to portray English - not yet British - settlers
as encountering the same problems as had the Spanish, principally those of ordering a
body politic far from the seat of government and of the catastrophic results of engaging
with a society utterly beyond their comprehension.
Before Robertson could address his principal themes of the problems Englishmen
would encounter in the New World, he had briefly to address the jealousy of state policy
and the history of religious enthusiasm that brought them there. Chronologically, Book
IX began with the European repercussions of the events of Books I through III. News of
the exploits and discoveries of Columbus rapidly spread to universal wonder. 'But in
England it did something more;' Robertson noted; 'it excited a vehement desire of
emulating the glory of Spain, and of aiming to obtain some share in those advantages
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which were expected in this new field open to national activity'.169 Yet England was
agonisingly slow in realising its own latent capacity for purposeful, self-interested action.
Much of the early sections of book nine described why, as a result of this, English
colonisation began in such a halting, uncertain fashion. Robertson repeated the narration
of 'technical retardation' Karen O'Brien has described as forming much of the content of
Book I, but with the gloss of a jab at stubborn English isolation. 'During the course of
two centuries, while industry and commerce were making gradual progress, both in the
south and north of Europe,' Robertson maintained, 'the English continued so blind to the
advantages of their own situation, that they hardly began to bend their thoughts towards
those objects and pursuits to which they are indebted for their present opulence and
power.'170 Yet the spirit of commerce did eventually direct the English commercial class
towards a realisation that their interest was greatly augmented through the discovery of
distant new markets, as woollen merchants found a ready market for their wares in the
Middle East.
Robertson found it puzzling that the normally jealous Henry VIII was not more
interested in the glory of overseas empire, particularly as the break with Rome meant that
there would have been no legal obstacle to claiming the lands Alexander VI divided
between Spain and Portugal. However, Henry was sufficiently preoccupied with his
169
Robertson, The History ofAmerica, vol. IV, in Works, p. 1.
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Robertson's tone was here particularly scathing, almost actively bating his English readers. ' While the
trading vessels in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, as well as those of the Hans Towns, visited the remote
ports of Europe, and carried on an active intercourse with its various nations, the English did little more
than creep along their own coasts, in small barks, which conveyed the productions of one country to
another. Their commerce was almost wholly passive. Their wants were supplied by strangers; and
whatever necessary of luxury of life their own country did not yield, was imported in foreign bottoms.
The cross of St. George was seldom displayed beyond the narrow seas.' Ibid., vol. IV, p. 3.
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unsuccessful attempts to triangulate between Charles and Francis, as well as his tussle
with Rome, that he never paid the issue of overseas exploration sufficient attention.
Successful merchant adventures to Moscow had the effect of inspiring the emulation of
other merchants. Robertson celebrated the nascent commercial zeal of the enterprising
English. 'As soon as the activity of the nation was put into motion, it took various
directions, and exerted itself in each with that steady, persevering industry which is the
soul and guide of commerce.' It was with Elizabeth, however, that English heroic
commerce and exploration truly began. During her long and prosperous reign, in which
'attentive economy, which exempted her subjects from the burthen of taxes oppressive to
trade,' England began to realise her true interest. Invoking the theme of his Charles V,
Robertson emphasised that fear of universal monarchy and the promise of thwarting
Spain at sea introduced the notion of founding colonies.171
For Robertson the impetus to settle New England was religion alone. This led
Robertson into an uncharacteristically detailed discussion of the political repercussions of
seventeenth-century Protestant sectarianism. He introduced a typology of reformation
based squarely on divergent views of church government; the minister naturally never
conceded that there might have been any substantive theological distinctions between
them. He spoke of two types of reformation, one in opposition to the state and the other
carried out with its active connivance. Calvinism was the model form of the first, where
the model of ecclesiastical governance was chosen in no small part for its very
'repugnancy to those of the Popish church.' The Church of England was representative
of the second, and did not involve such a radical rupture with past Roman practice.
Unfortunately for civil peace, both models of reformation occurred simultaneously in
171 Ibid.,sol IV, pp. 31-32.
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England, and their irreconcilability directly led to settlement in the New World. The
historian of Scotland retained some of his antipathy to Elizabeth. In a disdainful footnote
he remarked upon the Queen's insistence on her own superior skill in theology, as well as
172the haughty tone in which she dictated to others what they ought to believe. Yet, as
ever, Robertson felt the need to qualify his judgment as it applied to her, and the subject
of persecution generally. An age in which religion had become the principal reason of
state was not one that was practically or psychologically disposed toward modern notions
of toleration.
To the disgrace of Christians, the sacred rights of conscience and private
judgment, as well as the charity and mutual forbearance suitable to the
mild spirit of the religion which they professed, were in that age little
understood. Not only the idea of toleration, but even the word itself
in the sense now affixed to it, was then unknown. Every church claimed
a right to employ the hand of power for the protection of truth and the
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extirpation of error.
'But persecution, as usually happens, instead of extinguishing, inflamed their zeal to
such a height, that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law was deemed insufficient
to suppress it, and a new tribunal was established under the title of the high commission
for ecclesiastical affairs, whose powers and mode of procedure were hardly less odious
or less hostile to the principles of justice than those of the Spanish inquisition.'174 Yet it is
clear that Robertson held little more sympathy for motivations of the puritan settlers than
he had for the Spanish, dubbing their motivation as 'the levelling genius of fanaticism.'
The 'wild notions' of the Puritans caused them to reject 'various judicatories,
descending from one another in regular subordination'.175 They in fact landed in Cape
Cod, a region entirely outwith the jurisdiction of the Virginia company. Robertson
172 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 172.
173 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 175-6.
174 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 178.
175 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 179.
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levelled a discernibly Humean critique of the Utopian polity the puritans established.
Puritan notions of civil polity were founded on the 'wild notion' that scripture contained
within it a workable system of secular politics. The settlers, relying on a literal reading of
the Acts of the Apostles, had emulated their practice of holding property in common.
While Robertson extolled the benefits of this practice among unimproved people, for
English citizens this agrarian law was 'too refined to be capable of being accommodated
to the affairs of men.'176 The settlers were portrayed as being even more intolerant and
exclusionary than the court of Elizabeth itself. Only accepted members of the religious
community enjoyed any rights of citizenship. The degree of social control exercised by
the clergy could only be described as priestcraft at its most pernicious. Ministers
'exercised a discretionary judgment' so 'all men paid court' to them, hypocritically
'assuming those austere and sanctimonious manners which were known to be the most
177
certain recommendation to their favour.'
Two contradictory forces rendered the history of the settler community in New
England paradoxical; the natural tendency of constitutions to become more regular with
the passing of time, and the fact that the constitution of Virginia was built on and
encouraged the fanaticism at its root. 'The colony must henceforth be considered,'
Robertson insisted, 'not as a corporation whose powers were defined, and its mode of
procedure regulated by its charter, but as a society, which, having acquired or assumed
political liberty, had, by its own voluntary deed, adopted a constitution or government
11 o
framed on the model of that of England.' In escaping the clutch of exclusive
companies, British settlement in New England thus crucially avoided one of the principal
176 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 189.
177 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 210.
178 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 213-214.
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defects that had brought about the corruption of both Portuguese and Spanish settlements.
Only now was there any possibility of escaping the spirit of monopoly that served as such
a stranglehold over previous operations. Yet. Robertson regretfully pointed out that
twenty years of hardship had done little to recommend the folly of those very monopoly
rights to European based corporations. It is noticeable and worthy of comment that
Robertson displayed a striking lack of concern for the fact that English settlements
trampled upon the property rights of other Europeans. 'The Dutch, recently settled in
179
America, and too feeble to engage in a war, peaceably withdrew from Connecticut.'
The war between the New England settlers and the Pequods repeated the trope of
the wars between the Spanish and the natives of south. War between peoples had a
disturbing tendency to confound stereotypes, and often served to corrupt the better
aspects of both sides. It had not always been so among the English settlers. Robertson,
following his sources, was at pains to point out the relatively lawful behaviour of the
settlers regarding the indigenous population and their property rights. 'The tribes of
Indians around Massachusetts Bay were feeble and unwarlike; yet from regard to justice,
as well as motives of prudence,' Robertson maintained, 'the first colonists were studious
to obtain the consent of the natives before they ventured to occupy any of their lands; and
though in such transactions the consideration given was often very inadequate to the
value of the territory acquired, it was sufficient to satisfy the demands of the
proprietors.'180
The Pequods were a formidable people, who could bring into the field a thousand
warriors, not inferior in courage to any in the New World. They foresaw, not only
that the extermination of the Indian race must be the consequence of permitting the
English to spread over the continent of America, but that if measures were not
119 Ibid., vol. IV, p. 224.
180 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 228-229.
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speedily concerted to prevent it, the calamity would be unavoidable.181
The Pequods made war in the usual manner of the savage, 'they surprised stragglers, and
182
scalped them; they plundered and burnt remote settlements. The colonies then
combined to make war upon this tribe, with tragic results. 'In less than three months the
tribe of Pequods was extirpated: a few miserable fugitives who took refuge among the
neighbouring Indians, being incorporated by them, lost their name as a distinct people.'
The proximate cause of this minor genocide was the failure of the English to recognise
that the Indians had rights as free people. Instead, the English went the way of the
Spanish, and in emulating the savage state, far outdid the savagery of those they sought to
emulate. 'Instead of treating the Pequods as an independent people, who made a gallant
effort to defend the property, the rights, and the freedom of their nation, they retaliated
upon them all the barbarities of American war. Some they massacred in cold blood,
others they gave up to be tortured by their Indian allies, a considerable number they sold
as slaves in Bermudas, the rest were reduced to servitude among themselves.'183
Robertson's narrative terminated with events of the mid seventeenth century. Upon his
conquest of Jamaica - an issue upon which Robertson did not otherwise comment -
Cromwell entertained the project of transporting the population of New England there to
serve as a vanguard settlement in a contested region. That the settlers had the presence of
mind and the prudence to reject Cromwell's overture gave grounds for some hope for the
future.
While one cannot be at all certain whether additional unwritten sections on British
America would have substantially altered the character of Robertson's narrative, certain
181 7te7., vol. IV, p. 229.
Ibid., vol. IV, p. 231.
183 Ibid., vol. IV, pp. 234-235.
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tentative conclusions can be made. He would surely have argued that settlements made
for reasons that might make an enlightened commentator blush would be gradually
refined as industry and civility progressed. The constitution of British America would
develop and improve in tandem with the soil. The corruption of manners of the settlers
as well as their spirit of independence would eventually be mitigated by the increasingly
enlightened policy of the metropole. The rule of law would better regulate relations
between the English colonists and the Indians, thus paving the way for a more mutually
advantageous commerce to exist between them. The prudent policies of an enlightened
Spain and an enlightened Britain would naturally come to resemble each other far more
closely than the sharp cliched dichotomy between the empire 'protestant, maritime,
commercial, and free' and that of the leyenda negra of vulgar and sectarian opinion
would lead one to believe. It was possible to envision a future in which the wars of
religion and jealousy of trade would no longer be played out across the globe.
Unfortunately, events intruded, and one of the more irksome was to be beaten to
the publisher on a second occasion, but this time rather closer to home. Adam Smith had
not originally intended to include anything so topical as the present colonial policy, but
the wrangling among London politicians convinced him of the utility of entering in. Not
all thought the decision wise; Hugh Blair commented that dedicating so much space to a
temporarily topical issue would likely date the book rather quickly, and likely prove the
good doctor wrong in the process. Blair would have also have known all too well that
Smith's text threw something of a spanner in the works of Robertson's own imperial
project. The Wealth ofNations was altogether too brilliant and too relevant to possibly
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ignore, yet the work raised a number of awkward questions concerning the sustainability
of commercial empire of the sort to which Robertson gave his qualified endorsement.
Smith devoted considerable space to a discussion of colonies, emphasising both
their economic and strategic importance, or rather, their conspicuous lack thereof. In
keeping with the mainstream of enlightened critique, Smith held all European colonial
policy entirely informed by the spirit of the mercantile system and jealousy of trade.
Colonies were, at root, a means by which the metropole could secure a favourable
balance of trade vis a vis other metropoles. The acts of navigation, by restricting colonial
exports, and providing materials, such as pig iron useful for armaments, had fulfilled their
controlling and belligerent intent.
Smith found the original impetus to form colonies in modern Europe somewhat
obscure. It was not merely a land grab on behalf of the less well off, as had been the case
of ancient Rome. The explanation Smith provided bore some similarity to Robertson's;
the historian may well have altered his Book I to accommodate it, although, as has been
mentioned, the form of much of that book owed a great deal to the example of
Montesquieu. For an explanation Smith singled out the example of Venice. Venetian
success aroused the jealousy of the Portuguese, and provided the strategic impetus behind
the backing of Vasco de Gamma. Smith was less interested than Robertson had been in
how the Portuguese constitution enabled Portuguese discovery.
What Columbus found could not have been more disappointing; instead of the
rich markets of the east, he stumbled upon 'a country quite covered with wood,
184
uncultivated, and inhabited only by some tribes of naked and miserable savages.'
184 A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations, (Indianapolis, 1981) vol. II,
p. 559.
Columbus was unimpressed by the natural productions of the land he found, with a single
exception: gold. The conversion of souls was merely a pretext for the refinement of
minerals. All subsequent Spanish colonisation proceeded from this motive. It was a
disastrous choice. 'It is perhaps the most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or the one
in which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least proportion to the loss of
185those who draw blanks.' Mines, in short, offered no stable return for investment.
Smith went so far as to claim that, at the present moment, there existed no mines in
Spanish America worth anyone's bother. This was the wisdom of posterity, Smith
recognised. Other European powers chose the path of Spain, and sailed west in search of
an El Dorado to call their own.
For Smith, the American colonies enjoyed the tremendous advantage of a
population that had inherited subordination and agriculture, without the disadvantage of
the legal detritus of the feudal past, such as unnaturally high rents and entails. The
American colonies additionally enjoyed free trade within the internal market of the
Empire. The overall effect of present policy was the effective encouragement of
agriculture, which was more or less in accordance with enlightened principle. The
colonial relationship promoted high growth rates in both colony and metropole.
However, Smith was equally clear that it would not be possible indefinitely to
prolong rapid growth under the present restrictions. Nor was it clear that such a
fundamental redirection of trade to a distant market was the best deployment of British
capital. In many ways, France was ironically Britain's ideal market. It was a
particularly unfortunate irony as colonial competition had led to several costly wars
concerning which Smith was acidly cynical. The cruel fact was that British imperial
183 Wealth ofNations, vol. II, p. 562.
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policy was not written with the interest of the nation as a whole in mind, it wholly served
the merchant interest. The cost of the Spanish and French war was 'in reality, a bounty
which has been given in order to support a monopoly.' Bloody and destructive wars
continued to be fought for a commercial interest improperly understood.
Smith argued that only two options existed regarding her colonies, effective
taxation or withdrawal. The Seven Years War had been fought on behalf of the entire
empire, and thus it was not contrary to justice for colonists to make a contribution to the
repayment of the British national debt. The best solution would be to incorporate
colonies within the existing domestic tax scheme and to establish the entire empire as a
free trade zone. The most striking aspect of Smith's proposals for union was the offer of
colonial representation at Westminster. Smith argued that if raising additional revenue
were to prove impossible, no option remained but to reduce expense, and the British state
had no greater expense than the defence of far-flung colonies. 'If any of the provinces of
the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire,
it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those
provinces in time of war, and of supporting any part of their civil or military
establishment in time of peace, and endeavour to accommodate her future views and
designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.' In a distinctly Humean passage,
Smith goaded his readers:
The rulers of Great Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people
with the imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the
Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in the imagination only.
It has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire. . . If the project
cannot be completed, it ought to be given up.186
m Ibid., vol. II, p. 256.
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Smith's recommendations have traditionally been described as Utopian and only semi-
serious, but can be seen in as forming part of a tradition of Scottish recommendations for
187
empire to be rethought in terms of confederated union. Of course, Smith would or
should have known that at the time of publishing neither London nor Philadelphia was
prepared to consider a British empire in terms of confederation, the former had no
188tradition of doing so, the latter had only just given up doing so.
Robertson incorporated these Smithian insights into his final valedictory book on
Spanish policy as best he could. Perhaps sensitive to earlier criticism that Smith resented
the historian's unaccredited borrowings from his lectures in the View, Robertson not only
copiously cited Wealth ofNations in the text of Book VIII, but also wrote to Smith
forewarning he was to do so. Ironically given the uncomfomfortably close relation with
Smith's text, an early review declared this book to be 'perhaps the most interesting to
readers' of the entire work. A recent synoptic overview of writing on Spanish policy of
the early modern period also considered it to be the only genuinely original section of
189Robertson's text. Robertson had always intended his critique of Spanish policy as the
interpretive heart of his work, even if he had not foreseen that critique as a dialogue with
Adam Smith. In the course of Robertson's researches, he had come to be increasingly
impressed by the intellectual quality and the lack of patriotic sentimentality in the inquiry
of the Spanish literati into the causes of the decline of Spanish empire and the possibility
of civic and commercial renewal. This new generation of intellectuals lamented what
they perceived as the anachronistically militarised nature of Spanish society, a pathology
187 Ned Landsman, 'The legacy of British Union,' pp. 301-311.
188 J. G. A. Pocock, 'Empire, State and Confederation: The War of American Independence as a Crisis in
Multiple Monarchy' in Robertson (ed), A Union for Empire, pp. 341-345.
189 D. A. Brading, The First America: the Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State,
(Cambridge, 1991), p. 440.
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they attributed to the legacy of conquest. While recent scholarship has tended to
emphasise the economically tentative and neo-Colbertian nature of this reform
movement, essentially interested in increasing the efficiency of silver extraction and only
to a secondary degree interested in liberalising trade, what was most impressive to
Robertson was that these reforms enjoyed the enthusiastic endorsement of King Charles
III.190 The most eminent of these was the antiquarian and political economist, Don
Pedro Rodriguez Campomanes, sometime minister of state and director of the Royal
Historical Society of Madrid. In his Discurso sobre el Fomento de la Industria Popular
(1774), probably his best known work, Campomanes called for a thorough reform of
Spain's agrarian economy. Yet in his earlier Reflexiones sobre el Comercio Espanol a
Indias, Compomanes had argued that, alone of the European empires, Spain had
improved the indigenous peoples to the point where they became economically
productive. He was a Spanish 'ancient constitutionalist', who argued that since the
strategically disadvantageous link with the eastern branch of the Habsburgs had ended,
Spain could now begin the difficult path of reform and renewal. Campomanes believed
that the best path to achieve this end was the emulation of British practice, namely by
granting legislative autonomy to New Spain for the purpose of rendering it economically
competitive. Drawing from Hume, Campomanes understood that the very weakness of
the Spanish economy could prove the basis to effectively undercut the exports of richer
countries.191 Additionally, in the Spaniard's wish to reconceive Spain and her empire as
190 A. Pagden, Lords ofAll the World, p. 67.
191 C. Jago The 18th Century Economic Analysis of the Decline of Spain' in P. Fritz and D. Williams
(eds.), The Triumph ofCulture: 18,h Century Perspectives, (Toronto, 1972), p. 346. For the background
to Hume's thinking on the potential competitiveness of poor economies see I. Hont 'The Rich Country,
Poor Country Debate' in I. Hont and M. Ignattiev (eds.) Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping ofPolitical
Economy in the Scottish Englightenment, (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 271-315.
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an imperial union, Campomanes' reform programme demonstrated that the cutting edge
192of Spanish and Scottish imperial thinking was proceeding in tandem. Campomanes
proved a helpful research assistant for Robertson, and the two developed a friendly
correspondence. Robertson's Book VIII owed its greatest debt to these authors of the
Spanish Enlightenment.
The notion of Robertson as cribbing from Smith in his analysis of colonial policy
was also unfair in that Book VIII only addressed more systematically themes Robertson
had pursued all along. Robertson had first addressed the issue of Spanish culpability for
the shocking decline of population among the indigenous inhabitants in his narration of
the aftermath of conquest. While over the course of the narrative Robertson seemed to
sympathise with those governors who found their administrations thwarted by ministers
in Madrid, now he squarely placed blame on the policy of those same over-powerful
viceroys and governors. Robertson rejected the notion that either the Spanish crown or
the Spanish church had any role to play in this demographic disaster. Specifically,
Robertson did not hold the Spanish crown responsible for the excesses involved in
extracting labour from the native population. The Spanish crown had enacted prudent
legislation towards the protection of the Indians; it was hardly its fault if those laws were
1
badly enforced or largely ignored by those less admirable. This was a reasonably
America, vol. Ill, pp. 121-123.
193 'In those regulations of the Spanish monarchs, we discover no traces of that cruel system of
extermination, which they have been charged with adopting; and if we admit, that the necessity of
securing subsistence for their colonies, or the advantages derived from working the mines, give them a
right to avail themselves of the labour of the Indians, we must allow, that the attention with which they
regulate and recompense that labour, is provident and sagacious. In no code of laws is greater
solicitude displayed, or precautions multiplied with more prudent concern for the preservation, the
security, and the happiness of the subject, than we discover in the collection of the Spanish laws for the
Indies. But those later regulations, like the more early edicts which have been already mentioned, have
too often proved ineffectual remedies against the evils which they were intended to prevent. In every
age, if the same causes continue to operate, the same effects must follow. From the immense distance
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forthright rejection of the core of the black legend of Spanish history, that genocide and
Inquisition alike were the wicked design of popish bigots. However, in buttressing the
good intentions of the Spanish crown against the more inflammatory accusations of
protestant rhetoric, Robertson placed himself, for good or ill, in a historiographically
antagonistic relationship to a Creole scholarship that took a more dim view of Spanish
policy. For the historian, incidental abuses of the Indians, however grievous, were
fundamentally the actions of simply a few too many bad apples. Robertson was keen to
point out that such abuses were far from universal. Robertson went further still,
emphasising that such Creole complaints were not borne out by their own testimony.
'According to the accounts, even of those authors who are most disposed to exaggerate
the sufferings of the Indians,' Robertson wrote, 'they, in several provinces, enjoy not
only ease, but affluence; they possess large farms; they are masters of numerous herds
and flocks; and, by the knowledge which they have acquired of European arts and
industry, are supplied not only with the necessaries, but with many luxuries of life.'194
Creole complaints, in essence, were fundamentally ungrateful. Clavijero, the Creole
historian, would come to the conclusion as a result of this that the Scottish historian was
rather indecently eager to forgive and forget. From a Creole perspective, Clavijero's was
an entirely intelligible response. Robertson did come close to hinting at doubts that their
historiography had much merit as impartial history. No doubt Robertson would have
between the power entrusted with the execution of laws, and that by whose authority they are enacted,
the vigour even of the most absolute government must relax, and the dread of a superior, too remote to
observe with accuracy, or to punish with dispatch, must insensibly abate. Notwithstanding the
numerous injunctions of the Spanish monarchs, the Indians still suffer on many occasions, both from
the avarice of individuals, and from the exactions of the magistrates, who ought to have protected them;
unreasonable tasks are imposed; the term of their labour is prolonged beyond the period fixed by law,
and they groan under many of the insults and wrongs which are the lot of a dependent people.' Ibid.,
vol. Ill, p. 288.
194 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 289.
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considered his own more metropolitan sympathies more philosophical; it was only the
mark of prudent governance to treat a people in accordance with their level of
development.
This was not to say that Robertson found nothing to criticise in policy directed
from Madrid. Indeed, the present state of the Creole character was at root the fault of
Spanish policy. The crown would never have suffered colonial administrators to pursue
the policies they did had it not understood those policies to accord with its own interest.
The root was a misunderstanding of the true principles of commerce. The Spanish crown
had foolishly accorded too great a strategic importance to the acquisition of gold. The
effect ofmonopoly was to reinforce the Creole system of land tenure that kept the
Spanish colonies in a state of dependence and pupilage. The creation of great estates, the
encomienda system, had the effect of revivifying and consolidating the most pernicious
aspects of the feudal system at precisely the time such regulations were being relaxed and
reformed throughout Western Europe.195 The effect of this was that present day Creoles
suffered from the sort of lethargy that Europe suffered while under the feudal yoke.
Though some of the Creolian race are descended from the conquerors of the New
World; though others can trace up their pedigree to the noblest families in Spain;
though many are possessed of ample fortunes, yet, by the enervating influence of a
sultry climate, by the rigour of a jealous government, and by their despair of attaining
that distinction to which mankind naturally aspire, the vigour of their minds is so
entirely broken, that a great part of them waste life in luxurious indulgencies, mingled
195
'The mode in which property was distributed in the Spanish colonies, and the regulations established
with respect to the transmission of it, whether by descent or by sale, were extremely unfavourable to
population. In order to promote a rapid increase of people in any new settlement, property in land
ought to be divided into small shares, and the alienation of it should be rendered extremely easy. [Dr.
Smith's Inquiry, ii.l 16] But the rapaciousness of the Spanish conquerors of the new World paid no
regard to this fundamental maxim of policy; and, as they possessed power, which enabled them to
gratify the utmost extravagance of their wishes, many seized districts of great extent, and held them as
encomiendas. By degrees they obtained the privilege of converting a part of these into Mayorasgos, a
species of fief, introduced into the Spanish system of feudal jurisprudence, which can neither be divided
or alienated. Thus a great portion of landed property, under this rigid form of entail, is withheld from
circulation, and descends from father to son unimproved, and of little value to the proprietor or to the
community.' Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 274.
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with an illiberal superstition still more baffling. Languid and unenterprising, the
operations of an active extended commerce would be to them so cumbersome and
oppressive, that in almost every part of America they decline engaging in it. The
interior traffic of every colony, as well as any trade which is permitted with the
neighbouring provinces, and with Spain itself, are carried on by the Chapetones,
who, as the recompense of their industry, amass immense wealth, while the Creoles,
sunk in sloth, are satisfied with the revenues of their paternal estates.196
Robertson took this bit of vitriol relatively straight from Antonio de Ulloa, whose
strictures on the savage the historian had also adopted without substantial alteration.
European cosmopolitanism came into its own most fully in its acceptance of the principle
that the enemy ofmy enemy is my enemy too.
Having redeemed the Spanish crown, Robertson proceeded to redeem the Spanish
church. The most salient and surprising feature of the Spanish church in the Americas
was that it developed upon thoroughly erastian principles that any Moderate could
celebrate. The American church may well have appeared full of Romish pomp, but it
was certainly no vessel for Roman policy. This was not to suggest that the imposition of
popery on a new continent was free of pernicious effect. It was difficult to think of a set
of manners less conducive to the propagation of native industry than the monastic way of
life.
The early institution of monasteries in the Spanish colonies, and the inconsiderate
zeal in multiplying them, have been attended with consequences more fatal. In
every new settlement, the first object should be to encourage population, and to
incite every citizen to contribute towards augmenting the number and strength of the
community. During the youth and vigour of society, while there is room to spread,
and sustenance is procured with facility, mankind increase with amazing rapidity.
But the Spaniards had hardly taken possession of America, when, with a most
preposterous policy, they began to erect convents, where persons of both sexes were
shut up, under a vow to defeat the purpose of nature, and to counteract the first of
her laws. Influenced by a misguided piety, which ascribes transcendent merit to a
state of celibacy, or allured by the prospect of that listless ease, which, in sultry
climates, is deemed supreme felicity, numbers crowded into those mansions of sloth
and superstition, and are lost to society.197
176 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 278.
197 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 292.
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Ironically, American monasteries had produced the most literate members of the clergy.
Robertson further worried that the American clergy, though provided with every
opportunity, had not yet cultivated literature or science. It would seem the sort of clerical
Enlightenment Robertson understood was some time off. The retrograde development of
the American clergy had an unfortunate effect upon missionary activity. Monastic
missionaries, trained in scholastic sophistries rather than the languages of the natives,
rationalised that only the scantest interest in conversion constituted a genuine conversion
of the soul. As a result the Indians never properly understood the tenets of revelation,
mixing it with their prior understandings, and given, the slightest opportunity, would
relapse into idolatry. Yet, as Robertson's previous digressions concerning the nature of
the savage mind would indicate, even if Spanish missionaries had gone about their task
with due prudence, they would have been unlikely to enjoy success. The minds of
hunters were unprepared to entertain abstract notions, and thus 'the sublime and spiritual
198doctrines of Christianity must be, in a great measure, incomprehensible.'
While Robertson was eager to pardon both crown and church for war crimes
committed in the New World, the bulk of his review of Spanish imperial policy and
institutions was taken up with a discussion of the misguided and crippling commercial
policy that the Spanish crown bequeathed to Europe. The beginnings of Spanish empire
were coterminous with jealousy of trade.
The first object of the Spanish monarchs was to secure the productions of the colonies
to the parent state, by an absolute prohibition of any intercourse with foreign nations. .. .
This spirit of jealousy and exclusion, which at first was natural, and perhaps necessary,
augmented as their possessions in America extended, and the value of them came to be
more fully understood. In consequence of it, a system of colonizing was introduced,
to which there had hitherto been nothing similar among mankind.
198 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 301.
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Robertson's history of colonial policy, and his attempt to show the uniqueness of the
early modern achievement, owed a debt to Smith's discussion in Book IV of his Wealth
ofNations. Smith had contrasted modern from ancient colonies on the grounds that the
latter were pursued out of necessity, whereas the former had more opaque motivations.199
In Robertson's discussion, colonies in the ancient world followed either the Greek model,
the products of migrations that soon became independent, or the Roman model of
military garrisons. The Spanish model seemed to combine both. That Spain's new
colonies lay in the tropics, and produced goods distinct from that of the home market,
was central to their success. The American economy was entirely geared to the needs of
the metropole; production of goods Spain herself could provide was expressly forbidden.
During the first century of colonisation, this did not prove a problem, as Spain could
easily provide the needs of the fledgling American market. As the Spanish economy
collapsed at the end of the sixteenth century, it became increasingly self-defeating that
her colonies were disallowed trade with the other states of Europe or even with each
other. New Spain was perfectly capable of providing the material goods necessary to
keep the Spanish economy afloat and her people prosperous, but was not allowed to
compete with domestic production. Spanish colonies never achieved the economic
growth of which they were capable. 'Thus the colonies are kept in a state of perpetual
pupilage;' Robertson lamented, 'and by the introduction of this commercial dependence,
a refinement in policy of which Spain set the first example to the European nations, the
supremacy of the parent state hath been maintained over remote colonies during two
centuries and a half.'200
199 Karen O' Brien Narratives ofEnlightenment, p. 154.
200 America, vol. Ill, p. 273.
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Robertson held to the view that liberty could only be maintained in an empire of limited
extent, which was a key reason why he was such a warm supporter of the 1763 peace.
The dialectic of lust for gold abroad and jealousy of trade at home had transformed what
201should have been an empire for preservation into an empire of expansion."
As Robertson's narrative had shown, the classic problem of imperial overstretch
was not brought about by lust for territory, but by lust for gold. This lust for gold was a
key foundation for the set of attitudes Hume had described as 'Jealousy of trade', namely
that the metal itself was the foundation of wealth. Gold became the idol of new form of
superstition. 'The charms of this pursuit, like the rage for deep play, are so bewitching,
and take such full possession of the mind, as even to give a new bent to the natural
temper. Under its influence, the cautious become enterprising, and the covetous
202
profuse.' Echoing the classic moral parallel between the state and the individual,
Robertson remarked:
The same thing happens to nations as to individuals. Wealth, which flows in gradually,
and with moderate increase, feeds and nourishes that activity which is friendly to commerce,
and calls it forth into vigorous and well-conducted exertions; but when opulence pours in
suddenly, and with too full a stream, it overturns all sober plans of industry, and brings along
with it a taste for what is wild and extravagant, and daring in business or in action. Such was
the great and sudden augmentation of power and revenue, that the possession of America
brought into Spain, and some symptoms of its pernicious influence upon the political
201 'If the dominions of Spain in the New World had been of such moderate extent, as bore a due
proportion to the parent state, the progress of her colonizing might have been attended with the same
benefit as that of other nations. But when, in less than half a century, her inconsiderate rapacity had
seized on countries larger than all Europe, her inability to fill such vast regions with a number of
inhabitants sufficient for the cultivation of them, was so obvious, as to give a wrong direction to all the
efforts of the colonists. They did not form compact settlements, where industry, circumscribed within
proper limits, both in its views and operations, is conducted with that sober persevering spirit, which
gradually converts whatever is in its possession to a proper use, and derives thence the greatest
advantage. Instead of this, the Spaniards, seduced by the boundless prospect which opened to them,
divided their possessions in America into governments of great extent. As their number was too small
to attempt the regular culture of the immense provinces, which they occupied rather than peopled, they
bent their attention to a few objects, that allured them with hopes of sudden and exorbitant gain, and
turned away with contempt from the humbler paths of industry, which lead more slowly, but with
greater certainty, to wealth and increase of national strength.' Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 303.
202 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 307.
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operations of that monarchy soon began to appear.203
The arrogance and belligerence that characterised the foreign policy of Philip II could
thus be seen as the logical extension of commercial policy. Over-rapid economic growth
thus went to the head of the Spanish body politic. However, if the influx of species into
Spain had an adverse effect on her political development, Spanish economic policy had
an even more startling effect on the population of the Americas. The relationship had
become mutually disadvantageous. The dreary irony was that while a growing sociability
among the states of Europe produced a balanced state system that gave needed stability to
commerce, that very progressive development led to the establishment of colonies
established upon principles that rendered those settlements isolated, backward, and
corrupt. Jealousy of trade had brought about the alarming development that, in colonial
terms, commerce was the primary impediment to improvement. Robertson was not
peddling black legend; the logic of his argument extended North as it did South of the
Gulf of Mexico. The English, the French, the Danes, have imitated their example with
respect to East Indian commerce; and the two former have laid a similar restraint upon
some branches of their trade with the New World. The wit of man cannot, perhaps,
devise a method for checking the progress of industry and population in a new colony
more effectual than this.'204
Robertson's hopeful wish was that throughout Europe philosophy had begun to
correct errors in commercial understanding first brought about through jealous reason of
state. In Robertson's view, Spain was no longer an intellectual backwater. The ground
203 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 314.
204 Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 320.
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for an enlightened commercial policy had been prepared by enlightened monarchy, such
as the Bourbons, all of whom for Robertson had been 'beneficent princes'.
The spirit of philosophical inquiry, which it is the glory of the present age to have
turned from frivolous or abstruse speculations, to the business and affairs of men,
has extended its influence beyond the Pyrenees. In researches of ingenious authors,
concerning the police or commerce of nations, the errors and defects of the Spanish
system with respect to both met every eye, and have not only been exposed with
severity, but are held up as a warning to other states.205
Robertson had in mind not only his helpful correspondent Campomanes, but also such
authors as Antonio de Ulloa, whose testimony on the nature of the savage and of Spanish
policy he leaned on so heavily. By the time of the text's composition, Charles III had
been well under way in launching a series of root and branch reforms of colonial practice,
the bulk of which enlightened Europe was keen to approve. Particularly, Charles had a
decade earlier opened up Spanish possessions in the West Indies to trade with Spain
herself. Robertson was particularly happy to emphasise that a new generation of Spanish
magistrates had addressed themselves to 'revive a spirit of industry among their subjects'
so as at long last to satisfy American demand, rendering the colonial relationship
tenable.206
While Robertson was eager to present Spanish policy as encouragingly moving
towards an enlightened policy, he was under no misapprehension concerning the
difficulty of the task at hand. Even the most enlightened of legislator could face no
challenge more daunting than the renovation of a corrupt system. Thus, we return to
Robertson's harshly realistic assessment of the present state of the Spanish empire.
A spirit of corruption has infected all the colonies of Spain in America.
Men far removed from the seat of government; impatient to acquire wealth,
205 Ibid. vol. Ill, p. 337.
205 Ibid. vol. Ill, p. 348.
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that they may return speeetlily home from what they are apt to consider as a
state of exhile in a remote unhealthful country; allured by opportunities too
tempting to he resisted, and seduced by the example of those around them;
find their sentiments of honour and of duty gradually relax. In private life, they
give themselves up to a dissolute luxury, while in their public conduct they become
unmindful of what they owe to their sovereign and to their country.207
It is difficult to avoid the impression that Robertson was making a more general point
about the duties of colonial patriotism. If it was a sentiment scarcely likely to win the
approbation of a Creole readership, it was altogether more likely to win the ascent of an
enlightened, patriotic Spaniard. It was not the most triumphal of valedictories, but it was
enough to receive on 8 August 1777 the honorarium of Historiographer Royal of Madrid,
in gratitude from the Spanish intelligentsia for his dissemination of the knowledge of
Spanish history. The title was awarded following the public reading of a few chapters
translated into Spanish by Don Ramon de Guevara Vasconcelos. If Robertson was
ultimately unable to bring about the reconciliation of states, he made no small
contribution to the reconciliation of scholarly communities. As a moving testament to
this, Campomanes was soon to write Robertson a warm and respectful letter thanking him
on behalf of all men of moderation for his 'singularly humane and benevolent' conduct
on behalf of the Catholics of Scotland. The Spanish Academy commissioned for The
History ofAmerica to be translated into Spanish, yet this attempt at rapprochement was to
fare no better than Robertson's attempt to ease passage of Catholic relief. In November
of the next year, a member of the Academy, Jose de Galvez sent Campomanes a critical
2U/
Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 352
208 'Your laudable conduct in these critical circumstances will procure you the greatest credit and esteem in
the opinion of all men of moderation, probity, and discernment; being highly characteristical of that
temperate and mild philosophy which has distinguished wise men in the most enlightened ages... The
Academy, which knows how to appreciate the valuable qualities of the heart, as well as extraordinary
talents and learning, charges me to convey to you these sentiments; and it doubts not, but from a
conviction of what importance to the prosperity of a state, must be a religious peace and concord
between the subjects of a common sovereign, you will continue to extend your protection to the
Catholics of Scotland.' Op. cit. in D. Stuart, 'Life of Robertson', in Miscellaneous Works, p. 239.
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dissertation on the accuracy of some of Robertson's accusations against the
Conquistadors and recommended the Academy reopen debate on the work with the
intention to 'vidicar la verdad de la Historia, el honor de la nacion. la justicia de la
conquista y del gobierno y la reputacion de los conquistatores.'209 The Spanish crown,
which did not wish the details of colonial policy broadcast too widely among their own
citizens, swiftly aborted the translation. It was no small irony that the translation of a
work that sought to celebrate the reforms of an improving government, no less than his
210
support for religious toleration, had been thwarted for jealous reasons of state.
The preceding chapter has discussed the centrality of war to Robertson's narrative
of the rise of empire. It suggested that the dialectic of war and commerce had profoundly
informed imperial discourse throughout the eighteenth century, and that it was a central
theme of enlightened thought that this dialectic was based upon a flawed and profoundly
dangerous understanding of commerce. Robertson conceived his narrative at the time of
the Seven Years War and abandoned it as a result of the civil war resultant from its
aftermath. These wars were inspired by jealousy of trade, a fact reflected on nearly every
page of Robertson's text. The Spanish had understood wealth as gold, and had sallied
forth to the Americas to hoard as much of it as they could. Their lust had become a sort
of superstitious veneration, one that drove them to reduce the Indians to slavery so as to
obtain it with greater speed, and to understand the Indian as subhuman so as to rationalise
their crimes. The result was war between the Spanish and the Indians, and it had been
above all in the Indian conduct of war that Robertson's narrative had become unstuck.
209
Op. cit. in G. Anes and A. de Castrillon 'Don Pedro Rodriguez Campomanes, Director de Real
Academia de la Historia' in idem, Campomanes en su II Centario, p. 373.
210 D. Stuart, 'Life of Robertson,' p. 159; R. A. Humphreys 'William Robertson and His History of
America', pp. 26-27.
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The Indian did not conform to the norms of European war, and the explanation of its
savagery and its futility against the more improved Spanish could not be rendered
intelligible by humanist forms of narration. This drove Robertson to commence a
remarkable performance of historical jurisprudence in order to drive home one central
fact, the savage fought as he hunted. The conquests of Mexico and Peru only rendered
the theme of Spanish corruption in the face of overwhelming temptation the more stark
and horrible. It was a profound test of faith to understand all of this as the working of
Providence. Yet this was precisely what Robertson wished his reader to understand. The
discovery of America had been an inspiring chapter in the history of European
achievement and a remarkable proof of the progress of the human mind. Improvement in
knowledge and policy had now spread to Spain and held out the prospect for a
reformation of Spanish empire. The Providential path had clearly been strewn with
obstacles, but that was not in itself grounds for despair.
340
Conclusion
Robertson's public articulation of his views on the progress of international order was
frustratingly tentative and incomplete. This was not because his views were hazy or
undeveloped; the historian never felt able to write the comparative history of empires that
would have rendered his metanarrative more explicit. Nonetheless, a few tentative
suggestions can now be made. Taking Charles V and America together, it is possible to
describe a dynamic of outward spiralling 'state systems' that promised to embrace the
entire globe. This process happened twice in human history, the one climaxed in the
empire of Rome, and while the other had yet to come, it promised to take shape in the
form of global expansion of the European state system in the form of cooperative
commercial empires united under free trade. These empires had come into being through
brutal conquest, but that brutality had ceased after conquered territories had been
assimilated and the benefits of improvement could be enjoyed. Robertson understood
this to be as true of Spanish as it had been of Roman Empire. These empires, in the
fullness of time, would civilise the scattered peoples of the world to the point of readiness
for the Gospel. The first world empire helped prepare the world for Christ's first
appearance, the second imperial system held profound possibilities for the speculative
theologian. The telling of this process in its entirety would constitute a truly universal
history. Robertson realised to his chagrin he would not live long enough to witness the
events that would constitute such a history, but he could rest satisfied for having told a
key part of it, as well as for mapping out the principles upon which it could eventually be
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